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This thesis examines the role that the motif of divine abandonment played in 
the exegetical and ascetical literature of late antiquity. Divine abandonment of the 
soul was an integral part of the spiritual life. Its "normativeness" was related to the 
notion of divine paideia: God instructed the soul by abandoning the soul to ethical 
trials. This paideia had eschatological implications: divine abandonment highlighted 
the eschatological orientation of the Christian faith. Divine abandonment of Christ, 
however, is treated in Christological, rather than ascetical, terms. The experience of 
abandonment by the ascetics was not based on a "Christ-like" ethical model: Christ's 
abandonment was only connected to the ascetical abandonment within the scope of 
divine providence. 
The first part introduces the Patristic exegesis on the Song of Songs. It shows 
that Patristic exegesis related divine abandonment of the soul to ethical trials and 
highlights the role of the motif as part of divine paideia that leads the soul to an 
eschatological ethical perfection. The second part discusses Christ's abandonment on 
the cross, which Patristic literature handled with a certain hesitancy, even 
uncertainty. The last part examines the ascetical tradition. The motif illustrated God's 
providential care for the ascetic soul where God remedied the soul's weakness and 
led her to the ethical fulfilment in the eschaton. This part also addresses the subtle 
way in which asceticalliterature envisaged Christ as a spiritual model. 
The conclusion that this thesis draws is that it is within the theological 
framework of divine paideia and eschatology that the Patristic literature understood 
the notion of divine abandonment. Furthermore, it suggests that it is in this 
framework of their common tradition that the Eastern and Western spiritual traditions 
might mutually approach and understand each other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reassertion of the normativeness of Godforsakenness also opens new horizons for 
exploring the relationship between the spiritual heritage of the East and that of the 
West. 1 
With these words, Nicholas Sakharov concluded his examination of the theme 
of divine abandonment in the thought of the Russian ascetic, Archimandrite 
Sophrony Sakharov. This was his theological proposal, an invitation to a creative 
dialogue in order to discern the common traditions underlying the spirituality of the 
East and the West. 2 The place of Sophrony Sakharov in modem Eastern spirituality 
meant that the centrality of the theme of divine abandonment for the ascetic soul in 
his thought inaugurated a new era of scholarly interest in the motif of divine 
abandonment as part of Christian spirituality. Most significantly, the term was felt to 
create a bridge between Eastern asceticism and Western spirituality. The presence of 
the motif in St. John of the Cross and Sophrony initiated a creative discussion about 
the place of the motif of God-forsakenness in the two ascetics. 
But this is not the only bridge that the motif of divine abandonment provides 
with modem thought. Most importantly, the theme of divine abandonment is felt to 
be based on a Christ-like model that has brought the ascetical soul closer to Christ. 
The experience of divine abandonment, in the case of Sophrony, expresses the 
intimate bond between Christ and the soul which, in Eastern theology according to 
Nicholas Sakharov, is established on the notion of the "hypostatic principle". 
1 N. Sakharov, The Theology of Archimandrite Sophrony (PhD Thesis: University of Oxford, 1999), 
255. [This introduction and the bibliography included in it follows the discussion of N. Sakharov 
because he has presented the most complete survey of the modem approach on divine abandonment]. 
2 See J. Danielou, Platonisme et theo/ogie mystique: Doctrine spirituelle de Saint Gregoire de Nysse, 
Theologie 2 (Aubier: Montaigne, 1944), 134. Alongside this positive approach that showed the 
parallel lines of thought in St. John of the Cross and the Patristic thought of late antiquity, Sakharov 
indicated a line of reasoning that firmly distinguished the Eastern from the Western spiritual tradition. 
See I. Hausherr, 'Les Orientaux connaissent-ils les 'nuits' de Saint Jean de Ia Croix?', in Hesychasme 
et Priere, Orientalia Christian Analecta 176 (Rome: Pont. lnstitutum Orientalium Studiorum 1966), 
87-128. V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology ofthe Eastern Church (Cambridge: James Clarke, 1991), 
197. H. C. Puech, 'La Tenebre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys l'Areopagite et dans Ia tradition 
patristique', in En Quete de Ia gnose: La gnose et /es temps et autres essais, vol. 1, Bibliotheque des 
sciences humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 53. M. Lot-Borodine, La Deification de I 'homme seton Ia 
doctrine des Peres grecs, Bibliotheque fficumenique 9 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1970), 86. A. Louth, 
"Patristic Mysticism and St. John of the Cross", in The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: 
From Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 179-190. 
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Nicholas Sakharov has presented the most complete review of modem 
bibliography with regard to the place of the motif in Eastern spirituality.3 The 
"normativeness" of the motif of divine abandonment has not been unanimously 
accepted. The main theological points that Sakharov places his discussion of divine 
forsakenness between two theological poles: i) the "Palamite" theological filter 
through which Eastern spirituality has been received by modem scholars; and ii) the 
theme of "person/hypostasis" that was developed in the middle of the last century. 
Although Nicholas Sakharov provides an interesting analysis of the Patristic 
foundations of the notion of divine abandonment, his main purpose was to develop 
the concept in the second of the two above-mentioned theological poles. In doing so, 
he placed the notion of abandonment in its contemporary framework. 
Sakharov argues that the theological pole represented by the 'Palamite filter' 
renders the motif of abandonment foreign to Eastern spirituality because of the 
notion of God's union with the soul through his divine energies. Lossky is cited as an 
exponent of this position, among others. According to Lossky, the immanent nature 
of the divine energies meant that God was always in intimate closeness to his 
creation. Thus, there could be no notion of divine abandonment: as it is in the case 
of the sun always radiating, so it was with God's energies. For Lossky, it was absurd 
to argue that God was withdrawing his grace: it was the human individual that was 
closing down to the divine energies due to the presence of sin.4 However, to 
understand divine abandonment in ethical terms in relation to the "Palamite" 
distinction between the transcendent divine nature and immanent divine energies is, 
in itself, to evoke a point that remains debatable. The true significance of Palamas' 
thought is still to be evaluated for its theological value beyond the historical 
controversy between PaJamas and Barlaam. I have placed the term "Palamite" in 
inverted commas in order to make this exact point that it is still quite disputed what 
Palamas did argue. It was the "Palamite" understanding of the ethical life that made 
3 Sakharov, 'Theological Assessment of the Mystical-Ascetic Experience of Godforsakeness and its 
Integration into the Framework of Eastern Theology through the Teaching of Persona', in The 
Theology of Archimandrite Sophrony, 217-255. 
4 Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church. Idem, The Vision of God, trans. A. 
Moorhouse (London: 1963). R. Williams, The Theology of Vladimir Nikolaevich Lossky: An 
Exposition and Critique (PhD Thesis: University of Oxford, 1975). E. Every, 'Nature and Grace in 
the Eastern Orthodox Tradition', EsChQ 8 ( 1949-1950), 21-28. B. Krivoshein, 'The Ascetic and 
Theological Teaching of Gregory PaJamas', EsChQ 3 (1938-1939), 26-33; 71-84; 138-156; 193-214. 
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Lossky reject the "normativeness" of divine abandonment and argue the non-Patristic 
foundations of St. John of the Cross (and, therefore, by implication of Fr Sophrony). 
The second pole of 'person/hypostasis' highlighted the "normativeness" of 
divine abandonment in the spiritual life in terms of the notion of "personhood" in 
modern Greek theology, or "hypostasis" in the Russian thought. 5 The development of 
the notion of "personhood/hypostasis" originated in the kenotic theology of the 191h 
century. This led to the notion that kenosis can be found within the Godhead itself, so 
that the traditional distinction between theo/ogia and oikonomia is more or less 
elided. Divine abandonment was introduced in terms of the "kenotic" estrangement 
of the divine persons: the generation and the procession of the Son and the Spirit, 
respectively, were understood in terms of the Father's acceptance of their 
"otherness". It was this notion of "otherness" in the intratrinitarian relations of the 
three divine persons that led Bulgakov, for instance, to view abandonment in terms 
of Christ's "separation" from the Holy Spirit.6 For Balthasar, who employed a 
kenotic theology not unlike Bulgakov's, in assuming the sin of humanity, Christ 
became "estranged" from the Father. 7 
The assimilation of theo/ogia and oikonomia provided a helpful context for an 
ontological understanding ofthe Christian spiritual experience. The "normativeness" 
of divine abandonment for the spiritual life was due to the "normativeness" of the 
motif in the life of Christ. The introduction of a "Christ-like" model for the spiritual 
experience filled the gap that the Patristic literature had left concerning a more 
ontological understanding of the relationship between Christ and the ascetics. 8 This 
is, in part, because the Patristic literature generally upheld a clear distinction between 
the theo/ogia and the oikonomia. Thus, the introduction of a "Christ-like" model is 
not easy to reconcile with the distance between the two theological moments, i.e. 
5 See Sakharov, 'Fr. Sophrony and 'Hypostatic Palamism", in The Theology of Archimandrite 
Sophrony, 221-224. G. Florovsky, 'St. Gregory PaJamas and the Tradition of the Fathers', Sobornost 
4, no. 4 (1961), 165-176. 
6 S. Bulgakov, Du Verbe incarne (Agnus Dei), trans. Constantin Andronikof (Paris: Aubier, 1943). 
Idem, The Comforter, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids M1: William B. Eerdmans, 2004). Balthasar, 
Theodrama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. IV, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco CA: 
Ignatius, 1994). Idem, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter, trans. A. Nichols (Edinburgh: 
T &T Clark, 1990). 
7 See Balthasar, Heart of the World, trans. E. S. Leiva (San Francisco CA: Ignatius, 1979). 
8 Lossky objected to the idea that Christ was an ethical model for the early ascetics. Lossky, Mystical 
Theology, 215. Hausherr challenged Lossky's position in I. Hausherr, 'L'Imitation de Jesus-Christ 
dans Ia spiritualite byzantine', in A. G. Martimort (ed.), Melanges offerts au R. P. Ferdinand 
Caval/era (Toulouse: Bibliotheque de I'Institut Catholique, 1948). 
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theologia and oikonomia, which implies a distinction between the life of the Logos in 
terms of the theologia and the life of the Logos in his oikonomia. 
Furthermore, although the stereotyped idea of an "existential" West and a 
"personalistic" East seems to have retreated somewhat at a theoretical level, in 
practice it remains an important point in the separation and misunderstanding 
between the theologies of the East and the West.9 In his discussion of the 'dark 
nights', Hausherr had highlighted the different approaches in St. John of the Cross 
and the Patristic literature of late antiquity and the Byzantine period and related them 
to the notion of divine abandonment, Nicholas Sakharov employed the notion of 
"personhood" to distinguish between the teaching of St. John and that of the Eastern 
ascetics. 
These are the main lines of thought with regard to the "normativeness" of the 
motif of divine abandonment in modem Orthodox theology. What this thesis 
proposes to do is to provide an examination of the degree to which the Patristic 
literature saw divine abandonment as a spiritual norm. In doing this, the thesis is 
working on two levels: 
i) It shows that the Patristic literature of late antiquity established the 
"normativeness" of divine abandonment in the spiritual life in terms of divine 
paideia: in all stages of her spiritual life, the ascetical soul remained subject to divine 
providence which was understood in terms of God's instructing the soul. This 
paideia was also related to the eschatological message of the Christian faith: divine 
abandonment introduced the soul to the distinction between the spiritual progress in 
this present life and the final ethical completion in the life to come. 
ii) It addresses the degree to which Christ's abandonment on the cross was 
understood as a "Christ-like" model of spiritual experience. It questions whether 
Patristic literature was capable of making any connection between Christ's 
abandonment on the cross and the abandonment of the ascetical soul. This is related 
to understanding what the Patristic sources actually made of the notion of the 
"imitation" of Christ. Characteristically, the linking bond between Christ's 
9 See D. B. Hart, 'The Mirror of the Infinite: Gregory of Nyssa on the Vestigia Trinitatis', in S. 
Coakley (ed.), Re-thinking Gregory of Nyssa (London: Blackwell, 2003), 111-131. See the 
introductory chapter in C. Gunton and C. Schwtlbel (eds), Persons: Divine and Human: King's 
College Essays in Theological Anthropology (Edinburgh: Clark, 1991 ). I. Devtic, Der Personalismus 
bei Nikolaj A. Berdjaew: Versuch einer Philosophie des Konkreten (Rome: Pontificia Universitas 
Gregoriana, 1981). K. Ware, 'The Human Person as an Icon ofthe Trinity', Sobornost 8, no 2 (1986), 
6-23. 
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abandonment and the ascetical abandonment was the notion of "divine consent" that 
instructs and leads to salvation. 
Thus, the main purpose of this thesis is to show that, for Patristic literature, the 
"normativeness" of divine abandonment derived from the Patristic notion of the 
divine providence (pronoia) that instructed the soul, and led the latter to her ethical 
completion. 
The thesis is structured in three parts that address independent areas of thought 
in Patristic literature, namely: exegesis, Christology and asceticism. But this structure 
is meant to address the potential interactions between the three areas of theological 
deliberation. 
The first part examines the notion of divine abandonment in Patristic exegesis 
of the Song of Songs. It starts with an historical account concerning the character of 
this book and discusses why, despite its debatable presence in the Canon and its de 
facto exclusion from the liturgical life of the Church, it still attracted the attention of 
the Patristic exegetes. This part presents the biblical foundation of the notion of 
divine abandonment as a spiritual norm and addresses the relation between 
abandonment and sin. The main discussion in this part is dedicated to the exegetical 
works of Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Nilus of Ancyra, 
which are examined with respect to the motif of divine abandonment. It aims to show 
that, despite their individual approaches, these exegetes saw divine abandonment as 
an integral part of the spiritual life. This part provides the "theoretical" background 
against which the Fathers addressed the idea of divine abandonment. It also 
highlights the shift that the introduction of more systematic "ascetical ideals" brought 
to Patristic exegesis. As a result of this shift, "theoretical" deliberation encountered 
the "practical" application of what divine abandonment might mean for the Christian 
spiritual life. 
ii) The second part focuses on the Patristic interpretation on Mt. 27:46, i.e. 
Christ's abandonment on the cross. First of all, this part examines Elliott's 
hypothesis that the fate of the exegetical interest on the Song of Songs was bound to 
the Christological debates of late antiquity. 10 In arguing against this hypothesis, we 
anticipate the explanation that Christ's abandonment on the cross was not 
immediately linked to the abandonment of the ascetical soul at either a theoretical 
10 M. Elliott, Christology in the Song of Songs in Early Church 381-451, Studien und Texte zu Antike 
und Christentum 7 (TUbingen: M. Siebeck, 2000). 
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(exegetical) or practical (ascetical-spiritual) level. The subsequent discussion 
involving a thorough analysis of the Patristic sources that interpreted Christ's 
abandonment on the cross aims to explain the Patristic unwillingness to provide 
insights to the exact mechanism of his abandonment. It addresses with scepticism 
Jouassard's position that, after Origen, Patristic literature faced the danger of 
understanding Christ's abandonment as an act of pretence that did not involve Christ 
personally. As opposed to Jouassard's conclusions, we demonstrate that Patristic 
literature addressed Christ's abandonment in a twofold way i) in terms of separation, 
but without ever exemplifying the subject and the object of this separation; and ii) as 
a faithful prayer. Thus, the second part addresses the uncertainty with which Patristic 
literature approached Christ's abandonment due to i) the connection between 
abandonment and sin in a Christo logical context; and ii) the unique identity of Christ. 
Thus, it anticipates the discussion in the third part concerning the degree to which 
Patristic literature could have formed a firm notion of "imitating" Christ and also 
point to a "Christ-like" model of divine abandonment. 
Both points are discussed in the final part of the thesis. Before that, we bring 
out some further insights into Origen' s ethical thought in order to show the centrality 
that divine abandonment played in his thought. Then we address the case of 
Athanasius' Vita Antonii and Antony's Letters in order to illustrate the two 
theological stands that shaped the ascetical literature of late antiquity. The next 
chapter addresses the ascetical literature per se. It shows the main lines of reasoning 
that permeate ascetical discourse concerning abandonment and revisits the position 
that the asceticalliterature had discerned two "kinds" of abandonment. We move to 
discuss the notion of perfection in the light of divine abandonment and thus highlight 
the motif of divine abandonment as a spiritual norm in the ethical life. Finally, the 
third part concludes by seeking to shed some more light on the notion of the 
"imitation of Christ" for the ascetics. It shows that it was actually the notion of 
ascetic "humility" that provided the most fruitful grounds for connecting Christ's 
kenosis with the ascetical practice of progressively withdrawing from the society and 
even the self. 
Finally, we summarise and conclude our discussion concerning the degree to 
which divine abandonment was a spiritual norm in the theological Patristic thought 
of late antiquity. In doing so, we show the common Patristic grounds in which 
18 
Eastern and Western tradition could understand the Christian ethical life as part of 
God's paideia. 
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PARTl 
1. The Song of Songs and the Patristic commentators. 
The book of the Song of Songs has witnessed an adventurous journey from its 
compilation to its inclusion in the biblical canon for both Jews and Christians. 1 Its 
status as a canonical book -not to mention divinely inspired- had been put under 
criticism. It is only after the third-fourth century A.D. that a place among the other 
canonical books of the Old Testament was granted to it.2 The history of interpreting 
the book is closely related to rabbinic disputes about its value and also to the 
interaction between rabbis and Christians with regard to the compilation of the 
Hebrew and Christian canons in late antiquity. 3 Its imagery is picturesque, quite 
sensual, and this fact became the stumbling block for rendering any religious value to 
its literal content. However, it was felt that the book invited an allegorical reading. In 
viewing the Song as an allegory of spiritual mysteries, the rabbinic tradition 
established its spiritual nature and also, illustrated its conformity with the rest of the 
Hebrew canon. However, Cohen has taken a step back by questioning the reason that 
1 For an introduction to the author, date and setting of the Song of Songs see R. S. Hess, Song of 
Songs, Baker Commentary on the Old Testament (Grand Rapids MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 17-22. 
For its status among the Hebrew and Christian biblical canon see Lee M. McDonald, The Biblical 
Canon: Its Origin, Transmission, and Authority (Massachusetts MA: Hendrickson, 2007). S. Z. 
Leiman, The Canonization of Hebrew Scripture: The Talmudic and Midrashic Evidence (Hamden CT: 
Archon, 1976). E. E. Ellis, The Old Testament in Early Christianity: Canon and Interpretation in the 
Light of Modern Research, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 54 (Tubingen: 
J. C. B. Mohr, 1991). See The Midrash Rabbah: Esther and Song of Songs, vol. 9, trans. M. Simon 
(London: Soncino, 1951), 18 (footnote no. 5) [hereafter, The Midrash]. 
2 Even after that date, its perception from Christian authors remained equivocal, as the case of 
Theodore of Mopsuestia suggests. Cohen and Gilbert argued that after the council of Jamnia (c. A.D. 
90) the Song of Songs enjoyed a canonical status. See G. D. Cohen, 'The Song of Songs and the 
Jewish Religious Meantality', inS. Z. Leiman (ed.), The Canon and Masorah of the Hebrew Bible: An 
Introductory Reader (New York NY: KTAV, 1974), 262. S. L. Gilbert, The Targum of the Song of 
Songs: A Study in Rabbinic Biblical Interpretation (PhD Thesis: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
1977), 4-5. However, pace Leiman, McDonald has doubted the significance of Jamnia for the 
completion of the Hebrew canon, indicating that "the list of books acknowledged to be sacred 
continued to vary within Judaism up through the fourth century C.E". McDonald, 'Myth of the 
Council of Jarnnia', in The Biblical Canon, 173. J.P. Lewis, 'Jamnia Revisited' in L. M. McDonald 
and J. A. Sanders (eds.), The Canon Debate (Peabody MA: Hendrickson, 2002), 146-192. The work 
was included to the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Canon (c. 200 B.C). The first Christian 
witness to the book as part of the Old Testament Canon came from Melito of Sardis (c. A.D. 170). See 
Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, 4.26.12-14. See McDonald, 'Myth', 200-201. Also: A. W. Astell, 
The Song of Songs in the Middle Ages (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 1 [footnote no. 1 ]. 
R. Beckwith, The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church and its Background in Early 
Judaism (Grand Rapids MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 1985). 
3 For the various exegetical tools of interpretation in the rabbinic, early Patristic and modem times see 
S. 0. Fawzi, 'Major Views of Interpretation of the Song', in The Mystical Interpretation of the Song of 
Songs in the Light of Ancient Jewish Mysticism (PhD Thesis: University of Durham, 1994), 6-36. 
Gilbert, The Targum, 1-20. Hess, 'History oflnterpretation', in Song of Songs, 22-28. 
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someone would have expressed any interest in interpreting it, notwithstanding its 
sensual imagery: 
The problem is, really, why anyone should have thought of treating the work as an 
allegory in the first place. There must have been works aplenty that were excluded 
from the canon and that were not interpreted. One must, therefore, ask why the 
scales were tipped in favour of this particular poem that was a priori so religiously 
questionable. 4 
What Cohen has presented is the fact that various other works were felt to lack a 
religious content and thus remained unexploited theologically. However, the Song of 
Songs -a work of no particular religious significance in its content- was revisited in 
order to illustrate its significance as a religious work of spiritual value. Thus, Cohen 
put under question the mere affirmation that the allegorical interpretation was 
employed as part of justifying its canonical status. Why was the Song of Songs the 
only puzzling work that attracted the attention of exegetes such as Rabbi Akiba and 
Origen? 
Cohen provided a satisfactory answer which indicated the fact that the content 
of the Song of Songs was felt to fill a theological gap that "no other work in the Bible 
could fill". 5 Cohen has established the importance of the work for three reasons: i) 
conformity with Pentateuch; ii) content as love song; and iii) interaction with 
Hellenism. According to him, the depiction of a relation between husband and 
spouse was already an established device to express the relation between God and 
Israel in the Pentateuch and also the Prophets.6 However, it was only in the Song of 
Songs that love stands at the very core of the narrative. 7 What is more, such love has 
taken dialectic form in the Song of Songs. Thus, whereas in the rest of the canon, 
God has addressed Israel and vice versa, in the Song of Songs, it is felt that God has 
responded to Israel who, in her turn, has opened a dialogue with God. 8 
In other words, whereas the other books of the Bible do proclaim the bond of love 
between Israel and the Lord, only the Song of Songs is a dialogue of love, a 
4 Cohen, 'The Song of Songs', 264. 
5 Cohen, ibid, 265. 
6 Cohen brought forth the dialectical interaction between religious fidelity and infidelity to God as 
expressed through depictions of loyalty to the husband and ethical adultery. See also Gilbert, The 
Targum, 3. Also, Fawzi, Mystical Interpretation, 8-9. 
7 For the centrality of the theme of love in the Song of Songs and the rabbinic exegesis see M. 
Zlotowitz and N. Scherman (eds.), 'Love in its Highest Sense', in Shir Hashirim: An Allegorical 
Translation based upon Rashi with a Commentary from Talmudic, Midrashic and Rabbinic Sources, 
ArtScroll Tanach Series (Brooklyn NY: Mesorah, 1979), 1-lvii. J. B. White, A Study of the Language 
of Love in the Song of Songs and Ancient Egyptian Poetry, Society of Biblical Literature 38 (Missoula 
MT: Scholars, 1978). 
8 The Midrash, 19 alluding to Sol 1: 16-17. 
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conversation between man and God that gives religious faith a kind of intensity no 
other form of expression can. 9 
Finally, Cohen turned to the intellectual interaction between Hellenism and 
Judaism to establish the importance of the theme of love for the ancient world and, 
consequently, rabbinical interpretation. He has noted that, "wherever the Greek 
literature and philosophy went, the problems of Beauty and Love went with them." 10 
According to Cohen, an interpretation of the Song of Songs with its emphasis on the 
notion of love as the feature uniting human and divine became an intellectual 
response to the Hellenic search for eros, i.e. the common attribute between soul and 
divine. It is in its interaction with Hellenism that rabbinic exegetes turned to 
discerning the theme of love as the mutual union between God and Israel. Thus, the 
Song of Songs was felt to be an Old Testament interlocutor to Phaedrus and 
Symposium. However, unlike the eros of the Platonic dialogues, the Song of Songs 
maintained the Jewish theological agenda of arguing the unconsummated meeting of 
God and man, where the love between bride and groom as union in one flesh has 
been avoided, in order to keep the characters of the two lovers distinct. 11 
Rabbi Akiba advocated the supreme value of the Song of Songs: "The whole 
world is not worthy the day that the Song of Songs was given to Israel". 12 His 
statement is based on an allegorical interpretation that has brought forward the 
mystical character of the book. Its value springs from its carrying a spiritual 
meaning, depicting the loving union between God and Israel. It is the work that 
concludes human history, depicting Israel's ascension to God. Behind the sensual 
imagery the reader needs to discern the hidden meaning. 13 In this sense, the Song of 
Songs has addressed the spiritual elite. 14 It is confined only to the mature, spiritually 
speaking, since its sensual/erotic expressions could lead even the more instructed 
astray. Rabbi Akiba has moved within an established rabbinic tradition where a song 
9 Cohen, ibid, 275. 
10 ibid, 277. 
II ibid, 279. 
12 Gilbert, The Targum, 13. 
13 For the allegorical and mystical interpretation of the Song of Songs see the mentioned doctroral 
thesis: Fawzi, The Mystical Intepretation of the Song of Songs in the Light of Ancient Jewish 
Mysticism. Fawzi researched on the importance of the Song as a mystical work and drew the common 
lines between the Song of Songs and Merkabah mysticism. Also, McDonald, 'Song of Songs: 
Hermeneutics and Canon', in The Biblical Canon, 111-113. 
14 Cohen, 'The Song of Songs', 276. 
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is the ultimate expression of worshipping God. 15 The Song of Songs, with its mystical 
character, is the ultimate Song that Israel sings when meeting God. 16 That it was 
called the Song of Songs needs to be understood as a superlative indicating its value 
and also distinct character: it is the Song of all Songs. It concludes them as the 
supreme Song of the human race. 17 There is a spiritual ladder of ten Songs, found in 
various places of the canon, leading to higher levels of the worship of God. They also 
manifest the history of the human/Israelite race on earth after the fall. The Song of 
Songs lies on the ninth step of this ladder, being the highest expression of the 
worship and glorification of God. One last Song is to be sung, the tenth. It is the 
Song anticipating the Messianic restoration of Israel. 18 As Cohen has commented: 
As the ultimate form of theological expression, it [Song of Songs] was comparable to 
the one moment in the year when the high-priest entered the royal chamber, as it 
were, the Holy of Holies, and confronted his God privately on behalf of the house of 
Israel. It was to this supreme religious experience to which Rabbi Akiba compared 
the effulgence of emotion evoked by the Song of Songs when he said that all the 
Scriptures are holy, but the Song of Songs -the Holy ofHolies. 19 
Melito of Sardis was the first Christian author to include the Song of Songs in 
his list of canonical books. Hippolytus was the first author to appropriate its content 
in a Christian environment. 20 Yet, the reason that Christians were interested in the 
Song of Songs remains obscure. Hess has indicated that, in the hands of Hippolytus it 
became a device to communicate ascetical ideals?1 For Elliot, it is due to the theme 
of love that this work was felt to be appropriate for the Christian canon. 
15 Zlotowitz and Scherman (ed.), Shir Hashirim, xxii-xxxiii. In fact, rabbinic tradition supported that 
the Song of Songs was composed on the day that the Temple of Solomon was built. The rabbis saw the 
value of the Song in close connection to the importance of the temple. The temple was thought to be 
the "symphony of creation" and the Song of Songs melodically attributed this symphony that united 
the human to the divine: "Rabbi Yosi began: King Solomon was inspired to compose the Song of 
Songs when the Holy Temple was built and all the spheres, upper and lower, were completed with one 
wholeness ... and the Holy Temple was built as a replica of the Holy Temple above." See D. Marinov, 
Gr~~ory of Nyssa and Ambrose of Milan's Commentaries on the Song of Songs: A Comparative Study 
of 41 Century Christian Mysticism- East and West, 2, URL: http://rites.huji.ac.il/mazkirut/Dania.doc. 
For Rabbi Simon the title of the work had anticipated the dialectical theme of mutual love in the Song 
of Songs: "[b]eing composed of two strands -Israel's praise to God and God's praise to Israel". See 
The Midrash, 19 [footnote no. 4]. 
16 The Midrash, 19ff. 
17 F. Landy, Paradoxes of Paradise, Bible and Literature Series (Sheffield: Almond, 1983), 15-16. 
18 Zlotowitz and Scherman, Shir Hashirim, xxxiii [footnote no. 1]. 
19 Cohen, 'The Song of Songs', 275. 
2° For a list of the earliest Christian lists of canonical books see Appendices B-1 and B-2 in 
McDonald, The Biblical Canon, 439-442. For a list of late antiquity commentaries on the Song of 
Songs and their editions, see the monumental work of M. Geerard (ed.), Clavis Patrum Graecorum, 
vol. 3, CCSG (1979), 125-126. See also Marinov, Gregory of Nyssa. For the available commentaries 
in the Latin world see E. A. Matter, The Voice of my Beloved: The Song of Songs in Western Medieval 
Christianity, Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 203-210. 
21 Hess, Song ofSongs, 22. 
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Christological concerns of late antiquity urged Christian authors to seek for an 
appropriate language in which they could explain the mystery of the incamation?2 
Thus, it is suggested that Origen used the Song of Songs as a vehicle to communicate 
his speculative Christo logy, addressing questions concerning the identity of Christ. 
The language of union and love -a unique theme featured in this puzzling book- was 
felt to be appropriate to interpret the mystery of the incarnation. Such a position has 
enjoyed considerable support in modem scholarly circles.23 However, we need to 
take into account that Christian exegesis on the Song of Songs primarily comprised 
an interpretation of the scriptures into the light of the incarnation. As DeSimone put 
it: 
(The fathers of the Church) drew from the Sacred Scripture the basic orientation 
which shaped the doctrinal tradition of the Church, and provided fruitful theological 
instruction for the faithful. Their interpretations of Sacred Scripture were always of a 
theological and pastoral nature, relevant to man's relationship to God. The Fathers 
took the liberty to take a sentence out of its context to bring out some revealed truth 
which they found expressed in Scripture.24 
This is not to say that every passage of the Song of Songs became a reason to reflect 
on Christology. So, why were Christians interested in commenting on the Song of 
Songs? 
We need to look at Origen's exegetical interest in order to answer this question. 
King has shown that Origen was interested in interpreting the Song of Songs quite 
early in his exegetical career. Alongside his Commentary and Homilies, which are 
thought to be compositions of later date, Origen had also composed a brief 
Commentary on the Song of Songs which no longer survives. It seems that this work 
was the first attempt to interpret the scriptures. 25 If this is so, then it is interesting to 
22 Elliott, Christology in the Song of Songs in Early Church 381-451. Also, R. DeSimone, The Bride 
and the Bridegroom of the Fathers Subsidi Patristici 10 (Roma: lstituo Patristico Augustinianum, 
2000). 
23 See A. Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, vol. 1, trans. J. Bowden (London: Mowbrays, 
1995), 143. Also, H. Crouzel, Origen, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 192ff. For 
Crouzel 's exposition of Origenist Christo logy in the Song of Songs see Origene, Commentaire sur /e 
Cantique des Cantiques, vol. 1, L. Bresard and H. Crouzel (eds.), SC 375 (1991), 31. See also J.-N. 
Guinot, 'La Christologie de Theodoret de Cyr dans son Commentaire sur /e Cantique', VgCh 39 
(1985), 256-272. 
24 DeSimone suggested that from the time of Origen and Jerome onwards the Christians made 
extensive use of the Jewish tradition to draw the meaning of the Sacred Scripture. DeSimone, The 
Bride, 9-12. However, it seems that, after Origen, it was only Ephrem the Syrian and Theodoret of 
Cyrrhus that made extensive use of the Jewish exegetical resources. See E. Narinskaya, Ephrem - a 
'Jewish Sage': A Comparison of the Exegetical Writings of St. Ephrem the Syrian and Jewish 
Traditions (PhD Thesis: University of Durham, 2007). 
25 J. C. King, Origen and the Song of Songs as the Spirit of Scripture: The Bridegroom's Perfect 
Marriage-Song, OThM (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 6ff. 
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know why this puzzling book attracted his attention. King has argued that Origen felt 
that the Song of Songs concluded the "spirit of scriptures". It was felt to be the book 
that held the summit of union to God through its dramatic form. 26 It is due to this fact 
that Origen applied an allegorical interpretation to the Song. Through it, God has 
been manifested as reciprocal love. It is the theme of love as the intimate nuptial 
union of two parts that attracted his attention.27 
If we are to give any validity to King's observation that Origen's first attempt 
to comment on the Song had coincided with his conversion from the pagan literature 
to the Christian scriptures, then it is apparent that Origen had desired to manifest the 
Song of Songs as the equivalent of the Symposium. 28 Origen has spotted the centrality 
of love for the Christian message and also for the pagan sages. 29 He has indicated the 
classical philosophical failures to discuss the theme of love.30 What seems to be 
missing from the philosophical argument is the reciprocity and dialectical form that 
love might acquire at a personallevel.31 It needs to be noticed here that McGinn has 
observed the crisis that swept across second-Temple Judaism and its contemporary 
Hellenism. This crisis produced the apocalyptic literature of Judaism and introduced 
the need of individuals to unite with God at a more personal and reciprocal level.32 
26 Parente argued that, "it is exactly its spiritual and allegorical interpretation that has vindicated to the 
Canticle of Canticles a divine origin and a place among the canonical books in both Jewish and 
Christian tradition. Otherwise, how could a book be considered as divinely inspired for our instruction 
and edification in which the name of God is never mentioned and no religious or supernatural ideas 
ever seem to occur"? P. P. Parente, 'The Canticle of Canticles in Mystical Theology', CthBQ 6 
(1944), 143. King challenged such an idea by indicating that the fonn and the content of the Song as a 
marriage-song of perfect loving union was felt to have invited Origen to apply the allegorical 
interpretation to it. 
27 According to King, Origen introduced and developed the theme of intimate relation between God 
and soul within the era of the persecutions: "[f]rom his much later Exhortation to Martyrdom we learn 
of the prominence that he gave to the martyr's 'bridal' status before Christ the Bridegroom, wherein 
martyrdom and exhaltation to heavenly nuptial union become indistinguishable ... Perhaps, then, even 
during the Severan persecutions, Origen had already developed a nuptial understanding of martyrdom 
and, thus realizing the Song's relevance to the persecution that so preoccupied him, applied himself to 
a short exegesis of the text at this time". King, The Spirit, 8. 
28 King, ibid, 8. 
29 1 Jn 4:8. See Origen, Com. Prologus, 2.32 [all references in ACW 26 followed by number of book, 
chapter and page in ACW 26]. 
30 Origen, Com. Prologus, 2.23ff. It is indicative that, in his extensive Prologue, Origen highlighted 
and discussed the centrality of love for the Song. 
31 Origen, Com. Prologus, 1.21. Origen indicated the dialectical form ofthe Song. 
32 B. McGinn, 'The Jewish Matrix', in The Foundations ofChristian Mysticism, Presence of God, vol. 
1, (New York NY: Crossroad, 1991), 9-22. In Judaism, the book of Ezekiel signalled the shifting point 
to an interest in sacred texts that substituted the destruction of God's place of cultic worship, i.e. 
Temple. As Tuell illustrated, the book of Ezekiel transmitted the notion of prophecy in written form. 
Thus, prophecy took the form of written text: "Ezekiel, unlike his prophetic forebears, has written a 
book ... the reader of the text is able to experience what the prophet experienced". S. S. Tuell: 'Divine 
Presence and Absence in Ezekiel's Prophecy', in M. S. Odell and J. T. Strong (eds.), The Book of 
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Thus, sacred texts were felt to make the godhead more intimate to the devotee. It is 
the era when sacred texts were standing in the place of the temple in Judaism. At the 
other end, Hellenism was substituting the notion of written authority for the Platonic 
presence of the divinity within.33 As King indicates, even the gospels were felt to be 
lacking this centrality of reciprocity.34 Thus, Origen directed his attention to this 
small book that was meant to become the Christian Symposium. Origen's purpose 
was to set the scripture at the very heart of religious experience. 35 At the hands of 
Origen, the content of the Song became a device resembling the Platonic myth. The 
text invited its reader to move from the ephemeral to the eternal; from external 
appearances of the text to its hidden meaning. The Song led the soul from the 
depiction of sensual love to divine love. It is indicative that, in a semi-Platonic 
fashion, Origen tried to show the resemblance between the soul's love and divine 
love. Thus, through its content, the Song communicated something of the divine 
archetype of love to its reader. 
Origen's interest in the Song needs to be seen in close connection with his 
attempt to provide Christians with a distinct religious culture. 36 It is indicative that 
the people of the Old and New Covenants had simultaneously tried to establish their 
individual biblical canons and provide their interpretation in order to mark their 
religious individuality and independence. Biblical exegesis became the device 
through which Christians reflected their own distinct character on the book of the 
Ezekiel: Theological and Anthropological Perspectives, Symposium Series (Atlanta GA: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2000), I 09-110. 
33 In Hellenism, the introduction of the Chaldean Oracles, Hermitism and, primarily, the Neo-Platonic 
Commentaries on Plato expressed the need for written authorities through which the human individual 
attained union with the divine. See McGinn, The Foundations, 14. For an examination of the 
psychology of religion at late antiquity see E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: 
Some Aspects of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine (New York NY: Norton, 
1970). For the shifting to written authority with regard to allegory see R. Lamberton, Homer the 
Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition, Classic Heritage 
9 (Los Angeles CA: University of California Press, 1986). 
34 King, The Spirit, 27. 
35 Louth, Origins, 54. Louth argued that the Song of Songs was "the book on the summit of the 
mystical life". King slightly differentiated his position by indicating that "Origen approaches the Song 
of Songs itself, in its manifest intelligibility, as the summit of the mystical life and the supreme textual 
point of contact and union between the Christian soul and her heavenly Bridegroom". King, The 
Spirit, 36. 
36 P.M. Blowers, 'Interpreting Scripture', in A. Casiday and F. Norris (eds.), Constantine to c. 600, 
Cambridge History of Christianity, vol. 2 (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 619. According to Blowers, 
Christian exegesis meant to "establish a sacred past and credible identity for Christians". Also B. Neil, 
'Towards Defining a Christian Culture: The Christian Transformation of Classical Literature', in 
Casiday and Norris, ibid, 317-342. H. de Lubac, Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture, 
vols. 1-2, trans. M. Sebanc and E. M. Macierowski, Ressourcement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998-
2000). Fr. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation a/Christian Culture (Cambridge: CUP, 1997). 
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Old Testament.37 The Platonic Symposium was missing the theme of reciprocity. The 
rabbinic interpretation was missing the theme of the incarnation. Thus, Origen 
applied his reading of the scriptures in the light of the incarnation in order to 
illustrate the theme of love as the motif par excellence that has united the human and 
divine. 
Thus, Origen' s interest in the Song of Songs was not related to his need to 
demonstrate his speculative theology in more concrete terms. His exegesis on the 
biblical Song did not become the vehicle through which he demonstrated the more 
speculative aspects of his thought. His interest was to manifest the conformity of the 
Song to the Christian message. His purpose was to bring into light the fact that the 
love that the Song has demonstrated is related to the archetypal divine love: love has 
originated from God and has been directed to God.38 Thus Origen referred to its 
hidden wisdom, i.e. the secret meanings that only the Logos could have illuminated. 
When Origen addressed the inner meaning, what he had in mind was the presence of 
Logos as God's Wisdom. Thus, the reader is not invited to read the Song as an 
allegory that would introduce him to something different from the Logos himself. 
The fact that Origen turned to the classical form of Commentaries is indicative of his 
attempt to illustrate the tools through which his reader could have discerned the 
presence of the Logos behind the obscure passages of the Song. 39 Hence, the classical 
Commentary genre became a tool with which Origen could illustrate the inner 
coherence of the Song's obscure content. Blowers has indicated that Christian 
Commentaries in late antiquity had acquired a twofold function: i) contemplative 
and, ii) performative. In their first function, they had illustrated a "comprehensive 
vision of God's revelation to and in the world". In their latter function, they had 
37 For an interesting illustration of the intellectual interaction between Origen and his contemporary 
rabbis see N. R. M. de Lange, Origen and the Jews: Studies in Jewish Christian Relations in the 
Third-Century Palestine, Oriental Publications 25 (Cambridge: CUP, 1976). Y. Baer, 'Israel, the 
Christian Church, and the Roman Empire: From the Time of Septimius Severns to the Edict of 
Toleration of A.D. 313', SH 7 (1961), 79-149. For a discussion focusing on the interpretation of the 
Song seeR. Kimelman, 'Rabbi Yohanan and Origen on the Song of Songs: A Third Century Jewish-
Christian Disputation', HThR, vol. 73. no. 3/4 (Jui-Oct. 1980), 567-595. E. E. Urbach, 'The 
Homiletical Interpretations of the Sages and the Expositions of Origen on Canticles, and the Jewish-
Christian Disputation', SH22 (1971), 247-275. 
38 Origen, Com. Prologus, 2.32ff. 
39 King, The Spirit, 12. 
27 
urged to moral praxis: the reader had meant to identify himself with the persons 
presented to him and ponder on his spiritual position.40 
2. The main characters of the Song of Songs: the bride and the bridegroom 
As an epithalamium, i.e. a nuptial Song, the Song praises the love of two 
persons on the occasion of their marriage.41 As such, the drama focused on the 
central characters of the bride and her groom. As the drama unfolds, a group of 
maidens escorting the Bride is involved, alongside a second group following after the 
groom. In treating the Song of Songs as an allegory, the rabbis argued that the groom 
was God leading Israel to the promised land, whereas the bride was the nation of 
Israel.42 As Gilbert wrote, Christians "found it easy to extend the Jewish allegory 
beyond the Old Testament Israel".43 Hence, as early as Hippolytus, the Song of Songs 
was read within the context of the incarnation. 44 Christ was the groom and the 
Church was his bride. Already, Paul had depicted the relation between Christ and his 
Church in terms of the relation between groom and bride. 45 Patristic commentators 
had no doubts about the identities of the participants in the biblical drama. 46 Christ 
was the groom, and the bride was the individual soul/Church. The group of maidens 
was composed of uninitiated souls, and the second group was constituted by angels 
and prophets. 47 
All Christian commentators agree that the groom was an allegory for Christ, 
the incarnate manifestation of God.48 From the time of Irenaeus onwards Christ was 
4° For the classical commentaries on Plato see Lamberton, Homer, 63. Also Neil, 'Christian 
Transformation', 326. The Neo-Platonic commentaries illustrated the tensions and inconsistencies of a 
text as "perfectly reasonable and consistent" with the purposes of the commentator. Blowers, 
'Interpreting Scripture', 619. Origen, Com. 1.5.89 and also 3.8.198: "if there is anyone who has at 
some time burned with this faithful love of the Word of God; if there is anyone who has received the 
sweet wound of Him who is the chosen dart ... ". Origen, Hom. 1.7.279-280. 
41 Gregory, Hom. I, 22 [references indicate Homily number and page in GNO 6]. D. Turner, Eros and 
Allegory, CS 156 (1995), 83. 
42 Gilbert, The Targum, 3. Elliott, Christo/ogy, 4. 
43 Gilbert, ibid, 6. 
44 DeSimone, The Bride, 30ff. 
45 Eph 5:22. 
46 Byzantine commentators did not share the same confidence about the persons participating in the 
dialogues. This was due to the obscure character of the dialogues. 
47 Theodoret followed the scheme: Groom=Christ, bride=Church (perfect soul occasionally), 
maidens=pious souls, followers of groom=angels. Theodoret, Expl. Prrefatio, 44D and 1.64A 
[reference in pillar numbers in PG 81]. Origen believed that the maidens were allegories of the 
imperfect souls. Origen, Com. I. 4.119. 
48 It is entirely not within the scope of this thesis to present the problem of the identity of Christ with 
regard to the person ofthe Logos and the number of his natures. For a thorough analysis on the issue 
of Christo logy in the Song of Songs and the part that Commentaries on the Song of Songs played in 
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presented as the author of the two testaments. In the Commentaries, Christ stands at 
the middle of the two testaments, uniting them. According to Turner, for the Patristic 
commentators, the identity of Christ was related to the eschatological perspective of 
the Christian faith: he was the always-awaited saviour, long-awaited, yet always 
present. 49 His coming had been foretold through types, prophecies and theophanies 
in the Old Testament. He came in the New Covenant, to depart again, leaving the 
promise of his second coming to the faithful. After Origen' s exegesis, Christ was the 
Logos that descended to human history. In his presence, he unified human history 
leading time to redemption. He condescended to the weakness of his bride, in order 
to lift her up. Primarily, the Logos provided knowledge of the true God and thus his 
role needs to be viewed in terms of the soul's conversion from idolatry to the true 
faith. Hippolytus was the first commentator to stress the juxtaposition between the 
old synagogue and the Church, placing Christ in the middle.50 It is through the Logos 
that the bride learned about God and she ascended to his knowledge. 
The bride was a multifaceted character for the Patristic commentators of late 
antiquity. According to individual exegetical viewpoints the person of the bride 
ranged from the Church, to individual souls and even Mary. 51 Origen presented a fair 
balance between the Church and the individual soul. The one allegory was part of the 
other. That is to say, in Origen's scheme, the Church is the congregation of 
individual souls. And again, individual souls have achieved spiritual perfection only 
shaping Christological formulations in the early Church see Elliott, The Song of Songs and 
Christology in the Early Church 381-451. Elliott examined the case that the Song of Songs was 
employed in order to abstract from its imagery an idea of the union between human and divine in 
Christ. Christ's soul was the representative of all humanity. It was through it that the Logos was 
united to his humanity. The fact that there was a declining interest in composing Commentaries on the 
book after Chalcedon (A. D. 451) was considered to be the result of seeking for more precise 
Christological expressions that the imagery of the Song of Songs seemed to lack. However, this 
position overlooks the fact that, as was illustrated earlier, the primary interest of the commentators, 
such as Origen, was to establish a Christian correspondence to the Platonic theme of eros in the 
Symposium and thus, provide Christians with a cultural identity. Also, as Louth has put it, "Origen's 
real concern was with the interpretation of the Scripture. This was the repository of all wisdom and all 
truth, and the interpretation of Scripture lies at the very heart of his mystical theology". Louth, 
Origins, 54. See also J. Behr, The Way to Nicaea, Formation of Christian Theology, vol. I (Crestwood 
NY: SVS, 2001). Fr. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation ofChristian Culture. 
49 Turner, Eros, 85. 
50 DeSimone, The Bride, 30-31. 
51 Elliott, Christology, 120. Elliott also included the theme of Christ's soul as an allegory ofthe bride. 
However, apart from some passages in Nilus of Ancyra, I do not think that the other exegetes ever 
employed this allegory. See Louth, Origins, 55. DeSimone, The Bride, 30 and 38. As Parente noticed, 
the bride was originally thought to be an allegory of the Church (as in the work of Hippolytus). For 
this reason, the Christian writers followed the Jewish tradition, but by adapting it to the new reality of 
the incarnation, they replaced Yahweh with Christ. The synagogue was substituted by the Church. In 
the course of time, the righteous soul replaced the Church. Parente, 'The Canticle', 146. 
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within the Church, the latter being the locus in which they have met the Logos. For 
the purpose of our discussion, we will focus on the bride being an allegory of the 
individual Christian souJ.52 What is exactly her character/nature? Why is she distinct 
from the other souls/maidens? Eventually, why was she chosen to be the bride of 
Christ? These are the questions that need treatment, before moving to examine the 
nature of her experience (i.e. dereliction). 
The bride was not an allegory of any faithful soul; she was an image of 
perfection. She was advancing to the virtuous life having turned from idolatry to the 
true knowledge of God. Though she was not perfect, yet she was advancing to the 
way of perfection. There were two features that showed her as the bride of the divine 
groom: i) she was made "according to the image" of the Groom; and ii) she was 
baptised. These two factors actually interacted in Patristic exegesis. Origen stressed 
the fact that the soul was the image of the image of God, i.e. the Logos. But she was 
advancing spiritually because she had turned from ignorance to the knowledge of 
God. Spiritual life was envisaged as the soul's way to actualise the gifts of baptism, 
hence regaining the divine image. Procopius of Gaza, in his exegesis, firmly 
interwove divine image and baptism: 
I introduce you to intellect (voO<;), which is the house of the mother who, as it were, 
has given birth to me through baptism, that is, the grace of the all-Holy Spirit, as 
receptive of this in accordance with the likeness (15u) To Ka6' o~oiwmv); again it (i.e. 
intellect) is the inner chamber of grace, as the hidden treasures of grace laid down in 
it in accordance with the "image" (15u'l To KOT' EiK6va); which grace has conceived me 
through faith. 53 
It is through baptism that the soul was cleansed and recovered the divine imprint on 
her. Eventually, this imprint enabled her to approach the groom. 54 
Origen portrayed spiritual life as the soul's journey from Egypt, i.e. sinful life, 
to crossing the Red Sea (an allegory of the baptism). In the story of Exodus, Israel 
52 Origen, Com. 1.1.58. Theodoret, Expl. Prrefatio 440 and 1.64A. Gregory, Hom. I, 22. DeSimone, 
The Bride, 40. 
53 Procopius of Gaza, Catena in Canticum Canticorum, PG 87, 1709 C: "Eioayayw OE Ei<; voov, 0<; oTKo<; 
~tv tori Tf)<; l51o jkmrio~aro<; TEKOUOI'J<; ~E oTa ~I'JTpO<;, ToO rravayiou nvEu~aro<; XOPITo<;, we; TOUTI'J<; l51o TO 
Ka6' 6~oiWOIV XWPI'JTIK6<;• TO~IEiOV 15£ TTOAIV OUTf)<;. w<; TOU<; clTTOKpU(j)OU<; TOUTI'J<; 61'JOOupou<; 1510 TO KOT' EiK6va fxwv 
Orr06tTOU<; tv taUT4J• {ill<; ~E XOPI<; OUVtAOJ3E 1510 TTiOTEW<;". 
54 All commentators agree that the notion of the soul's recovering the divine imprint through baptism 
was seen as an extension ofthe incarnation and the passion. It was by means of Christ's incarnation 
that she was cleansed, due to the fact that he assumed the soul's human nature. Philo of Carpasus, 
£narratio in Canticum Canticorum, PG 40, 9 and 11. Nilus, Com. 7.13.23 and 77.l.l92 [numbers 
refer to chapter, paragraph and page in PTS 57]. 
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had left Egypt behind by crossing the Red Sea. In the same fashion, the soul departed 
from every sinful condition. As Louth commented, 
[the] ascent of the soul to God begins with her 'coming out of Egypt and crossing the 
Red Sea', that is her conversion and baptism. The mystical ascent for Origen begins 
in baptism and is a deepening and bringing to fruition of baptismal grace. 55 
For Nilus of Ancyra, it was through baptism that the soul received divine grace. In 
her baptism, the soul put off her previous sinful life. Thus, she found the true God. 
She recovered the divine image within, the one that sin had tarnished. Gregory of 
Nyssa argued thus: the soul was the image of the Groom. She approached him in 
order to resemble him. As he put it, "by approaching the archetypical beauty ( apxtru-
nov KaMo~) you became fair, since like a mirror you have obtained my character (np 
EIJQ xapaKr~pl EIJIJOp<pw9e:loa)".56 Thus, the soul's recovery of the image was 
envisaged within the scope of spiritual life. It was not a given condition. It is a 
dynamic condition that has followed the soul's ascension to the divine. The more the 
soul has advanced in her approaching the divine groom, the more she has recovered 
his image within. The concept of the divine image has placed the soul in close 
relation to the groom. A part of the soul is kinsman to the groom: 57 "(The soul 
became fair) when she approached the good and obtained the image (tve:1Jopcpw911) of 
the divine beauty". 58 For Gregory, the soul was identical to the groom in terms ofthe 
divine image. In this present passage, the soul was fair and good because the groom 
was fair and good. In another passage, the Logos that was the dart of the Father had 
wounded the soul. In her tum, the soul became the dart of the Logos and wounded 
the uninitiated souls.59 Procopius commented on Sol 7:7: "you (the soul) have put on 
the majestic beauty, i.e. the likeness of the archetype". Due to the divine imprint that 
55 Louth, Origins, 56. See also, J. Danielou, Origen, trans. W. Mitchell (London: Sheed & Ward, 
1955), 297ff. For an exposition on the divine image according to Origen see H. Crouzel, Theologie de 
I 'image de Dieu chez Origene, Theologie 34 (Paris: Aubier, 1956). 
56 Gregory, Hom. 4, 103. H. U. von Balthasar, Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Religious 
Philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa, trans. M. Sebanc (San Francisco CA: Ignatius, 1995), 77 [hereafter 
cited as Presence]. For an exposition of Gregory's thought on the notion of divine image see 
Balthasar, 'The Defmition ofNature', in ibid, 111-119. 
57 See Balthasar, Presence, 89-90 and also 113ff. 
58 Gregory, Hom. 5, 150. 
59 Gregory, Hom. 4, 129. The soul became God's dart. 
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she carried within, the soul was a vehicle for the groom. The uninitiated souls could 
contemplate the divine groom through her.60 
But what truly made the bride stand out was the fact that she accepted the 
divine call to salvation.61 The bride was the soul that was working for her spiritual 
progress. As Origen stated, though she had not reached perfection, she was reckoned 
as perfect because she was moving in this direction.62 Nilus' exegesis was suggestive 
of this fact: the bride was the soul that had approached the archetypal beauty of the 
groom through faith and the virtuous life. She had cleansed herself from every 
bodily care and evil transgression.63 The Song of Songs was thought to present the 
soul's ethical labours in her journey to achieve union with God. Every part of the 
bride's journey illustrated the soul's spiritual struggles: from sinfulness and 
ignorance to knowledge and the Christian virtues. This journey was the soul's 
response to the divine call. Through the incarnation the Logos had invited the soul to 
union manifesting his divinity. Thus, it was the soul's turn to respond by ascending 
to her groom. Unlike the bride, the uninitiated souls were neglecting Christ's call. 
They remained in sinful conditions. It was the soul's spiritual struggle that illustrated 
her relation to the groom. It has been argued that Origen diminished the role of the 
body in his exegesis by focusing on the role of the soul. We need to see his exegesis 
in the light of spiritual and ethical effort. It is through putting off sinfulness --not 
necessarily the body-- that the soul was advancing spiritually. In Origen, the image 
of putting off materiality was synonymous to ethical effort. This was the turning 
point, where the commentators overcame any notion of elitism: through the 
redemptive work of Christ on earth, every soul could become his bride. Yet, it was 
only the ethically-working soul that became his bride having accepted his call 
wholeheartedly. This notion was summed up by Nilus' reflection on Sol 1.4: the 
groom was the Logos of God, who was incarnate for the salvation of the world. He 
had invited all souls to his wedding. But only the virtuous soul accepted his nuptial 
call. The other souls did not conceive the majesty of the groom's call. They were 
60 Procopius of Gaza, Fragment a in Cantica Canticorum, PG 87, 1760 A. It needs to be noticed that, 
for Origen, soul had been called neighbour ( rrArwloV) with respect to her nearness to the groom. She 
was called beautiful and neighbour only when she approached near the Logos. Before that, she was 
called "blackened" and "tanned" by the sun. See Origen, Hom. 2.4.289. 
61 Theodoret, Exp/. 2.850. Nilus, Com. 27.19.82. 
62 Origen, Com. 2.5.136: "[the] soul that has indeed been set in the path of progress, but she has not 
yet attained the summit of perfection. She is called beautiful because she is advancing" [all 
translations by Lawson unless otherwise stated]. 
63 Cf. Nilus, Com. 10. 8.32. Origen, Com. 3.14. 240. 
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remaining unconvinced of its importance. Thus, it was granted only to her, through 
her ethical efforts, to enter into spiritual heights and learn the divine mysteries --i.e. 
divine providence and the mystery of the incarnation--.64 
Was the individual soul a solitary unity advancing spiritually in inner 
loneliness --like the Plotinian soul--?65 Was she detached from the maidens? The 
Patristic exegetes left no place for a solitary ascension of the soul to spiritual heights. 
The fact that Origen could interchange between the union of Logos and soul, and 
Christ and Church illustrates his thought that the soul always remained part of the 
Christian community in her ascension to the divine.66 The Church constitutes the 
unity of the faithful -spiritually advanced or not- as the body of Christ.67 The soul 
was always a member of this body in her spiritual ascension.68 Thus, there was a 
strong bond between the bride and the other members of the Church. 
Gregory of Nyssa reinforced the notion of union between bride and the 
community in his Life of Moses. In his exegesis, Moses --like the Solomonean bride-
- stood as an allegory for the soul: both Moses and the bride were advancing in their 
union to God. For Gregory, it was not accidental that Moses lived isolated in Midian 
(or Mount Sinai) for some time. Yet, he eventually returned to his people.69 The time 
of isolation was the time of spiritual progress. Yet, this progress did not detach 
Moses from the community. In his return, Moses was communicating to Israel the 
experience of his spiritual union with God. For Gregory, there was a strong bond 
between the perfect soul and the uninitiated ones. This bond had acquired the 
64 Nilus, Com. 5.1.15. Origen, Com. 1.5.86. 
65 Plotinus, Enneads. 6.9.11. K. Corrigan, 'Some Notes towards a Study of the 'Solitarity' and the 
'Dark' in Plotinus, Proclus, Gregory of Nyssa and Pseudo-Dionysius ', SP 30 (1997), 151-157. 
66 Louth, Origins, 53: "Origen is talking about the life of the baptised Christian within the Church; 
Plato and Plotinus about the search for the ultimate truth by an intellectual elite, either in the company 
of other like-minded souls, or as 'the alone to the Alone"'. King, The Spirit, 14. 
67 Origen, Com. 1.1.59: "[but] the Church, you must observe, is the whole assembly of the saints". See 
Balthasar, Presence, 134: "the point of departure of religious 'metaphysics' is necessarily of an 
individual nature: it is an analysis of desire and the aspirations of the soul. Whatever there was of a 
social nature in the mysteries of the pagans was merely the expression of a gregarious instinct whose 
aim it was to assure the individual salvation of the members of the group. The theological fact, by way 
of contrast, is radically social. For if the exterior fact and the interior fact constitute one solitary 
history, the social character of the exterior fact (the Church) demonstrates thereby the social character, 
as well, of the interior fact (the Mystical Body)". 
68 Origen, Com. 3.13 .231. 
69 Nilus, Com. 69.1.172. Gregory, Moses, 1.56 [edition in CS 1]. 
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character of a relationship between tutor and disciple: 70 by observing her life and her 
spiritual achievements, the latter desired union with God. 71 
No commentator was as suggestive as Procopius of Gaza in this matter: he 
designated the soul as "1S1MaKahoc;" (teacher). In their tum, the uninitiated souls were 
called '\ra91']rEU61Jrvm" (disciples). She became their teacher and guide; they were her 
students; for, as the act developed, it was apparent that the bride was guiding the 
maidens to seek and find the groom.72 In her communicating with them, the bride 
stirred up their love, motivating them to join her to her spiritual ascension. Even at 
the times that she was only addressing the groom, the uninitiated souls could observe 
her life. They were praising her beauty/perfection and, eventually, they were longing 
for divine love. For Procopius of Gaza, what constituted the bond between the 
spiritually advanced soul and the uninitiated souls was the fact that she was 
contemplating the image of the groom on them. 73 Thus, not only did she recover the 
divine image within her but she also discerned the divine image within the rest of 
humanity. 
In short, the Patristic commentators viewed the bride of the Song of Songs as 
an allegory of the Christian soul that was advancing in spiritual perfection. She was 
depicted in terms of perfection even though it was noted that she had not reached 
perfection yet. The fact remains that she responded to the groom's call, thus 
advancing to spiritual life through ethical labouring. 
3. Absence and presence in the Song of Songs. 
i. The biblical background. 
One of the main features of the Song of Songs is the fact that it introduced the 
theme of separation and abandonment. The imagery with regard to the relationship 
between bride and groom was less than ideal: the groom abandoned his bride. As 
Origen noted: 
[The] Bridegroom, however, is to be understood as a husband who is not always in 
house, nor is He in perpetual attendance on the Bride, who stays in the house. 
Rather, He frequently goes out, and she, yearning for His love, seeks Him when He 
is absent; yet He Himself returns to her from time to time. It seems, therefore, that 
70 Origen, Com. 2.3.117. Gregory used the analogy between Paul and the bride: Paul had exhorted the 
faithful to become his imitators like he had become an imitator of Christ. The bride exhorted the 
maidens addressing them with the same words as Paul. Gregory, Hom. 2, 46. 
71 Nilus, Com. 5.3.16. Origen, Com. 1.5.84. Procopius ofGaza, Fragmenta, PG 87, 1756 A. 
72 Procopius ofGaza, Fragmenta, PG 87, 1757 D and 1772 B. 
73 Procopius of Gaza, ibid, 1760 A. Theodoret, Expl. 2.93A and 4.197 A. 
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all through this little book we must expect to find the Bridegroom sometimes being 
sought as one who is away, and sometimes speaking to the Bride as being present 
with her.74 
In the biblical canon, the theme of abandonment was not confined only to the 
content of the Song of Songs; nor was it a characteristic of Hebrew religious 
literature. Block traced the introduction of the theme in religious literature within the 
Sumerian and Akkadian (Assyrian-Babylonian) religious cult.75 It was within the 
religious poems of the Near East that Block identified the origins of the notion of 
being abandoned by God. Block's presentation makes it evident that the theme was 
an integral part of the early religious literature of the Middle East. It had been 
employed as part of myths that functioned as explanations for disasters and 
misfortunes that had come upon the Assyrian and Babylonian nations. The myths 
connected divine absence to distressful conditions. Thus, it was felt that distressful 
conditions occurred because the local deity had abandoned its place of cultic 
worship. What was the cause for divine abandonment was not always clear. The 
myths referred to human sin several times. But that is far from making it the 
exclusive cause of divine abandonment. Most times, the devotee was inquiring about 
the inexplicable sense of abandonment. From 15 instances in ancient literature that 
Block discussed, human provocation appeared 8 times.76 When it appeared, human 
sin and misdeeds had offended the local deity that departed, thus leaving the nation 
subjected to natural (e.g. flood) and also political (e.g. invasion) disasters. Whenever 
it did not appear, then the myth was stressing the consequences of the sudden 
departure of the deity. Samuel Balentine highlighted the presence of the theme in the 
Sumerian and Akkadian religious literature suggesting that: 
In view of the parallel laments about the deity's aloofness which can be found in 
Sumero-Akkadian psalms, it can no longer be assumed that this was a problem 
74 Origen, Com. 3.13.230. 
75 D. I. Block, 'Divine Abandonment: Ezekiel's Adaptation of an Ancient Near East Motif, in Odell 
and Strong (eds.), Ezekiel, 16-17. For Block, the development ofthe theme of divine abandonment in 
the prophecies of Ezekiel was influenced by the religious and political interaction of Israel with 
nations that had already developed a notion of divine desolation in their religious literature. Block 
highlighted the fact that Ezekiel adapted the theme appropriating it according to the monotheistic 
character of the Israelite religion. Before Block, Balentine had already discussed the presence of the 
theme in the Near East of antiquity indicating that the motif of divine abandonment had also addressed 
the relation between the divine and the individual. SeeS. E. Balentine, 'The Historical Background', 
in The Hidden God: The Hiding of the Face of God in the Old Testament, OThM (Oxford: OUP, 
1983), 22-44. J. F. Kutsko, Between Heaven and Earth: Divine Presence and Absence in the Book of 
Ezekiel, Biblical Judaic Studies 7 (Winona Lake IN: Eisenbrauns, 2000). 
76 Block provided a list with regard to the motif including among other issues: i) the genre in which 
the theme has appeared; ii) the cause (human provocation); iii) the motive (divine anger); iv) the effect 
(disaster); and v) deity's altered disposition. For the list see Block, 'Divine Abandonment', 32-33. 
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which Israel confronted for the first time in the sixth century BC. Instead it is best to 
see Israel's laments as having taken up a motif that was probably quite common in 
the lament Gattungen of the Near East.77 
Block researched the way in which Israel developed the notion of divine 
abandonment in its cultural and religious interaction with the nations of the Near 
East. As he noted: 
In tracing the history of the motif we may recognise five specific dimensions of 
Yahweh's abandonment contemplated in the Old Testament: (I) Yahweh's absence 
from an individual, devotee or otherwise; (2) Yahweh's absence from his people, the 
nation of Israel; (3) Yahweh's absence from the land of Israel; (4) Yahweh's 
absence from Jerusalem/Zion; (5) Yahweh's absence from his sanctuary.78 
Whereas Block discussed the notion of divine abandonment exclusively in terms of 
God's relation with the nation of Israel and the place of cultic worship, in his Hidden 
God, Balentine shed more light on the presence of the theme in the religious 
literature of Israel, thus focusing on the personal relationship between God and his 
devotee. Thus, he examined the various meanings that the concept communicated in 
Psalms, the Wisdom literature (Ecclesiastes-Job) and also the prophets. 
According to Balentine, the Old Testament transmitted the theme of divine 
abandonment primarily in terms of God's "turning away his face" from the 
individual.79 In developing the theme, Hebrew religious literature paid attention to 
the fact that the relationship between God and his devotee was not always 
harmonious; nor was God bound to his promise to stand by the side of his devotee. 
For Balentine, the theme of God's "turning away his face" was synonymous with 
divine abandonment. 
The most indicative examples of Hebrew literature where the theme was 
introduced were the Psalms of lamentation: the devotee questioned God as to why he 
77 Balentine, Hidden God, 170. The sixth century BC is of particular significance since it corresponds 
to the Babylonian invasion and exile. According to Balentine and Block, Ezekiel appropriated the 
notion of divine absence in order to interpret Israel's exile to Babylon. 
78 Block: 'Divine Abandonment', 16-17. Block did not intend to discuss the first dimension of divine 
abandonment (individuaVdevotee), since he focused on the prophetic understanding of divine 
abandonment (Ezekiel). However, certain assessments could be used in order to help us understand the 
~lace that the theme had held in Middle East religions of antiquity. 
9 Balentine traced this position already in the Sumerian and Akkadian literature. Balentine, Hidden 
God, 24. Balentine discussed the combination of the words ,no (to hide) and C'l!) (face) as 
indications of God's turning away his face. The latter term became synonymous to divine 
abandonment. However, Balentine did not engage in an examination of the verb :JT31 (to abandon) in 
the Old Testament. It was Block that researched on the various linguistic forms of the verb. His 
examination, nevertheless, was limited to the appearance of the theme in the book of Ezekiel. See 
Block, 'Divine Abandonment', 16-17 [footnotes nos. 6-7]. 
36 
had abandoned him ("why?");80 or he inquired about the duration of the experience 
("how long?").81 Alongside the inquisition, there developed another form of 
lamentation psalm which included a petition that God should not abandon his 
devotee ("abandon me not/hide not your face"). 82 Balentine drew his reader's 
attention to the fact that the cause of divine abandonment was not always clear. The 
psalmist's inquiry about the cause and also the fact that he protested about his 
innocence demonstrate the inexplicable character of the experience. 83 Balentine 
challenged the position that advocates the presence of sin, even when there was no 
explicit reference to the latter. 84 It is true that, in the prophetic books, sin was always 
the cause of abandonment. 85 However, as Balentine put it: 
In the laments which feature the phrase 'hide the face' several factors work against 
the theory that the suppliant perceives sin to be the cause of his dilemma ... what is 
lacking in these particular psalms is not merely information about the specifics of 
the transgression; it is rather information that would indicate that sin is involved at 
any level at all. 86 
Thus, Balentine suggested a dissociation between the theme of divine abandonment 
and the concept of divine punishment. The two motifs seem inseparable only in the 
prophetic books. But for the psalmist of the lamentation psalms, the cause was 
hidden from him. Thus, divine abandonment was felt to be the hiding of God's face, 
where God had hidden his works from man. What we need to highlight is the fact 
that the Hebrew religious literature as portrayed in Psalms dealt with the cause of 
abandonment as a mystery that had troubled the heart of the devotee. 
Balentine also examined the consequences of divine abandonment. He 
indicated that the theme of abandonment and its consequences went side by side in 
the Old Testament: it is as a result of the consequences that the devotee realised that 
80 Ps 21:2; 43.24; 87:15 [References to the Psalms are according to the Greek numbering which 
combines the Hebrew Ps 9 & 10, and separates the Hebrew Ps 147 into two]. 
81 Ps 13:2. Both forms of inquiry were of Sumerian origin. See: Balentine, Hidden God, 26ff. 
82 Ps 9:32; 37:22; 27:9. Balentine, ibid, 50-51. 
83 See: Balentine, 'The Signinficance of the Motiffor Old Testament Theology', in ibid, 164-176. 
84 Due to the fact that the psalms were thought to be models of prayer for the community, scholars 
have supported the idea that any reference to specific sin would have limited the use of the psalm to a 
specific ethical context. The book of Psalms maintained an ambiguity about the specific sin that had 
resulted in divine abandonment so that their content could have found a broader use according to 
individual needs. Fr. N<>tscher, Das Angesicht Gottes Schauen' nach Biblischer und Babylonischer 
Auffassung (Auflage: WUrzburg, 1924). S. Terrien, The Elusive Presence: Towards a New Biblical 
Theology (New York NY: Harper & Row, 1978). See also, Balentine, Hidden God, 52 [footnotes nos. 
13 and 17]. 
85 For Balentine, the reason for the connection between divine abandonment and sin in the prophets 
needs to be sought in the conditions of the exile, where the prophets appropriated the themes of divine 
abandonment and punishment to explain Israel's Babylonian captivity. Balentine, ibid, 76. 
86 Balentine, ibid, 53. 
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he was abandoned by God. This fact suggests that abandonment had consequences. 
Balentine classified the consequences into three categories: i) separation between 
God and man; ii) separation between God and place of cultic worship; and iii) 
confinement to Sheol. 87 Here, we will briefly examine the first and the last motifs. As 
it concerns the first point, divine abandonment resulted in cutting off the 
communication between God and man. God has not listened to the prayers of the 
individual. He has left him prey to his attacking enemies. The psalmist employed the 
verbs "to hear"-"see"-"answer" in order to encompass all modes of divine activity.88 
God did not intervene in the supplication of his devotee. This separation of 
communication was expressed with the vivid description of man's descent to the pit 
or the grave, i.e. Sheol: 
For my soul is full of troubles: and my life draws into the grave. I am counted with 
them that go down into Sheol: I am as a man that has no strength,89 
[and] you have brought me into the dust of death/0 
[when] you are silent to me, I become like them that go down into the pit. 91 
The fact that the individual was confined to Sheol demonstrates the connection 
between divine absence and death. God is the source of life and everything that is 
good in humanity.92 He is the strength of one's life.93 When the individual felt 
separated from God, his strength withdrew and he reached the face of death. The 
Psalms touch upon the theme of man's dependence on God. It is only when God has 
looked upon his devotee that he has felt divine protection. But, when God has turned 
away his face, the individual has felt abandoned and thus, he/she has reached 
Sheol.94 Divine abandonment was felt in terms of separation between man and God. 
Such separation put under jeopardy also man's life. Without divine protection, the 
individual felt the absence of life, i.e. Sheol, "the land of forgetfulness". 95 As a final 
remark it needs to be noticed that, as Block remarked, even though God had warned 
87 Balentine, ibid, 56-57. 
88 Balentine, ibid, 57. 
89 Ps 87:4. 
90 Ps 2I:I6. 
91 Ps 27:1. 
92 IKgs 20:3. 
93 Ps I 7:2; 24. I; 60:4. 
94 Ps I03:28-30. 
95 J. Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, vol. 2 (London: OUP, 1926), 462. For the meaning of 
Sheol see, Ph. S. Johnston, Shades of Sheol: Death and Afterlife in the Old Testament (Downers 
Grove IL: InterVarsity, 2002). 
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that he might tum his face away from the sinner, the Old Testament never affirmed 
that God ever actually realised his threat.96 It was the individual that felt his 
separation from God. Yet, God never explicitly declared that he abandoned his 
people. The prophetic books marked a shifting point in religious literature: divine 
abandonment was part of God's plan that resulted in divine restoration. Thus, the 
pessimistic tone of the Psalms was complemented with the concept of God's return. 
As Balentine wrote: 
With the end of the period of captivity, the prophets speak of an end to the period of 
God's hiding and of the promise of future deliverance. Thus, the ultimate 
consequence of God's hiding is not separation, which is the implication in the 
psalms of lament, but restoration.97 
ii. Abandonment of the soul: perfection and sin. 
The Song of Songs was composed in the form of a drama. Its content unfolded 
through monologues, dialogues, and narrative. The drama was full of romantic words 
and sensual imagery illustrating the love between bride and groom. Nevertheless, as 
it was noted, their relationship was less than idyllic. The introduction of the theme of 
abandonment to the drama juxtaposed times of union between the two lovers and 
times of separation. The groom twice abandoned his bride. The latter felt his absence 
and she sought him at the city-market.98 Rather than presenting a romantic search for 
the beloved, the compiler of the Song emphasised her distress: the bride was 
wounded by the city's watchmen who removed her garment.99 Though in Sol 3:4 the 
groom dissolved her despair immediately, in Sol 5:6 he prolonged the soul's despair. 
Before we move to an analysis of Byzantine exegesis on the episodes of the Song of 
Songs we need to make the following observations: 
i) The Song has introduced the theme of abandonment. It seems that, 
originally, the Song of Songs was a love-poem describing the sudden departure of the 
beloved; thus, stressing his lover's despair. At first sight, the Song was missing the 
petition or inquiry of the lamentation psalms: the bride did not address an inquiry 
about his departure. This is true in terms of addressing the groom himself. But the 
96 Block, 'Divine Abandonment', 17. 
97 Balentine, Hidden God, 76. 
98 Sol 3:1: "I sought him (whom my soul loveth) but I found him not"; Sol 5:6: "My beloved had 
withdrawn himself, and was gone ... I sought him but I could not find him; I called him, but he gave 
me no answer". For a textual analysis ofthe two episodes, see Hess, 'Lovers Joined and Separated', in 
Song ofSongs, 101-108. Idem, 'Search and Union', in ibid, 160-192. 
99 Sol 5:7: "The watchmen that go their rounds in the city found me; the keepers of the walls took 
away my veil from me". 
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biblical bride had asked the watchmen: "Have you seen him whom my soul loves"? 
The question, as such, did not resemble the usual questions (why? how long?) that 
we encountered in Hebrew and non-Hebrew religious literature. However, behind the 
lines of union and separation in the Song, rabbis and Christian commentators might 
have discerned a theme quite favoured in religious poetry: divine abandonment. The 
fact that, right from the beginning, the Song of Songs was valued as an authentic 
religious poem -as opposed to a mere love song- could not be dissociated from the 
fact that at its heart lay the theme of love and also abandonment and separation. If its 
content was felt to be of one accord with the biblical canon, then its theme of divine 
abandonment must have been felt to share the same notion of abandonment with the 
other books of religious value. 
ii) We find no explanation of the sudden departure of the groom in the first 
episode. 100 The Song provided no leads about what forced the groom to depart from 
his bride. In the second episode, the delay of his lover to open the door seems to 
cause his departure. 101 But the groom never uttered any causes for his behaviour. It is 
also true that the bride did not ponder on the matter. Undeniably, she felt his absence 
without ever thinking about the cause of his departure. The fact that no causes were 
mentioned might be the reason why the rabbis felt that the Song was in conformity 
with the rest of religious literature. As is the case of the lamentation psalms, the Song 
maintained the same obscurity about the causes of divine abandonment. 
a. Origen: perfection and trials 
We will now discuss the presence of the theme of divine abandonment in the 
Byzantine exegesis of the Song, relating our examination to the notion of sin. We 
will start with Origen, the author who set the exegetical agenda for later 
commentators on the Song. 
The theme of abandonment in the Song of Songs was spotted by Origen. But, 
according to him, it was not only in the episodes at Sol 3: 1 and 5:6 that the motif was 
introduced. Origen established his exegesis on the dialectical form of presence and 
absence throughout the work. In a passage quoted earlier, Origen observed: 
100 Soi3:Iff. 
101 Sol 5:3: "I have put off my coat; how shall I put it on? I have washed my feet, how shall I defile 
them"? 
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[The] Bridegroom, however, is to be understood as a husband who is not always in 
house, nor is He in perpetual attendance on the Bride, who stays in the house. Rather, 
He frequently goes out, and she, yearning for His love, seeks Him when He is absent; 
yet He Himself returns to her from time to time. It seems, therefore, that all through 
this little book we must expect to find the Bridegroom sometimes being sought as one 
who is away, and sometimes speaking to the Bride as being present with her. 102 
It was the form of the narrative that made Origen emphasise the tension between 
presence and hiddenness in his exegesis. But, for Origen, the image of union and 
separation needed to find an interpretation that could manifest its meaning for the 
text. The opening scene -the bride's plea- had anticipated the coming of the groom. 
Origen remarked that the scene was the soul's prayer to the Father asking for the 
coming of the Logos. Origen presented a paradox: whereas the soul had anticipated 
the coming of the groom, the latter was already present: 
[While she is thus praying] the Bridegroom was present and standing by her as she 
prayed ... The Bride having seen that He, for whose coming she was praying, was 
already present, and that even when she spoke He offered her the things she asked. 103 
Origen introduced the interchange between presence and absence as an historical 
reality: the bride had already received the gifts of the groom, i.e. the Law and the 
Prophets. Origen had no doubt that the Law and the Prophets had manifested God's 
presence within history. And yet, the bride remained in anticipation of his coming. 104 
The theme of love that was the soul's wound also led him to the direction of attesting 
the divine presence within the soul. As it was argued, in fact, it was the divine image 
that the soul had recovered within, that illustrated the intimacy between bride and 
groom. Yet the paradox remained: the bride was anticipating the coming of the 
groom. The groom's leaping off the mountains and bounding over the hills105 and the 
groom's voice were indications of his immanence. Yet, the fact that he was hiding 
behind the walls and also that he communicated with his bride only through enigmas 
attested his hiddenness. 
This tension between divine presence and hiddenness was not unknown to the 
rabbinic interpretation that was contemporary to Origen's exegesis. The Talmudic 
tradition had also highlighted divine presence and absence in the light of Israel's 
history. The Song of Songs was felt to demonstrate the historical ascension of Israel 
from Egypt to its eschatological completion. God had manifested his presence in 
102 Origen, Com. 3.13.230. 
103 Origen, Com. 1.2.63 and Com. 3.11.210: "the Bridegroom is thus sometimes present and teaching, 
and sometimes He is said to be absent; and then He is desired". 
104 Origen, Com. 1.1.58-59. 
105 So12:8. 
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Sinai where he revealed his Law to Israel. It was the time of intimacy when God 
communicated his "innermost secrets" to Israel. 106 Yet, Israel felt God's 
abandonment in the desert and her exile (Babylon). The night of the bride in Sol 3:1 
was the period when God did not speak to Moses. It was the time of God's silence: 
Rashi explains night as referring to the torment of Israel's darkness when they were 
under the 'Ban' [incurred because of the sins of the Spies who turned the people 
against the land. During this period, the Midrash (2: II) explains, God did not speak 
with Moses] ... According to Alschich, the verse refers to the dark 'nights' of the 
Egyptian and Babylonian exiles when Israel sought out their God to redeem them and 
resume His love for them. [The imagery is poignant. It depicts the anguish of a 
tormented, insomniac Israel -bereft of its former open, uninhibited relationship with 
God- figuratively twisting and turning sleeplessly during its period of most 
pronounced separation, longing after Him, and a resumption of His love]. 107 
The Targum interpreted Sol 5:6 as the soul's prayer to God. However, God remained 
silent forsaking her: "I called Him but He did not answer me, i.e. I prayed but He did 
not respond". 108 Such a prayer stressed Israel's despair. God became intimate and 
hidden within the history of Israel. This interpretation was based on the development 
of the theme of divine abandonment in the prophetic circles of Israel: it was Israel's 
sin that led God to abandon his people. Thus, the tension between presence and 
absence was established on Israel's ethical purification: 109 Israel's actions urged 
God's reaction. 
However, even Hellenism seems to have developed a vague notion of union 
and separation (hiddenness) that never took real form before the work of Philo and 
Plotinus. As Louth remarked, Origen employed the Platonic language of a sudden 
appearance of the groom. 110 Unlike Plato, Origen also taught of a sudden separation 
106 Zlotowitz and Scherman, Shir Hashirim, 69-70. 
107 ibid, 116. 
108 Zlotowitz and Scherman, Shir Hashirim, !50. 
109 See, Block, 'Divine Abandonment'. 
110 Orig. Hom. 1.7.280. Cf. Plato, Epistula 7, 341d: "pT]tov ydp otoaj.l.&<; i>cmv roc; dAA.a j.l.a!li]j.l.ata, 
a.n· i>K 1toAA.ii<; auvouaia<; ytyvoj.I.EVT]<; 1tEpi to 1tpuyj.l.a abto Kai tou au~ilv i>~ai<pvT]<;. otov 0.1to 
1tupd<; 1tT]oi]aavto<; i>~a<p!lev <pro<;, i>v tfl 'l'uxfl 'YEV6j.I.Evov auto !:auto ijoT] tpE<pEt" (for a thing of this 
kind cannot be expressed by words like other disciplines, but by a long familiarity, and living in 
conjunction with the thing itself, a light as it were leaping from a fire will on a sudden be enkindled in 
the soul, and there itself nourish itself). Idem, Respublica, 515c4. Idem, Symposium, 210.e.2: "[o<;] 
ydp iiv llEXPt i>vtauea 1tpoc; td i>prottKd 1tatoayroyT]!lfl, !lEroj.I.EVo<; i><pE~ll<; tE Kai bp!l&<; td KaA.u, 
1tpO<; tEAO<; ijOT] tCoV t&v i>prottK&v E~at<pVT]<; Kat6'JfEtat tt !lauj.l.aatOV tr)v <pUatV KaA6v, tOUto 
EKEtVO, & ~roKpatE<;, 00 or) EVEKEV Kai Ot Ej.1.1tpoa!lEV 1tUVtE<; 1t6Vot l'Jaav" (whoever then is 
advanced thus far in the mysteries of Love by a right and regular progress of contemplation, 
approaching new to perfect intuition, suddenly he will discover, bursting into view, a beauty 
astonishingly admirable; that very beauty, to the gaining a sight of which the aim of all his preceding 
studies and labours had been directed) [trans. Taylor]. See also, Plotinus, Enneads, 5.3.17; 5.5.7ffand 
6.7.34. Philo, Quod Deus est lmmutabilis, 93.lff: "otav ydp b !lEo<; 1tapaotocp td til<; O.toiou ao<pia<; 
!!Eropi]j.l.ata Kaj.I.Utou xropi<; Kai 1t6VOU, tauta E~ai<pVT]<; ob 1tpoaooKi]aavtE<; 6T]aaupov Eboatj.I.OVta<; 
tEA.Eia<; EbpiaKOj.I.EV" (when God delivers to us the lore of His eternal wisdom without our toil or 
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between bride and groom. McGinn argued that the concept of a sudden apparition of 
the divine in Plato put under question the notion of an "impersonal" auto-salvation in 
classical philosophy. For McGinn, the sudden manifestation ofthe divine was a sort 
of "divine interference" that resulted in the soul's awakening. 111 Like the 
development of the theme of divine abandonment in the prophetic circles of late 
Judaism, the Hellenic classical heritage had also introduced a sudden separation 
between the human and divine that was not caused by sin. Origen's contemporary, 
Plotinus, wrote about a sudden apparition and also about a sudden falling from the 
vision. 112 McGinn implied a connection between Plotinus' thought and the notion of 
paideia. In examining Plotinus' thought, McGinn discerned three stages in spiritual 
life: i) preparation; ii) union; and iii) return. At the stage of preparation, subject and 
object (i.e. soul and Intellect) were distinct. When union was achieved, soul and 
Intellect were indistinguishable. The stage of return was a sort of separation where 
soul and Intellect were becoming distinct again. 113 According to McGinn, for 
Plotinus the stages of union and separation were repetitive and complemented each 
other. The stage of separation signified the soul's return to discursive reason. As 
soon as the soul had turned to the latter, then the distinction between soul and 
Intellect was introduced again. The soul's return did not occur due to any sin or 
incompetence. McGinn argued that, for Plotinus, the stage of preparation has been a 
feature of this present life. Despite the fact that Hellenism never really developed an 
idea of eschatology, it is the case that Plotinus postponed the soul's journey to the 
divine after leaving the body. 114 The soul could not achieve full union with the 
divine Intellect in this life. Thus, the stages of preparation, union and return have 
been features of this life. In this way, Plotinus introduced an eschatological 
labour we find in it suddenly and unexpectedly a treasure of perfect happiness) [trans. Colson and 
Whitaker]. Idem, De Praemiis et Poenis, 37-51. For a discussion on the motif of soul's sudden union 
with God in Plato and Plotinus see Louth, 'Plato', in Origins, 1-17. Also, McGinn, Foundations, 30ff 
and 53ff. 
111 McGinn, Foundations, 30. See also, Louth, Origins, 13. A. J. Festugiere, Contemplation et vie 
contemplative seton Plat on (Paris: J. Vrin, 1936). 
112 Plotinus, Enneads, 6.9.11: " DEK1ti1t't(J)V OS tf]c; etac; 1tliAtV kydpac; npE'tl)v" (when one falls from 
the vision, he wakes again the virtue in himself) [trans. Armstrong]. 
113 McGinn, Foundations, 44ff. 
114 A theme that had already appeared in Plato's dialogues, especially Phaedo. Cf. D. Melling, 
'Preparing the Soul for Death: the Phaedo', in Understanding Plato, OPUS (Oxford: OUP, 1987) 64-
74. 
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perspective in his thought: the soul was meant to surpass the stage of separation at a 
future point. 115 
In Philo, the theme of hiddenness was introduced in the context of 
understanding the scriptures. It is in this author that the theme acquired its dialectical 
form: divine presence went alongside divine absence. For Philo, it was the Logos as 
divine Wisdom that has dwelled within the scriptures. Yet, this Wisdom sometimes 
illuminated him by directing his intellect to divine knowledge. At other times, it 
abandoned him, when the meaning of words was impenetrable and Philo would give 
up his philosophical pursuits. In a lengthy passage Philo exposed his own experience: 
I feel no shame in recording my own experience, a thing I know from its happening 
to me a thousand times. On some occasions, after making up my mind to follow the 
usual course of writing on philosophical tenets, and knowing definitely the 
substance of what I was to set down, I have found my understanding incapable of 
giving birth to a single idea, and have given it up without accomplishing anything, 
reviling my understanding for its self-conceit, and filled with amazement at the 
might of Him that is to Whom is due the opening and closing of the soul-wombs. On 
the other occasions, I have approached my work empty and suddenly become full, 
the ideas falling in a shower from above and being sown invisibly, so that under the 
influence of the Divine possession I have been filled with corybantic frenzy and 
been unconscious of anything, place, persons present, myself, words spoken, lines 
written. 116 
Again, it needs to be noticed that, there was no reference to sin nor, in fact, any other 
cause for this hiddenness. This is not the only place in which Philo introduced the 
theme of a sudden apparition. Yet, this is the only place that Philo emphasised in all 
vigour the dialectical form of presence and absence. 
In Origen, the theme of divine abandonment occurred in the same context as in 
Philo. In the same fashion, Origen reported on his own experience while 
commenting on the Song of Songs: 
God is my witness that I have often perceived the Bridegroom drawing near me and 
being most intensely present with me; then suddenly he has withdrawn and I could 
not find him, though I sought to do so. Then when he has appeared and I lay hold of 
him, he slips away once more. And when he has so slipped away my search for him 
begins anew. 117 
Was it mystical experience or biblical impenetrability that Origen felt? As Louth 
observed, it is difficult to distinguish between mystical experience and biblical 
interpretation in Origen's thought. In Plotinus' case, the soul flew to the divine. In 
Origen, such a flight could not become dissociated from the manifestation of the 
115 See D. O'Meara: •A propos d'un temoignage sur )'experience mystique de Plotin', Mnemosyne 27 
(1974), 238-244. 
116 Philo, De Migratione Abrahamis, 34 [trans. Colson and Whitaker]. 
117 Origen, Hom. 1.7.280. 
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Logos within the scriptures. In other words, Plotinus had emphasised the soul's 
preparation for her spiritual journey. Origen highlighted illumination that originates 
from the Logos. In Plotinus, the device of sudden union was meant to introduce the 
notion that the soul could achieve a union that was beyond her understanding. 118 In 
Origen, the divine Logos was at the very heart of union and --what is more important 
for us-- separation. Origen provided a "personalistic" interpretation of spiritual life 
where the Logos was the person calling for the soul. 119 He was also the person that, 
suddenly, separated from the soul. But, such "personalistic" argument had begun 
with the Logos' manifestation within the scriptures, i.e. the locus of his revelation. 
Origen did not separate between mystical experience and the manifestation of the 
Logos in scripture. 120 In a passage, reminiscent of the Philonic account, Origen 
wrote: 
When she [the soul] is trying to understand something and desiring to know some 
obscure and secret matters, as long as she cannot find what she is looking for, the 
Word of God is surely absent from her. But when the thing she sought comes up to 
meet her, and appears to her, who doubts but that the Word of God is present, 
illuminating her mind and offering to her the light of knowledge? And again we 
perceive He is withdrawn from us and comes again, in every matter that is either 
opened or closed to our understanding. 121 
There is no doubt that, as Louth put it, for Origen, 
these passages have a spectrum of meaning that ranges from the sort of thing I have 
mentioned [i.e. engagement with Scriptures] to something which is genuinely 
mystical experience of God. 122 
118 Louth, Origins, 14. According to Meredith, Plato had suggested divine incomprehensibility and 
Plotinus had touched upon the theme of divine infinity. See A. Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, Early 
Church Fathers (London: Routledge, 1999), 13-14. Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 28c: "'tov jlEV oov 7tOtl]'ttlV 
Kat 1ta'ttpa wuoE wu 1tano<; Ebpdv 'tE Epyov Kai Ebp6v'ta Ei<; mina<; aouvawv A.tyEtv". Plotinus, 
Enneads, 5.5.6: "yEA.otov ydp /,;l]'tEiv EKEtVl]V 'ttlV ci1tA.E'tOV q>6atv 7tEptA.aj.1~6.vEtv" (it would be 
absurd to seek and comprehend that boundless nature) [trans. Armstrong]. Also in Enneads, 6.9.6: " 
A1']1t'tEOV 0€ Kai cimtpov ab'tov ou 't!'i> aotE~t'tl']np f] 'tOU llEYE9ou<; i) 'tOU apt9jlOU, aA.A.d 't!'i> 
U7tEptA.l']7t'tQl 'tfl<; ouvajlEro<;" (and it must be understood as infinite not because its size and number 
cannot be measured or counted but because its power cannot be comprehended) [trans. Armstrong]. 
119 King, The Spirit, 15. 
120 Louth, Origins, 70. Also King, The Spirit, 16: "True, Origen is describing an experience of textual 
intepretation here [Origen, Hom. 1.7.279-280]. Yet, it is only an impoverished attitude towards texts 
and their reading that could construe the hermeneutical process as necessarily counter- or sub-
effective. In Origen, allegory and mystical experience converge in a unitary symbolic language, which 
expresses the contemplatio stuporis or lK(JTaat~ that accompanies the exegete's penetration of -and 
by!- the meaning of the text". 
121 Origen, Com. 3.11.210-211. Cf. Philo, De Migratione Abraham is, 38 : "Hereby comes to pass even 
the seeing of the Divine light, identical with knowledge, which opens wide the soul's eyes, and leads 
it to apprehension distinct and brilliant beyond those gained by the ears". Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, 
Fragmenta in Cantica Canticorum, PG. 69, 1284. 
122 Louth, Origins, 71. 
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Thus, the theme of abandonment was realised in terms of the Logos' presence within 
the scriptures and also, the soul's preparation to engage with the scriptures in order 
to discern the manifestation of the Logos in them. 
Yet, an overemphasis on the biblical foundation of Origen's mysticism could 
miss the point that Origen related divine dereliction to ethical trials and tribulations. 
Without referring to the presence of sin, Origen related divine abandonment to trials: 
"[the] fact that emerges is that he appears to his bride all through the winter -that is 
to say, in the time of tribulations and trials". 123 Origen related the time of tribulations 
and trials as part of the soul's spiritual journey. Since the winter was the time of 
trials, it is important to note that the presence of the groom was manifested in the 
middle of the winter. For Origen, that is to say that the Logos has appeared to his 
bride in a secret way at the time of tribulations. Reflecting on the episodes of the 
Song, Origen distinguished between the voice of the groom and his presence. His 
voice was a manifestation of his presence. Yet, it was not the same mode of 
revelation as his true presence. The fact that the bride had discerned the groom's 
voice in the middle of the winter provided Origen with the imagery to argue that it 
was within tribulations that the Logos made his presence manifest. What kind of 
tribulations did Origen have in mind? We only have leads based on his exegesis on 
the Song. Origen employed the same analogy between winter and tribulation in his 
Exhortatio ad Martyrium to argue that the Logos had reinforced his devotee at times 
of persecutions. In his exegesis on the Song of Songs Origen connected the winter-
time to the Church's tribulations and, subsequently, to the soul's trials. 124 On the 
other hand, Origen wrote: 
That visitation, however, whereby she is visited for a while and then left, in order 
that she may be tested, and then sought again, so that her head may be upheld and 
she be wholly embraced, lest she either waver in faith or be weighed down in body 
by the load of her trials, is different. 125 
Here, two points need to be noted: i) the passage appeared within the context of 
faith: the tribulations referred to the soul's establishment on faith. Origen's reference 
to bodily trials needs to be seen in the context of faith and also in the light of our 
earlier observation126; ii) Origen introduced the motif of divine "visitations" in his 
exegesis on the Song. The term was suggestive of the temporary nature of divine 
123 Origen, Com. 3.11.212. 
124 Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, Fragmenta in Cantica, PG 69, 1284. 
125 Origen, Com. 3.11.212. 
126 i.e. that there is a connection between ethical trials and historical (ecclesiastical) persecutions. 
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presence and absence. 127 Divine manifestation was only a visitation. In other words, 
it was limited in its duration. Origen concluded within the term the imagery of the 
Song: the groom had visited and then abandoned the bride. Thus, Origen related the 
imagery to his theological agenda: the Logos' manifestation was understood in terms 
of divine visitations. As it will be discussed later, the term acquired eschatological 
connotations in his work. 
With regard to the first point, the absence of any reference to sin in connection 
to divine abandonment needs to be examined. It was noted that the bride was an 
image of perfection for Origen. Despite the fact that the soul was advancing in 
spiritual life, Origen praised the soul's perfection encouraged by the praises that the 
Song had addressed to her. The fact that sin was addressed only in terms of the soul's 
past life was suggestive of Origen's position that sin was not immediately involved 
in the soul's spiritual ascension; as opposed to his position in De Principiis, where 
Origen clearly associated divine abandonment with sin. In this latter case, it was due 
to sin that God had abandoned the soul to trials and tribulations. 128 However, he 
associated trials and tribulations only with divine paideia which he reserved for 
souls that have followed after God's commandments. Thus, in his De Principiis, 
Origen had suggested that trials and tribulations were parts of God's providence for 
the spiritually mature: in her ascension to the divine, the soul moved from the stage 
of chastisement to perfection. At the stage of perfection, the soul remained subjected 
to trials and tribulations as part of divine paideia. 129 
Origen related the soul's subjection to trials to the concept of divine 
"testing". 130 We need to view this position in the general context of asserting the 
soul's potential backsliding. Origen did not deny that, even though the soul has 
127 Origen, op. cit.: "that visitation, however, whereby she is visited for a little while and then left, in 
order that she may be tested, and then sought again ... lest she either waver in faith or be weighted 
down in body by the load of her trials". Origen distinguished between visitations in the soul's trials 
and visitations to provide spiritual insights. The one reinforced the soul; the other led her upwards. 
128 Origen, Prine. 3 .1.1 2-13. 
129 Lilla highlighted the accommodation of the classical ideal of instruction (paideia) by Clement. 
Ethical perfection was a combination of i) human natural tendency to virtue (lB~rpuatr); and, ii) 
[divine] instruction (TTOt~krliaKflUt(-J.1Ct0flatr). See: S. R. C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in 
Christian Platonism and Gnosticism, OxThM (London, OUP, 1971). 
130 The Talmud had introduced divine dereliction by means of training/exercising God's people, 
Israel. "Divrei Yedidiah interprets ... when you recognise God's greatness testify that I realise that the 
cause of suffering is not due to inability on His part to rescue me, or because He has decided to cast 
me off, never return to me. I am fully aware that my travail is because, I am sick by virtue of His love 
for me: His chastisements are chastisements of love, designed to awake me and bring me to 
repentance". Zlotowitz and Scherman, Shir Hashirim, 154. 
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turned from ignorance to faith, she might return to her previous ignorance. 131 In 
accommodating the classic motto 'know thyself Origen emphasised the soul's tum 
from ignorance to knowledge (faith). 132 But he also implied knowledge about the 
soul's previous status before descending into a material body: 
We should think that, having been created some time earlier, it comes for some 
reason to assume a body. And, if it is believed to be thus drawn into the body for 
some cause, then the work of knowledge is to determine what that cause may be. 133 
It is easy to discern Origen's speculative cosmology and anthropology behind his 
exegetical exposition: the soul fell from her divine contemplation to the condition of 
acqumng a material body due to a primordial weakness. Otis identified this 
weakness as satiety (K6poc;). 134 Yet, in De Principiis and, most importantly, his 
Commentary on the Song of Songs, the term that appeared is slothfulness. 135 Origen 
indicated that, through abandonment, God has tested the soul thus, exercising her 
against slothfulness. Origen viewed the soul's initial satiety as her tendency to 
ethical laxity. By introducing the soul's descent to the present material body, Origen 
highlighted the soul's tendency to laxity, meaning that it is by this descent God has 
tested the soul and enabled her to work against such laxity. Divine abandonment-
as a device- has instructed the soul against slothfulness, not so much in terms of 
returning to laxity as in terms of exercising her spiritual vigilance. 
Due to the theological bond between his Commentary on the Song of Songs 
and his Exhortation to Martyrdom, and also given the fact that Origen composed 
both works at times of religious persecution, it seems that Origen understood this 
"return" in terms ofthe soul's return to idolatry. 136 Thus, it is not discernible whether 
Origen had addressed a "mystical" return of the soul to inner slothfulness -with 
regard to the soul's turning away from divine contemplation- or her religious turning 
from faith to idolatry. 137 It seems that, for Origen, the two positions went side by 
side. What we need to keep in mind is the fact that, for Origen, sin always remained 
131 Origen, Com. 2.5.138. 
132 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 1.40. Clemens, Stromata, l.l4.60.3. Origen, Com. 
2.5.128. 
133 Origen, Com. 2.5.135. Cf. Origen, Prine. 2.9.2. 
134 B. Otis, 'The Cappadocian Thought as a Coherent System', DOP 12 (1958), 102. 
135 Origen, Prine. 1.6.2. 
136 It is difficult to distinguish between the notion of the soul's progress in faith and her ethical 
P:rogress. In Origen the one motif presupposed the other. 
37 Origen, Com. 2.3.117: "after she (i.e.the soul) has turned to God and come to faith, undoubtedly 
experiences conflicts of thoughts and assaults of evil spirits, which strive to call her back to the 
attractions of her former life and the errors ofunbelief'. 
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a possibility. In her ascension to the divine, the soul was exercised against a future 
lapsing. However, the presence of trials and tribulations was an indication that the 
soul had approached perfection. Paideia was not a matter of chastising her sin any 
more: divine abandonment was a spiritual device through which Origen illustrated 
the soul's ascension to perfection through divine instruction. 
It was commented that, whereas Louth pointed to Origen's positive exegetical 
positions, Otis highlighted the negative aspects of Origenist thought. This is due to 
the implications of introducing the soul's potential backsliding: Louth treated the 
Commentary on the Song of Songs as the soul's 'spiritual journey' to the divine. He 
noted that the stage of divine abandonment was only a temporary device that was 
meant to be overcome by the final union with God. 138 On the opposite side, Otis 
illustrated Origenist exegesis as the soul's 'return' to the divine. Thus, the 
introduction of the soul's primordial lapse by Otis diminished Origen's optimism 
that Louth supported. Otis seems to have ignored the notion of divine instruction as 
part of the classical ethical system employed by Clement and inherited by Origen, 
presenting the complementarity between nature and paideia. 
Louth supported the idea that, for Origen, the end of spiritual life was divine 
contemplation. This contemplation passed through times of darkness. Origen's point 
was that knowledge of the divine seems to surpass human conception. Thus, the 
theme of abandonment was another way for Origen to argue the relationship between 
the majesty of divine nature and the soul's limited perceptive capacity. However, 
Origen did not address God as totally unknowable: his union with the soul will be 
complete. 139 But when? 
To answer the question we need to take into account one last aspect of 
Origenist exegesis on the Song. This is the notion of time which Cheek has aptly 
called as Heilsgeschichte in Origen. Cheek argued that what lays behind Origenist 
exegesis on the Song of Songs is the Christian message of an eschatological 
completion. 140 The interplay between divine presence and absence needs to be seen 
in terms of God's leading human history to its completion, towards an eschaton. 
138 Louth, Origins, 71-72. 
139 Louth, op. cit. 
14° Cheek illustrated the Jewish foundation of the theme. Thus, Origen was not a mere adherent of 
classical Hellenic philosophy. He was also an exegete that was moving within the theological context 
that the Old Testament had already outlined. See J. E. Cheek, Eschatology and Redemption in the 
Theology of Origen: Israelite-Jewish and Greek-Hellenistic Ideas in Origen 's Interpretation of 
Redemption (PhD Thesis: Drew University, 1962). 
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Origen introduced the progressive revelation of Christ to the soul: the bride was 
introduced progressively to the fragrance of wine, then the sweetness, and then the 
taste of it. In the same fashion, the perfect soul was introduced to spiritual mysteries 
through various stages. Origen left the completion of the soul's initiation to divine 
mysteries open. He only implied the Eucharistic completion "on the festal day in the 
heavenly places, when the great feast is set". 141 As in the rabbinic interpretation, the 
love between bride and groom was understood to remain unconsummated. For 
Origen, the soul was granted insights into the divine mysteries. Yet, Origen 
maintained an open horizon with regard to the time when the enigmas and the veils 
would disappear and the soul would contemplate God face to face. His position 
suggested an eschatological dimension that illustrated the progressive, yet 
unconsummated, revelation from God. The theme of abandonment addressed the 
presence of God within history through theophanies and revelations. The incarnation 
meant a new era for the soul where she discerned God's intervention for her 
redemption. The incarnation also illustrated the true divine presence. After the 
incarnation the soul realised that the theophanies and prophecies of old were but 
types of his presence. Yet, notwithstanding the centrality of the incarnation to 
Origen, Christ's incarnation was another stage of divine revelation that would lead to 
the final union between God and man: 
The redemptive work of God has been fulfilled in the incarnation and man is already 
redeemed. But the plan waits to be consummated in the future at the end of time; 
man does not yet fully participate in the blessings of redemption. The redemptive 
blessings, however, can be participated in by anticipation through the relationship 
which the believer establishes with the Incarnate Word; through his sharin~ in the 
gifts of the Spirit; through his participation in the community of the Church. 1 2 
In sum, in his exegesis, Origen introduced elements of his cosmology and 
anthropology. Thus, the presence of sin was only implied in terms of the soul's 
potential fall. In any case, divine abandonment was not discussed in terms of sin and 
chastisement, but as part of divine paideia. Origen mastered his exegesis in such a 
way that brought forth a positive attitude towards the soul's spiritual ascension. In 
141 Origen, Com. 2.11.167. Origen distinguished between various levels of revelation with regard to 
the Logos' presence; the Logos' fragrance and his presence. Origen referred to the latter (i.e. 
presence) in the future tense, thus indicating its anticipation by the soul. See also Origen, Com. 1.4. 78. 
Origen gave an eschatological twist to his argument. He referred to the union between the soul and 
Christ. According to Origen, the Logos has taken over the soul's physical and spiritual functions: 
"What, do you think, will they do when the Word of God takes possession oftheir hearing, their sight, 
their touch, and their taste as well, and offers excellences from Himself that match each single sense 
according to its nature and capacity"? 
142 Cheek, Eschatology, 120. 
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contrast to Otis' view, the theme of divine abandonment in Origen addressed the 
dynamic presence of God within history. It also highlighted the eschatological 
horizon of the union between God and the soul, always emphasising divine paideia 
as God's intervention to lead the soul to ethical perfection. 
b. Gregory of Nyssa: the intellectual abandonment 
In his exegesis, Gregory ofNyssa acknowledged his indebtedness to Origen. 143 
Gregorian interpretation incorporated the main elements of Origenist exegesis with 
regard to the value of the Song and the identification of the characters. Gregory also 
exploited the Origenist notion of God's progressive manifestation in the Old 
Testament that reached its climax with the incamation. 144 Overall, Gregory worked 
on the Origenist understanding of the Song as a depiction of the soul's progressive 
introduction to the divine mysteries. However, where Origen only implied a direct 
manifestation of the Logos to the soul, always mediated by his manifestation in the 
scriptures, Gregory explicitly taught the direct presence of the Logos within the soul 
that transcended his manifestation within the scriptures. Gregory established his 
exegesis on a mystical experience between the soul and God, where the soul has 
searched for knowledge of what God is within his nature. But this is not to say that 
Gregory was an intellectualist. For the soul's moral life played an important role in 
his interpretation. Not only had the soul ascended to knowledge of the divine 
mysteries, but she also advanced in her moral life. Danielou and Meredith have 
highlighted Gregory's moral teaching to be of equal value with his idea of divine 
gnosis. 145 Meredith commented that in Gregory's works of exegetical maturity, 
the moral, the contemplative and the ascetic life are deeply related to each other. In 
his earlier writings he seems to have thought of the relation as only one-way, that is, 
of virtue as the gateway to gnosis; but in his more mature writings the movement is 
two way. 146 
143 Gregory, Hom. Prologus, 13. For the details of this work see, J. B. Cahill, 'The Date and Setting of 
Gregory ofNyssa's Commentary on the Song of Songs', JThS 32 (1981), 447-460. Also, J. Munitiz, 
'The Church at Prayer: Ecclesiological Aspects of St. Gregory of Nyssa's In Cantica Canticorum', 
EsChR, vol. 3, no. 4 (Autumn 1971 ), 385-395. J. Danielou, 'Chronologie des reuvres de Gregoire de 
Nysse', SP 7 (1966), 159-169. M. Canevet, 'Exegese et theologie dans les traites spirituels de 
Gregoire de Nysse', in M. Harl (ed.), Ecriture et culture phi/osophique dans Ia pensee de Gregoire de 
Nysse (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 144-168. A. Meredith, 'The Homilies on the Song of Songs', in The 
Cappadocians (Crestwood NY: SVS, 2000), 78-89. 
144 Gregory, Hom. 5, 140ff. 
145 Meredith, 'Contemplation and Virtue', in The Cappadocians, 59-62. 
146 Meredith, ibid, 61 and 69. In Meredith's own words, "as was already clear from the Homilies on 
the Beatitudes Gregory was becoming increasingly convinced that Christian excellence was ethical 
rather than mystical". 
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Gregory's position was that the more the soul advanced morally, the more she was 
introduced to the divine mysteries. 147 The introduction of the soul to the divine 
mysteries meant that the soul had realised the presence of the image of the groom 
within her. In fact, Gregory followed two directions that lead to the same position: 
due to her participation in the divine image the soul was able to participate in the 
virtues. And it was because of her virtuous life that she had recovered the divine 
image within. 148 The two positions were equally balanced in Gregory's exegesis. 
It is commonplace that, in Gregory's Homilies on the Song, the theme of 
divine abandonment had addressed divine transcendence. Indeed, the two works of 
Gregory's spiritual and exegetical maturity, i.e., De Vita Moisis and In Canticum, 
give evidence to Gregory's progressive attachment to a more apophatic language 
with regard to spiritual life: at the summit of spiritual life is knowledge of the divine 
being. But, as Balthasar put it, such knowledge could only conceive the existence 
(Eiv01) of the divine being (ovrw~ ov), without disclosing what the divine is in its 
nature. 149 In the De Vita Moisis, Gregory addressed the progressive ascension of 
Moses from "light" (cpw~) 150 to "darkness" (yv6cpo~) 151 and unknowability. 152 In In 
Canticum, Gregory observed the fact that the bride was suddenly abandoned by the 
groom. 153 It is acknowledged that Gregory argued theological positions according to 
the text that he was interpreting. Thus, in the former work, Moses ascended to 
various conditions. In the latter work, the bride did not ascend; she found and 
suddenly lost. 154 Yet, Gregory brought together the notions of ascension and 
abandonment since he indicated that both biblical images have addressed divine 
incomprehensibility: the soul realised that it is impossible to grasp fully the divine 
147 Balas illustrated the close relationship between Gregory's anthropology, ethical thought and 
mystical theology. The soul was meant to participate in the divine attributes. Virtue was an attribute of 
God. Thus, "the consummation of virtuous life is said to consist in the 'participation in God"'. See D. 
Balas, 'Participation and Spiritual Life', in Maouuia ecoO: Man's Participation in God's Perfections 
according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Studia Anselmiana 55 (Rome: Pontificium Institutum S. 
Anselmi, 1966), 152-157. 
148 For a discussion on the notion of participation see Balas, Mcrouala ecoo. Also, M. E. Keenan, 'De 
Professione Christiana and De Perfectione: A Study of the Ascetical Doctrine of Saint Gregory of 
Nyssa', DOP 5 (1950), 167-207. Also, G. B. Ladner, 'The Philosophical Anthropology of Saint 
Gregory ofNyssa', DOP 12 (1958), 59-94. 
149 Balthasar, 'The Philosophy of Becoming and Desire', in Presence, 27-l 08. 
150 Gregory, Moses, 2.19. Cf. Ex 3:2ff. 
151 Gregory, ibid, 2.162. Cf. Ex 20:21. 
152 Gregory, ibid, 2.233. Cf. Ex 33:18-23. 
153 Gregory, Hom. 6, 181. Cf. Sol3:1- 4. 
154 For instance, compare Ex 33:18-23 to Sol3:4. 
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being as it is in its nature. 155 It lies beyond the limits of this thesis to argue the 
sources and discuss the exegetical technicalities of Gregory's position with regard to 
the divine incomprehensibility/infinity. What needs to be noted is the fact that 
Gregory seems to be the first Christian thinker who associated incomprehensibility 
with divine infinity: God knows no limits since there is no other quality in his 
essence to limit him. 156 From this ontological observation, Gregory moved to the 
idea that divine infinity implied that spiritual life was an unceasing quest. Since God 
was infinite, the soul's ascension was a ceaseless quest. 
At this point, we shall make three observations with regard to Gregory's 
position on the theme of divine abandonment. We will deal with i) the relationship 
between abandonment and ascension in the In Canticum and De Vita Moisis; ii) the 
notion of abandonment as a state of perfection; and iii) the connection between 
abandonment, trials and sin. 
i) The motif of divine abandonment was peculiar to Gregory's In Canticum. 
We need to remember that, in his De Vita, Gregory introduced the theme of 
ascension, but not abandonment. In this latter work, Gregory held the same position 
as In Canticum that divine being lies beyond the soul's intellectual (discursive) and 
intelligible comprehension. Moses' desire to reach the summit of divine knowledge 
had remained unfulfilled: God was surrounded by darkness. 157 It is through the latter 
motif that Gregory has introduced divine incomprehensibility. Gregory 
155 Gregory, Moses, 2.236: "IlatoEUEtat ydp otd t&v dpru1€vmv on to E>Etov Katd tl)v l:autou 
q>uow Mptotov, obo~:vl. n~:ptEtpy6Jl&vov n€pan" (Moses is instructed from what has been said, that 
the Divine is of itself infinite, circumscribed by no limit) [trans. Meredith]. Gregory, Hom. 12, 370: 
"EloE to Mpun6v tE Kat UnEpiypantov tOU aya1tffiJlEVOlJ KliA.A.oc; l;v naon tTl liiot6tT]tl t&v 
airovmv Kpdttov ad ~:bptoK6Jl&vov" (she saw the infinite and uncircumscribed beauty of the 
beloved, which is always found anew in the eternity of the ages). 
156 For a thorough discussion on the matter in the light of the Song see: M. Laird, Gregmy of Nyssa 
and the Grasp of Faith: Union, Knowledge and Divine Presence, Oxford Early Christian Studies 
(Oxford: OUP, 2004). Also, J. Danielou, 'La Tenebre ou de !'amour', in Platonisme, 175-307. M. 
Laird, 'Gregory of Nyssa and the Mysticism of Darkness: A Reconsideration', JR 79, no. 4 (Oct. 
1999), 592-616. Danielou's introduction in Gregoire de Nysse, Vie de Moise, J. Danielou (ed.), SCI 
(Paris: Cerf, 1955), xiv. Also, A.K. Geljon, 'Divine Infinity in Gregory of Nyssa and Philo of 
Alexandria', VgCh 59 (2005), 152-177. A. Meredith, 'Gregory ofNyssa', in The Cappadocians, 62ff. 
K. Ware, 'God Hidden and Revealed: The Apophatic Way and the Essence-Energies Distinction', 
EsChR, vol. 7, no.2 (1975), 125-136. V. Lossky, 'Darkness and Light in Knowledge of God', trans. E. 
Every, EsChQ 8 (1969), 460-471. M. Laird, 'Apophasis and Logophasis in Gregory Nyssa's 
Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum', SP 37 (2001), 126-132. 
157 Gregory, Moses, 2.162-164: "Tote J.!Ev ydp tv q>roti, vuv lit tv yv6q>tp to E>Etov opiitat ... "OtE 
oov JlEi~mv l;y{;v~:to Katd tl)v yv&otv b Mmuof]c;. t6tE OJlOAoyd tov E>~:ov tv yv6q>cp iodv, 
tout€on t6tE yv&vat on tKEiv6 l:on tTl q>uo~:t to E>dov 6 nlioT]c:; yvroo~:roc:; tE Kat KataAl'J'VEffic; 
tonv avrot~:pov" (then the Deity was seen in the light, now is it seen in the cloud ... it is only when 
Moses has increased in knowledge that he confesses that he beheld God in the cloud, that is, that he 
knows that the Divine is by nature something above all knowledge and comprehension) [trans. 
Meredith]. Cf. 2 Sm. 22:10. 
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communicated this position without referring to the theme of abandonment or the 
image of the bride of the biblical Song. This latter interaction was also peculiar to his 
In Canticum. For, in this latter work, Gregory brought into play the image of Moses 
which he related to the biblical bride. 158 The introduction of the theme of Moses' 
progressive ascension from light to darkness helped Gregory develop his position on 
divine incomprehensibility in the In Canticum. However, the main device through 
which Gregory supported divine incomprehensibility in this latter work is the theme 
of divine abandonment. Danielou aptly observed that Gregory altered his exegesis 
according to the text on which he was working. It is the fact that biblical narratives 
present diverging imageries that urged Gregory to follow diverging interpretations. 
In the De Vita, God had communicated with Moses and yet he denied Moses access 
to his divine nature. The imagery was that of ascension, communication and denial 
(darkness). In the Song of Songs, the groom had suddenly abandoned the bride. The 
Song illustrated the similes of communication, separation (darkness) and re-union. 
Laird indicated a shift in Gregory's exegesis in his In Canticum: according to Laird, 
the In Canticum illustrates a more optimistic position in Gregory with regard to the 
summit of spiritual life. If, in his De Vita, Gregory had argued in terms of darkness 
and incomprehensibility, in the In Canticum, Gregory shifted to the language of 
union and light. 159 It is true that the motif of abandonment was part of the narrative. 
158 Gregory, Hom. 6. 181. For Meredith, though the two accounts of the De Vita and In Canticum 
shared common themes with regard to spiritual progress, they also had dissimilarities that need to be 
taken into account. See Meredith, The Cappadocians, 84. According to Meredith, Gregorian exegesis 
on the Song saw yv6cpof) to be at the summit of spiritual ascension, as opposed to aK6roc; of the De Vita. 
Also, Gregory has expounded his exegesis on the Song by alluding to Ex 20:21; in the Vita Moisis, he 
has highlighted the theological importance of Ex 33:20-23. For Meredith, exegesis on the Song 
addressed divine incomprehensibility; whereas the Vita Moisis focused on divine infinity. However, in 
both works Gregory interlinked yv6<pof) and aK6roc; without significantly differentiating between the 
two terms. The yv6cpoc; is the dark cloud in which God dwells. 
159 See Laird, 'Gregory of Nyssa and the Mysticism of Darkness'. Laird acknowledges that it was 
Meredith that supported this balance between light and darkness in Gregory. See Meredith, 'Gregory 
of Nyssa', in The Cappadocians, 52-101. For Meredith, the theme of darkness was never really 
integrated into his commentary on the Song. Meredith, ibid, 84. Laird argued against the idea that 
Gregory was a mystic of"darkness". According to him, Gregory introduced the theme of darkness and 
discursive separation to the same degree at which he also introduced the motif of union in light. 
According to Laird, it was in his In Canticum that Gregory presented his most elegant balance 
between "darkness mysticism" and "light" spirituality. In doing so, Laird moderated the significance 
of Puech and Danielou's position that Gregory was a mystic of darkness par excellence. For instance, 
Crouzel had argued that, "Origen and Gregory of Nyssa have often been contrasted by attributing to 
the former a mysticism of light and to the latter a mysticism of darkness". In Crouzel's thought, 
Gregory and Origen provided different exegetical and theological insights due to Origen's refutation 
of the Montanists and Gregory's defence against Eunonius. However, Crouzel had concluded that 
"behind the different forms of expressions, it is by no means certain that the experience of the one was 
all that different from the experience of the other". Crouzel, Origen, 121. See also Danielou, 
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Yet, the theme of abandonment needs to be seen in connection to the notion of 
union. Rather than dealing with utter separation of 'discursive' and 'intelligent' 
thought (~JavoJa-voO~) from the divine reality, Gregory highlighted the notion of 
separation and re-union. Any overemphasis to the exegetical similarities between the 
De Vita and In Canticum would do an injustice to the fact that the motif of love -
being the main element of the Song- communicated the notion of union between God 
and the soul. Thus, the theme of abandonment needs to direct us to the motif of re-
union between bride and groom. 
ii) Despite the fact that Plotinus and Philo had both touched upon the idea of 
divine infinity, 160 it is only Gregory who argued the notion of divine abandonment as 
the summit of knowledge about God. It needs to be noticed that Origen, in his 
Commentary on John, had also addressed the theme of separation with regard to the 
soul's perception of the divine. However, it is acknowledged that Origen never 
supported divine infinity. 161 What Origen indicated is the fact that the Logos 
remained with the intellect162 for as long as the latter was capable of holding him; 
but, he would soon depart. Origenist exegesis depended on Jn 2:11 and 4:40 and 
lacked the Gregorian overtones of the soul's seeking of and ascending to "knowing 
God in unknowing", since Origen denied divine infinity. 163 
Platonisme, 190-199. Idem, 'Mystique de Ia tenebre chez Gregoire de Nysse', in DSp 2.2, 1872-1886. 
H.C. Puech, 'La Tenebre mystique chez le Pseudo-Denys I' Areopagite et dans Ia tradition patristique', 
in En Quete de Ia gnose: La gnose et les temps et autres essais, vol. 1, Bibliotheque des sciences 
humaines (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 119-141. For a thorough analysis of the imagery of union in the In 
Canticum see: Laird, 'Fountain of Presence, Breasts of Wine: The Flow of Knowledge in the In 
Canticum Canticorum', in Grasp ofF aith, 13 1-153. 
160 See: Geljon, 'Divine Infinity in Gregory of Nyssa and Philo of Alexandria'. Geljon has criticised 
MUhlenberg's position that Gregory was the first thinker to introduce the theme of divine infintity. He 
shared sides with Guyot -while remaining critical of him- so that "starting points" of the notion of 
divine infinity originated in Philo. See E. MUhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von 
Nyssa: Gregors Kritik am Gottesbegriff der Klassischen Metaphysik, Forschungen zur Kirchen und 
Dogmengeschichte 16 (G~ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966). H. Guyot, L 'Infinite divine 
depuis Phi/on /e juifjusque' a Plot in (Paris: AI can 1906). 
161 Origen, Commentariis in Evange/ium Joannis, 13.52.347 [pg 224 in SC 222]. Origen scholars have 
indicated that Origen maintained the Platonic argument that the unlimited --hence undefined--
equalled to the the non-being. It was the latter that lacked any kind of form and definition. See 
Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa, 13 and 66: Gregory turned the argument to his own favour arguing that 
what defines a limit is the presence of an opposite quality (e.g. light and darkness). For the reason that 
God did not accommodate opposite qualities (e.g. good-evil) in him, the divine was undefined and 
unlimited. Gregory ofNyssa, Contra Eunomium, 1.168 [edition in GNO 1]. See Otis, 'Cappadocian 
Thought'. 
162 Allegorised in the similes ofthe Canaanites and the Samaritans of the gospel. 
163 Despite the fact that both Gregory and Origen referred to the soul's limitation to grasp the divine, 
their respective positions had commenced on differing anthropologies and theologies. Origen 
attributed such limitation to human weakness due to the fall. Gregory rendered incomprehensibility to 
divine nature as such. See Laird, 'Mysticism of Darkness', 593 [footnote no. 3]. 
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However, it is in another point that Origen and Gregory came close in their 
exegesis. Origen and Gregory envisaged separation from the divine as an experience 
that took place at a spiritually mature level. For Origen, at the summit of spiritual 
development, the soul had experienced trials that Origen associated with divine 
separation. Origen's argument held more ethical overtones than that of Gregory of 
Nyssa. In his tum, the Cappadocian exegete maintained a more sophisticated 
argument than Origen's: he did not refer to trials, but to divine 
incomprehensibility. 164 Yet, for both authors, we need to notice that the theme of 
abandonment was introduced after the soul's initial ascension. It is the biblical 
narrative that urged the two exegetes to introduce the theme of separation and re-
union. However, they both established their thought on theological and 
anthropological suppositions. For Origen and Gregory, the Song of Songs drew its 
theological value from the fact that its content was of one accord with divine 
revelation. Thus, the motif was incorporated in their exegeses as a theme introduced 
in the biblical narrative. Origen indicated that divine paideia found its ultimate 
expression at the summit of spiritual life where the soul remained subjected to trials. 
Origen argued the above position in his other works, such as De Oratione, 
Exhortatio ad Martyrium and Homi/ice in Numeros. Gregory dismissed this Origenist 
line of interpretation in his De Vita and In Canticum. Yet, he maintained the notion 
of divine paideia. Only this time, paideia did not instruct the soul about her fall 
(Origen), but about the true nature of the divine. Thus, the fact remains that both 
exegetes attested that the soul experienced abandonment -in different levels-- in her 
pursuit for the divine groom. 
It is apparent that Origen and Gregory referred to different kinds of 
experiences connected to the theme of abandonment. For Origen, it was an 
experience in ethical terms where the soul was subjected to trials. Yet we need to 
remember that Origen also associated the experience with the hiding of the groom 
from the intellect. For Origen, the soul remained puzzled about the meaning of the 
scriptures. For Gregory, the experience revealed the incomprehensibility of the 
divine nature. We could not overlook this fundamental difference between the two 
exegetes. Yet, we need not exaggerate their exegetical divergence. Like Origen, 
Gregory also presented the experience of abandonment as a distressful condition. 
164 See the overall presentation in Gregory, Hom. 6, 173-199 and 12, 340-370. 
56 
Balthasar highlighted the importance of the soul's frustration and despair in his 
Presence et Pensee. 165 Laird smoothed over any Origenist overtones by indicating 
that for Gregory, the soul did not really reach despair since she was not deprived of 
the divine presence altogether. Even though she did not fully grasp the divine, her 
desire was fulfilled through the presence ofthe divine within her (divine image). We 
could not agree more with Laird's observation. Yet, the fact remains that both 
Origen and Gregory attested that, at the stage of spiritual maturity, an experience has 
taken place that took the soul by surprise and momentarily caused distress to her. 
Both exegetes derived this position from the imagery presented in the Song. The 
imagery of separation is followed after the simile of union. 
Mosshammer has researched on Gregory's intellectual development from his 
De Beatitudinibus to his In Canticum. 166 His article is an excellent presentation of 
the way that Gregory's thought developed throughout the years. However, 
Mosshammer did not discuss the fact that Gregory advanced his thought further in 
distinction to the Origenist tradition. This fact becomes more apparent when we take 
into consideration Gregory's exegesis on the third beatitude,167 and compare it to his 
interpretation on Sol 3: 1. In both cases Gregory presented the idea of distress that 
165 Balthasar, Presence, 104. Balthasar construed Gregory's thought with regard to the Cappadocian's 
insights on the structure of"time" and "being". Cf. Gregory, Hom. 12, 369: "tp6nov nvd nA.iJuuEtat 
KUt tpUllJ.lU'ti~Etat tfl llVEA1ttU'ti~ 'tOU 1t000llJ.lEVOll llt~:A.f) 'tE KUi avun6A.uuutov 'tOU KUAOU tl'lv 
imtOuJ.tiav voJ.tiuuuu" (in a way, the soul is hurt and wounded in despair by thinking that the longing 
for the desired is imperfect and the good cannot be enjoyed). Laird and Bahis dismissed a 
psychological overemphasis on such sadness that could argue that the soul remains clueless about the 
divine. Ably, they indicated that, according to Gregory, it was the very pursuit that turned to the soul's 
spiritual satisfaction. Laird, Grasp of Faith, 88-89 and especially pg. 96 [footnote no. 179] where 
Laird has criticised Balthasar's position. Williams had reached the same conclusion with Laird. SeeR. 
Williams, 'Makrina's Deathbed Revisited: Gregory of Nyssa on Mind and Passion', in L. R. Wickham 
et. al (eds.)., Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity: Essays in Tribute to George 
Christopher Stead (Lei den: E. J. Brill, 1993), 242. For Laird, the issue is not whether soul experiences 
a sort of frustration, but whether she is presented with a 'consolation prize'. Williams has focused on 
the relation between soul's life and natural passions. Balas, Maouaia e~oo, 158. Cf. Gregory, Hom. 12, 
369: "7tEptatpdtat 'tO tile; AU1tT]<; etptutpov Otd 'tOU J.lUOEtV O'tl 'tO ad 7tpOK61ttEtV tv tcp ~T]'tELV 
KUt to J.lT]Iit1tO'tE tf)<; av6oou 1tUUEU0Ut toih6 l;unv i"J llA.T]Ol't<; tou 7t000llJ.lEVOll an6A.auut<; tf)<; 
mivtotE nA.T]pot>J.lEVT]<; l:ntOUJ.ltU<; f:ttpav tmOuJ.tiav tou l>nEpKEtJ.ltvou y~:vvffiuT]<;" (she removes the 
garment of sorrow when learning that, to progress always in pursuit and never to cease ascending, this 
is the true pleasure of the desired; the desire that is fulfilled becomes the beginning of another desire 
of what lies above). K. Rombs, 'Gregory of Nyssa's Doctrine of Epektasis: Some Logical 
Implications', SP 37 (2001), 288-293 
166 A. A. Mosshammer, 'Gregory's Intellectual Development: A Comparison of the Homilies on the 
Beatitudes with the Homilies on the Song ofSongs', in H. R. Drobner and A. Viciano (eds.), Gregory 
of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes, VgCh 52 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 359-387. 
167 Mt 5:5: "blessed are the sorrowful, for they shall be comforted". Gregory, Beat. 3.98.24ff 
[reference to number ofhiomily, and page in GNO 7.2]. 
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has taken place at the soul's spiritual ascension. 168 For Gregory, the beatitudes were 
a spiritual ladder of ascensions. The beatitudes were addressed to spiritually mature 
souls that were advancing in spiritual life. Gregory commented on the fact that, in 
the beatitudes, mourning was part of the third beatitude: mourning was close to the 
peak of spiritual ascension. 169 According to Gregory, in an Origenist fashion, at the 
summit of spiritual life, the soul meditated on her nature, her previous condition (i.e. 
before the fall) and the fact that she had rediscovered a treasure that she possessed 
but lost due to her fall. 170 Gregory defined sorrow as "the loss of something the heart 
was set upon", i.e. a deprivation. 171 His exegesis echoed the Origenist Homilies on 
the Song: the soul needed to meditate on her nature, in order to advance to further 
spiritual hights. Most significantly, Gregory seems to have accommodated the 
classical image of the Platonic cave in the Republic: 172 the soul that had looked upon 
light descended to the shadowy world. 173 Origen had explicitly engaged the role of 
trials as paideia in this instance; a fact that Gregory continued to overlook. Gregory 
focused on the contrast between the soul's previous status and her current condition. 
Grief was the product of the soul's spiritual progress. The more she realised her loss 
of divine heights, the more she grieved about this loss. Gregory emphasised the fact 
that the soul possessed this Good before the fall. 174 
In the In Canticum, grief appears m connection with divine 
incomprehensibility. Gregory had presented the idea of divine transcendence in his 
earlier work De Beatitudinibus. He also related transcendence to grief in this 
168 For a discussion of Gregorian exegesis on Mt 5:4 see, Fr. Vinet, 'Gregoire de Nysse, De 
Beatitudinibus: Oratio III, "Bienheureux les affliges, parce qu'ils seront consoles" ', in Drobner and 
Viciano (eds.), Homilies on the Beatitudes, 139-147. 
169 Again, Gregory was following the scriptural narrative that presented Christ as addressing the 
beatitudes from a high place (hill). Cf. Mt. 5: I. Gregory, Beat. 2.89.31 and also 3.98.24. 
170 Gregory, Beat. 3.104.1. 
171 Gregory, Beat. 3.102.16: "7tEV90~ EOtl OKU9pro7tl) oui9Eot~ tile; 'I'UXfJ~. E7ti OtEpi]oEt ttVO~ t&v 
Kata9ul!irov ouvtotai!Evr)" [trans. Hall]. 
172 Plato, Respub/ica, 516e. For the use of Plato's cave in Gregory see A. Meredith, 'Plato's "Cave" 
(Republic vii 514a-517e) in Origen, Plotinus, and Gregory of Nyssa', SP 27 (1993), 49-61. 
173 Gregory, Beat. 3.103.17: "b oE tfi lmoA.a6oEt toll i:~ro c:proto~ ouvEt9tOI!EVo~. e~ E1tllPEia~ ttvoc; 
Kat<iKA.Etotoc; yEVlltat, obx Ol!oi~ ill!q>OtEprov fJ t&v 7tap6vtrov Ka9<i7ttEtat oul!c:popd, b !!EV ydp 
doro~ ou eotEPlltat, ~apdav 7tOtEitat toll q>rotoc; tl)v ~lll!iav" (the other is used to the pleasure of 
the light outside and has been shut in by some hostile act. The present circumstances affect them quite 
differently: the one who knows what he has been deprived oftakes the loss of light very hard). 
174 Gregory, Beat. 3.105.10: "To6tou I!Evtot toll b7tEpaipovto~ 1tnoav ouval!tV KataA.ll7tttKl)v, ev 
I!Etouoi~ 7tOtE TJI!EV oi dv9pro7tot" (Yet, this which transcends all power of understanding is 
something we human beings once enjoyed as participants). Gregory has referred to the imprint of the 
divine image in the soul. 
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instance. 175 It was not divine incomprehensibility that caused the soul's grief, but the 
idea that she had fallen from her previous blessed status. Thus, Gregory employed a 
semi-Origenist line of reasoning. However, in his In Canticum, Gregory refined his 
thought by highlighting the close relation between grief and divine transcendence. 
From a sort of anthropologically-connected perception of grief which bears more 
psychological overtones, Gregory moved to a theological conception that 
emphasised grief as intimately connected to divine knowledge. 176 What we need to 
conclude is that, despite this shifting in his exegetical position, Gregory maintained 
the idea of an "event" within spiritual life that, in its own terms, saddened the soul 
without involving the notion of sin or trials. In his De Beatitudinibus, Gregory 
illustrated a clear distinction between past, present and future: 
The one who has been able to look upon the truly Good and thereafter considered 
the poverty of human nature, will surely hold his soul to be unfortunate, regarding it 
as a sorrow that his present life is deprived of that Good. Therefore the saying does 
not seem to me to bless the pain, but rather the knowledge of the good, since what is 
being sought is not present in life. 177 
iii) Finally, the lack of any reference to sin as cause of abandonment remained 
among the main features of Gregorian exegeses on the Song. Origen had only 
implied the presence of sin in his work and only with regard to her paideia. Thus, the 
soul was not chastised by the experience. She was instructed to look at her origin and 
realise her immanent weakness. Thus, even if Origen had referred to trials -in 
connection to divine abandonment- it was not sin that had caused the presence of 
trials. 
Gregory maintained this distinction between the expenence of divine 
abandonment and the presence of sin: it was not the latter that had caused divine 
abandonment. It is more likely that Gregory refrained from associating the two 
events because of the biblical narrative. For, as it was observed, the narrative 
175 Gregory, Beat. 3.105.5: ""Oocp o& t~~ yvrom;ro~ fll,t&v U\jiTJMtt:pov dvat to ityaeov tfl qniot:t 
7ttO'tEUO~EV, 'tOOOU'tql ~aA.A.ov 'tO 1tEVllo~ l;v abtoi~ E7tt'tEtV(J)~EV, on 'tOtoU't6V !;on Kai 'tOOOU'tOV 
to ityallov, ou otE~EUy~tvot wrxavo~EV, (o~ ~TJOE tt'Jv yv&otv abtou xropEiv 06vao9at" (the more 
we believe the Good to be by nature higher than our knowledge, the more we intensify our sorrow, 
that the Good from which we find ourselves separated is such and so great that we cannot even attain 
the knowedge of it). 
176 The De Beatitudinibus features more homiletical elements through which Gregory attempted to 
move his audience. The In Canticum provides more evidence of Gregory's mature theology on divine 
infinity as part ofhis refutation ofEunomian Arianism and Apollinarianism. 
177 Gregory, Beat. 3.104.1: "b to itA.TJll&~ ayaeov KattoEiv ioxuoa~. E7tEtta tt)v 7ttroxdav t~~ 
av9pro7tiVTJ~ cp6ot:ro~ Katavoi)oa~. l;v ou~cpop~ tt)v 'l'uxt'Jv 7tavtro~ s~Et, tcp ~t'J dvat l;v tcp ityaecp 
l:Kdvcp -rov 1tap6vta ~iov, ntveo~ 7toto6~t:vo~. ObKouv ou tt'Jv A.67tTJV ~m ooKEi ~aKapi~Etv b 
A6yo~. itA.A.d tt)v dOTJOlV tOU ityaeou, fl to t~~ AU7tTJ~ 1tallo~ E7ttOU~~aiVEt, otd 'tO ~t'J 7tllpEtVIlt tcp 
~iql 'tO ~TJtOU~EVOV". 
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provided no explicit hints of misdeeds that had caused the departure of the groom. 
Unlike Origen, Gregory overlooked the presence of sin altogether: the soul ascended 
to the divine unhindered. We agree with Otis that it was due to diverging 
anthropologies that Origen and Gregory presented different approaches to sin. As 
Otis observed, Origen was occupied with the idea of the soul's potential lapsing, and 
her "return" to the divine. 178 To this position, Otis juxtaposed Gregory's optimism: 
Gregory highlighted the soul's "pursuit" of divine knowledge instead. 179 This might 
be so. However, the reason why Gregory overlooked the presence of sin is not 
merely because he refined Origenism. As Meredith and Keenan have shown, 
Gregory illustrated the theological tension of Patristic literature to argue spiritual life 
in terms of the efficacy of the redemptive work of Christ. 180 Thus, that the soul 
ascended unhindered was not due to her knowledge of her own weakness, as Origen 
might have put it. 181 It was due to the incarnation and the passion. 182 Thus, Gregory 
viewed sin and human weakness as utterly overcome by means of the incarnation. 
178 For Otis, Origen was holding a Platonic understanding about the soul's changeability as a negative 
attribute: changeability meant moral mutability that urged the soul to move from good to evil. Otis, 
'Cappadocian Thought', 101 ff. On the opposite side, through his notion of epektasis as the unceasing 
quest for the divine, Gregory shifted the terms arguing that changeability was the quality that enabled 
the soul to pursue her unceasing quest to know God. 
179 Gregory, Hom. 12, 366: "otd touto mivtotE tote; €~-tnpoaOEv lmEKtEtvo~-ttVT] ou 7tllUEtat Kilt ano 
wu tv ci> tattv t~touall Kilt npoc; to tv06tEpov daouo~-ttVT] tv ci> ounro l:'ytv~:to" (for this reason, 
she [the soul] does not cease always to stretch ahead, and leaving behind the place she is, she moves 
even deeper where she has not yet been). 
180 Athanasius might have been Gregory's source at this point. Cf. A. Meredith, The Cappadocians, 69 
and 87. See also, Keenan, 'De Professione Christiana' for Gregory's Christocentrism. As will be 
discussed in the 3'd part; indeed, in his Vita Antonii, Athanasius had envisaged the spiritual life in the 
light of the incarnation: Athanasius' Antony was victorious over passions due to Christ's victory over 
sin. For Meredith, Gregory's Christocentric argument was part of the Cappadocian's reaction to 
Appolinarian human minimalism in Christology. See Meredith, 'Plato's "Cave" (Republic vii 514a-
517e) in Origen, Plotinus, and Gregory ofNyssa'. 
181 Gregory, Hom. 6, 174: "[O]td tf]c; t&v €~-tnpoaOEv tnEKtc:ia~:roc; tv A.l'JOU ytvo~-ttvrov t&v 
npootT]VUa~-ttvrov" (stretching out, forgetting of what is behind). Cf. Phil 3.12. The term epektasis 
became a technical term only after Danielou's monumental work on Gregory of Nyssa. Danielou 
emphasised that epektasis connotes the soul's ceaseless pursuit for the divine due to divine infinity. 
See J. Danielou, 'L'Epektase', in Platonisme, 291-307. Idem, From Glory to Glory: Texts from 
Gregory of Nyssa's Mystical Writings, trans. Herbert Musurillo (Crestwood NY: SVS, 1979), 56-71. 
M. Canevet, 'Le Perception de Ia presence de Dieu: A propos d'une expression de Ia Xle homelie sur 
le Cantique des Cantiques', in J. Fontaine and Ch. Kannengiesser (eds.), Epektasis: Melanges 
patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Danielou (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 443-454. 
182 Gregory, Hom. 2, 51 :"[y]i;yovE ~-t€v f] iJ.vOpronivT] cp6atc; tou iJ.A.T]Otvou cprotoc; iJ.nEtK6vta~-tll n6ppro 
t&v CJKO'tEtv&v XllPilK'tl'jprov tfl toU iJ.pXE'tU7t01) Kc:iA.A.ouc; b~-tot6tl]tt atiA.Pouall, b M 7tEtpaa~-toc; 'tOV 
cpA.oycOOT] KUUOffiVIl ot' iJ.nc:itT]c; tmPill..rov ... EiJOuc; otd tf]c; 7tllpllKof]c; iJ.7tO~T]pc:ivllc; ... otd tf]c; KllUCJEffic; 
~-ttA.Ilv tnoiT]CJEV" (human nature became an image of the true light, shining forth the archetypal beauty 
far from dark features; the temptation cast upon it the flaming heat through deception... he 
immediately dried it up ... he blackened it through burning heat). In this passage, Christ's redemptive 
work is realised in the efficacy of baptism. The soul had lost her divine image through the fall. But 
baptism restored this divine image within the soul. 
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But this is not to say that Gregory believed that the soul was assaulted by trials 
any more. He illustrated such trials in terms of hindrance: 
[The soul] should look into herself and walk on the divine way with every safety, 
leaping across and overcoming all the hindrances that appear on her way from 
temptations. 183 
We need to note that in this present passage from In Canticum, Gregory maintained a 
good deal ofOrigenist thought: 184 the soul had meditated on her nature, and thus, she 
overcame what might obstruct her way to the divine. It is important to highlight the 
fact that Gregory referred to temptations that seem to continue afflicting the soul. 
Indeed, Gregory did not deny that the soul remained subjected to assaults from evil 
spirits and pride: 
So, if someone establishes his soul to have tranquility in waveless silence, [the soul] 
shall not be disturbed by the evil spirits, or arrogant in pride, or foamy from the 
waves of anger, or shaken by any other passion and wandering in the winds that stir 
up the various waves ofpassions. 185 
What Gregory implied is that, at the summit of the spiritual life, the soul was not 
unassaulted by trials and temptations: the soul reached the stage of apatheia. The 
term indicates that the soul remained undisturbed from temptations assaulting her. As 
Danielou has observed, temptations are coterminous with this present life. 186 As long 
as the soul had remained in this life, she remained subjected to trials and temptations. 
Comparing Origen with Gregory of Nyssa, Otis ably observed that "Gregory, of 
course, refers to temptation en route, but for him this is never a temptation to relapse 
once the final "shadow" has been entered". 187 We need to view Otis' observation in 
terms of Gregory's eschatological direction. The soul remained afflicted by 
183 Gregory, Hom. 3, 80: "[1t]po<; f:autl)v ~A.tm:tv Kai l>t' iiacpaA.da<; miaT]<; 1tpO<; tOV eEtov OpOjlOV 
tm:iy~:aeat mivta td i:K m:tpaajlrov nvrov f:yytv6jlEVa 1tpO<; tov l>p6jlOV Ejl1t6l>ta l>taA.A.ojlEVTJV Kat 
U1tE~aivouaav". Cf. Gregory, Beat. 1.85.lff: "'0 ydp 1tp0<; tautov, Kai 111'1 td 1tEpi autov ~AE1t(J)V, 
obK liv ~:bA.6yro<; ~:i<; to totoutov f:jlmaot mi6o<;" (one who looks into himself and not at what is 
around him could not readily fall into such a condition). Gregory has used the same expression to 
show that the soul that has looked into herself could not be assailed by pride. At this instance, 
Gregory has exemplified that "looking into herself' means meditating on her humble origin. However, 
the overall homiletical overtones of the De Beatitudinibus suggest that Gregory has been carried away 
in addressing his audience rather than pondering on spiritual mysteries. Pride in the latter work seems 
not to have sprung from spiritual ascensions but earthly-possessions. 
184 Gregory, Hom. 2, 58-59. The soul's past sinfulness was related to her pride. 
185 Gregory, Hom. 3, 81: "d toivuv outro tt<; tl)v tautou 'l'uxl)v Kataatl'JaEtEV, ffi<; abtl'Jv tE 
yaA.itVTJV EX.EtV tv iiK6jlOVt tfl flaux.i~ jlTJOEV 1tapaKtVOUIJ.EVTJV l:K t&v 1tVEUiJ.O.trov tTJ<; 1tOVT]pia<; 
llTttE ot' um:pT]q>avia<; oioaivouaav jll'jtE tot<; tou 6UjlOU KUjlaatv l;~aq>pi~ouaav llTttE Kat' dUo tt 
1tO.Oo<; KA.uorovt~OiJ.EVTJV Kat 1tEptq>Epo1J.EVTJV 1tavti ilvtjl(p tiP td 1tOtKiA.a K6jlata t&v 7taOT]jlO.trov 
l:y~:ipovn". 
186 J. Danielou, 'La Lutte contre les Tentations', in Platonisme, 87-92. 
187 Otis, 'Cappadocian Thought', 116 [footnote no. 52]. 
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temptations. However, the grace brought by the incarnation "secured" the soul from 
lapsing. The soul continued to labour ethically until the time of her rest to come. 188 
To this end, Gregory introduced the notion of interchanging periods between 
rest and trials, which seems to have developed independently of Origen. In fact, 
Gregory followed the language of the Song introducing the interaction between 
"winter" and "spring". Whereas the latter connoted spiritual rest -the time that 
virtues had shone forth- the former period was synonymous with trials and 
temptations: "this present time lies between the two seasons of the winter dejection 
and ofthe summer communion ofthe fruits". 189 Gregory presented the soul's current 
condition as balancing between the cultivation of virtues and the expectation oftrials. 
He made the distinction between "early figs" (6Auv9oi) and "mature figs" (yAuKtoc; Kai 
n:AEiou Kaprro0). 190 That is to say that, Gregory distinguished between the initial fruits 
of virtue and the mature works of virtue. This distinction was meant to introduce the 
position that this life is conducted with the interaction of the winter of trials and the 
spring of virtue. Thus, Gregory maintained the Origenist tension between resting and 
labouring. Regardless of the soul's spiritual ascension to the divine, the present life 
was expected to be conducted in labour and rest. Gregory alluded to Mt 13:39 to 
bring forth the scriptural foundation of his argument: 
For this reason, on the one hand, it expressly announces the provision of evils, and 
on the other hand, it does not present perfectly the fruits of virtue. But, she [i.e. the 
soul] will deposit them in proper time, when the summer shall come. You know 
188 Modem research discusses Gregory's eschatology in terms of his universalism and also his position 
of epektasis. For instance see: A. A. Mosshammer, 'Historical Time and the Apokatastasis according 
to Gregory of Nyssa', SP 27 (1993), 70-93. Also, M. Ludlow, Universal Salvation: Eschatology in the 
Thought ofGregory of Nyssa and Karl Rahner, OThM (Oxford: OUP, 2000). Thus, modem research 
overlooks the fact that an aspect of Gregory's eschatology was that the soul was expecting her 
liberation from trials. If the idea of epektasis and the unknowing knowledge of God had, somehow, 
limited the importance of eschatology for Gregory, the fact that in both De Beatutitinibus and In 
Canticum Gregory illustrated a firm distinction between "here" and "there" or "now" and "then", 
gives evidence that, in his thought, Gregory incorporated a genuine Christian anticipation of the 
eschaton as the point in history that would bring something new to the soul. M. Alexandre, 
'Perspectives eschatologiques dans les homelies sur les Beatitudes de Gregoire de Nysse', in Drobner 
and Viciano (eds.), Homilies on the Beatitudes, 257-291. 
189 Gregory, Hom. 5, 155: "[OJ M Katpoc; outoc; 1J.E96pt6c; l:crtt t&v ouo Katp&v, tfjc; tE X,Et!J.Eptvfjc; 
Katfl<pdac; Kat tfjc; EV tcp Of:pEt tiDV Kap7tiDV IJ.EtOUOtac;". 
190 Gregory, Hom. op. cit.: "to tolvuv npo tou yA.uKt:oc; tE Kal. tEA.Eiou Kapnou uno tfjc; auKilc; l:v 
Kapn&v EtOEt 7tpoPaH61J.EVOV oA.uveoc; A.t:yEtat, 07tEP Kal. abto !J.eV EOcOOt!J.OV ecre' OtE toic; 
pouA.oiJ.f:Votc; l:crtiv. ot IJ.TtV l:KEiv6 l:crttv b Kapn6c;, liHd tou Kapnou npooi!J.toV yivEtat" (so that, 
which appears before the sweet and mature fruit from the fig tree in the form of a fruit, is called an 
early fig, and it is edible for those that desire it; it is not the mature fruit, but it is the beginning of the 
mature fruit). 
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about the meaning of the summer from the voice of the Lord which says that: "the 
harvest is the consummation of the age". 191 
Gregory presented this life as conducted in tension between labouring (winter) and 
resting (spring), until the Second Coming that signaled the soul's harvesting the 
fruits of her virtue (summer). Thus, Gregory maintained a clear eschatological 
perspective. 
In arguing thus, Gregory showed the need for moral and ethical struggle. 
Gregory exhorted to ethical vigilance and also presented us with the idea that 
spiritual life is not an intellectual exercise. Moral life was standing at the same level 
with the soul's grasping God through faith. 
Finally, we need to look more closely at the expression meq6pto~. Gregory did 
not find refuge in the notion of abandonment in order to argue that this life was 
balanced between two conditions. Unlike his contemporaries Macarius and Evagrius, 
Gregory developed a spirituality that derived from his distinct anthropology. This 
life is J1&86pto~ (being a boundary); for the human being is a J1&86ptov being a 
boundary between heaven and earth, the intelligible and tangible, anticipation and 
fulfilment. 192 In Ladner's word, 
[the] temporal rhythm is one of life and death, of wakefulness and sleep, of tension 
and relaxation, of continuous renewal until time be consumed and consummated in 
eternity. What Gregory says about reformation and time, resurrection and eternity, 
stands on the border line between the philosophical-physiological and the mystical-
ascetical aspects of his anthropology. 19 
Gregory developed an anthropology in which he implanted the notion of mediation 
at the centre: in all his aspects, man is a medium between two conditions. This 
position shows that Gregory provided a uniform understanding of man: before the 
191 Gregory, Hom. op. cit.: "otd tot.ltO to J.1EV 1tapqlX,llKEVat td KaKd otappflOllV €00'Y'Y€AH;Etat, touc; 
OE Kap1tOUc; tf)c; itpEtf)c; OU1tffi t€f...droc; 1tpoodKVUOtv. af...Ad toutauc; J.1EV EV tcp Ka9f1KOV'tt Katpcp 
taJ.LtEUOEtat, 6tav l:votfl to Of:poc; otoac; oE 1tlivtroc; to otd tol> Of:pouc; OllAOUJ.1€VOV l:K tf)c; tou 
KUptOU q>rovf)c;, i'J tOUt6 QlllOtv ()n '0 9EptOJ.10c; OUVtEAEta tOU al.rov6c; l:ottv". 
192 Gregory, Hom. II' 334: "t] av9pro1ttVll ljiUX.tl Olio q>UO€ffiV ouoa IJ.€96ptoc;, rov t] J.1EV aomJ.1at6c; 
l:ott Kat voEpd Kat I'LKT)patoc; t] BE l:tf:pa oroJ.LattKtl Kat uA.ri:Jo11c; Kat liA.oyoc;" (the human soul is 
being a boundary between two natures, the one bodiless and intelligible and uncompounded, the other 
bodiless and material and irrational). Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, De Opificio Hominis, PG 44, 125-256. 
For the Christocentric dimension of Gregory's pc06p1~ see Balthasar, Presence, 146-147. L. 
Thunberg, 'The Human as Microcosm', in B. McGinn and J. Leclercq (eds.), Christian Sprituality: 
Origins to the Twelfth Century, World Spirituality 16 (New York NY: Crossroad, 1985), 295-297. E. 
Corsini, 'L'Harmonie du monde et l'homme microcosme dans Ie De Hominis Opificio', in Fontaine 
and Kannengiesser (eds.), Epektasis: Melanges patristiques o.fferts au cardinal Jean Danielou, 455-
462. Cf. Nemesius of Emessa, De Natura Hominis, M. Morani (ed.), Bibliotheca Scriptorum 
Graecorum et Romanorum Tevbneriana (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1987), 1,45 [pg. 5]. 
193 Ladner, 'The Philosophical Anthropology', 59-94 [the above citation on pg. 86]. 
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fall -mediating between intelligible and tangible; in this present life -mediating 
between labour and rest; and in the future life -mediating between anticipation and 
fulfilment. What Gregory achieved was a theological synthesis that maintained more 
positive elements about humanity than Origenist thought. Gregory gave his spiritual 
teaching a remarkable balance in arguing divine presence and absence without 
referring to sin, even as a potential foe. And again, the notion of absence due to 
divine incomprehensibility introduced the notion that man was meant to exist in a 
state of mediating between extreme conditions uniting them and illustrating their 
dialectical form. 
c. Theodoret of Cyrrhus: the ethical development 
Theodoret and Nilus formed their exegesis on the Song in a milieu that was 
already familiar with the work on the biblical text of the great masters, Origen and 
Gregory. Both authors were mentioned by name in Theodoret's work. 194 Despite the 
fact that Nilus did not refer to any exegete prior to his age, the critical text of 
Rosenbaum and Guerard's analysis of Nilus' commentary establishes the exegetical 
indebtedness of Nilus to Origen and Gregory. 195 It is important to demonstrate here 
the familiarity of the two exegetes with the work of Origen and Gregory in order to 
show their similarities with -and points of departure from- Origenist and Gregorian 
thought. 
It needs to be noticed that, alongside the exegetical ambience of late antiquity, 
the two later exegetes were also familiar with the development of monastic thought 
across the Byzantine Empire. In what follows, we will demonstrate Theodoret and 
Nilus' ascetical connections. In doing so, we will suggest that the two exegetes of 
late antiquity have departed from Origenist and Gregorian exegesis as they have 
enriched their understanding of divine abandonment with ascetical ideals. 
Origen had lived in the age of the last martyrs. Asceticism was primitive in its 
structures. Gregory of Nyssa knew Evagrius personally due to the strong affiliation 
between the young Evagrius and Gregory's brother Basil and his friend, Gregory of 
Nazianzus. 196 However, as Keenan observed, at that time, Gregory was only familiar 
194 Theodoret, Expl. Prrefatio, 32B. Theodoret did not refer to their exegetical work, as such. He 
related that both authors had supported the spiritual value of the Song. 
195 See the introduction by Guerard in Nil d' Ancyre, Commentaire sur le Cantique des Cantiques, vol. 
I, M.G. Guerard (ed.), SC 403 (1994), 23. 
196 Basil had appointed Evagrius as lector. Bousset supported that Evagrius also received the monastic 
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with the ascetical system of two members of his family, i.e. Basil and Makrina. 197 
The two had supported a coenobitic system of ascetical withdrawal from the world. It 
is established that Gregory's thought had an impact on young Evagrius. 198 What is of 
importance for us is that Gregory was interacting with a sort of premature ascetical 
spirituality. 
This was not the same for Theodoret and Nilus who lived at a time when 
Evagrius had presented his unique synthesis on the ascetical life and the presence of 
the desert fathers was becoming more and more significant for the life of the Church. 
We take as a point of reference the development of Evagrian thought in the desert 
from the 4th to the 6th century A.D. 199 
By the time Theodoret became bishop of Cyrrhus, Syria had become a thriving 
place for asceticism.2°0 His Historia Re/igiosa has provided the necessary historical 
evidence to establish the strong affiliation between the bishop of Cyrrhus and the 
ascetical communities in Syria. However, Urbainczyk has maintained that Theodoret 
composed this latter work for political reasons; in defence of Antiochean 
theology/spirituality -as opposed to Alexandrian theology/spirituality.201 But such an 
argument overlooks the fact that the life of Theodoret had been marked by the 
presence of anchorites from an early age.202 Primarily, it dismisses Theodoret's 
habit from Basil. However, Bamberger doubted this position. See Bamberger's introduction in 
Evagrius Ponticus, The Praktikos and Chapters on Prayer, trans. J. E. Bamberger, CS 4 (1981), 
xxxvi-xxxvii [footnote no. 55]. Gregory of Nazianzus ordained Evagrius as a deacon shortly after 
A.D. 379 (Basil's death). Evagrius participated in the general council in Constantinople (A.D. 381), 
where Gregory of Nyssa opened the proceedings. Gregory himself dedicated a letter to Evagrius on 
the occasion of the latter's ordination. Gregory of Nyssa, De Deitate adversus Evagrium, GNO 9 
(1967), 331-341. 
197 Keenan, 'De Professione Christiana', 169-172. 
198 Jaeger addressed Gregory's influence on Evagrius. See W. Jaeger, Two Rediscovered Works of 
Ancient Christian Literature: Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius, Harvard Institute for Classical Studies 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954), 208ff. Evagrius, The Praktikos, xxxviii-xxxix. 
199 The first date coincides with the beginning ofEvagrius' literary activity in the Egyptian desert. The 
latter date signifies the outburst of the Origenist-Evagrian controversy in the desert ascetical 
communities that reached its peak with the condemnation of Origenism-Evagrianism in A.D. 553 (2"d 
council in Constantinople). 
200 For the history and character of monasticism in Syria see A. VMbus, History of Asceticism in the 
Syrian Orient: A Contribution to the History of Culture in the Near East, vols. 1-2, CSCO 184&197 
(1958-1960). Ph. Escolan, Monachisme et eglise: Le monachisme syrien du JVe au Vlle siecle, 
Theologie Historique 109 (Paris: Beuchesne, 1999). 
201 Th. Urbainczyk, Theodoret ofCyrrhus: The Bishop and the Holy Man (Ann Arbor MI: University 
of Michigan Press, 2002). 
202 Urbainczyk maintained the idea that any personal connection between Theodoret and the ascetics 
was introduced deliberately into the work in order to establish Theodoret's ecclesiastical status. See 
Urbainczyk, Theodoret ofCyrrhus. Theodoret related that he was the fruit of a monk's prayers since 
his mother could not conceive. See Theodoret of Cyrrhus, A History of the Monks of Syria, trans. R. 
M. Rice, CS 88 (1985), Macedonius. For the bond ofTheodoret with the Syrian ascetics from an early 
age see the introduction in CS 88, pg xi-xiii. 
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admiration for ascetical examples -since he, himself, was a monk at "Nicerte near 
Apameia"- and overlooks the fact that Theodoret composed his work at a time when 
ascetical biographies had become an established genre (e.g. Athanasius and 
Palladius).2°3 Rice observed that, even as a bishop, Theodoret maintained his 
monastic ideals -for a short time, he had the chance to return to his monastery in 
A.D. 449.204 That is not to say that ecclesiastical politics might not have been a 
strong drive for Theodoret to compose his Historia Re/igiosa.205 But, we need to 
acknowledge a deeper intimacy between the bishop of Cyrrhus and the Syrian 
ascetics. 206 According to Canivet, Theodoret has reflected on such ideals in his 
Historia Religiosa?07 However, we agree with Urbainczyk about the content of the 
work. Theodoret's Historia Religiosa was not composed as a work including 
ascetical teachings. Unlike the Apophthegmata Patrum and even the Historia 
Lausiaca, Theodoret has focused on the extrodinary character of the lives of the 
Syriac ascetics, as opposed to their spiritual teachings. Was Thedoret directly 
influenced by ascetical ideals when he was composing his Explanatio in Canticum 
Canticorum? 
In the Prcefatio of his commentary, Theodoret provided information about the 
circumstances under which he undertook his exegetical attempt on the Song?08 his 
addressee209 had requested Theodoret for such a commentary. Theodoret had 
indicated that, in composing his work, his main concern was with contemporary 
objections about the spiritual value of the work.210 Yet, his addressee was not a 
monastic. In fact, Theodoret provided no hints that the work was read by monastics. 
203 Theodoret ofCyrrhus, A History, xii. Cf. Theodoret ofCyrrhus, Epistulae 80 and 81 [in SC 98, pp. 
188-198] 
204 Theodoret, A History, xiii. Cf. Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Epistula 119 [in SC Ill, pg. 76-82]. 
205 For Pasztori-Kupan, the In Canticum and Historia Religiosa belonged to the same period of 
Theodoret's theological career. See I. Pasztori-Kupan, Theodore/ of Cyrrhus, Early Church Fathers 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 18. 
206 No modem monograph has discussed Theodoret's spiritual thought in his In Canticum. Cf. P. 
Canivet, 'La Spiritualite de Theodoret dans l'Histoire Philothee', in Theodoret de Cyr, Histoire des 
moines de Syrie: Histoire Philothee, P. Canivet (ed.), SC 234 (1977), 44- 51. 
207 For Syrian monastic ideals see P. Canivet, Le Monachisme syrien selon Theodoret de Cyr, 
Theologie Historique 42 (Paris: Beauchense, 1977). According to VMbus the translation of the 
Evagrian corpus into Syrian might have occurred as early as the middle of the 5th century. See, A. 
VMbus, 'The Role of Evagrius', in History of Asceticism in the Syrian Orient: A Contribution to the 
History ofCulture in the Near East, vol. 3, CSCO 81 (1988), 142-150. 
208 For Quasten, the commentary on the Song was the earliest exegetical attempt of Theodoret. J. 
Quasten, Patro/ogy: The Golden Age of Patristic Literature, vol. 3 (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1960), 540. 
209 The subscription of the work was addresses to "E>wqnA.Eatlitcp emmc6ncp 'lc.olivvn". According to 
Quasten it was John ofGermanicia. Quasten, ibid, 540. 
210 Theodoret, Exp/. Prrefatio, 29A. For the historical context and related scepticism with regard to the 
exact circumstances that led to his commentary see Elliott, Christology, 35. 
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It remains to discuss whether Theodoret was reading the Song as a work of value for 
ascetics. 
Theodoret presented a unique synthesis in his exegesis. It was observed that 
Origen and Gregory had illustrated two differing traditions: Origen referred to the 
presence of trials in the Song of Songs as linked to the notion of divine abandonment. 
Gregory had only discussed an intellectual understanding of the episode where the 
soul had been introduced to the notion of divine incomprehensibility. It was in the 
work of Theodoret that the two notions of ethical and intellectual exercise finally 
came together. 
Theodoret related the incident to the tradition of the lamentation psalms. He 
indicated that the episode in Sol3:1 echoed Ps 12:2. In the latter, the theme of God's 
"turning away his face" had been introduced. 211 In discerning the inter-biblical 
connection between the Song and the lamentation Psalms, Theodoret highlighted the 
biblical foundation of the experience. The episode in Sol 3: 1 was in conformity with 
the biblical imagery in the Psalms. Theodoret dealt with an episode that had 
occurred in other places in the biblical canon. By implying this position, Theodoret 
suggested that his exegesis was in conformity with the scriptural evidence. He also 
indicated that it was the biblical imagery that had provided evidence about the 
exegetical position that he needed to follow. Gregory had introduced divine infinity 
in his early works. Yet it was only when he composed exegeses on the Song and 
Exodus that he fully exploited the motif of divine abandonment. However, for 
Gregory, the motif of abandonment was a theological device for Christian 
anthropology. As in the case of Gregory, the motif of abandonment appeared only 
once in Theodoret's work, i.e. in his present commentary. There is no indication that 
Theodoret had incorporated the notion of divine abandonment within a broader 
anthropological context -as opposed to his seniors Macarius and Evagrius. 
Theodoret's initial silence about the cause of the experience -at least in his 
opening lines- indicated his dependence on the biblical narrative, as opposed to a 
systematic exposition of Christian anthropology: 
211 This is not the only biblical allusion by Theodoret. He has also brought into play the case of Paul 
(2 Cor 12:7-9) and Elijah (IKgs 19:4). 
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Many times while exercising the souls of the faithful, the God of all permits them to 
encounter manifold trials, sometimes giving the petitioners relief, sometimes delaying 
this gift, devising benefit from all quarters for his followers. 212 
Despite the fact that Theodoret introduced the motif of divine paideia (yu!Jva~wv-
rra1~Euwv ), he did not discern a specific cause that would refer directly to the soul. 
For Theodoret, the groom has departed to exercise his beloved. However, Theodoret 
did not provide an analysis of that which needed to be exercised within the soul. 
If we are to take into account Pasztori-Kupan's observation that Theodoret's 
exegetical works belong to the same period between Ephesus (A.D. 431) and 
Chalcedon (A. D. 451 ), then it seems that, in his In Canticum, Theodoret departed 
from his own exegetical line of reasoning. In his Qucestiones ad Octateuchum, 
Theodoret had indicated that God permitted trials to occur in order to exercise the 
soul's self-determination (aurE~oumov). This is a line of reasoning that Theodoret had 
presented in various other places in his exegetical work? 13 It was self-determination 
that was the subject of divine paideia. In his In Canticum, Theodoret did not bring 
into play the motif of self-determination. Before we continue, we need to make some 
observations about Theodoret's exegesis. 
i) Theodoret viewed the episode of Sol 3: 1 as related to divine abandonment. In 
Gregory, the bride's abandonment had taken the form of divine hiddenness, as 
opposed to separation-forsakenness. Gregory identified divine presence with the 
soul's desire, i.e. the wound of God within the soul. Thus, Gregory presented a 
dialectic between presence and hiddenness: God was hiding; yet he was present 
within the soul through her desire. Theodoret followed another exegetical route: God 
truly abandoned the soul: "abandoning him (i.e. Elijahi 14 for a while ... he appears to 
him"?15 Reflecting on the same episode, Gregory had used the verb Kara.J..eilcw while 
212 Theodoret, Exp/. 2.113A: "fUjlVU~O)V 1tOAAUKt<; b t&v ol..rov 8Eo<; t&v EUOI::~&v td<; ljiUXdc:;, 
1tEtpaOjlOt<; 1tOtKil..ot<; ounropd 1tEpt1tt1ttEtV, Kat 1tOtS jlSV lmaHayl'lv attOUjll::Vot<; oioroot, 1tOtS OS 
c'lva~O.H~:tat tl'lv Mmv, 1tavtax69~:v i.O<pl::I..Etav toi<; 9taomtat<; !lllxavmjlEVo<;". 
213 Cf. Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Qurestiones in Deuteronomium, 37 [PG 80, 440A]: "ob ~ta~Etat os t&v 
c'lv9pm1trov tl'lv yvffi!lllV, c'll..l..d ttP abt~:~ouoicp 1tapaxroplft" ([God] does not force human choice, but 
makes way for self-determination). Theodoret, Psa/. PG 80, 1716.41: "ttP abt~:~ouoicp 1tapaxrop&v, 
Kat td<; jltV l::nt~oul..d<; lll'l Kroi..Urov" ([God] makes way for self-determination without preventing 
hostilities). Idem, Interpretatio in Ezechie/is Prophetiam, 21.17 [PG 81, 1 0 13 B]: "ttP abtE~ouoicp t&v 
c'lv9pm1tffiV 1tapaxrop&v, Kai ttP tp61tcp tOUtro oiKa<; t&v c'ljlaptlljlUtrov 1tpatt6jlEVO<;" ([God) gives 
way to human self-determination, and in this way he lays judgement upon misdeeds). 
214 Theodoret, Exp/. 2.113C: "Katal..mi.ov abtov 1tPO<; bl..iyov ... i::nupaivEtat abtW'. Having 
introducing the case of Paul, Theodoret alluded to 1Kgs 19:4 (Elijah). 
215 Theodoret was familiar with the Platonic motif of a "sudden" appearance. The context, however, in 
which he used the motif was different in that he placed the term within a Christo logical context. Due 
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negating divine abandonment: "My beloved has departed, not abandoning the soul 
that follows him, but attracting her to him".Z16 Theodoret moved to the affirmative: 
"abandoning him for a while to be exercised". 217 
ii) This is not to say that God has forsaken the soul. Following Origenist 
exegesis, Theodoret related divine abandonment to the presence of trials. It is in trials 
that the soul comes to realise divine abandonment. However, Theodoret has 
developed this Origenist notion: divine abandonment does not refer to divine 
forsakenness. The motif took on the means of God's postponing his intervention: 
God delays intervening in the soul's trials.218 Theodoret constantly reminded his 
reader of this position in his exegetical works. Despite the fact that God could have 
prevented trials, he gave his permission for them. This assertion played a single role 
in his work: to refute the Gnostic attack that God was the author of evil 
deeds/misfortunes. In relating trials to divine permission, Theodoret distinguished 
between giving consent to and causing trials. God did not cause trials. Yet he gave 
his consent: "the God of all permits them to encounter manifold trials".219 Theodoret 
had composed a work on divine providence (De Providentia) arguing that God was 
the author only of good deeds.Z20 In his exegesis, the· term "auyxropEi" was 
Theodoret's device to distinguish between divine providence and misfortunes. Thus, 
he discerned that a divine plan had been at work.221 The human individual was meant 
to the incarnation, the soul was suddenly cleansed from her idolatry. Whereas, in Plato, Philo -and 
Origen to some extent- the adverb had addressed the encounter between God and soul, in Theodoret, 
the adverb referred to the advent of the Logos in his flesh. It was due to this latter fact that the soul 
was cleansed from her previous idolatry. Cf. Theodoret, Exp/. 1.69C. 
216 Cf. Gregory, Hom. 12, 353: " 1 Aot::A.qn06~ jlOU 1tapl1A.8Ev, ob KataA.mffiv tl'lv !:1tojltvTJv abt4J 
\jiU;(llV and 1tp0~ tUUtOV !:cpEAK6j.1EVO~". 
217 Theodoret, Exp/. 2.113C. 
218 Cf. Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Epistu/ae, 93 [in SC 98, pg 244]: "' P~otov jlEV ydp Jiv tcp t&v oA.rov 
6Ecp VEUCJUt Kai A.uaat td CJKU8pom6.: an· ava~unt::tat Kai t&v 1tOAEj.10UjlEV(l)V tl'IV avopEiav 
lmtoEtKvu~ Kai bjliv acpopjld~ sl~ fficpf:A.Etav 1tap£xrov" (it is easy for the God of all to nod and 
dissolve the sorrow; but he postpones, manifesting the courage of the afflicted and providing a cause 
of edification for us). 
219 Theodoret, Exp/. 2.113A. Cf. Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Historia Re/igiosa, 31.17: " 'AA.A.d Kai 
t1tUjlUVOVt0~ tOU ewu, KUl tfl jlUKpo8Ujliq. YUjlVU/;;OVto~. Kai ounropouvto~ oexsoeat til~ MtKia~ 
td~ 1tpoo~oA.6.~. b1.1oiro~ otf:jlstvsv aya1t&v" (and with God's assistance, exercising his long-suffering 
allowing to accept the afflictions of injustice, he remained in the same love). Cf. Procopius of Gaza, 
Fragmenta, PG 87, 17730: "Muv11 crol trrtABn crapK6~. Kar<'.t cruvxwpEmv tiJ~V yivwcrKE ro ToloOmv 
tmcru1Jj30IVEIV crOI· Tva ri TIP~ t~Jt ay61Tll1TClai Kan:lOllAO~ yiVETal, ~-~~ tvOIOOUOll~ TOI~ lTEIPOOIJOI~. Kai ouxi 01<'.1 TO ~-~~ 
dvm rrp6v01av trri rr6vTa OI~Koucrav" (when bodily distress might come upon you, know that this happens 
to you according to my consent. So that your love for me might become apparent to everyone, not 
giving in to temptations, and not because there is no providence extending over everything). 
220 Theodoret, De Providentia, PG 83, 556-773. 
221 Note also the presence of Til~ cpuyfl~ T~v oiKovoiJiav in the text. Theodoret, Expl. 2.113C. 
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to profit from the experience: "devising benefit from all quarters for his 
followers". 222 
iii) Theodoret had developed the motif of divine consent within a 
Christological context. The fact that --unlike the Apophthegmata Patrum and the 
Lausiac History-- Theodoret did not mention this motif in his Historia Religiosa, 
indicates that the latter work was not composed as a book including "ascetical" 
teachings. 223 In his Christo logical works, like Cyril, Theodoret had highlighted the 
fact that Christ's divinity permitted his humanity to experience natural human 
passions.224 That is, it is only through divine intervention that humanity was 
subjected -or not- to natural human passions, such as thirst. Due to the fact that the 
date of exegetical composition on the Song remains debatable, it is not clear whether 
Theodoret had introduced the notion of divine permission into an anthropological 
context which he later on applied to his Christology or vice versa.225 Origen had 
already introduced the notion of divine consent with regard to trials. 226 In the Lausiac 
Histor/27 and the Spiritual Homilies of Macarius,228 we encounter a developed 
notion of divine consent with regard to trials (napax.ropllm~-cruyx.ropTtm~). It seems 
that, from an anthropological context, the notion was adapted in order to be exploited 
in the Christological debates of late antiquity.229 
222 Theodoret, Expl. 2.113A: "navmx68Ev (mptA.Etav to'i<; 8taorotat<; lll'JXUVWjlEVo<;". Cf. Theodoret, 
EpP. PG 82, 449: "[reflecting on 2 Cor. 12:7] tOutou ydp o1) xuptv, cplloi, tf]<; E!lf]<; b AEo7t6tll<; 
7tp0j.11180UjlEVO<; rocpEA.Eia<;, tOU<; 7tUVtOOU7tOU<; jlot CIUVEKA.t'JprooE 1tEtpaOjlOU<;" (for this reason, he 
says, the Lord devising for my benefit, he chose the lot for me of various temptations). 
223 Theodoret did not related divine paideia to trials or self-determination in his Historia Religiosa. In 
this latter work, divine paideia meant learning of the scriptures. 
224 Theodoret ofCyrrhus, De Incarnatione Domini, PG 75, 1457C. Cf. Cyril, De Sancta Trinitate, PG 
75, 1033B-C. 
225 There is not much evidence in Theodoret's work in this matter. Scholars tend to support one 
position or the other according to their disposition towards Theodoret's Christology. For scholars 
supporting that Theodoret had always maintained an Orthodox theology, his Commentary on the Song 
of Songs belonged to an early stage of his career as an exegete (e.g. Guinot). For those scholars that 
hold that Theodoret was tamed in Chalcedon, the book was one of his latest compositions where he 
had the chance to present his Chalcedonean Orthodoxy for fear of being deposed from his office (e.g. 
Richard and Bardy). Cf. J. N. Guinot, 'La Christo Iogie de Tbeodoret de Cyr', 256-272. Elliott, 
Christology, 34-35. Pasztori-Kupan has suggested of a middle solution placing the composition during 
the "cold war years" between Ephesus (A.D. 431) and Chalcedon (A.D. 451 ). Pasztori-Kupan, 
Theodoret ofCyrrhus, 18. 
226 Origen, Fragment a in Lucam (in catenis ), 192 [number of fragments in GCS 49]. 
227 Palladius, Laus. 47 [reference to vita]. 
228 Theodoret would have known Macari us as part of the Egyptian desert tradition. It is only in recent 
years that scholars established the Syriac ambience of the Macarian spiritual corpus. For a review of 
the literature see: M. Plested, The Macarian Legacy: The Place of Macarius-Symeon in the Eastern 
Christian Tradition, OxThM (Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
229 In his Historia Religiosa, Theodoret did not refer to any technical ascetical terms such as: 
temptations, pride and listlessness. Voobus supported the peculiar character of Syrian asceticism 
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The next step that Theodoret took was to introduce the scriptural images of 
Paul and Elijah?30 Theodoret did not seem to distinguish between the two scriptural 
figures and their causes of abandonment: both figures had undergone abandonment. 
Theodoret maintained his line of reasoning: God did not intervene to deliver his 
devotee from his afflictions. Paul had prayed to be spared from his experience. But 
God did not remove the "thorn in the flesh"; "and Paul pleads, but he is not 
granted".231 Elijah "is looking for the defender"?32 However, "he [i.e. God] abandons 
him for a while to be exercised through fear". 233 Theodoret did not discern any 
variations between the motif of abandonment as it had appeared in Ps 12:2 and its 
occurrence in 2 Cor. 12:7-9 and 1Kgs 19:4; at least not explicitly. 
However, one could discern such a distinction when taking into account the 
way in which Theodoret introduced the aftermath of the experience. Paul was 
granted understanding about the nature of divine grace: "for [Paul], having being 
taught what he did not know, he accepts with pleasure not to be granted what he had 
asked for". 234 The ascetical literature had already related the figure of Paul to a 
precautionary level of abandonment: God prevented the presence of pride in Paul.235 
Theodoret had followed such an understanding of Paul's experience in his exegetical 
work on Paul's epistles.236 However, in his In Canticum, he shifted his position: Paul 
was taught about the role of weakness. It is through weakness -in terms of trials- that 
God reinforced the soul. The Pauline passage implies a precautionary action on 
God's behalf. But Theodoret did not elaborate on this matter. Yet, in citing 2 Cor. 
12:7, he supported this point. Thus, Paul was taught about divine pedagogy in terms 
of God's acting in a precautionary way, highlighting the presence of human 
weakness. 
which, according to him, Macarius expressed in his spiritual corpus. Theodoret's editors of the 
Historia Re/igiosa for the CS series, alongside Cavinet, commented on ascetical ideals that Theodoret 
introduced in his Historia. Yet, in his ascetical biographies, there was no reference to what made 
Syrian asceticism distinct from Egyptian asceticism. Either Theodoret composed his work at an early 
stage, before developing his vocabulary in his exegetical works; or, he idealised the image of the 
Syrian ascetics to such an extent that they carried nothing of what defines asceticism in technical 
terms (pride-temptations). This latter position was supported by Urbainczyk. See Urbainczyk, 
Theodoret ofCyrrhus. 
230 Theodoret, Exp/. 2.113B. 
231 Op. cit.: "Kat 1tapaKaA.d nauA.o~. Kat ou tUYXUVEt". 
232 Op. cit.: "~tytd o€ tOV E1tLKOupov". 
233 Op. cit: "KataA.mrov autov 1tpO~ bA.iyov l;yyuJ.LvaoOf]vat tcp cp6f}cp". 
234 Op. cit: "otoaoK6J.LEVO~ 0 fryv6Et, J.LE9' ftoovf]~ tO J.Lt'! A.aPdv a UtllKE OEXEtat". 
235 Palladius, Laus. 47. 
236 Theodoret, EpP. PG 82,449: "to cpp6V11J.LU xaA.tv&v" ([God] curbs arrogance). 
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As it was mentioned, without pointing out that he was shifting his line of 
reasoning, Theodoret brought into play Elijah's case: 
[God] appears to him and as though ignorant asks the reason for the flight, not to 
mock him but to bring out the plan behind the flight, and to teach him, as one with a 
human nature and the victim of its passions, to make allowances.237 
Theodoret emphasised that God did not chastise Elijah. It is easy to discern in the last 
lines the notion that the experience of abandonment involved a sort of knowledge 
(gnosis) with regard to human nature. Indeed, in the case of Paul, Theodoret implied 
that such knowledge was communicated through the experience. Also, Theodoret 
introduced the notion of instruction in vigorOUS terms: "W<; lJ:'(VOWV 7tUV9UVEtUt, 
otod<n(COV, 7tUtOEucov". But what was the content of such an instruction? 
[God] appears to him and as though ignorant asks the reason for the flight, not to 
mock him but to bring out the plan behind the flight, and to teach him, as one with a 
human nature and the victim of its passions, to make allowances.238 
When comparing between his exegetical work In Canticum, and his Quaestiones in 
Libras Regnorum239 with regard to 1 Kgs 19:5, it becomes evident that Theodoret 
knew of an anthropological position that could have brought his exegesis closer to 
the ascetical argument. What stands at the core of his exegesis is the notion of gnosis 
ofhuman weakness. In the latter work, Elijah's experience was identical to Paul: 
In order not to be puffed up by arrogance due to the wonder-working, grace granted that 
cowardice would be introduced to his nature, so that he might know his own 
weakness. 240 
Theodoret introduced a precautionary level at which the soul had felt divine paideia. 
What is of interest is the last sentence: "he might know his own weakness". Origen 
had already argued that, through the experience, the soul gained knowledge of her 
237 Theodoret, Expl. 2.113C: "lmt<palvEtat aut<{>, Kat roc; a:yvo&v 1tUV6UVEtat tf!<; <puyilc; tl'JV ai.tiav, 
OUK imttro9a~rov aut<{>, ai.J .. d Otoa<JK(l)V til<; qmrilc; tl'lv OtKOVOJ.liav, Kat 1tUtOEUffiV Elvat 
OUYYVcOJ.lOVU, av6pro1tEiav <pUotV 1tEptKEtJ.1EVOV, Kai i.l1tO troV tUUtll<; 1ta6&v 1t0AEJ.10UJ.1EVOV" (trans. 
Hill on pg. 69]. 
238 It needs to be noted that the grammatical expressions that Theodoret used had also appeared in 
Theodoret's work within a Christological context. The expression referred to Christ who put on 
humanity. The explication "u1to t&v ta6tT]<; 1ta6&v 1tOAEJ.lOUJ.1EVov" was a device to argue the 
consubstantiality of Christ's humanity with the rest of the human race. Cf. Theodoret, Expl. 3.141A. 
Theodoret did not explicitly see Elijah as a type of Christ. However, it could not be coincidental that 
this is the first time that Theodoret appropriated the expression "ilv!lpro?tEiav <p6otv 1tEptKEtJ.1EVov" 
outside of an explicit Christological context. Cf. Theodoret ofCyrrhus, Eranistes, 90 [pg 60 in FOTC 
I 06]. Ibid, 205 [pg 196]: "b 1tOtT]tl'J<; i:Katl';pav ouvaotEiav Katal..ooat 9EA.l'Joac; tl'Jv b1to to6trov 
1tOAEJ.lOUJ.1EV1'JV avi';A.a~E <p6otv" (desiring to destroy both powers [i.e. death and the devil], the creator 
assumed nature that was afflicted by them). 
239 Cf. Theodoret, EpP. PG 82, 449. 
240 Theodoret of Cyrrhus, Quaestiones in Libros iii Regnorum, 59 [PG 80, 733A]: ""Iva ydp J.ll'J tf!<; 
aauJ.latoupyiac; to J.lEYE!loc; i:1tapn to <pp6VTJJ.1a, evol';oroKEv fJ :x.apt<; <p6oEt tl'lv I>Etl..iav doM!;ao!lat, 
tVa emyvcp tllV OtKEtaV ao!li';VEtaV". 
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origin. Theodoret indicated that it was human weakness that was the content of such 
gnosis. It is important to mention, in advance, Hausherr's observation that, for 
Evagrius, gnosis of human weakness remained at the summit of spiritual life and it is 
the highest fruit of divine abandonment. Macarius had made the same point. 
It is certain that Theodoret did not mean his reader to discern such a technical 
observation in his In Canticum.241 Theodoret was still addressing natural passions 
such as "cowardice". What needs to be concluded at this point is the fact that, 
apparently, Theodoret introduced the notion of divine abandonment as a precaution 
related to the scriptural image of Paul. He only implied the presence of pride within 
the soul. There is no evidence that Theodoret was aware of Paphnutius' discourse in 
the Lausiac History. In advance, we will note that: i) Theodoret was missing a clear 
distinction between events with regard to divine consent and will; and, ii) he did not 
refer to pride explicitly. These are the two points that Paphnutius had argued. 
Theodoret did not associate divine abandonment with chastisement. In this matter, he 
followed Origen and Gregory. But this is due more to the fact that he followed the 
biblical narrative than to a firm anthropological theory as in Gregory's case. The fact 
remains that, at the summit of spiritual perfection, Theodoret discerned a distressful 
condition that caught the soul by surprise. 
Theodoret provided another context in which he discussed the motif of divine 
abandonment. This time his exegesis came closer to the Gregorian interpretation. The 
experience of abandonment was related to trials. Yet its aftermath was felt at an 
intellectual level: the soul was introduced to the notion of divine 
incomprehensibility.242 Theodoret followed Gregory in arguing the distinction 
between uncreated God and creation (intelligible-material).243 The soul had left 
behind all material and intelligible reality in order to conceive that God was 
241 Theodoret was following the biblical narrative where God had fed Elijah in the desert, redeeming 
his hunger. Cf. I Kgs 19:5-8. In this sense, the term "natural passions" was an allusion to I Kgs 19:5-6 
and addressed natural passions --distinct from the Evagrian!Macarian content of the word passions 
that described the inner motions of the soul. 
242 Theodoret, Exp/. 2.116A-D. 
243 Theodoret, op. cit.: ". Em;l. lit KO.l. tOt<; ayiot<; ayytA.ot<; UKO.'tUA1'J1ttO<; b VU!lcpio<; n'tv obuio.v 
!:;on ... 11118£ tOinot<; O.U'tOV Elvo.t KO.'tO.Al11t'tOV, K'ttO'tOt<; ouut 'tOV UK'ttU'tOV ... ro<; ~po.x.u. l>td !l6VOV 
'tO K'ttO'tOV vcp KO.l. O.U'ttlV 'ttlV ayyEAIKtlV cpootv l>tt~llV, tva. 'tOV UK'ttUtOV Elipro 'tOV lxy0.1tll't6V !lOU, 
io<; t>bt>pyt'tllV 11ou, nio'tEt 116vn KO.'ttox.ov o.b't6v" (For the groom is incomprehensible in his nature 
to the holy angels ... for he is not conceivable to them (angels), the uncreated to the created ... only 
through the created nous, shortly, having passed beyond the angelic nature to find the uncreated, my 
beloved, I conceive him only through faith as my benefactor). 
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incomprehensible.Z44 Unlike Gregory, Theodoret did not introduce the notion of 
divine infinity. Despite the fact that God was beyond comprehension, he indicated 
that it is within the life of the Church that the soul has been united to God. Thus, 
Theodoret did not argue about the soul's ceaseless quest for the divine. He exploited 
the Gregorian notion of the incarnation and the presence of the divine image within 
the soul to argue --in more vigorous terms than Gregory-- that the soul was truly 
united to God. 
In Sol 5:2 the bride had claimed that her heart was vigilant. 245 However, she 
did not hurry to open the door to her groom.Z46 Analysing this episode, Theodoret 
was carried away by the text: on the one hand, he indicated that the soul was 
vigilant.247 On the other hand, he thought that the soul fell into a state of slothfulness 
(6Kvo~).248 Apparently, this discrepancy was due to Theodoret's intention to remain 
loyal to the biblical text. 
Unlike Gregory, who had remained coherent in his exegesis on the biblical 
episode in Sol 5:3, Theodoret shifted his interpretation. He placed the theme of 
desire and eros at the core of his argument.249 But, most importantly, he also 
introduced the notion of slothfulness (6Kvo~).Z50 The theme of slothfulness appeared 
244 Note the use of trfar&t povn in Theodoret's text and compare it to Laird's argument with regard to 
the importance of faith: part ofthe divine is graspable by means offaith. Theodoret, Expl. 2.116C. Cf. 
Gregory, Hom. 3, 87: "otd jl6Vflc; 7ttO't£(J)c; dootKi~£tV l;v l;mnn A.f:y£t odv tt'lv 7t(lVta vouv 
b7t~:p&xouoav qn)otv" (it is proper to introduce into herself the nature that lays beyond every perception 
through faith alone). See Laird, The Grasp of Faith, 104. 
245 Sol 5:2: "'Eyro KaO~:uoro, Kai tJ Kapoia jlOU ilypu1tvd" (I am sleeping, but my heart is vigilant). 
246 Sol 5:3: "' E~diuO<ljlflV 'tOY X,tt&vd jlOU, 7t&c; EVOUO(J)jlat abt6v; EVtiJIUjlflV wuc; 7t6ouc; jlOU, 7t&c; 
jloA.uv& abwuc;;" (I have put off my garment, how could I put it on? I have washed my feet, how 
could I defile them?). 
247 Theodoret, Expl. 3.149B: "Kutd ouivotav l;ypi'(yopa, Kai 'tOV tile; p~OUjltac; U7tVOV ob 
KataO&xollat, wu vujlcpiou tt'lv 1tapouoiav 7tpOOjl&vouoa" (I am vigilant in my mind, and I have not 
accepted the sleep of listlessness, anticipating the presence ofthe groom). 
248 Theodoret, Expl. 3.152B: "luoaoK6jl£0a l;vt~:ue~:v, ooflv tiKt£t I3MI311v, Kai ooov l>mcpf:p~:t 1t6vov 
toic; x.projlf:votc; b 6Kvoc;" (from that, we are taught what great is the blame and what great is the toil 
slothfulness brings to him who succeeds to it). 
249 Theodoret, op. cit.:. "Kal l>mtot'l ilv~:!}dAA.~:to I>Kdvatc; taic; 7tpocpdo£ot XPllOUjlEVfl, l>tf:proc; abtt'lv 
0 VUjlcptoc; Ot£-y£ipEt" (the groom Stirs Up her desire alternatively; because, she has postponed [opening 
by] using such excuses). Theodoret, Expl., 3.153A: "0£pjlaiv£t ot abtilc; Kat 7tUpo£6£t tov sprota" 
(he heats up and inflames her eros). The presence of eros and desire {rr69oc;) are indications of 
Theodoret's exegetical debt to Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. The fact that divine abandonment was 
related to desire for the divine, however, shows that Theodoret was primarily working on the position 
of the latter exegete. 
250 He 12:1. Cf. Gregory, Beat. 3.98.24. 
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at the opening and closing lines of his exegesis. 251 Despite his assertion that the soul 
was vigilant, Theodoret indicated that the soul fell into slothfulness. Thus, through 
the experience of abandonment, God corrected the soul's slothfulness. This time, the 
cause of abandonment seems to be clear: the soul's lack of zeal. However, Theodoret 
was cautious not to introduce a reading that would have suggested the soul's 
chastisement. By placing desire at the heart of the episode, Theodoret commented 
that, through abandonment, the groom had intended to stir up the soul's desire. Thus, 
Theodoret shifted his focus from the soul to God: God was working on many levels 
to attract the soul. 
The introduction of slothfulness was an exegetical device rather than anything 
else (e.g. Evagrian acedia): Theodoret did not introduce the term in a coherent 
anthropology that had discussed slothfulness as a foe for spiritual perfection. The 
latter position was part of the argument in the ascetical literature. For instance, 
Macarius and Evagrius had defined slothfulness as a sort of spiritual laxity?52 
Evagrius had favoured the term acedia that introduced the notion of spiritual laxity at 
the summit of spiritual progress. Through trials, God exercised the soul, urging her to 
spiritual warfare. Most importantly, Evagrius had connected acedia to demonic 
presence. 253 In Macari us and Evagrius, acedia was introduced within a certain 
anthropological context that defined spiritual life as the warfare between laxity and 
spiritual effort. Theodoret did not reflect on such a position. He was aware of the 
term acedia, but only as part of the biblical vocabulary.254 He did not use it in his 
Historia Religiosa?55 Theodoret did not integrate the notion of spiritual laxity in his 
spirituality. The only instance where the term clearly appeared in an anthropological 
context was in his Eranistes: he indicated that oKvo~ refers to the natural bond 
251 Theodoret, Expl. 3.153C: "t\toaoK6~€1la toivuv f:K t&v dp11~tvrov, 7tlivta oKvov lmolltollat, Kai 
tiP vu~cpicp Kpouovtt 7tapautiKa uvoiy€tv" (so, we are taught, from what has been said, to put away 
slothfulness, and open immediately when the groom knocks). 
252 Macarius had related oKvO!;"as a cause of ethical lapsing from perfection. Cf. Macarius, Hom. 15.16 
[all reference in PTS 4]. Evagrius had linked it to acedia. Evagrius, De Vitiis quae Opposita sunt 
Virtutibus, 4 [PG 79, 1144]. See G. Bunge, Akedia: La doctrine spirituelle d'Evagre le Pontique sur 
I 'acedie, Spiritualite Orientale 52 (Begrolles-en-Mauges: Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1991 ). 
253 Bunge, Akedia. 
254 Cf. Is 61:3. Ps 60:3. Ps 101:1. 
255 The theme of acedia had appeared in his other works. Theodoret had used it in its classical form. 
Thus, it had taken the meaning of "hesitating" or "postponing" a task, and being "slothful". In its 
latter meaning, the motif had not appeared in a spiritual-anthropological context addressing the soul's 
spiritual struggles. For Theodoret, slothfulness was a natural passion, as opposed to Evagrius' 
slothfulness that was related to the work of the demon of acedia. Whenever the motif had carried the 
meaning of being slothful, it was due to Theodoret's following the biblical text. Cf. Theodoret, EpP. 
PG 82, 189. Cf. Ro 12:11. Theodoretus, Intepretatio in Psalmos, PG 80, 1325; 1676 and also 1829. 
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between soul and the present life that God implanted into the soul.256 All the above 
evidence suffices to suggest that the presence of the term slothfulness was accidental 
in his work. It appeared due to Theodoret's discerning this motif in the bride's 
hesitation to listen to the groom's calling zealously. Theodoret did not insist any 
further on this matter. We need to remember that, despite the fact that Theodoret had 
introduced the soul's slothfulness (6Kvo~), the experience of abandonment remained 
unlinked to sin and chastisement. Theodoret introduced a semi-Gregorian argument 
by shifting his exegetical interest immediately to the training of desire. 
d. Nilus of Ancyra: the ascetical features 
It has been suggested by Guerard that, according to internal and external 
evidence, Nil us of Ancyra was the author of the Commentary on the Song of Songs, 
and also, of other ascetical writings (e.g. Ascetical Discourse).257 According to 
Guerard, Nilus was an ascetic himself.258 So, why did Nilus compose his only 
commentary on the Song of Songs? Evidence from his writings supports the fact that 
Nil us knew the exegetical Evagrian corpus. 259 The very fact that Nil us composed a 
work on the Song raises the question about the degree to which Nilus envisaged his 
work as completing Evagrian exegesis on the trinity of wisdom literature: 
Ecclesiastes, Proverbs and Song of Songs. 260 Guerard opted for the position that 
Evagrius was, most likely, his inspiration.Z61 However, her position overlooks the 
256 Cf. Theodoret, Eranistes, 245 [pg 243 in FOTC 1 06]. In this instance, Theodoret addressed 
Christ's shrinking back in Gethsemane. 
257 Cf. Guerard's introduction in Nil D' Ancyre, Commentaire sur le Cantique, 25. For a list of his 
writings see ibid, 100. 
258 For the problem of the identity ofNilus see ibid, 16-25. 
259 Ibid, 42. 
260 Ibid, 43. Evagrius had followed the Origenist position about the trinity of wisdom literature that 
had brought the soul from practical to natural contemplation, and then, divine contemplation. 
Evagrius, Prov. 22.20 (247). Cf. Origen, Com. Prologus.3.41. Indeed, Evagrius composed 
commentaries on Ecclesiastes and Proverbs -and even on Job (surviving in Niceta's catena). It seems 
that death stopped him from composing a work on the Song of Songs. Macari us also had appreciated 
the content of the Song for the ascetic soul. He alluded to the Song with regard to spiritual perfection. 
See Macarius, Typs. 3.2 [edition in TU 72] --citing Sol 2: 10; 3.3 --citing Sol 2:6; and 7.5- citing Sol 
2:5). The fact that Macarius was the only ascetical author of late antiquity to make extensive use of 
the Song ofSongs needs to be viewed in connection to VMbus' observation that the imagery of Christ 
as the "Bridegroom" was peculiar to Syrian theology from an early stage. Of course, his observation 
presupposed a Syriac ambience for the composition of the Macarian corpus. See Vt}obus, 'The Fifty 
Spiritual Homilies', in History of Asceticism, 3155. Idem, On the Historical Importance of the Legacy 
of Pseudo-Macarius: New Observations about its Syriac Provenance, Estonian Theological Society in 
Exile 23 (Stockholm: Etse, 1972). 
261 Nil, Commentaire sur le Cantique, 43. 
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presence of Didymos' exegetical influence on Nilus.262 Origen's trinity of wisdom 
literature had also appeared in the exegesis of the Alexandrian scholar. Unlike 
Evagrius, Didymos had interpreted the three books of wisdom literature, including 
the Song of Songs. 263 It is certain that Nilus was influenced by a broader Origenist 
appreciation of the wisdom literature that was common in Didymos and Evagrius. 
Thus, it is difficult to know for certain if Nil us completed the Evagrian or Didymian 
trilogy on the wisdom literature. However, if we turn to internal evidence in his In 
Canticum, then it becomes apparent that Nilus incorporated Evagrian anthropology 
and spirituality in his work. Hence, whatever the cause of his motivation, in his 
commentary, among other traditions, Nilus reflected on Evagrian ascetical positions 
with regard to Christian spirituality and asceticism.264 
Nilus of Ancyra presented a remarkable coherency when interpreting the 
episodes in Sol 3: 1 and Sol 5:2 which was due to his anthropological perspective. 
Both times, he departed from the biblical narrative. Part of his coherency is the fact 
that he discerned the motif of slothfulness (pa9u1Jia) behind the biblical episodes. As 
it will be illustrated, unlike the biblical text and his exegetical predecessors (Origen, 
Gregory, Theodoret), Nilus located the cause of divine abandonment within the soul. 
Commenting on Sol 3:2-3, Nilus indicated that the episode occurred while the 
soul was on her way to perfection, following after the groom. 265 What lies behind his 
exegesis is an Evagrian anthropology that, unlike Gregory and Theodoret, had 
stressed the soul's role in spiritual life. It is remarkable that, in the two latter 
exegetes, the soul was advancing in spiritual life without any hindrance. Even 
Theodoret's pride was only a potential foe that was prevented by divine paideia. 
Nilus employed a different stand: the soul was not secured in her spiritual journey. 
Nilus brought together divine abandonment and spiritual laxity: 
When you seek, is not possible to find the desired-one in comfort (for ascesis for 
goods fights listlessness) ... [the soul] I thought it was light and easy to acquire the 
262 Ibid, 41-42. According to Guerard, Nilus employed Didymos' Christology and also his biblical 
exegesis. 
263 Didymos was the only known author, after Origen, that completed a commentary on each book of 
the wisdom literature. For a fragment in his Commentary on the Song see J. Meursius, Eusebii, 
Polychronii, Psel/i in Canticum Canticorum Expositiones Graece (Lugduni: Batauorum, 1617). 
264 Nilus was influenced from the liturgical tradition of the early Church (Cyril of Jerusalem and John 
Chrysostom), the Christological and exegetical positions of Athanasius and Didymos the blind, and 
the pagan philosophy and culture of classical and late antiquity. See Guerard, 'La Culture de 
I' Auteur', in Nil, Commentaire sur /e Cantique, 38-4 7. 
265 Nil us, Com. 32.1.1 00. 
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virtue and be similar to the wisdom, and I was looking for it without effort, 
carelessly and lightly, resting on the bodily (matters) like a bed.266 
Spiritual perfection required the soul's active participation. We need to view this 
exegetical line within the context of arguing the need for spiritual efforts in the 
ascetical tradition. Characteristically, Nilus did not refer to praxis but, ascesis, a 
stronger indication of the soul's efforts which connotes ethical purification.267 As 
Guerard noted, Nilus accommodated the Evagrian notion of praxis as the means by 
which the soul cleansed her concupiscence (tmeu~o~ia) and "purified the passionate 
part ofthe soul''.268 Ascesis was the only means to virtue. Nilus envisaged virtues as 
the basis on which the soul was established in order to advance spiritually. The above 
observations would suffice to indicate that Nilus introduced divine abandonment as 
means of correction, but not chastisement. Yet, Nilus brought into play the notion of 
the soul's satiety (K6po~). In her spiritual journey, the soul was not secure. This was 
due to the possibility of being fed up, overlooking spiritual efforts. This position 
placed Nilus within an Evagrian anthropological milieu. Nilus did not think of satiety 
as a cosmological principle that caused the soul's original fall from divine 
contemplation. He dismissed Evagrian speculation and only maintained the 
anthropological implications ofEvagrian thought.269 Nilus pinpointed the presence of 
Kopo~within the acquisition of virtues: 
Many, when they reach their pursuit, either because of becoming fed up with it after 
some time or, because of turning away their disposition to something else, they 
stand aloof and becoming neglectful, after a little while, they fall from the perfect 
state.270 
266 Nil us, Com. 32.3 .1 00: "ouK EOTI IJET<i avarrauotwc; (JlroOvra rov rroeouiJEvov EUPEiv (aoK(JoEI yap rwv Ka/\wv 
PQOTWVI'J TTOAtiJIOV) ... EVOIJIOO KoOcpov Eival Kai EUXEptc; TO KT(Joauem r(Jv apEr(Jv Kai r(Jv UO<piav oiKEIWUOU801 KOi 
E((JTOUV OU IJETO TTOVOU, aM' OvEIIJEVW<; KOi PQ8UIJW<;, Kai TOi<; OWIJOTIKOi<; we; KhiVO ETTOVOTTOUOIJEVI'J". 
267 Nil us, Com. 48.6.140. V. Messana, 'npa~1c; and 0twpia chez Nil d' Ancyre', SP 18/2, 235-241. 
268 Nil, Commentaire sur /e Cantique, 80. 
269 We need to note that the term "Evagrian thought" indicates an anthropology that dealt with 
spiritual life from the soul's point of view and incorporated a firm notion of the soul's potential 
backsliding. It refers to a broad tradition of late antiquity that needs not be identified only with the 
work of Evagrius. For instance, Macarius had also maintained the same notion of the soul's potential 
lapse even at a mature spiritual level. Thus, the term "Evagrian" is meant to juxtapose the idea of 
backsliding to the notion of unhindered spiritual ascension in Athanasian and Cappadocian thought. 
270 Nilus, Com. 32.16.102: "oi 1.1tv yap rroMoi, orav q>Sauwmv trri r6 urrou6a(61JEvov, f) K6pov Aaj36vrtc; auroO 
r(i> xp6vq~ f) TTEpi fTEpa r(Jv rrpo8UIJiOV arroKAivavrEc; a<piOTOVTOI Kai IJIKpOV OIJEA(JoavrEc; EKTTimoumv rf)c; apiOTI'J<; 
f~Ewc;". 
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Despite the fact that Nilus did not attribute satiety to the biblical bride, nevertheless, 
his position that the soul became neglectfut271 needs to be viewed in close connection 
to the presence of satiety. The soul fell into laxity; she was idle. Thus, divine 
abandonment healed her laxity and stirred up her desire for the divine. Nilus was the 
first commentator to connect divine abandonment with a negative attribute within the 
soul. Theodoret had introduced abandonment as a precaution. Nilus also brought into 
play the notion of abandonment as chastising, i.e. healing the soul's negative 
properties. 
This latter position becomes more apparent from what follows. Even though 
the soul felt the urgency to correct her perception of spiritual effort (laxity-ascesis) 
and, despite the fact that she was working on the virtues, the groom remained hidden. 
Nilus was of one mind with Macarius and Evagrius that, in fact, the acquisition of 
virtue hides a parasite, i.e., pride: 
Having left the bed to conduct my pursuit through deeds, but even this did not lead 
me to find it. Though it is proper to hide the toil when working on the virtues, I (i.e. 
the soul) was manifesting it (i.e. effort) making it public in the squares and the 
market places hunting after the praise of men.272 
Nilus attributed the soul's desire to manifest her spiritual toil to her being puffed up. 
Pride originated by her virtues. The word pride occurred several times in his work 
either in the form K&vo6o~ia or rp1Ao6o~ia.Z73 The parallel between Nilus' In 
Canticum274 and Evagrius' De Octo Spiritibus Malitiai75 is striking.276 
271 Nilus, Com. 32.2-3.100 
272 Nilus, Com. 32.6.1 00-101: "KmaAmoOoa TI'\V KAivr]V ETTi T6l5' [pywv TTOII'\000901 TI'\V <IiTI101V, aM' oul5t TOUTO 
IJE TTpO<; TI'\V EUpEOIV wl5IiV110EV. l5tov yap tpya<oiJEVi1V TO T~<; apET~<; KPUljJOI TOV TTOVOV, ETTiliEIKTniloa TOOTov 
tl5111JOOiEUov tv nAmEiai<; Kai tv ayopaic;, TOV Twv av9ptimwv fna1vov 911PWIJEvr]''. 
273 Nilus, Com. 12.18.36; 12.20.36; 29.4.90; 32.7.101; 38.4120. 
274 Nilus, Com. 12.18-19.36: "KaAwc; 6 npo<pi'\TI1<; TI'\v KEvooo~iav 6.TTooEOIJOV EinEv TETPUTTI11JEvov ("6 ouvaywv 
yap", qli10i, "lou<; IJI09ou<; ouv(JyayEV Ei<; 6.TTOOEOIJOV TETpUTTi11JEVOV"), 6.TTOOEOIJOV IJEV TI'\V npa~IV, OTT(JV lit TOV 
oKonov T~<; 156~11<; EiP11Kwc;" (correctly, the prophet called pride a bag full of holes, 'for he that gathers', 
he says, 'gathers his reward to a bag full of holes', the bag is the praxis and he called hole the 
disposition of glory). Cf. Hg 1:6. Guerard noticed the role of this biblical passage in Nilus' In 
Canticum and his other ascetical works. See, Nil D' Ancyre, Commentaire sur le Cantique, 25. 
275 Evagrius, De Octo, 15 [PG 79, 11600]: "BaM.vttov tEtPllJltvov oi.> qmA.dttEt to ~A.119Ev, Kat 
JCEvolio~ia c'm6A.A.u<n Jlt09oti<; itpt:t&v" (A pouch full of holes does not keep what was put in it, and 
pride loses the reward of the virtues). 
276 Rosenbaum highlighted the parallel text of Evagrius. See, Nilus von Ancyra, Kommentar zum 
Hohelied, H. U. Rosenbaum (ed.), PTS 57 (2004), 36-37 (in the critical apparatus). The Greek 
manuscript tradition attributed the De Octo Spiritibus to Nilus of Ancyra. It is an indication of the 
uniformity between his work and Evagrian ascetical thought. See VMbus, History of Asceticism, 
31146. 
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Evagrius had indicated that the proud soul asked for human praise at public 
places (rrhmEim).277 Nilus applied this image to the biblical bride?78 In doing this, 
Nilus had followed the biblical narrative. However, the fact that Nilus was the only 
commentator to link the bride's appearance at public places to pride was a strong 
indication that he also had Evagrius' afore-mentioned passage in his mind. 
In his Narratio, Nilus had defined pride as "counting on one's self". As in the 
case of Macarius and Evagrius, Nilus had emphasised that the soul dismissed the 
need for divine assistance, thinking that spiritual progress was her own 
achievement. 279 In the In Canticum, Nil us indicated that pride had sprung from the 
soul's spiritual advancement: the soul that realised the presence of virtues within her 
became puffed up.280 
Nilus discerned a deeper reason that led the soul to pride. He implied that the 
soul's disposition was corrupted. The reason that she desired to acquire the virtues 
was not related to her desire for the divine. She was looking for human appraisal. 
Nilus' position was reminiscent of Paphnutius' discourse in the Historia Lausiaca. 
As will be discussed later, Paphnutius had distinguished between disposition 
(rrp68wu;;) and praxis (rrpa~1c;). A virtuous action is taking place. However, the 
disposition, i.e. the cause that leads to this action, might be corrupted. Nilus is of one 
mind with Paphnutius: the bride (i.e. the soul) was working on the virtues. Yet, her 
disposition was corrupted since what she was really after was public praise. 
Nilus' thought on divine abandonment shared common themes with Evagrian 
thought: divine abandonment was part of divine paideia devised to "chastise" the 
soul from her negative attributes of pride and laxity. The term "abandonment" might 
not have appeared in his commentary. Yet, he has communicated the ascetical 
message for spiritual effort and vigilance against pride and laxity. 
Nilus' exegesis on Sol 5:4 followed the same line of reasoning. Divine 
abandonment was introduced as a form of chastising the soul's negative attributes. 
277 Evagrius, De Octo, 16 [PG 79, ll61A]: "'Ev 7tA.a't&lat<; 7tpoo&ux.&oeut ou~~ouA.&uEt K&volio~iu" 
(pride instructs us to pray in public places). Cf. Mt 6:5. Evagrius had paraphrased the Matthean 
passage. Nil us followed Evagrius in relating public places to displaying virtue and being prideful. He 
found the imagery ofSol3:2 as appropriate to apply this Evagrian connection to his biblical exegesis. 
278 Niius, Com. 32.6.100-101. 
279 Nilus of Ancyra, Narratio, 3.15: "r6v auvEpy6v r6v KaAwv a9ETo0aa 9E6v Kai taurn rwv Karop9w1J6Twv 
tmypacpouaa rr;v ~UVOIJIV" (disregarding God, the colleague in good, she claims credit of the power of 
what is achieved for herself). 
280 Nilus, Com. 29.4.90. 
80 
The only difference is that, here, Nilus was explicit about the connection between 
abandonment and chastisement:281 
[The soul) suffers because she did not obey to the word zealously to be shown that 
the one who is most precious to God, being after comforts and resting, is despised 
and receives the experience of punishment. For, 'he [i.e. God] has sent', it is said, 
'the hand that chastises the disobedient'. 282 
It seems that Nilus had addressed his commentary to ascetics. For, he was at pains to 
exhort to spiritual vigilance and highlight the importance of ethical effort. In his 
exegesis, the bride was never secure in her ascension to the divine. Nilus did not 
present the episodes of the Song in the Gregorian notion of the aKoAouBia of the text. 
Morover, his exegesis was not coherent, mixing up the bride as an ascetical figure 
and already acquainted with the groom. Nilus made his way through the commentary 
by introducing elements of ethical edification wherever he felt it more appropriate. 
281 Cf. Nilus, Com. 81.3-4.198-199. 
282 Nilus, Com. 57.1-2.158: "m1crXEI trrti 1.1~ rrpo9li1JW<; urr~Koucr£ 14l 'A6y4>, iva i5EIXSO on 6 rro.\UTiiJio<; 9t4l 
OVEGIV i51WKWV KOi CvOTTEIDWKW<; KOTOqlpoVEiTOI Kai TIIJWpiac; TTEipav AOIJI3QvEI. CrrrtOTEIAEV yap, qli")OiV, T~V 
nali5tuouaav muc; <'m£19Eic; xEipa". Rozenbaum indicated the common reference to the "hand that 
chastises" in Nilus and Apponius. In the latter's commentary on the Song, the "hand" was related to 
the soul's chastisement through "losing her goods, through the famine, through the abandonment to 
the enemies (uastitatem hostilem), through the privation of his proximity, through the imprisonment 
due to slander, through the torments of various maladies (uariorum infirmitatum tormenta)". 
Apponius' commentary had come close to Eastern ascetical thought on divine abandonment. Cf. 
Apponius, Commentaire sur le Cantique des Cantiques, vol. 2 (books IV-VIII), B. de Vregille and L. 
Neyrand ( eds. ), SC 421 ( 1997), 8.15. 
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PART2 
1. The Groom abandoned on the cross. 
In his Christology in the Song of Songs, Elliott put under scrutiny the role that 
commentaries on the Song of Songs played for the formation of the Christological 
doctrine of the early Church. 1 That is to say that Elliott maintained that -at least 
from A.D. 381 (1 51 Constantinople) to A.D. 451 (Chalcedon}- the commentators 
dealt with the Song of Songs as a vehicle to exemplify their Christological positions 
by exploiting the Song imagery. According to Elliott, Chalcedon signified the 
shifting of interest from imagery to more precise Christological formulas that the 
Song of Songs was felt to lack. Eventually, according to Elliott, the Song fell out of 
exegetical sight and its theological value faded away. 
This part will look at Christ's abandonment on the cross. We will begin by 
discussing the role that the experience of abandonment of the biblical bride might 
have played in the formation of a theological position with respect to Christ's 
abandonment on the cross in late antiquity. Then we will move to illustrate more 
thoroughly the ways that Byzantine theology developed to provide an interpretation 
of what actually happened on the cross. In doing so, the purpose of this second part is 
to show whether there are implicit or explicit connections between the experience of 
abandonment by the Christian devotee and Christ. 
i. The Byzantine sources. 
Before we move on to our main discussion we need to make some observations 
with regard to: i) the nature of the Byzantine sources; ii) their historical context; and 
iii) the context within which they have discussed Christ's abandonment on the cross. 
First of all, we have to ask whether the Byzantine commentaries on the Song 
provided any material that could shed light on Christ's abandonment on the cross. 
The answer is negative. The commentaries of late antiquity on the Song of Songs did 
not put side by side the experience of the biblical bride and that of Christ on the 
cross. In fact, Byzantine commentators did not see the bride's abandonment as 
1 Elliott, The Song of Songs and Christology in the Early Church (381-451). 
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resembling Christ's "loud cry" (cpwv~ IJEV<l"-'1) on the cross.2 Theodoret, who provided 
the most scriptural cross-references in the biblical episode, did not draw any links 
between Mt 27:46 and Sol 3: 1. In advance, we need to note that, whenever Patristic 
literature provided a discussion about Christ's abandonment, this was never in terms 
of the experience of the biblical bride. 
In the first part, we examined the main exegetical lines that the four main 
exegetes followed in interpreting divine abandonment in the light of the biblical 
episodes in the Song. Our discussion covered Elliott's suggested span because 
Gregory of Nyssa was present at the council in Constantinople (A.D. 381) and 
Theodoret of Cyrrhus was active at the period during the council in Ephesus (A.D. 
431) and -more interestingly- he was part of the congregation at Chalcedon (A.D. 
451). 
According to Elliott's hypothesis, it was only after Chalcedon that Byzantine 
theology dismissed the imagery of the Song of Songs as insufficient to address late 
antique scepticism about Christ's identity. Prior to Chalcedon, Byzantine theology 
had depicted the union between humanity and divinity in Christ in terms of an 
arsenal of imagery that depended on the Song of Songs. However, this position seems 
to be susceptible to criticism. For, when focusing on details -such as the motif of 
union and separation in the Song - it becomes evident that Byzantine Christology 
never depended on the Song of Songs to exemplify the mystery of Christ. At least in 
the light of the episode in Sol 3:1, what the Song was felt to provide was imagery 
depicting the motif of "union" and "separation" between God and his devotee. In the 
case of Gregory and Theodoret, this depiction was addressed in concrete terms: i.e. 
the presence of biblical figures such as Moses (Gregory), David, Paul and Elijah 
(Theodoret). Humanity was addressed in concrete terms of individuals, as opposed to 
a more abstract reference to "humanity" that might have implied Christ's humanity. 
Thus, in the core of their argument was the Christian devotee, such as Moses and 
Paul. 
The Patristic biblical commentators did not involve a discussion about the 
experience of Christ on the cross in their exegesis on the Song. If it is the case that 
their main concern was the exemplification of the mystery of the incarnation, then it 
2 Cf. Mt 27:46 and 27:50. Mk 15:34 and 15:37. Lk 23:46. In the Gospels, the Evangelists used the 
same expression to indicate Christ's cry in dereliction and also, his last breath, i.e. q>wvr'J IJEVOAil (loud 
cry). Thus, they implied the close connection between the loud cry in dereliction and the dying Christ. 
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is paradoxical that they did not involve a discussion on the abandonment on the 
cross. This is especially true for exegetes such as Gregory and Theodoret. In the 
years before composing his In Canticum, Gregory had addressed the Apollinarian 
scepticism about Christ's humanity. In his Antirrheticus, the episode on the cross had 
drawn Gregory's attention in order to show Apollinarian Christological -and 
Trinitarian- inconsistencies. Scholars have shown that, in his In Canticum, Gregory 
refuted Eunomian Trinitarian theology and also Apollinarian anthropological 
minimalism. However, in Homily 6 and 12 of the In Canticum, Gregory developed 
his thought on divine infinity only as part of his refutation of Eunomian 
existentialism. There is no evidence that Gregory ever linked together the biblical 
bride to the suffering Christ and the Apollinarian refutation. 3 It seems that Gregory 
never treated Christ as Bridegroom and bride. Christ was the Bridegroom that 
abandoned the Christian soul; he was never the bride that was abandoned by God. 
Elliott and Guinot suggested that, in his commentary, Theodoret deliberated on 
the Christological turmoil of his era (the Nestorian controversy).4 In this case, it is 
pointless to say that Theodoret missed the chance to discuss the motif of 
abandonment in a Christological context --he had done so in his other exegetical 
works. Cyril had already provided the important information that Christ's 
abandonment on the cross was part of Nestorius' argument in the latter's distinction 
between the Logos and the Son of Mary.5 Indeed, in his Nestoriana, Loofs included 
3 For Rosse and Balthasar, this position never really changed before the presence of the Rhineland 
mystics in the West. The latter were the first to employ the image of the abandoned bride as linked to 
the ascetical experience of abandonment and the suffering Christ on the cross. See G. Rosse, The Cry 
of Jesus on the Cross: A Biblical and Theological Study, trans. S. W. Arndt (New York NY: Paulist, 
1987), 73 and especially 97 [footnote 12]. See also, Delumeau, Sin and Fear:The Emergence of a 
Western Guilt Culture 13th-18th Centuries, trans. E. Nicholson (New York NY: St. Martin's, 1990), 
73. Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter, trans. A. Nichols (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1990), 75ff. 
4 See Elliott, Christology. Also Guinot, 'La Christologie'. 
5 In ACO 1.1.2/49: "IIEpi tou u\.ou 'At:yrov· Outoc; b A.Eyrov: Od; !.lOU, Oct !.lOU, 'iva ti l.lE 
i>"(KU'tEAl1tEc;; outoc; b tPllll.lEPOV 'tEAEU'tTtV U7tO!lEivac;" ([Nestorius] says about the son: he is the one 
that says " my God my God why have you abandoned me"? He is the one that underwent the three-
day burial). In what followed, Nestorius addressed humanity as a concrete active-subject alongside the 
divine Logos. Cyril had accused the Nestorian party of dividing Christ into two active-subjects in the 
same way that Paul ofSamosata had divided them in the past. See ACO, 1.1.1/101 and 110, and also 
1.1.4/36. Nestorius rejected such an accusation. See Nestorius, The Bazaar of Heraclides, trans. G.R. 
Driver and L. Hodgson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1925), 1.1 [book and part]. Loofs and Bethune-Baker 
tried to establish a reconsideration of Nestorius' Christological thought. However, as Bathrellos 
indicated -borrowing from McGuckin- the evidence did not suffice to restore Nestorius as a merely-
misunderstood theologian. See F. Loofs, Nestorius and his Place in the History of Christian Doctrine 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1914). J. F. Bethune-Baker, Nestorius and his Teaching: A Fresh Examination of 
the Evidence (Cambridge: CUP, 1908). J. McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria, the Christological 
Controversy: Its History, Theology, and Texts (Leiden: Brill, 1994). D. Bathrellos, The Byzantine 
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three passages where Nestorius had addressed Christ's abandonment on the cross.6 
Abramowski and Goodman provided two further citations. 7 The fact that Guinot and 
Pasztori-Cupan maintained Theodoret's orthodoxy with regard to his Christology is 
not sufficient to remove the paradox that, in a work reflecting the Christological 
controversies of 5th -century Byzantium, Theodoret did not address the motif of 
abandonment with regard to Christ's experience on the cross.8 If we accept the 
position of Richard and Bardy about the "tamed" exegete that felt the urgency to 
provide proof of his Chalcedonian orthodoxy, then Theodoret missed an important 
chance to show that he did not believe that the suffering subject on the cross was 
distinct from the Logos -as he was accused by the Cyrillian party.9 Cyril had already 
provided an exegetical exemplar of interpreting Sol 3: 1 from a Christological 
position. 10 For, Cyril had treated Sol 3:1 within a christological/historical framework 
indicating that the bride's "bed" was Christ's tomb and the bride's "night" was the 
time when the Myrrh-bearing women approached to venerate the dead Christ, 
unaware of the resurrection. 11 Theodoret must have been aware of this exegetical 
position which he deliberately avoided turning to Origenist ethical discourse and 
Gregorian spirituality. 12 If we accept the hypothesis of an early composition for the 
Christ: Person, Nature and Will in the Christo/ogy of Saint Maximus the Confessor , Oxford Early 
Christian Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 16-24. 
6 F. Loofs, Nestoriana: Die Fragments des Nestorius (Halle A. S: Niemeyer, 1905), 219; 260 and 360. 
For the overall Antiochean Christology see Grillmeier, Christ. 
7 In fact, Mt 27:46 appears three times in this collection. However, one is a translation of Loofs 
German text. L. Abramowski and A. E. Goodman (ed.), A Nestorian Collection of Christo/ogica/ 
Texts, vol. 2, Cambridge Oriental Publications 19 (Cambridge: CUP, 1972), 43; 68 and 118 [the latter 
was also included in Loofs, Nestoriana, 219]. 
8 Pasztori-Kupan, Theodore! ofCyrrhus. Also Guinot, 'La Christo Iogie'. 
9 Elliott, Christo/ogy, 34. According to Guinot, the commentary on the biblical Song was composed 
before the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy (A.D. 428-431). For, Pasztori-Kupan, it was 
composd during the "cold war years" between Ephesus (A.D. 431) and Chalcedon (A.D. 451 ). On the 
opposite side, Richard and Bardy discerned in the Commentary the theological adventures of a radical 
Antiochene -during the 420s- who was tamed at the years close to Chalcedon. What triggered such 
diversity of positions was the lack of reference to the humanity of Christ in concrete terms, and also 
the illustration of the divine Logos as the only active-subject in the commentary. Guinot and Pasztori-
Kupan maintained an orthodox Theodoret that remained such throughout his theological career but 
was quite misunderstood. For Ricard and Grillmeier, Theodoret shifted from an Antiochean 
Christological language to Cyrilian thought. For Theodoret's reception at Chalcedon see ACO 
2.l/69ff. 
10 Cyril of Alexandria, Fragmenta in Cantica Canticorum, PG, 69, 1285C. 
11 The Cyrilian fragments on the Song show that Cyril had diverged from the Origenist and Gregorian 
tradition by discussing the Song from a more historical point of view -always in the light of the 
incarnation. 
12 In fact, a close associate of Epiphanius of Salamis, Philo of Carpasus, was the first to interpret the 
Song of Songs from a christological/historical point of view. See: Philo of Carpasus, Enarratio in 
Canticum Canticorum, PG 40, 28-153. His purpose was to show the new reality of the Christian 
history, thus diminishing the value of the Synagogue. 
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commentary, then it is plausible that Theodoret's work was prior to the 
Christological debates of 51h-century Byzantium. Pasztori-Kupan's suggestion of a 
composition earlier than Chalcedon but later than Ephesus (A.D. 431) increases the 
paradoxical position that Theodoret did not relate Sol3:1 and Mt 27:46 to each other. 
As it was mentioned, if the date of composition was later than A.D. 451 (Chalcedon), 
then Theodoret lost the chance to defend his orthodoxy. 
However, this paradox could be solved if we asserted that the Song of Songs 
was treated on its own terms, as opposed to becoming a vehicle of Christological 
deliberation. The commentators addressed the Christo logical scepticism of their era, 
but not exclusively. They did not employ the biblical Song to resolve such 
scepticism. It seems that, after Origen, the exegetical agenda was directed to the 
spiritual value of the Song of Songs at an ethical level. Even Gregory's refutation of 
Eunomius was incorporated into his scheme of exhorting to ethical perfection. 
Despite the Christological debates that the commentators found themselves involved 
in, the Song was expressing an exhortation to ethical advancement for the Christian 
devotee. It was an arsenal from which the exegetes drew images to this end, as 
opposed to highlighting such images as addressing the problem of Christ's identity. 
Yet another factor needs to be taken into consideration: even when Byzantine 
theology entered into a discussion of Christ's abandonment on the cross, such a 
discussion was never conducted in the light of the experience of the biblical bride. 
This is true for a span that covers Elliott's historical horizon, i.e. from Origen's time 
(c. A.D. 254) until the CEcumenical Council at Chalcedon and, in fact, even beyond 
that (e.g. Maximus-John Damascene). 13 This is another indication of the limited 
interest that the Song aroused as a source for Christological deliberation in late 
antiquity. 
In his excellent introduction to the motif of Christ's loud cry on the cross, 
Rosse noted that, "the cry of Jesus on the cross did not enjoy any particular attention 
during the patristic era nor in the successive periods of Carolingian and Scholastic 
13 John Damascene belon~ed to the Byzantine era during the outbreak of iconoclasm (A.D. 731) and 
the Arabic incursion (7 -81h centuries). This era witnessed the progressive diminution of any 
exegetical interest and the uprising of the need for polemical works alongside handbooks that would 
define the faith in terriories (such as the Persian Empire) since Christianity could no longer count on 
Imperial protection in her fight to establish herself amongst other religions. See, Louth, John 
Damascene: Tradition and Originality in Byzantine Theology, Oxford Early Christian Studies 
(Oxford: OUP, 2002). Idem, Greek East and Latin West: The Church A.D. 681-1071, The Church in 
History, vol. 3 (Cresswood NY: SVS, 2007) 
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theology". 14 Rosse did not discuss any particular reasons for this. To the absence of 
any real interest in Christ's abandonment on the cross, for instance, we could 
juxtapose the Patristic theological interest in the Gethsemanean prayer. 15 Any real 
theological concern about Christ's abandonment appeared only in terms of polemics 
during the time of the great Trinitarian and Christo logical controversies -and even in 
this case, it was only part of the broader argument. For instance, Lethe!, in his 
influential work on Maxim us, examined the importance of the Gethsemanean prayer 
for the development of monothelite/dyothelite lines of reasoning during the ih 
century. 16 In the dyoenergist florilegia presented at Laterano (A.D. 649), Christ's 
abandonment on the cross played only a subordinate role. 17 And even before that, at 
the time of the Arian controversies, biblical verses such as Pr 8:22 were of central 
importance, as opposed to Mt 27:46. 18 Little did the Patristic authors write about Mt 
27:46 in their polemics. Benoit observed: "from the beginning, Christian exegetes 
have given a great deal of attention to these words and several suggestions have been 
put forward to explain this desertion by God". 19 Benoit exaggerated the real attention 
that the verse attracted in late antiquity. One further element that argues against 
Benoit's exaggeration is the fact that: i) there was not even a single homiletical work 
that discussed Christ's abandonment on the cross exclusively; and ii) commentaries 
on the Passion Narratives included a disproportionate interpretation of the loud cry 
in comparison to their discussion of other elements in the narrative. For instance, a 
prolific commentator of the stature of John Chrysostom, who interpreted the Passion 
Narrative in Matthew, spent only a couple of lines to the loud cry.20 The same is true 
14 Rosse, Cry of Jesus, 73. 
15 For the homiletical works and available commentaries on the prayer see Geerard, CPG 5/130. 
16 F. M. Lethe!, Theo/ogie de /'agonie du Christ: La /iberte humaine du Fils de Dieu et son 
importance soterio/ogique mises en /umiere par Saint Maxime /e Confesseur, Theologie Historique 52 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1979). Idem, Maxime /e Confesseur: L 'Agonie du Christ, Les Peres dans Ia foi 64 
(Paris: Migne, 1996). Idem, 'La Priere de Jesus a Gesthemani dans Ia controverse monothelite', in 
Felix Heinzer and Christoph Sch6nbom (eds.), Maximus Confessor: Actes du symposium sur Maximus 
/e Confesseur, Fribourg, 2-5 Septembre 1980, Paradosis 27 (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires 
Fribourg Suisse, 1982). Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 140-147. 
17 See the "Tenth Act" in AC02 2.1/288-368 (dyothelite florilegium) and 370-390 (monothelite 
florilegium). 
18 Bathrellos examined the importance that the Gethsemanean prayer had attracted prior to the 
monothelite controversies, during the Arian debates. Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ, 141: "it seems that 
the Gethsemane prayer first came to the fore of doctrinal disputes in the fourth century". 
19 P. Benoit, The Passion and Resurrection of Jesus Christ, trans. B. Weatherhead (New York NY: 
Herder & Herder, 1969), 194. 
20 John Chrysostom, In Matthreum, PG 57, 776. Chrysostom devoted more than 50 lines to the solar 
eclipse in Mt. 27:45, and only 12 lines to Mt 27:46. In two contemporary commentaries on Matthew 
and Mark, being actually compilations of Byzantine works, Simonetti (Matthew) provided four entries 
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about Cyril of Alexandria.21 
Overall, the Patristic theological production where the motif of Christ's 
abandonment appeared could be divided into three groups: i) scriptural 
commentaries; ii) homilies; and iii) polemical writings. 
The first group refers to Byzantine scriptural Commentaries.22 Such 
commentaries discussed and analysed the scriptural text verse by verse. In this case, 
the commentaries treated Christ's abandonment only as part ofthe biblical narrative, 
i.e. -to put it more precisely- the Passion Narratives. Comments on Christ's 
abandonment on the cross were included in exegetical works on Matthew and Psalms 
(e.g. Ps 21 :1). Rarely, comments appeared in commentaries on other canonical books 
such as the book of Isaiah and Paul's epistles (e.g. Hebrews). 
The second group contains Homilies that were not part of major exegetical 
works on the scriptures (i.e. Commentaries). This group includes occasional homilies 
whose content was connected to major feasts ofthe Church (e.g. Holy Saturday), the 
New Testament readings during the Holy Service, or other occasions. The Homilies 
of this period treated the abandonment of Christ on the cross only briefly without 
exclusively focusing on it. 
The majority of works that preserve the most material about the Patristic 
theological deliberation on Christ's cry on the cross belong to the third group of 
theological literature of late antiquity: i.e. polemical works. Such works refuted 
contemporary Trinitarian and Christological positions. 
ii. The historical context. 
Early Christian literature (Apostolic Fathers) never directed its attention to 
Christ's "loud cry" (q>wvn ,.a:yai\n) on the cross. Historically, the first time that the 
episode attracted some -insignificant-attention was in Irenreus and appeared in a 
polemical context. The bishop of Lyon (c. A.D. 130-c. 200) provided the first 
historical witness that Gnostic circles tried to interpret Christ's loud cry on the cross. 
(Hilary of Poitiers, Origen, Jerome, and Chrysostom) for the divine abandonment of Christ while he 
cited nineteen patristic witnesses for the prayer in the Mount of Olives. Oden and Hall (Mark) 
provided three entries (Augustine was quoted twice and Ambrose once) for Mt 27:46, and nineteen for 
the prayer in agony. This is an indication ofthe lack of interpretations by Byzantine commentators. M. 
Simonetti (ed.), Matthew 14-28, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture (Illinois IL: lnterVarsity, 
2002), 253-259 and 292-295. T. C. Oden and C. A. Hall (eds.), Mark, Ancient Christian Commentary 
on Scripture (Illinois IL: InterVarsity, 1998), 208-214 and 232-234. 
21 Cyril of Alexandria, Commentarii in Matthreum (in catenis), PG 72, 312. 
22 Cf. Neil, 'Christian Tranformation', 326-329. 
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Despite the fact that Irreneus provided only the Gnostic witness without refuting it, it 
is evident that, historically, the first attempt to reflect on Christ's experience on the 
cross was related to conflicting traditions about the identity of Christ: according to 
some groups of Gnostics, as a lower aeon in the gnostic hierarchy of beings, Christ 
was truly abandoned by the Pleroma or Wisdom. 23 
The next person to refer to the event was Origen, in the 3rd-century. In his 
Contra Celsus, Origen addressed his interlocutor's despising mockery of the 
Christian claim of Christ's divinity. According to Origen, Celsus wanted to impose 
the position that the loud cry on the cross was a mere human cry without any 
implications about Christ's divine status.24 
After the time of Origen, it was only during the fourth century that the loud cry 
came to the fore again. Its presence occurred in a polemical context. Arianism 
introduced a sophisticated scepticism about the place of the Logos in the hierarchy of 
beings. Part of the Arian argument also included Christ's cry in dereliction which the 
Arians interpreted in terms of his separation from the Father. 25 According to the 
adherents of Arianism, he that was abandoned on the cross could not have existed co-
eternally with the Father. 26 The experience of abandonment introduced the separation 
23 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, l.l.7.11and 1.1.16.22. Cf. Epiphanius, Pan. 31.25.6 [GCS 11423]. 
24 Origen, Contra Celsum, 3.32. 
25 Mt 27:46 was not Arius' proof text in questioning the Logos' natural divinity. There is no evidence 
that Arius addressed it at all. It seems that it was Arius' supporters that made it part of their argument. 
In any case, it was Pr 8:22 that was the most important point of exegetical tension between the Arian 
and the Nicene party. According to McGuckin, Pr 8:22 "was elevated as his supreme proof text" by 
Arius. J. A. McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Thought (Westminster: John Knox, 
2004), 29. Bromiley indicated that in the Arian thought, "in the New Testament the most important 
passages are Mk 10:18 and 13:32, Jn 17:3; 5:19 and 14:28. These call God alone Good, speak ofthe 
knowledge of the only true God, say that the Son can do nothing of himself, describe the Father as 
greater than the Son, and refer to the Son's ignorance regarding the last day. In the Old Testament, Pr 
8:22 provided the Arians with their strongest support". G. W. Bromiley, Historical Theology: An 
Introduction (Edinburgh: T &T Clark, 1978), 85. For Gregg and Groh, it was Phil 5-11 that was 
constantly and consistently refuted in Athanasius' Contra Arianos. According to them, Arius 
depended on the scriptural depiction of Christ's "derived" or "received" power and his ignorance. For 
a thorough discussion of Arianism with respect to its biblical dependence see R. C. Gregg and D. E. 
Groh, Early Arianism: A View of Salvation (London: SCM, 1981). R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for 
the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318-381 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988). R. 
Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition (London: SCM, 200 l ). 
26 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 380: "·Eott of: Kat tOlltO nap' abt&v A.q6jl€VOV" n&c; ouvatat b 
A6yo<; loto<; dvat tou llatpo<;, ou dvw obK ~v b llatl'Jp not€, ot' ou td mivta 1t0t€\. roc; UIJ.d<; 
<ppovdt€, 0 f:nl. IJ.EV tOU otaupou A.f;yrov: E>EE IJ.OU, E>€E IJ.OU, iva ti IJ.€ f:yKatEAl1t€<;; ... E\. ~V Katd 
tt)v Ujl€tEpav ouivotav iiiotroc; bmipx.rov b Y\6<; npo<; tOV E>€0V, out' c'iv kyKat€A.d1t€tO b 
ouvumipx_rov" (it is this that they also say: how is it possible that the Logos belongs to the Father, 
without whom the Father never existed, through whom he creates everything, like you think, the one 
who said on the cross: my God, my God, why have you abandoned me... if the Son was not, 
according to your thought, existing with the Father in all eternity, then he would never have been 
abandoned he that co-exists). Hanson questioned the degree to which his opponents copied Arius' 
own words. It seems that Athanasius cited the Arian position but not Arius himself. See Hanson, 
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between God and the suffering subject (i.e. the Logos).Z7 
In their turn, the exponents of Appolinarianism defended the Logos' natural 
divinity against the Arian existential diminution. In stressing the divinity of Christ, 
Apollinarius questioned the integrity of his humanity, indicating that the Logos took 
the place of nous in the incarnation. There is no evidence in Lietzmann's edition that 
Apollinarius exploited Mt 27:43 in the light of his peculiar minimalistic 
anthropology.Z8 In the surviving fragments from Apollinarius' works, Appolinarius 
exploited the verse in an Athanasian fashion -defending against the Arians- arguing 
that the loud cry expressed separation and belonged to the humanity of the Logos.Z9 
Gregory of Nyssa included Mt 27:46 in his defence against Apollinarius.30 Yet, 
Gregory did not address Apollinarian theology on Mt 27:46 as such. Gregory used 
the verse within a broader discussion of refuting the extreme Apollinarian position 
that Christ was a "heavenly man", indicating the problematic elements m 
Apollinarius' suggested discontinuity between Christ's humanity and the rest of 
mankind. 31 
'Arius' Own Words', in Christian Doctrine, 6-18. Kopecek, Stead and Williams criticised this 
position indicating the authenticity of such passages in Athanasius' work. For the literature on this 
matter see Hanson, Christian Doctrine, 11 (footnotes no. 33 and 34). For Arius' theology see also, J. 
Behr, 'Arius', in The Nicene Faith, Formation of Christian Theology, vol. 2/2 (Crestwood NY: SVS, 
2004), 130-149. 
27 Epiph. Pan. 69.19.5 [GCS 3/168]:"[quoting from Arius] Kat n<i.A.tv f:v tcp otaupcp, q>TJoiv, EA.EyEv: 
8d j.lOU, 8Et j.lOU tva ti j.lE EyKattA.t1tE~; Kat bp~~. Q>TJOiV, ro~ E1tllitEtal ~O'fl9Eia~;" (and again on 
the cross, he says, he [Christ] said: my God, my God why have you abandoned me? and do you see, 
he says, how he is in need of assistance). 
28 H. Lietzmann (ed.), Apo/linarius von Laodicea und Seine Schule (Verlag: Georg Olms, 1970). See 
Bathrellos, 'Apollinarianism', in Byzantine Christ, 10-16. Cf. Theodoret of Cyrrhus, His tori a 
Ecclesiastica, 5.9.12 [in GCS 19/292]:"o0TE cnpuxov, oOTE livouv 11 errEMl Triv Tile; aapK6c; oiKovoi.Jiav 
rrapai>EX61.JEVOI, o'Aov 1St EiMTEc; TE'AEIOV I.JEV rrp6 aiwvwv OVTO 0E6V 116yov, TEAEIOV 1St avepwrrov trr• 
taxerrwv Twv rii.JEpWv IS1a Tr'Jv rii.JETtpav awTI']piav yEV61.JEvov" (not soulless nor without nous nor imperfect, 
do we accept the economy of the flesh, but we know that the whole is, on the one hand, perfect Word 
of God before all ages; on the other hand, he became perfect man in the latter days for our salvation). 
29 E. MUhlenberg (ed.), Psa/menkommentare aus der Kateneniiberlieferung, vol. 1, PTS 15 (1975), 28 
IPs. 37:22] and 53 [Ps. 42:2] [hereafter Fragmenta in Psalmos followed by number offragrent]. 
0 Gregory, Apol. 3.1/168. 
31 Grillmeier, 'The Heavenly Man', in Christ, 330-333. Behr, 'Antirrheticus against Apollinarius', in 
Nicene Faith, 212, 451-458. For Grillmeier the idea of a 'heavenly humanity' was a misunderstanding 
of Apollinarian Christology by his contemporaries. Before Grillmeier, Harnack had argued that 
Apollinarius' Christology was not different from his opponents. The 'heavenly man' did not signify a 
flesh that had come from heaven. The incarnation introduced a historical analogy between Christ and 
the condition of the Logos in his divine status. A. Harnack, History of Dogma, vol. 4, trans. E. B. 
Speirs and J. Millar, Theological Translation Library (London: Williams & Norgate, 1898), 149-163. 
For Behr, Gregory objected to the discontinuity between Christ's humanity and our humanity. 
Apollinarius was approaching human mutability from a Platonic (negative) point of view. For 
Gregory, "change", as expressed in Christ's humanity, was the basis of Christian asceticism and 
spirituality. Olson missed this latter point in his attempt to argue the continuity between Athanasius 
and Apollinarius. According to him, Apollinarius was only working on an Athanasian line of 
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Nestorius, in the fifth century, refuted such an Apollinarian discontinuity at the 
expense of sharply distinguishing between two active subjects: the Son of Mary who 
suffered on the cross and the divine Logos who worked miracles on earth. 32 As it was 
noted, part of the Nestorian argument was the loud cry on the cross. However, this 
episode played only a secondary role in the formulation of his "dividing" 
Christology. The main opponent of Nestorius, Cyril of Alexandria, included a more 
thorough discussion on the loud cry as part of his polemics against the Nestorian 
party. In his exegetical works prior to the Nestorian outbreak, Cyril had only treated 
Mt 27:46 as part of the Passion Narrative. 33 
In the years following after Ephesus (A.D. 431) and the era around the 
controversial council in Chalcedon (A.D. 451 ), monophysitism tried to establish 
itself as Cyril's successor in Christology: it attacked Nestorianism and also 
threatened the ecclesiastical and imperial unity.34 The years after Chalcedon (5th_7th 
centuries) progressively encouraged the appearance of monothelitism: a ramification 
of imperial attempts to safeguard the political unity of Byzantium through 
encouragmg an ecclesiastical unity.35 It was mentioned that the prayer in 
Gethsemane played an important role in the development of post-Chalcedonian 
monothelite theology. Any discussion of the loud cry on the cross was only a part of 
reasoning that the Cappadocians never really realised (Harnack's position). For Olson, the 
Cappadocian refutation of Apollinarianism resulted in a consequent refutation of"Athanasianism". R. 
E. Olson, The Story of Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition and Reform (Downers 
Grove IL: InterVarsity, 1999), 188-190. According to Behr, Apollinarius was more careless in his 
Christology than Olson had observed. See also, P. Gavrilyuk, 'Arianism Opposed: The Word's 
Divinity is not Diminished by Involvement in Suffering', in The Suffering of the Impassible God: The 
Dialectics of Patristic Thought, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2004), 101-134. 
32 In ACO 1.1.2/49. Gavrilyuk showed how close Nestorius brought himself to the Arian notion of 
divine transcendence in his attempt to safeguard the notion of divine impassibility. See Gavrilyuk, 
'The Similarity between the Function of Divine Impassibility in Arianism and Nestorianism', in 
Suffering, 141-144. 
33 McGuckin has presented the fullest account of the Nestorian controversy so far, putting under 
scrutiny the modem "romantic" restoration of Nestorius. McGuckin questioned the depiction of Cyril 
as a stubborn, intransigent and inferiorly-educated theologian. McGuckin, Saint Cyril. For Wessel, 
Cyril was far different from the modem depiction of a bishop that was not learned in the classic 
letters. S. Wessel, Cyril of Alexandria and the Nestorian Controversy: The Making of a Saint and of a 
Heretic, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: OUP, 2004). Bathrellos, 'Nestorianism', in 
Byzantine Christ, 16-24. Grillmeier traced this modem approach to reassess Nestorius' theological 
position in the work of J. Gamier. See Grillmeier's, 'The Nestorius' Question in Modem Study', in 
Christ, 559-568. 
34 For the years from Ephesus (A.D. 431) to Chalcedon (A.D. 451) see Grillmeier, 'From Ephesus to 
Chalcedon', in Christ, 488-539, and 'The Council ofChalcedon', in ibid, 543-554. For the reception 
of and reaction to Chalcedon see Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition: From the Council of 
Chalcedon (451) to Gregory the Great (590-604), vol. 2.1-2, trans. J. Cawte and P. Allen (London: 
Mowbray, 1987-1995). Also, J. Meyendorff, Imperial Unity and Christian Divisions: The Church 
A.D. 450-680, Church History 2 (Crestwood NY: SVS, 1989). 
35 Cf. Meyendorff, Imperial Unity. 
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the broader argument concerning the number and operation of Christ's energies. 
Characteristically, the main exponent of Chalcedonian theology, Maximus the 
Confessor, addressed the number of wills and energies in Christ without ever 
introducing the loud cry on the cross. The only witness about any discussion on Mt 
27:46 during this era was limited to the jlorilegia promoting the dyothelite theology. 
The mono-energist jlorilegium presented in 2"d Constantinople (A.D. 680) did not 
include any patristic uses (xp~aw;) on the loud cry on the cross. It is only the dyo-
energist florilegia that included such patristic uses --primarily drawn from the time of 
the Arian controversies-- on the scriptural episode. 36 However, even in this case, the 
patristic preference for exegesis on the Gethsemanean prayer was significantly larger 
than patristic interpretation on the loud cry. 
2. The nature of divine abandonment. 
i. Byzantine exegesis: separation or prayer? 
The main feature of modem scholarship on the loud cry on the cross is 
exegetical diversity. Based on the textual analysis of the episode in the Synoptics, 
three possible assertions are brought to the fore: 37 i) the loud cry was an intentional 
interpolation added at a later stage either by the evangelist or copyists. 38 According 
to Rosse, even those defending the authenticity of the cry are divided with regard to 
the content of the loud cry on the cross. Whereas some support Christ's true 
separation from the Father,39 others discern the obedient prayer of the Son to the 
Father.40 In most cases, it is the identification of the loud cry with Ps 21:1 that has 
become the stumbling point: did Christ appropriate the psalm in its literal meaning or 
36 In AC02, 1184-90 and 258-336. Ibid, 2.11288-368 (dyothelite-dyoenergist florilegia) and 370-390 
(monothelite florilegium). 
37 Rosse, Cry of Jesus, 39cf. For the textual analysis of the Passion Narrative with regard to Christ's 
loud cry see D. P. Senior, The Passion Narrative according to Matthew: A Redactional Study, 
Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 39 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 
1975). R. E. Brown, The Death of the Messiah: From Gethsemane to the Grave; A Commentary on 
the Passion Narratives in the Four Gospels, vols. 1-2, Anchor Bible Reference Library (New York 
NY: Doubleday, 1994). L. Morris, The Gospel according to Matthew, (Grand Rapids MI: W. B. 
Eerdmans, 1992). 
38 Branscomb distinguished Mark's pen: the loud cry was an articulate addition by Mark in 
introducing a flavour of the Old Testament to the scene. B. H. Branscomb, The Gospel of Mark, 
Moffat New Testament Commentary (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1937), 297. C. S. Keener, A 
Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew (Grand Rapids MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 1999), 682-3. 
39 Brown, 'Jesus' Death Cry', in Messiah, vol. 2, 1043-1069. Also, M. B. Carra de Vaux Saint Cyr, 
'L' Abandon du Christ en croix', in H. Bouesse et al. (eds.), Prob/emes actuels de Christologie, Textes 
et etudes theologiques (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1965), 295-316. 
40 J. P. Heil, The Death and Resurrection of Jesus: A Narrative Critical Reading of Matthew 26-28 
(Minneapolis MN: Fortress, 1991), 83. Keener, Matthew, 682-3. 
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is it the case that he used the psalm as an allusion to the faithful suffering servant of 
the Old Testament? 
Byzantine analysis of the loud cry was formed in a long process that never 
raised questions about the authenticity of the words: Christ did cry out what appears 
to be the opening verse of Ps 21: 1. With the exception of Theodore of Mopsuestia, 41 
there was no doubt about the identification of Mt 27:46 with Ps 21:1. Exegetes such 
as John Chrysostom and Theodoret of Cyrrhus explicitly highlighted this connection. 
Alexandrian exegetes (e.g. Cyril) overlooked the connection by focusing on the 
actual event of abandonment, stressing that the cry belonged to Christ. It is a paradox 
that, in their exegetical works on the Psalms, Athanasius, Didymos, Theophilus and 
Cyril of Alexandria highlighted the link between Mt 27:46 and Ps 21:1; however, in 
their polemical works, they totally overlooked this point. 
The main issue in Patristic thought was the content of the cry; that is to say, the 
degree to which the loud cry on the cross expressed dereliction or not. Due to the 
proclaimed divine character of Christ, from the time of Origen onwards, it was felt 
that the cry belonged to Christ but only in a refined way ( oiKt:iwmc;). Through a long 
process of theological development, Byzantine theology tried to appropriate the 
presence of natural expressions in Christ without introducing the notion of natural 
corruption. Abandonment was not the only motif that theology of late antiquity felt 
the urgency to refine in Christ's case. This experience was grouped together with 
other natural expressions -such as thirst, hunger, labour, rest, ignorance and fear. 
Didymos the Blind was the first exponent in a process that created a technical 
anthropological understanding of such passions as natural expressions of his 
humanity. In this way, Patristic thought sought to maintain Christ's ethical purity and 
safeguard the reality of his incarnation. However, it was only after the th -century 
that Byzantine theology addressed such natural expressions in technical terms 
(blameless passions).42 
41 In his exegetical work, Theodore of Mopsuestia dismissed the Christo logical value of Ps. 21 :2 
which he found inappropriate to be rendered to Christ due to the centrality of sin in the psalm. See 
Theodoret, Psalm. PG 80, 1009. 
42 Irenaeus was the first to introduce the presence of such natural passions in his defence of the reality 
of the incarnation against the Gnostics. lrenaeus, Adversus Haereses, 3.33.8ff. Didymos employed the 
medical terminology of his time to distinguish between degrees that a passion is expressed (na9oc:;-
npom19Eia, passio-propassio). Didymos introduced a more technical means of defending the reality of 
natural passions. Didymos, In Psalmos 20-21, 43.20 [Ps. 21.21] [reference to fragments in PTA 7]. 
Didymos, FrPs, 716 [Ps. 68:17] [references to fragments in PTS 15-16]. D. Brakke, Demons and the 
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a. Origen: patristic foundations 
In his pioneering doctoral thesis L 'Abandon du Christ par son Pere durant sa 
passion d' apres Ia tradition patristique et les docteurs du Xllle siecle, Jouassard 
examined the motif of Christ's abandonment in the patristic era.43 He noted the 
diversity of patristic positions and classified Patristic thought in two groups: i) 
realism; and ii) typology. According to Jouassard, this polarisation of patristic 
interpretations originated in Origen. 44 Indeed, Origen was the first Christian author to 
address the motif of Christ's abandonment on the cross.45 According to Jouassard, 
Origen followed two diverging directions in his interpretation on Mt 27:46:46 
"realism on the one hand, metaphorical system on the other".47 Jouassard's thesis and 
subsequent articles were influential for patristic studies on this matter. Most of the 
scholars addressing the loud cry on the cross have maintained this polarization 
between realism and metaphor.48 
It seems that Jouassard was following the current continental theology of the 
first half of the 201h century with regard to Origenist studies. Origenist scholarship 
reached its peak with Danielou's highlighting the presence of three exegetical 
Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 54. Cf. Grillmeier, Christ, 363. Maximus the Confessor appropriated the Aristotelian 
analysis of Nemesius of Emesa concerning natural passions by introducing the distinction between 
"actions" that are "up to us" (tcp' ~IJiv) and those actions that "are not up to us" (ouK tcp' ~IJiv). Nemesius 
also appropriated the Stoic classification of fear and shrinking back into various ethical levels. Cf. 
Aristotle, Ethics, 3.1109b-1119b. Nemesius, Natur. 19 [pg. 80 in Morati's edition], 21 [pg. 20], 29-34 
[pg. 93-104] and 39-40 [pg. 112-117]. Maximus, QnD. 66 [PG 90, 837]. Maximus, Thai. 42 [PG 90, 
405]. Damascene, ExpF. 38-42 [pp 94-99], 64 [pp 162-163] and 67 [pp 165-166]. See W. F. R. 
Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 152-181. 
43 G. Jouassard, L 'Abandon du Christ par son Pere durant sa passion d' apres Ia tradition patristique 
et les docteurs du Xllle siec/e (PhD Thesis: Institut catholique de Lyon, 1923). Unfortunately, his 
thesis which was submitted at the Catholic Institute in Lyon has never been published. Jouassard 
produced a couple of articles extracted from his thesis which are the only source available about his 
work. Notwithstanding the excellent InterLibrary Loan service (ILL) in Durham University, and 
despite my many efforts, it has been impossible to obtain a copy of this thesis. Even the Bibliotheque 
Nationale de France was unable to provide any help in this matter. Thus, this section entirely depends 
-with due caution- on Jouassard's articles: G. Jouassard, 'L'Abandon du Christ en croix dans Ia 
tradition grecque des 1v• et v• siecles', RSR 26 (1925), 609-633. Idem, 'L'Abandon du Christ en croix 
dans Ia tradition grecque, RSPhTh 14 (1925), 633ff. 
44 Jouassard, 'L' Abandon du Christ en croix dans Ia tradition grecque des 1v• et v• siecles', 609 
[hereafter 'L' Abandon']. 
45 Cf. Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses, I. I. 7.11; 1.1.16.22. 
46 Jouassard, 'L' Abandon', 609. Rosse, Cry of Jesus, 73cf. 
47 Jouassard, 'L' Abandon', 609. 
48 Rosse, Cry of Jesus, 73: "[Origen] finds himself at the beginning of two currents of interpretation 
that persist until the Middle Ages". The same idea resounded in Carra de Vaux Saint Cyr, 
'L' Abandon', 305-306. Cf. Balthasar, Mysterium, 125 (footnote no. 70). 
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currents in Origenist exegesis: i) literalism; ii) typology; and iii) allegory.49 In his 
thesis, Jouassard drew the distinction between literalism and typology. 
Indeed, in his Selecta in Psalmos, 50 Origen treated Ps 21:1 in a "typological" 
manner: Origen identified Mt 27:46 with Ps 21: 1: 
[Ps 21 : 1] this is the voice of Christ our Lord when he was hanging on the cross, and 
in another way it is a type of our own passion. For, we were abandoned and forsaken 
before ... he appropriated our folly and malediction. 51 
Christ's utterance was the cry of the humankind that Christ "accommodated" for 
himself. Being a type of the suffering humanity ( 16 ~IJtTEpov m]Bcx; Turroi), he became the 
mouth of his humanity: it was the human race that was abandoned by God due to the 
fall. Rosse put under question the degree to which Christ was personally involved in 
the passion. According to Rosse, "Christ as the representative of humanity expresses 
a reality that does not regard him directly but concerns his body, of which he is the 
head".52 Rosse was following Jouassard's position that, for Origen, Christ suffered as 
the head of his body without being personally involved in the suffering. Christ gave 
voice to the pain of the human race through his loud cry by "accommodating" 
(oiKEIOUIJEvo<;) a "passion" (rrAI")IJIJEAt<;) that did not involve him personally. At the end of 
the day, it is the human race that was abandoned by God, not Christ. 
To this position, Jouassard juxtaposed the Alexandrian's exegetical 
intepretation in his Commentarii in Matthceum. In this latter work, Origen elaborated 
an "alternative" exegesis: Origen highlighted Christ's personal involvement in his 
suffering. The subject of abandonment was Christ. 
Certain people, in an outward display of piety for Jesus, because they are unable to 
explain how Christ could be forsaken by God, believe that this saying from the cross 
is true only as an expression of his humility. We, however, who know that he who 
was "in the form of God" descended from the greatness of his stature and emptied 
himself, "taking the form of a servant" according to the will of the one who sent 
him, understand that he was indeed forsaken by the Father inasmuch as he who was 
the form of the invisible God and the image of the Father "took the form of a 
servant". He was forsaken for people so that he might shoulder so great a work and 
come "even to death" and "the death of the cross", a work which seems most 
49For a review of the literature on this subject see P. Martens, 'Origen the Allegorist and the 
Typology/ AllegoryDistinction' ,URL:www.pitts.emory.edu/hmpec/secdocs/Martens Origen SBL 04. 
ru!f (last accessed 05/03/08). For Martens, the definition of typology as non-literal interpretation is 
misleading. Martens indicated that Danielou applied to Origen a distinction that had been already 
circulating in continental exegetical circles. Cf. G. Zimmermann, Die Hermeneutischen Prinzipien 
Tertul/ians {Wllrzburg: K. Triltsch, 1937). Cf. Origen, Prine. 6. Iff. 
50 It is still quite debatable if this is an authentic work of Origen. 
51 Origen, Se/ecta in Psa/mos, PG 12, 1253A [Ps. 21:1]: "AutTJ f'J <pOlvl) tou Kupiou Xptotou, til> 
otaupi!> 7tpOOTJAffill&vou, Kai aA.A.Ol<; OE tU7tot to f'JilttEpov 7td.Oo<;. . H!!Et<; ydp li!!EV ol. 
E"(KUtUA.EA.ElllllEVOl Kai 7tUpEOlPU!!&VOl 7tp6tEpov ... iixmEp tl)v acppoouVTJV f'Jil&V Kai to 1tATJilllEAE<; 
olKElOUI!EVO<;". 
52 Rosse, Cry of Jesus, 73. 
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shameful to most people. It was the height of his abandonment when they crucified 
him with thieves and when "those who passed by blasphemed and wagged their 
heads". The chief priests and scribes said, "He saved others but cannot save 
himself'. At that time "even the thieves reviled him" on the cross. Clearly then you 
will be able to understand the saying "Why have you forsaken me"? when you 
compare the glory Christ had in the presence of the Father with the contempt he 
sustained on the cross, for his throne was "like the sun in the presence of God and 
like the moon established forever; and he was his faithful witness in heaven". 
Afterwards, he also added with regard to those reasons for which he said "why have 
you forsaken me".53 
The reality of the experience was unquestionable; Christ was indeed abandoned. 
Origen opened his exegesis with an attack on a "pious" attitude that overruled 
Christ's abandonment in real terms: according to it, the loud cry was an expression of 
his humility. In vigorous terms, Origen denied such piety maintaining the reality of 
the experience. For Origen, Christ was the subject of abandonment. Origen defined 
the meaning of abandonment: Origen pointed out the dramatic character of the 
incarnation: i.e. the Logos' kenosis. It was the Logos' kenosis that explained Christ's 
voice in dereliction. At the core of his argument, Origen placed a term that was 
meant to play the most important role in Christian theology. From Athanasius to 
Cyril of Alexandria, and --in modem theology-- from the German kenotists of the 
19th century (Gottfried Thomasius) to the theology of Sergius Bulgakov and von 
Balthasar, and from the ascetical ideal of the Rhineland mystics in the West to the 
modem kenotic spirituality of Sophronius Sakharov in the East, the notion of kenosis 
became the main terminus technicus to exemplify the mystery of the incarnation. 
According to Origen, having left the majesty of the Fatherly bosom, the Logos 
became the subject of mockery and contempt. Origen has compared the current status 
of the suffering Christ to his divine glory. His abandonment is a sort of poverty with 
regard to his glory: being "in the form of God", he was scorned and reviled "in the 
form of a servant". The term kenosis did not occur here as such. However, Origen 
alluded to Phil 2:6-7.54 Origen juxtaposed "the form of God" with that "of a servant" 
to highlight the notion of the Logos' poverty. If, in his In Psalmos, Origen had 
emphasised the notion of "separation", in his In Matthceum, the motif of 
53 Origen, Commentarii in Matthr.eum, 135 [in Simonetti, Matthew, 294]. 
54 It is the locus classicus where kenosis appeared in the New Testament. St. Evans, 'The Self-
Emptying of God', inS. Davis et al. (eds.), The Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the 
Incarnation of the Son of God (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 246-272. L. Richard, Christ: The Self-Emptying 
of God (New York NY: Paulist, 1997). R. B. Strimple, 'Philippians 2:5-11 in Recent Studies: Some 
Exegetical Conclusions', Westminster Theological Journal 41 (1978), 247-268. P. D. Feinberg, 'The 
Kenosis and Christology: An Exegetical-Theological Analysis of Phil 2:6-11 ', Trinity Journal 1 
(1980), 21-46. 
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abandonment took the form of "poverty": it was a condition that the Logos 
underwent in the process of the incarnation. For Jouassard, exegetical "realism" 
highlighted the motif of accommodation (oiKEiwmc;); whereas, the "metaphorical 
system" featured Christ's self-emptying (Ktvwmc;). 
But this theological juxtaposition between "realism" and "typology" is 
problematic: it suggests that the notion of accommodation denied Christ's real 
involvement in the passion. More or less, Jouassard suggested that the Origenist 
accommodation was a vague exegetical formula that bears no real meaning. It related 
Christ to the suffering humankind without truly addressing the true sense in which 
Christ underwent abandonment: if he was not abandoned, how did he complain 
without pretending? How did he approach the suffering humanity if he did not 
suffer? Jouassard and Rosse's position suggested that Christ suffered as a 
representative of the human race. Such a position has implications for soteriology: 
Origen's soteriology was endangered by his typology. Salvation depended on a true 
personal involvement of Christ in human suffering. 
In Fragments surviving under Origen's name, the author indicated that: 
And I (i.e. the Logos) am asking for your help; as if he is without assistance by the 
Father, but he is not really without assistance even if he says; My God, my God, 
why have you abandoned me?55 
The presence of the condition "as if' could justify modem scepticism about the 
degree to which Origen believed that the experience of abandonment was truly 
authentic. However, Origen rejected an ontological separation between Christ and 
Father. It was Christ's soul that became the bearer of human transgressions: 
Christ says, my soul is filled with troubles, for he bears our sins in his soul and, he is 
filled with troubles ... For, if he carries our sins and suffers for us, he properly says 
that he is filled with troubles. 56 
There is no doubt that Origen pushed the identification of Christ with human 
suffering to its extremes: through his soul, Christ made human suffering his own. 
Origen denied a separation between Logos and God. The presence of a "human soul" 
in Christ enabled Origen to maintain the full accommodation of human suffering by 
55 Origen, Fragmenta in Psa/mos 1-150, Ps 87.5 [edition in J. B. Pitra (ed.), Ana/ecta Sacra Spici/egio 
So/esmensi Parata, vols. 2-3 (Venice: St. Lazarus Monastery, 1966)]: "Kat tile; oflc; otoJ.tat ~ol"]OEiac;. 
:..Qc; i:t~oi]Ol"]'tO<; J.lEV, oi.J J.ltlV i:tA.l"]Oro<; i:t~ol'JOll'tO<;, io<; i:tm) 'tOU Ilatpoc;, £l. Kat Elm:v: '0 8Eo<;, 0 
8€6<; J.lOU, tva ti £yKattA.uttc; J.lE;". 
56 Origen, ibid, Ps 87.3: "btA.i]oOll KaKrov ft 'I'UXil J.lOU, b Xptoto<; A.EyEt, tdc; i:tJ.laptiac; ftJ.lroV q>tpmv 
i;v tft \j/UXTI ai.Jtou, Kat 1tATJPll<; rov [KaKrov] ... Ei ai.Jto<; td<; i:tJ.lap-riac; ftJ.lroV E~UCJ'taCJE, Kat 1tEpi 
ftJ.lrov oouvnmt, EiK6tmc; KaK&v £vE1tA.i]o011. <Plloiv". 
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Christ, without endangering his ethical purity and also his divine relationship with 
the Father. For Origen, it was Christ's soul that truly suffered on the cross. The 
Logos remained united to the Father. And through his human soul, he participated in 
human sufferings. Thus, Origen did not question the authenticity of Christ's personal 
involvement in human suffering. 
What Jouassard called "realism" was a theological device that asserted the 
condescension of the Logos to human maledictions through his human soul. The 
"metaphorical system" maintained Christ's ethical purity and his ontological status 
as divine. In both cases, it is the soul that was the subject of human suffering. 
Unlike what Jouassard suggested, Origen envisaged the notion of kenosis as 
poverty only in terms of the Logos' identification with human suffering at a real 
level. Otherwise, even the "realism" of the Logos' kenosis would have been 
endangered by Christ's accommodation of human passions, understood as an action 
in pretence. But for Origen, the accommodation was not a mechanism that kept the 
Logos personally uninvolved in human suffering:57 "(Christ prays) not in pretence 
for Satan, not by accommodating the will of the world, but in his own person, he 
economically prays with a cry". 58 Origen seemed to have juxtaposed accommodation 
to personal involvement. However, even in his Commentary on the Song of Songs, 
Origen had defined the incarnation as the condescension of the Logos to the natural 
limitations of the soul. Thus, it is impossible to separate between the economy of the 
incarnation and the accommodation of human conditions. What Origen denied was 
not accommodation as a genuine reality in Christ, but an understanding of his 
experience in a "metaphorical" sense that would remove the notion of Christ's 
personal involvement in human suffering. Weinandy illustrated that it was Origen's 
constant concern to illustrate God's personal involvement in suffering.59 Thus, the 
notion of accommodation did not remove the ideal of divine involvement. It refined 
the over-humanisation of the Logos that might have endangered his divine state. 60 
Origen provided a genuine understanding of the loud cry on the cross. He 
57 For Weinandy, love is the divine feature that transcends divine impassibility and illustrates an 
authentic way in which God becomes a co-sufferer with the humankind. See Weinandy, 'Origen and 
the Suffering of God', SP 36 (2001), 456-460. Idem, Does God Suffer? (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2000). 
58 Origen, ibid, Ps 68.14: "[o]UK l;v U7t0Kpiost E7tt to os/..slioat tOV LUtavav, ou to tOU K60J.lOU 
oixstouJ.lsvoc; 6ti..TJJ.lU, an· !::~ oiKsiou npoocimou Xptotoc; oiKoVOJ!tK&c; !:Kouoiroc; npoosux_stat 
J.lStd Kpauyftc;" · 
59 Weinandy, 'Origen and the Suffering of God'. 
60 Cf. Origen, Contra Ce/sum, 3.32.10. 
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defined it in terms of separation and poverty. It was separation with respect to 
Christ's humanity (i.e. soul), and poverty according to Christ's divinity. Origen tried 
to illustrate the condescension of the Logos to human suffering avoiding applying the 
motif of abandonment as separation to the relationship between the Logos and his 
Father. In employing the language of accommodation, Origen showed the 
authenticity of Christ's identification with human suffering. Arguing Christ's 
experience in terms of kenosis, Origen maintained the divine state of Christ without 
endangering the reality of his experience. 
b. Athanasius of Alexandria: against the Arians 
After the time of Origen, the partisans of Arianism posed the question that 
Origen had not answered: what was the theological implication of abandonment with 
regard to the being of the Logos? Origen had denied a separation between the Father 
and his Logos. The Arians exploited a literal understanding of the loud cry in their 
attempt to support their questioning of the divine state of the Logos. The Arians 
applied the "narrowest" and most literal exegesis for the word abandonment in Mt 
27:46. Thus, Jouassard has remarked: "the Arians sought to profit from the scene of 
the anguish to deny that a being thus overpowered by suffering is really the power of 
God".61 It was remarked earlier that Mt 27:46 was only one amongst the various 
biblical verses that the Arians used in their dispute on the divine state of the Logos. 
Athanasius provided the necessary information about the way that the Arians 
included the loud cry as part of their theological argument. 
Athanasian refutation of the Arian interpretation of Mt 27:46 was not 
systematic. 62 Still, there was an inner logic to his argument that enables us to discern 
the pattern of his thought. In advance, it needs to be noticed that though Athanasius 
did not deny that abandonment was experienced by the Logos in his humanity, he 
never demonstrated the mechanism in which Christ's humanity could ever have been 
abandoned. That is to say, Athanasius introduced an exegetical obscurity about the 
precise subject of abandonment and the way in which abandonment took place. 
Athanasius' interest in Mt 27:46 occurred only as a response to his Arian 
interlocutors. Though he never put aside his defence of the divinity of the Logos, his 
61 Jouassard, 'L' Abandon', 610. 
62 Jouassard, ibid, 612. For an introduction to Athanasian thought see T. G. Weinandy, Athanasius: A 
Theological Introduction, Great Theologians Series (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007) 
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exegesis corresponded in many ways with the Arian line of reasoning, highlighting 
the logical absurdities and inconcistencies of their argument. Athanasius was more 
interested in bringing to light such inconsistencies. He did not intend to provide a 
psychological discussion of what happened on the cross. That is to say that 
Athanasius did not engage in a creative discussion concerning the experience of 
abandonment qua experience. 
Athanasius addressed questions imposed by his Arian interlocutors who 
refuted the natural divinity of the Logos:63 
How is it possible that the Logos is essential to the Father without whom the Father 
was never, and through whom he makes all things, as you believe, who said upon 
the cross, 'my God, my God why have you abandoned me?' ... If the Son was, 
according to your thought, from all eternity to the Father as his Logos, he would not 
have been ignorant of the day, but he knew; nor would he that co-exists from 
everlasting be abandoned. 64 
According to Athanasius' witness, the Arians were taking the loud cry on the cross at 
face value. How was it possible that the Logos was abandoned by his Father? Did the 
Logos ever exist separated from his Father, even for a moment? According to Mt 
27:46, he did. The Arians defined abandonment as separation: the Logos was 
abandoned -i.e. separated- by the Father. The logic behind the Arian question 
involved the notion of divine mutability: if the Logos was God and always existed 
united to the Father, then the separation on the cross introduced a change to his 
everlasting relationship to the Father.65 But according to the Arians, only an exalted 
creature could have been subject to such a change. The Arian passage cited by 
Athanas ius is indicative of the Arian position: if there was a time that the Logos was 
separated from the Father, then it was not illogical to argue that the Logos was not 
divine in his nature. 
Gavrilyuk examined the Arian position in terms of the notion of divine 
immutability and impassibility. In order to compromise between divine impassibility 
and the soteriological need for a "divine" involvement in human suffering, Arius 
63 Most lines in the Athanasian corpus addressing the loud cry on the cross are found in his Orationes 
tres Contra Arianos, and especially in his third oration where Athanasius had extensively refuted 
Arian interpretation on scriptural passages. 
64 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 380: "TI&~ ouvann b A6yo~ iotoc; Elvat tou Tiatp6c;, ou dvsu obK ~v 
b Tiatl'Jp 1tOtE, lit' 00 td 1tliVtll 1t0tel, roc; O)lel<; cppovdte, b lmi )lEV tOU otaupou A.&yrov: 8~:& 
)lOU, 8~:& )lOU, Yva ti )l& tyKattA.t7tE<;; ... Ei. f)v Katd tl'lv b)!Et&pav l>tavotav iiioiro~ tmapx.rov b 
Ytoc; 1tpO<; tOV 8~:ov, out' c'iv 'flyv61']0E 1tepi tf]c; f])l&pac;, a.n· tyivroOJCEV roc; A6yoc;, out' c'iv 
tyKat~:A.dn~:to b ouvu7tapx.rov". 
65 G. D. Dragas, Athanasiana: Essays in the Theology of Saint Athanas ius vol. I (London: 1980), 51: 
"Arius' starting point is theo-monistic and results in a tension between the transcendent absolute being 
of God and the transient and contingent being of the creatures, which are seen as opposites". 
maintained a suffering subject that was not "mere man" (soteriology), but was not 
fully divine (impassibility) either. According to Gavrilyuk, divine impassibility and 
immutability provided a coherent background for the Arian argument. 66 
To answer these objections, Athanasius employed a threefold device: i) 
scriptural quotations manifesting the divinity of the Logos; ii) scriptural witnesses 
that the Father did not abandon his Son; and iii) scriptural witnesses indicating 
transgressions as part of human nature. 
Athanasius juxtaposed the biblical depiction of Christ encouragmg and 
exhorting his disciples to put off cowardice before death with the image of Christ 
shinking back at Gethsemane.67 Also, he brought to the fore Christ's assertion that the 
power to lay down his own soul lay was his.68 Athanasius intended to show the 
absurdity of supporting the idea that Christ encouraged his disciples against 
cowardice while he shrank back before death. Thus, Athanasius juxtaposed the motif 
of life with that of death.69 For Athanasius, it was illogical that Christ was recipient of 
both attributes (i.e. cowardice and courage) at the same time. 70 
Athanasius pointed out that the Logos was never actually abandoned by the 
Father on the cross: 
Lo, when he utters 'why have you abandoned me?' the Father showed that as 
always he was in him then. The earth, knowing its talking master, immediately was 
trembling, and the veil was tom apart, the sun was hiding, and the stones were 
crackinf, and the graves, as I said, opened, and the dead that were in them were 
raised.7 
The natural and supernatural phenomena related by the evangelists manifested his 
divine power remaining united with the Father. For Athanasius, Christ maintained his 
unbreakable relationship with the Father on the cross. Athanasius agreed with his 
interlocutor that, if he was abandoned by the Father, qua Logos, he could not have 
been God in his nature: 72 "so, it is not possible that he was abandoned by the Father, 
the Lord who is in him in all eternity, and before he spoke and after he left this cry 
66 Gavrilyuk, Suffering of God. 
67 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 436. 
68 Athanasius, ibid, 437. 
69 Athanasius, ibid, 436. 
7° Cyril developed this Athanas ian line of reasoning by illustrating the absurdity of maintaining that 
the source of life was afraid of death. Cf. Cyril of Alexandria, ComLk (in eaten is), PG 72, 920A. 
71 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 441 :" ioou ydp A.tyovto~ abtou, "Iva ti JlE £yKattA.tnE~; £oEiKvuEv o 
Ilat1)p, (o~ ad Kai t6tE l]v EV abtQ>. 'H ydp yf], yt VWOKOUaa tOV A.aA.ouvta ~E01t6tT]V, Eb8u~ 
etpEJlE, Kat tO Kata1tttaOJla £ox_i/;EtO, 0 t'JA.t6~ tE EKptl1ttEto, Kai ai nttpat otEppi]yvuvto, Kat td 
JlEV JlVT]Jlda, ro~ npodnov, t)voiyEto, oi oE £v abtot~ VEKpoi t)yEipovto". 
72 Jouassard, 'L' Abandon', 611. 
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(i.e. Mt 27:46)." 73 But unlike the Arians, Athanasius maintained the immutability of 
the Logos. This position could expose Athanasius to the accusation that he taught an 
action in pretence on the cross. For, if it was not the Logos that was abandoned on 
the cross, then the loud cry would have no meaning. 
There is no indication that Athanasius actually faced such scepticism. 74 
However, from his overall argument, it is apparent that Athanasius knew the 
weakness of such a position which he tried to argue. He provided a positive and a 
negative answer with respect to the suffering subject: "it was the Logos crying out 
what belongs to the soul";75 "it was not the Logos qua the Logos".76 The subject of 
abandonment was the humanity of the Logos. In this case, the soul ( lj.luxr'l) represented 
the whole of the human race. 77 The Athanasian position depended on the Origenist 
refinement of Christ's suffering in the "form of the servant". The patriarch of 
Alexandria, however, did not define abandonment as the Logo's "poverty". For the 
latter, abandonment was a matter of "separation" that actually highlighted the 
distinction between oikonomia and theologia. 78 
73 Athanasius,Arian. PG 26, 440: ""09EV oulii; i:yK!l't(lAEhtEo9at liuvatat 7t!lpd 'tOU Tia'tpO<; b 
Kupto<; b i:v ai>'tcp &v lld, Kal. 7tpo 'tou d1tdv, Kal. ihE 'taU't'lV f]<piEt •l'lv <provi]v". 
74 The question in the De Sancia Trinitate was articulated in order to introduce his position. 
Athanasius, Trin. PG 28,1261D: "Tic; i]v b A.tyrov: "9E£ J.LOU 9E£ J.LOU, iva'ti J.LE i:yKa't£A.t7tE<;;" (who 
was the one that says: my God, my God why have you abandoned me?). In the West, Ambrose 
established a more anthropological notion of abandonment explicitly connecting Christ's experience 
to contemporary humanity. For Ambrose, Christ shared with the rest of the human race the same 
'feeling' of being abandoned during perilous times. His position antedated the eastern ascetical motif 
of abandonment in terms of feeling left alone in trials. Thus, Ambrose brought Christ closer to human 
experience without involving the notion of sin. For Origen and Athanasius, abandonment was linked 
to the state offallen humanity. See Ambrose, De Fide 2, 7.7-37 [PL 16, 594)]. Isaac of Syria was the 
Easterner that exploited the notion of feeling alone and abandoned even from friends during trials. See 
Isaac of Nineveh, The Second Part: Chapters IV-XLI, trans. Sebastian Brock, CSC 225 ( 1995), 8.21. 
75 Athanasius, Trin. PG 28, l264A: "i\v 61\6yoc, <pwvwv ro rr'jc; ljJUXi\c; 'i1S1a". 
76 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 440: "ouK ~v 61\6yoc,, ~ l\6yoc,". 
77 Grillmeier focused on the notion of soul as a theological and anthropological factor in Byzantine 
Christology. With respect to Athanasius, Grillmeier tried to examine whether the soul was the 
physical subject of suffering at an anthropological level, or a theological factor that united the material 
(body) to the divine (Logos). See Grillmeier, Christ, 308cf. However, his analysis on Athanasian 
Christology within this context had had many pit-falls that were highlighted by various scholarly 
works. See Anatolios' criticism of Grillmeier with respect to the notion of the Logos' moving the 
body as an instrument. K. Anatolios, Athanas ius: The Coherence of his Thought (London: Routledge, 
1998). For a more thorough discussion on the subject with regard to Grillmeier's position see G. D. 
Dragas, 'The Soul of Christ', in St. Athanas ius: Contra Appo/inarem, Church and Theology 5 
(Athens: Parisianos, 1985), 289-399 [especially pg. 344-356]. 
78 For Grillmeier, the Athanasian refinement was meant to safeguard the divinity from personal 
involvement in the passion: the humanity became a sort of shield for the divinity. However, Dragas 
and most recently Gavrilyuk have critiqued such a reading of Athanasius and the Nicene faith in 
general. See Dragas, 'The Soul of Christ', 346ft': "(Quoting from Grillmeier) [Athanasius] had to find 
the subject of all suffering in the manhood of Christ, so as to put it as a protective shield before an 
inviolable Godhead". Also Gavrilyuk, 'Arianism Opposed', in Suffering, 132. 
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Athanasius appropriated the notion that the Logos gave voice to the sufferings 
of human kind. For Jouassard, in Origen, this position was diminishing the personal 
involvement of Christ in the passion. But, according to the same scholar, when 
Athanasius was dealing with the same line of reasoning, this diminution of the 
Logos' involvement in the passion was removed: the Logos made his own the reality 
of the suffering human race. Christ accommodated such human nature that was able 
to experience the same passions (i.e. natural passions), with the rest of the human 
race. 79 When Christ was shrinking back and complaining that he was abandoned by 
God, "through this he was making known that, though he is God impassible, he has 
taken passible flesh; with his works he shows himself to be the Logos of God that 
then has become man". 80 That led Athanasius to distinguish between natural 
operations that belonged to the Logos qua Logos, and actions/passions that belonged 
to the oikonomia of the union (tvwcrEw~ oiKovo!Jia) between human and divine in 
Christ.81 
For these (passions) are not the nature of the Logos qua Logos; for the Logos was in 
the flesh that was suffering those (passions) ... and these were not sgoken before the 
incarnation; but when the Logos became flesh, and he became man. 2 
Athanasius' position was part of the process in patristic thought that argued the 
compatibility between natural passions and ethical purity. To achieve that, 
Athanasius distinguished between the status of the Logos before and after his 
incarnation. 
In the same way that he trampled down death through his death, and all the human 
(afflictions), in this way he subdued our shrinking back through the assumed 
shrinking back. 83 
Soteriology was Athanasius' crux: the Logos saved humanity by assuming human 
limitations. In doing so, Athanasius overturned the Arian argument that a saviour 
who was involved in human suffering would have endangered the divine 
impassibility. Athanasius brought his thought to a climax, swapping the 
79 Jouassard, 'L' Abandon', 612. 
80 Athanasius, Arian. PG 26, 43 7 :" . E K jlEV ydp t&v tOtoUtOJV i;yvropt~f:V' Ott, eso<; ffiv t'maOl'l<;. 
oapKa 1ta8l')tllV 1:/..a~sv: EK o€ t&v 1\pyrov todKVUf:V i;autov A6yov 6vta toll ewu, Kat uotspov 
Y£V6jl£VOV av8pOJ1tOV". 
81 Jouassard, ibid, 610. 
82 Athanasius, ibid, 437:" 'AH' obK ~v iota cpuost tou A6you tauta, fl A6yo<; ~v: tv M tfl 
totaura 1taoxouon oapKi ~v b A6yo<; ... Kai ydp obK dpl')tat taura 1tp6 tl;<; oapK6<;: i:J.'),.f,: ots b 
A6yo<; odpl; i:yEV£!0, Kai. yf.yovsv av8pro1to<;". 
83 Athanas ius, ibid, 444:". Q<; ydp tOV eavatov eavatcp Katl'Jpyl')O£, Kat i:J.v8pro1tivro<; 1tUVta td 
i:J.v8pro1ttVa, OUtOJ tfl VOjlt~OjlEVTI Of:tAt~ ttiV tjjl&V O£tAiav acpnps'ito". 
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soteriological factors: "In the same way that, having become in our body he imitated 
our (condition), in the same way having taken him, we participate in his 
immortality".84 The Greek text presents a syntactic symmetry containing two dyads 
of one participle and a verb each: yEv61JEv~-EIJIIJr'Jcraro and 6E~OIJEvor-11EraAa111XJvo11Ev. The Logos 
became a co-sufferer with humanity, and humanity was freed from its weakness and 
participated in Christ's divinity. It was in his Vita Antonii that Athanasius 
exemplified the outcome of the incarnation through a vivid use of imagery. 
However, Athanasius did not address the true subject and object of 
abandonment and most significantly the mechanism through which abandonment 
occured: if Christ's humanity was abandoned, then Athanasius did not explain 
whether it was abandoned by the Logos (i.e. the divine element in Christ) or the 
Father. This question has troubled modem scholarly research on Athanasian thought 
for the reason that it is related to the notion of Christ's death. If abandonment is 
defined as separation, then did Athanasius support a separation between humanity 
and divinity in death? Such a position would have highlighted the separation between 
the Logos and the human element in Christ leaving unaddressed the role of the Father 
in the Passion. Grillmeier suggested of a separation between body and soul, doubting 
that the soul was a valid anthropological element in Athanasius. In this case, it is not 
the Father that abandons. The notion of separation is limited within the relationship 
between the Logos' and his humanity. Athanasius never really provided an answer. 
The question remained open and became the backdoor for the appearance of 
Nestorianism. 
For Dragas, Athanasius' hesitation to answer the question concerning 
separation in death was due to the fact that Athanasius never saw himself involved 
with an analysis of the ontological mechanism that caused Christ's passion and death. 
It seems that Athanasius only indicated that it was the Logos that suffered, without 
making Christ's soul the subject of suffering. His position emphasised the 
involvement of the Logos in suffering, including the motif of abandonment.85 
Athanasius worked out the soteriological reasons that led to his abandonment. In 
doing this, he was cautious to meet his adversaries' scepticism about the nature of the 
84 Athanasius, op. cit.:"'Qc; ydp abtoc;, yEV6f.1£voc; tv t(\> tuu'ov oroj.tatt, td f]j.trov E!ltllt'Joato, outroc; 
fJ!lEic;, oE~UjlEVot abtov, tf]c; 1tap' €Kdvou j.1EtaA.a!lf3dvojlEV il9avacriac;". 
85 Dragas, 'Christ's Soul', 350. 
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person that underwent abandonment. Athanasius' intention was to secure the divine 
state of the Logos, not to engage in a discussion of the inner mechanism that resulted 
in the loud cry. 
His Arian interlocutors forced Athanasius to imply that the Logos was 
abandoned by the Father, but in a refined manner. Athanasius avoided such a trap but 
did not avoid introducing theological obscurity about the exact nature of Christ's 
abandonment on the cross. For Athanasius, abandonment meant separation. Origen 
had already dissociated abandonment from separation at the level of the oikonomia, 
understanding it in terms of the fall and its consequences. The Logos took on the 
consequences of the fall without changing his relation to the Father. Thus, Origen 
had introduced the notion of abandonment in terms of the Logos humility in mockery 
and contempt. The more elaborate Arian argument addressing the ontological 
condition of the Logos, left no space for Athanasius to tum to the Origenist ethical 
discussion. Instead, Athanasius met the Arian scepticism on their own territory, 
introducing the distinction between oikonomia and theologia: that is to say that 
Athanasius distinguished between the being of the Logos qua the Logos, and the 
being of the Logos in his incamational status. 86 
c. Gregory Nazianzen: typology or realism? 
According to Jouassard, the Athanasian synthesis that brought together 
Origen's "realism" and "metaphorical system" was lost in the years following his 
theological legacy. In fact, Jouassard pointed to Gregory the Theologian as the 
representative of this disturbance. For Jouassard, Gregory offered an allegorical 
interpretation that endangered Christ's personal involvement in abandonment.87 
The only place that Gregory discussed Mt 27:46 was in the so-called De Filio 
of anti-Arian content. Like Athanasius, Gregory corresponded with his interlocutors' 
86 Athanas ius introduced another exegetical line that presented Christ as the "fish-hook". This position 
was known since the time of Origen. It became a favourite for the two Cappadocian Gregories, 
whereas in the West Augustine altered it to the "mouse-trap". Athanasius, Homilia de Passione et 
Cruce Domini, PG 28,228. See J. Riviere, 'Le Marche avec Ie demon chez Ies Peres anterieurs a Saint 
Augustine', RSR 8 (1928), 257-270. Also D. F. Winslow, The Dynamics of Salvation: A Study in 
Gregory of Nazianzus, Patristic Monograph Series 7 (Cambridge MA: Philadelphia Patristic 
Foundation, 1979), 107. In Athanas ius, this interpretation appeared only in homiletic works and 
highlighted the fact that every event in the life of Christ contributed to the defeat of death and the 
devil. 
87 Jouassard, 'L' Abandon', 612-613. 
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positions. It has been suggested -not without scepticism- that, for this work, Gregory 
actually corresponded to an Arian catena of scriptural witnesses, refuting them verse 
by verse.88 
In Mt 27:46 Gregory recognised the opening lines ofPs 21. With regard to the 
subject that experienced abandonment, Jouassard maintained that Gregory only 
appropriated the Origenist metaphorical system: Christ gave voice to the suffering of 
the human race. 89 According to Jouassard, such a position diminished the Athanasian 
achievement of showing the personal involvement of the Logos in the passion. 
He is not forsaken either by the Father or by his own Godhead, as it seems to some, 
as if it is afraid of the passion, and for this reason it closes up to the sufferer. Who 
forced him to be born on earth in the first place or ascend on the cross? In himself, 
as I said, he is the type for us. For we were abandoned and disregarded before; and 
now we are assumed and saved through the suffering of the impassible.90 
Gregory followed the Athanasian position that distinguished between actions 
attributed to the Logos qua God and qua man.91 For Gregory, lowly names (e.g. 
slave) and actions, such as subordination and submission, belonged to the incarnate 
condition of the Logos. It is true that Gregory stressed the reality of Christ's 
humanity in vigorous terms:92 it was his humanity that was abandoned on the cross. 
Like Athanasius, Gregory did not develop an understanding of the inner mechanism 
in which Christ's humanity was abandoned. Athanasius dismissed the separation 
between the Logos and his Father, and Gregory followed suit. But Gregory also 
dismissed the position that the Logos' divinity abandoned his humanity. Thus, 
notwithstanding his vigorous language, Gregory maintained the singleness of the 
suffering subject. 
88 T. A. Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism, vol. 2, Patristic Monograph Series 8 (Cambridge MA: 
Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979), 502. Norris followed this argument though he questioned the 
order that Gregory followed when discussing the various scriptural verses: "The ordering is probably 
his (Gregory), the substance their (Eunomians)". F. W. Norris (ed.), Faith Gives Fullness to 
Reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of Gregory Nazianzen, VgCh 13 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1991), 55 and 159. 
89 Cf. J. A. McGuckin, Saint Gregory ofNazianzus: An Intellectual Biography (Crestwood NY: SVS, 
2001), 299: "[Gregory] argues that they (Mt 27:46) do not indicate anything of the mind of Christ 
considered either as God or as the man-God. They speak out, at the great moment of his act of 
salvation for the world, the entire plight of the human race alienated from the divinity". 
90 Nazianzene, Fil. 5 [PG 36, 109B]:''ob ydp abtoc; i;yKataA.tAwttat, fJ bno tou natp6c;, fJ uno ti'Jc; 
!;autou llE6tT)toc;, 0 OOKEl noiv, roc; c'iv QJO~OUjlEVTJS to milloc;. KUi Old tOU'tO OUOtEAAOjlEVTJS U1t0 
too naoxovtoc;. tic; ydp fJ y~:vvT)Ilf]vat Ktitro tl)v apxl'Jv, fJ l:ni tov otaupov av~:A.e~:tv flvtiyKaaEv; 
!;v !;aut£P of:, 07tEp dnov, tU7tOl to fljlEtEpOV. flllEtS ydp ~jlEV oi. !;yKUtUAEAEljljlEVOl KUi 
7tUpEropUjlEVot 7tp6tEpoV, dta VUV 7tpOOElAT)jljlEVot KUi OEOWOjlEVOl tOlS tOU U7tUilouc; 1tUIJEOtV". 
91 Winslow, Salvation, 104. 
92 According to Winslow, Gregory adopted a firmly and coherent unitive Christology only after 
confronting the Apollinarian positions. Winslow, ibid, 94. 
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That Gregory maintained the accommodation of the human passions by the 
Logos was taken by Jouassard as an indication of his typological interpretation: 
Christ was "called" sin and malediction, but his existence was never identified with 
the presence of sin. He was also called "abandoned" but, in reality, no real separation 
took place.93 Christ only gave voice to the suffering of human kind without ever 
experiencing the passion (i.e. separation from the Father) of human race. Jouassard 
remarked on the sharp distinction between the condition of Christ on the cross and 
the condition of humankind: "he is not forsaken ... by his own Godhead which closes 
up, afraid of suffering, and abandons the sufferer".94 For Norris, Gregory introduced a 
unitive Christo logy highlighting the singleness of the suffering subject: "now we are 
saved by the suffering of the impassible".95 Norris also suggested that Christ's 
humanity did not play the role of a shield for his divinity.96 What Jouassard viewed 
as typology was Gregory's way to argue the need for full divine and also human 
involvement in the passion: 
He honors obedience for this reason in practise and from his suffering he gains 
experience. For the disposition is not enough, as it is not enough in our case us, 
unless we give it practical effect. The deed is proof for the disposition. Probably it is 
not less to believe that he tastes our obedience and counts [or pays] everything 
through his passion in the art of loving mankind. 97 
For Gregory, it was only through personal involvement in afflictions that the Logos 
freed humanity from her weakness. Such an argument meets any modem scepticism 
concerning his typology. Gregory was thinking of abandonment in real terms without 
deliberating on the mechanism in which it took place. At the end of the day, Gregory 
defended the natural divinity of the Logos in the light of soteriological 
presuppositions. This was the reason why Gregory employed a Christology that 
prepared the ground for the Christological controversies of the 5th century. However, 
Gregory was only working on the spirit of Nicaea (A.D. 325).98 For Gregory, 
abandonment was a personal experience of Christ. 
93 Nazianzene, Fil. op. cit. 
94 Nazianzene, Fil op. cit. 
95 Nazianzene, Fit op. cit. Norris, Faith, 50 and 163ff. 
% Norris, ibid, 50: "Humanity is not inserted into the equation so that divinity will be kept from full 
involvement". 
97 Nazianzene, Fit. 6 [PG 36,l09C]:"[Ii]td "COUto EP'Y((l 'ttl!~ 'tTtV i.>1taKoi]v, Kat 1tetpiitat 'tUUtll~ tK 
"COU 1tU9dv. ob ydp tKUVOV f] lit6.9eot~. fixmsp obi)€ i'J!!tV, d !!Tt Kat litd t&V 1tPU'Y!!Ut<OV 
xropi]aUt!!eV. Epyov ydp t'm61iet~t~ litalltasro~. ob xdpov ()€ taro~ KO.KetVO tmoA.a~dv. O'tt lioKt!!Uset 
tt'lv i'JI!ettpav ll1taKoijv, Kat 1t6.V'ta l!etpd tot~ !:autoi.l 1t6.8sat ttxvn q>tA.av8pro1tia~". 
98 For Gregory's Christology see Grillmeier, Christ, 368-370. Norris, Faith, 47-59. Winslow, 
Salvation, 73-119. 
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d. Gregory of Nyssa: the polemicist. 
Basil of Cresarea: the ascetic 
Gregory of Nyssa was not an exception m his treatment of the motif of 
abandonment in Christology. He only directed his attention to the episode when 
confronted with the Apollinarian position of a minimalist anthropology. However, 
Gregory did not directly correspond to Apollinarian exegesis on Mt 27:46. Gregory 
refuted Apollinarius' Arr66&t(t~ without specifically addressing Apollinarian exegesis 
onMt27:46. 
The only witnesses of Apollinarian exegesis on Mt 27:46 are found in 
fragments from exegetical catenas.99 There is no indication -based on Lietzmann's 
edition- that Apollinarius used Mt 27:46 extensively within the context of his unitive 
Christology. For Behr, modem scholarship has appreciated Apollinarian Christology 
in the light of Apollinarius' defence of the Nicene faith and also his rejection of a 
divisive Christology that presented a loose union between the Godhead and a man 
(e.g. Diodore ofTarsus). 100 
In his exegesis, Apollinarius followed the basic patristic direction of his era: it 
was not the Logos that was abandoned on the cross. 101 Apollinarius' intention was to 
prevent an Arian understanding of the episode where the Logos was abandoned by 
the Father. In his defense, Apollinarius negated that the Logos was abandoned in 
99 See MUhlenberg (ed.), Psa/menkommentare, PTS 15 (1975), 3-118. 
100 See Olson, 'Apollinarius's "God-in-a-Body" Heresy', in Christian Theology, 207-208. Indeed, 
Apollinarius has refuted the divisive Christo logy of Diodore of Tarsus. See Behr, Nicene Faith, 212, 
392. Cf. Gregory, Apol. 185 [1200] [all references in GNO 3.1]: "DAA.A.' fl~-tu<; !pllCH ouo np6arona 
A.tysw, tOV llsov Kat tOV napd tou llsou 7tpOCJA'l(jllltvta avllpronov" ([quoting from Apollinarius] but 
we say, he says, of two persons, the God and the man assumed by God). Apollinarius understood 
person in terms of nature as the life-giving principle and the point of union in Christ. Thus, for him, 
the formula of two natures or two persons introduced two principles of union and also two life-giving 
sources. Harnack and Grillmeier noticed the Stoic understanding of the soul as the principle of life and 
motion permeating the whole human being in Apollinarius. Alongside his Nicene conviction, 
Apollinarius understood -in Stoic terms- that there was only one life-giving principle in Christ, the 
Logos. Otherwise, the union between God and flesh would have been loose. For the notion of nature 
(rpu(Jf~) and person ("p6aw"ov) in Apollinarius see Grillmeier, 'Mia Physis' and 'The Concept of 
'Person", in Christ, 333-340. For the philosophical anthropological principles behind Apollinarius' 
thought which should not be exaggerated as his only theological drive see Harnack, History of 
Dogma, 149-163. Also, H. A. Wolfson, 'Philosophical Implications of Arianism and 
Apollinarianism', DOP 12 (1958), 5-28. 
101 Apollinarius, FrPs. 28 [Ps. 37.22-23] [reference to fragments in PTS 15]: "to "Iva ti i::yKattA.st7tt<; 
!!E; onou 0£ to Mli i::yKataA.st1tTI<; 1-lf:, Kai to Mli t'lnoatft<; an' 1::~-tou, ro<; i::n' autou ys totlto 
t'louvatov" (the 'why have you abandoned me; or the 'do not abandon me" and 'do not stand aloof 
from me' it is impossible to be by such one). 
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these terms. 102 Overall, Apollinarius followed the Athanasian line of reasoning 
indicating natural phenomena as the testament about the unity between the Logos and 
his Father on the cross. 103 In stressing this union, Apollinarius employed a 
"typological" interpretation that excluded the personal involvement of the Logos. 
Thus, Apollinarius avoided the Athanasian and Gregorian distinctions between 
Christ's actions qua Logos and qua man. Apollinarius dismissed concrete 
anthropological terms in Christology. 104 Athanasius and Gregory had implied that 
abandonment could refer to a "Logos-man" scheme. 105 Apollinarius rendered the 
notion of separation between the Logos and the Father as invalid. He wrote: 
This [divine glory] is said to have changed into humility, when he came to the 
passion suffering what was for the sake of men and being abandoned by them for 
whom he was suffering 106 
For Apollinarius, abandonment did not imply a disturbance of the relationship 
between the Logos and his Father. Christ was abandoned in terms of the people that 
disregarded him and crucified him. However, Apollinarian Christology was not as 
innocent as it appeared. 107 
In his Antirrheticus adversus Apollinarium, Gregory attacked the above 
102 Apollinarius, FrPs. op. cit.: "Oi.J yap djlt, <pTJOlv, 116voc;. btd b 1tati]p 1.10u jlEt' EjlOU i;anv" (For 
I am not alone, he says, because my Father is with me). 
103 Apollinarius, FrPs. 53 [Ps. 42.2]: "DE1ti Of: tou Kupiou 1tavtd.&c; to "Iva tl i;yKat€A.t7ttc; 111: 
A.sy~:tat, 6tav Kai to Kat' ai.Jtov oi.JK d~tov i;yKataA.~:hv~:roc;: oto Kal. taxc'ia f] tile; oi.Jpaviou 
PoTJ9clac; E1tt<pav~:ta 1tcpl. t({> 1tfioxovtt arojlatt ot' EKEtvo 1tcpi fJiliic;" (It is not said for the Lord the 
'why have you abandoned me', when what is according to him is not rendered to be worthy of 
abandonment; therefore, it is immediate the manifestation of the heavenly assistance for him who 
suffered through this body for us). 
104 Apollinarius' debate with Diodore of Tarsus is a factor that needs to be taken into consideration 
when assessing his Christology. His argument was shaped according to the position of his interlocutor 
even if this fact brough his positions close to the Arian diminution of Christ's humanity. Apollinarius 
knew that his Christo logy was different from that of the Arians in the sense that, in his model, the 
Logos was the life-giving principle as fully divine. 
105 I have used this expression with due caution. Athanasian and Gregorian interpretation were 
different in many respects from the later development of Antiochene Christology that resulted in 
Nestorianism. Their purpose was not to exemplify the relation between the human and divine in 
Christ, but rather to safeguard the fact that Christ, as fully divine, trully assumed human limitations. 
106 Apollinarius, FrPs. 148 (Ps. 87.16b]: "taUtTJV de; taJtEivromv jlctaP~:PA.fla9ai <pTJotV, f]viKa de; to 
1ta9dv i;A.l'JA.u9c oooxrov td lmtp av9pc01t(l)V Kai lm' ai.Jt&v lmtp rov S1taox~:v EyKataA.l1t6jlEVOc;". 
107 For Apollinarius, it was the body that accepted the passion. Christ's humanity was called the 
"passive part" of the Logos. The passion belonged to Christ's humanity only to the degree that there 
was a presence of the human element in the "commingling" of divinity and humanity --what 
Grillmeier called the compositum 'Christ'. Indeed, Gregory accused Apollinarius that he made Christ 
another substance (neither God nor man) that was the result of mingling divinity and the lower 
functions of humanity. See Grillmeier, Christ, 329. Despite Harnack's attempt to exaggerate the 
Apollinarian Christological achievement --remarked by Grillmeier--, nevertheless, he presented a fair 
exposition of Apollinarian Christology. Harnack, History of Dogma, 149-163. Behr, 'A "Nicene 
Opponent: Apollinarius of Laodicea"', in Nicene Faith, 212, 3 79-40 l. 
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Apollinarian line of reasoning. Behind the Apollinarian argument Gregory discerned 
the theory of a "middle-being" -as Grillmeier designated it- that suffered on the 
cross. 108 
Who cried out being abandoned by God, if the divinity of the Father and the Son is 
one? And from whom does abandonment occur which (i.e. abandonment) he cried 
out on the cross?109 
Gregory believed that abandonment meant separation; hence his inquiry about the 
subject of the abandonment. Gregory presented a "pro-Nestorian" position 
concerning the human reality in Christ. 110 Gregory argued that, it was absurd -
indeed- to believe that such separation belonged to the relationship between the 
Logos and the Father: 
If it is the Godhead that is the suffering, the faithful have claim that the Son is of one 
essence with the Father -he says the one who suffers, my God my God why have 
you abandoned me?- how is it, when it is one, that the Godhead is divided during 
the passion and the one abandons, and the other is left? 111 
It was the Nicene notion of the Logos' consubstantiality with the Father that 
informed Gregory's interpretation. Gregory was well aware of the Arian scepticism 
concerning the divine state of the Son. For Gregory, Apollinarius hesitated to 
acknowledge a suffering humanity in Christ. That led to the absurdity of a passible 
God. In case Apollinarius insisted that the suffering belonged to the Logos, then 
Apollinarius could jeopardise the natural union between Father and Son 
(Arianism). 112 In any case, Gregory rejected the unflexible unitive Apollinarian 
Christology. The passion belonged to the Logos but only in his incamational state. 
What Gregory really objected to was the Apollinarian notion of Christ as a 
"heavenly man". 113 Gregory did not intend to argue Christ's humanity as a second 
active subject in Christ. 114 According to Behr's observation, Gregory's intention was 
108 Grillmeier, Christ, 332.Gregory, Apol. 133 [1128]. 
109 Gregory, ibid, 168 [1176]: "tic; b eyKataA.EA.etq>9at 1tapd tou 9wu ~oi]oac;, d Ilia 9E6trtc; 1tatpoc; 
Kat ui.ou; Kai 1tapd tivoc; 11 eyKataA.wvtc; yivEtat, flv e1ti tcp otaupcp i><;Eq>rovrtoEv;". 
11° For a thorough discussion of Gregory's objections to Apollinarian Christology see Berh, 
'Contemplating the Eternal Christ', in Nicene Faith, 2.2/451-458. 
111 Gregory, Apol. 168 [1176]: "Ei ydp to 1taoxov 11 9E6trtc;. l!tuc; ot dvat 9E6trttoc; tcp 1tatpt tov 
ui.ov oi. EtlOE~ouvtEc; ouvti9Evtat -<prtoi ot b mioxrov on 0Et I!OU, 9Et !!OU, iva ti I!E 
kyKattA.t1tEc;;-, 1t&c; l!ia ouoa 11 9E6trtc; EV tcp mi9Et I!EPL~Etat Kat t] !!EV KataA.Ei1tEl, t] OE 
KataA.Et1tEtat". 
112 Gregory, Apol. 137 [1133]. 
113 B. E. Daley, "Heavenly Man' and 'Eternal Christ': Apollinarius and Gregory of Nyssa on the 
Personal Identity ofthe Savior', Journal of Early Christian Studies 10, no. 4 (2002), 469-488. 
114 Historically, such a position was never addressed until the outbreak of the Nestorian controversy. 
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to expose the Apollinarian discontinuity between Christ's humanity and the human 
race. It is certain that -unlike Grillemeier's comment- Gregory had full knowledge 
of what Apollinarius truly meant by the "heavenly man". In fact, Gregory elaborated 
a rhetorical manreuvre to ridicule it, 115 discerning Apollinarius' hesitation to attribute 
natural passions to Christ's humanity. For Gregory, such passions testified to the 
reality of the incarnation, indicating the full degree to which the Logos assumed real 
humanity. 116 Attributing such passions to a "middle-being" endangered the reality of 
the incarnation. 
Even though Gregory exposed the Apollinarian illogicality, he did not provide 
an analysis of the mechanism of abandonment. Gregory followed the Athanasian line 
of reasoning: the Father did not abandon the Logos. For Gregory, the loud cry was an 
indication of separation. Yet, Gregory did not define the subject of this separation. 
He believed that: i) the Logos qua Logos was not abandoned by the Father; 117 ii) the 
Logos remained united with his humanity and the body. The Logos was the life-
giving principle that ensured the union between body and soul. 118 Thus, the Logos 
But, the problem of how one referred to a full divinity and humanity in Christ without introducing two 
active subjects remained unsolved even beyond the time of Chalcedon and the neo-Chalcedonian 
model of Christ in the 6th-century. Bathrellos' introduction to the theology of Maximus is a good 
historical survey of the problem providing a valid review of the bibliography on this matter. 
Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ. Also Grillmeier's contribution is monumental: Grillmeier, Christ in 
Christian Tradition. S. Coakley, 'What does Chalcedon Solve and what does it not? Some Reflections 
on the Status and Meaning of the Chalcedonian Definition', in S. Daviset et al. (eds.), The 
Incarnation: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Incarnation of the Son of God (Oxford: OUP, 
2002), 143-163. I. R. Torrance, Christo/ogy after Chalcedon: Severus of Antioch and Sergius the 
Monophysite (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 1988). R. C. Chesnut, Three Monophysite Christologies: 
Severus of Antioch, Philoxenus of Mabbug, and Jacob of Sarug, Oxford Theological Monographs 
(Oxford: OUP, 1976). P. T. R. Gray, 'Leontius of Jerusalem's Case for a 'Synthetic' Union in Christ', 
SP 18 (1985), 151-154. N. Madden, 'Composite Hypostasis in Maximus the Confessor', SP 26 
(1993), 175-197. B. E. Daley, "A Richer Union': Leontius of Byzantium and the Relationship of 
Human and Divine in Christ', SP 24 (1993), 239-265. 
115 Cf. Gregory, Apo/. 148 [1148]. 
116 For Gregory, natural passions were not necessary for the being of the Logos but only in the sense 
that he followed the natural accordance. Gregory, Apo/. 231 [ 1265-1268]. 
117 Gregory, Apo/. 137 [1133). 
118 Gregory, Apo/. 153 [ 1156]: " ili..Ad KUi rep OWJlU'tl KUi rfi \jfUX.fi EUUtOV E1tlJlEpicra~ otd JlSV til~ 
\jfUX.il~ ilvol")'El t<P "-ncrrfi tOV 7tapdoEtOOV, otd M tOU OWJlUtO~ tOtfJcrt til~ q>9opa~ tt)v EVEP"YElUV" 
(but dividing himself in the body and the soul, with the soul he opens Paradise to the thief, and with 
the body he stops the action of corruption). In his On Soul and the Resurrurection (De Anima et 
Resurrrectione), Gregory had shown that it was the soul that remained the connecting link between 
itself and the material elements from which the body is composed. However, at this instance, Gregory 
shifted his position. It was not by means of the soul that corruption was prevented, but thanks to the 
presence of the Logos in the body. For a discussion over Gregory's anthropology with respect to the 
connection between the soul and the soul's life in the body see Williams, 'Gregory of Nyssa on Mind 
and Passion', 227-247. G. S. Stead, 'Individual Personality in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa', in U. 
Bianchi and H. Crouzel (eds.), Arche e Telos: L' Anthropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa, 
Studia Patristica Mediolanensia 12 (Milan: Univ. Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 1981), 170-191. Stead 
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never abandoned his humanity or the body. Grillmeier was right to observe the 
diminution of the anthropological role of the soul in Cappadocian thought. The only 
separation that Gregory did not deny -he did not assert it either- was the Platonic 
separation between body and soul during death. If this is the case, then, it remains a 
mystery why Christ cried out "My God, my God" during this separation since there 
was no true separation between humanity and divinity. 
Even more laconic than his junior brother was Basil. Basil discussed the motif 
m an unexpected context: asceticism. In his work Regulae Morales, Basil had 
addressed eighty principles for Christian asceticism. 119 The sixty fifth Rule reads 
thus: "that we need to pray for what is suitable even at the time of death". 120 Basil 
provided the necessary scriptural backup for his principle, citing Mt 27:46, Lk 23:46 
and Ac 7:58-59. Basil did not comment on the verses. For Basil, the loud cry in Mt 
27:46 was a faithful prayer: in fact, Mt 27:46 was a recantation ofPs. 21:1. Christ 
gave his loud cry according to the type of lamentation psalms in the Old Testament. 
Out of the context of theological polemics, Basil showed the value of the loud cry for 
the ascetic soul: it was a faithful prayer. Basil reflected on a patristic position that 
illustrated Christ as an example of life for the faithful. Such a position found its 
fullest expression in John Damascene's notion of"(moypa1JIJ6c;". 121 
e. Didymos the blind: the technical foundations 
According to Jouassard's examination, Didymos presented a "typological" 
understanding of the loud cry on the cross: Christ cried out as an intercessor that 
indicated the presence of a personal element that guaranteed the union between soul and body at the 
resurrection. 
119 According to Fedwick, the work belonged to the period A.D. 363-378 when Basil composed most 
of his Homilies. See P. J. Fedwick, 'A Chronology of the Life and Works of Basil of Caeasarea', in 
Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic, vol. 1 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1981 ), 3-19. 
120 Basil of Cresarea, Regulae Morales, 65 [PG 31, 804C]: " "Ott od Kat tv ai.rtfl cfl !>~6ocp 
7tpocJE(YXE06at 'td 7tplmovca". 
121 The origin of the term was scriptural: 1 Pe 2:21. Origen developed the motif in the context of the 
ethical appropriation ofChrist's example. Origen, Excerpta in Psa/mos, PG 17, 109 [Ps. 16:4]. SeeR. 
A. Layton, 'Propatheia: Origen and Didymos on the Origin of the Passions', VgCh 54, no. 3 (2000), 
269: "Origen turns Jesus agony into both a didactic opportunity and an indication of Jesus' full 
participation in human nature". Interestingly, with the exception of John Chrysostom, the motif was 
favoured by the Alexandrians. Athanasius, De Virginitate, 3.20 [if it is Athanasius' work). Didymos, 
In Psa/mos 29-34, 160.8 [Ps. 31:2 in PTA 8]. Cyril, ComJn, PG 74, 92C. Cf. Maximus, Thai. 65 [PG 
90, 770]. Damascene, ExpF. 68. 
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appropriated the passion of others in his person. 122 For Jouassard, Didymos depicted 
Christ primarily in terms of his ethical purity: "In such purity of being", Christ did 
not experience true abandonment. The latter motif was associated with sinfulness. 123 
Indeed, Didymos followed Origen in his interpretation: Christ maintained his 
ethical purity. However, Didymos introduced the fullness of Christ's humanity, and 
also his closeness to humankind. Jouassard overlooked the fact that Didymos was 
defending the existence of a rational soul in Christ against the Apollinarians. For 
Grillemeier, Didymos returned to the Origenist position of highlighting Christ's soul 
as an anthropological factor. If Didymos had accommodated only a "typological" 
interpretation, then his exegesis would not have been different than that of 
Apollinarius. In his defence against Apollinarianism, Didymos was the first author 
that developed a technical vocabulary in order to shed light on the nature of natural 
passions. 124 That is to say that Didymos was the first to discuss the accommodation 
ofhuman conditions without endangering Christ's ethical purity. 
The Alexandrian scholar employed the Origenist ethical distinction between 
passion and pro-passion (m18~-rrpom18Eia). 125 Grillmeier commented on the neo-
Platonic anthropology of Didymos with regard to this matter. 126 However, Layton 
demonstrated the Stoic origins of Didymos' theory. For Layton, Origen had already 
introduced the motif in his ethical thought. 127 Thus, Didymos found it in Origen, and 
further exemplified the way in which the scriptures presented human passions in 
Christ ~such as shrinking back from fear. His intention was to dissociate natural 
passions from sin. 128 Despite the fact that Didymos' thought did not lead 
122 Cf. Didymos, In Psa/mos 20-21,25,17 [Ps. 21.1 in PTA 7]. Indeed, for Didymos, Christ uttered the 
loud cry as the head of the suffering body. But, this is not to say that Didymos believed in a "docetic" 
-i.e. relative- accommodation of human sufferings -as Jouassard suggested. 
123 Jouassard, "L'Abandon ", 615. 
124 Grillmeier, 'The Alexandrian Development of a Christo logical Psychology', in Christ, 361-367. 
125 Didymos, Ecc/ 7-8:8,221.21 [Eccl 7:20 in PTA 16]. Didymos, In Psa/mos 20-21,43.16 [Ps 21:21 
in PTA 7]. It is not quite clear how this distinction could work in real psychological terms for 
Didymos. It seems that according to Didymos, the latter term (i.e. rrpom18Eia) defines the condition 
when a passion is only a thought. At that time the soul has not given her consent to the execution of 
the passion. When the soul has reached the condition of m18oc; then the soul has consented to the 
execution of a passion and the latter has taken place. 
126 Grillmeier, Christ, 363. 
127 Layton, 'Propatheia', 262-282. 
128 Didymos, Ecc/ 11-12, 337.24 [Eccl 11:10 in PTA 9). 
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anywhere, 129 Layton ackowledged that Didymos put into fore the fact that Christ 
shared limitations and sufferings with the rest of humankind in a genuine way. 130 
Unlike what Jouassard has suggested, Didymos appropriated Ps 21:1 for Christ: 
i.e. David's offspring "that was born according to the flesh". 131 Didymos introduced 
a distinction peculiar to his interpretation: Christ was abandoned according to the 
"logoi of transgressions" (Myo1 rrapamw!Jarwv), not the "transgressions" 
(rrapamw1Jara). 132 According to Didymos' thought, this distinction exemplified the 
reason that caused abandonment: the Alexandrian scholar related the multifaceted 
logoi as connoting the results that transgressions caused on humankind. Christ 
experienced the results, not the transgressions as such. In introducing such a 
distinction, Didymos i) affirmed the reality of Christ's abandonment; ii) emphasised 
Christ's closeness to human sufferings; and iii) he maintained the unique identity and 
ethical purity ofthe suffering subject. 133 However, his theory could only make sense 
in the context of the Athanasian distinction between the actions of the Logos before 
and after the incarnation. 
In his De Trinitate, 134 Didymos reinforced the motif of a co-suffering Christ. 
This time he discussed the reason that Christ was abandoned. Didymos followed 
Gregory ofNazianzus' dictum: "quod non est assumptum non est sanatum".m In his 
sufferings, Christ experienced the weakness of the human nature according to the 
natural "accordance" (aKoA.ou9ia.). 136 Thus, Didymos introduced the link between 
abandonment and natural accordance. Having separated abandonment from sin, for 
129 For Layton, Didymos shifted his argument from the Stoic and Origenist notion of propassio as 
addressing the external stimuli to the concept of passio in tenns of human deliberation and assent. 
Though he introduced the involvement of human disposition and deliberation into the argument, 
Didymos did not demonstrate the exact line that distinguishes between passio and propassio, or the 
way in which the notion of human disposition was not linked to sin. See Layton, 'Propatheia', 2281-
282. Cf. Didymos, In Psalmos 20-21,25.6-8 [Ps 21.2 in PTA 7]; abandonment was caused by the lost 
of one's initiatial disposition. However, Didymos did not indicate how this notion included Christ's 
case. 
130 As Layton put it, "Didymos needed to show that the psychic event gave sure proof of human 
rational functions in the Incarnation". Layton, 'Propatheia', 276. 
131 Didymos, FrPs. 175 [Ps. 21:1]. 
132 Didymos, FrPs. 176 [Ps. 21 :2a ]. 
133 Grillmeier has observed that Didymos has maintained the Alexandrian identification of the 
suffering subject primarily as the Logos, however, introducing a coherent psychological basis in his 
analysis that shows a creative integration of"Aiexandrian" and "Antiochene" Christologies. 
134 Didymos, Trin. PG 39, 904A. 
135 
"What is not assumed is not saved". 
136 Didymos, Trin. PG 39, 901B. 
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Didymos, Chist assumed on himself the results of sin. Such results defined what the 
humanity is. 137 
That he (Christ) condescended in everything, being in poverty in the form of the 
servant, and refashioning according to the word himself without change into the 
common (nature) and keeping the natural accordance of the incarnation, without 
destroying the reality of the character (incarnation). 138 
Didymos accommodated the Irenaean defence of showing Christ's true incarnation as 
manifested through passions that were according to the human nature that he 
assumed. 
How would we know that, according to what is written, he lifted our weaknesses on 
the holy cross, so that through it he offered a better condition to men, if before that, 
in the way that he knows, he did not assume them on him and show them?139 
Overall, Didymos seems to support that Christ "felt" or "experienced" 
abandonment, without ever experiencing it in terms of separation. Didymos did not 
discuss the actual subject that abandoned Christ on the cross. Was it the Father?140 
The Alexandrian exegete exploited the Athanasian distinction between experiencing 
abandonment qua humanity, and also the Origenist notion of Christ's soul as the link 
between the humanity and divinity. 141 Didymos defended the natural character of 
abandonment against the Apollinarian application of a typological reading. He 
argued the continuity between Christ's suffering and the humankind, further 
expressing the patristic scepticism concering abandonment: what lies at the core of 
divine abandonment is sin. Abandonment was the result of the fall. Didymos 
137 For Layton, according to Didymos, "propatheia is a proof of nature, not a quality which produces 
moral defect or virtue". Layton, 'Propatheia', 273. Didymos connected the event on the cross to 
Christ's shrinking back in Gethsemane. See Didymos, In Psa/mos 20-21, 43.20 [Ps 21: 21 in PTA 7]. 
138 Didymos, Trin. PG 39, 901B: "(JJ,J,.' ott KilVtllu6u ouyKutll~d~ d~ rrcivtll, Klli rrtroxeurov tfi tou 
oouA.ou !!Op<pfl, Kill !!Etll1tAUOil~ t<P A.6ycp l>llUtOV iltpE1ttro~ d~ tO KOtVOV, Kill 1tUOilV tf]~ 
tvllv6prom'Joero<; UKoA.ou6illV qmA.cittrov, Kilt lll]OEV toU Xllp!lKtf]po<; tf]<; UA1']9dll<; Uq>llVi~rov". For 
Didymos, poverty did not define abandonment, as it was the case with Origen. However, Didymos 
brought into play the motif of kenosis to show the continuity between Christ's suffering and human 
experience. 
139 Didymos, Trin. PG 39,904A:"Wi'><; ydp c'iv t7tA.f]poq>opl'J6f]1!EV, ott td<; ao9evdll~ i"Jil&v, Klltd to 
'YE'YPilll!!EVOV, d<; tOV tilltoV UVTJV£YKE otaupov, root£ otd toUtOU KpdttOVIl 7tllp!lOXEtV tot~ 
av9prorrot<; Klltciotaotv, d lli't 1tp6tepov llUtd<;, KUO' OV oloE tp6rrov, d<; l>llUtOV UVEAil~E tE Kilt 
EOEt~EV". 
140 Didymos. In Psa/mos 20-21. 25.6-9 [Ps 21:2 in PTA 7]: God abandons an individual when the 
latter has abandoned his own disposition. 
141 For Didymos' Christology see Grillmeier, Christ, 361-367. Also A. Gesche, La Christo/ogie du 
commentaire sur les Psaumes decouverte a Toura, Universitas Catholica Loveniensis Dissertiones 7 
(Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1962), 71-90. Guerard, 'Didyme d'Alexandrie', in Nil, Commentaire sur /e 
Cantique des Cantiques, 41-42. P. C. Bouteneff, 'Placing the Christology of Didymus the Blind', SP 
37 (2001), 389-395. J. Lebon, 'S. Athanase a-t-il employe l'expression KUptllK6~ 6.v8prorro<;?', Revue 
d'histoire ecc/esiastique 31 (1935), 307-329. 
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distinguished between cause and result. He also indicated the various ethical levels in 
which human passions function. Didymos' intention was to show the natural 
character that passions acquired after the fall without discussing the mechanism of 
abandonemnt. Abandonment initially resulted due to sin (i.e. the fall). In this present 
life, it has become an integral part of human nature without introducing sin, as such, 
since now it is a "result" of the initial corruption that sin brough to human nature. 
Didymos denied the bond between sin and abandonment. As a result of the initial 
corruption of human nature, abandonment could occur without necessarily resulting 
from sin that has been acted by the subject. In discussing abandonment in terms of 
natural passions, Didymos removed the question concerning divine theodicy: 
abandonment was part of human nature; it was not caused by an active sin. 
However, the subject that abandoned (e.g. Father?) and the true object that was 
abandoned on the cross (e.g. humanity?) remained uncertain in his thought. What 
Didymos achieved was to provide the necessary thought and vocabulary that would 
lead to the clear distinction of later Patristic literature (i.e. Maximus-Damascene) 
between "natural properties" and "sinful passions". 
f. Epiphanios of Salamis: the anti-Arian/ Apollinarian rigorist. 
On the other side of the Mediterranean, a contemporary of Didymos, 
Epiphanios of Salamis, tried to provide insights into divine abandonment with regard 
to the subject of the experience. Like Didymos, the Cypriot bishop was preoccupied 
with opposing Arianism and Apollinarianism. 
In his defence against the Arians, Epiphanios was following Athanasius and the 
Nicene theology. 142 Indeed, Epiphanios dismissed any separation between Father and 
Son: 
When was a son abandoned by the father, when was not the Son in the Father and 
the Father in the Son? The Son was on earth, and the Logos, the God, was walking, 
but he was touching upon the heavens ... he was inside Mary and became man, and 
he was filling the cosmos with his power. How is it possible that he and such a one 
was desperately saying according to his divinity "Eli Eli"? 143 
142 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.19.5 [GCS 3/168] and 69.63.1 [GCS 3/211-212]. 
143 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.63.6 (GCS 3/212]: "1t6'tE ydp EYKU'tEA.dq>lllJ uio~ i11to 7tU'tp6~. 1t6'tE os oi.lx, b 
uio~ i>v -rep 1ta-rpi Kat b 1ta-rt')p i>v uicp; !>1ti yfJ~ J.Ltv ydp o uio~ Kai [o] lleo~ A.6yo~ PePl'JK~:t, 
oi.lpavou os fl7t-re-ro ... Kai i>v Mapi~ E'tunav~: Kai dv9pomo~ l>ytvew, i:tA.A.d -rfl ouvdJ.1Et ai.lwu 
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The Nicene line of reasoning was arguing the natural unity between Father and Son. 
Epiphanios pointed out the unity of the active/suffering subject with his Father by 
highlighting two conditions of Christ's being: i) Christ in his unity with the Father; 
and ii) Christ in his incarnate condition. Like Athanasius, Epiphanios distinguished 
between the two conditions of Christ's being (theologia-oikonomia). For Epiphanios, 
it was Christ's humanity that was abandoned by God, since the passion was rendered 
to the incarnate condition of Christ. At the level of the theologia, the relationship 
between the Father and the Son remained undisturbed by the passion. 
Ps 15: 1 0 was Epiphanios' proof text that Christ's soul was not abandoned in 
Hades: the unity between soul and divinity remained unbroken. 144 The resurrection 
gave evidence to this unity: because of her unity with the divinity, the soul was not 
taken over by death. 145 But, if abandonment signified separation, who was separated 
by whom? Epiphanius excluded the separation between Father and Son, and also 
divinity and soul. He was left with the option that the body was separated by the soul: 
His incarnation ... seeing that the divinity together with the soul was already moving 
to leave behind the holy body, utters this at the person ofthe dominical man, i.e. his 
incarnation. 146 
On the cross, Christ experienced death. Before dying, the body felt the departure of 
the soul. Epiphanius was following the classical definition of death as separation 
between body and soul: 
If it is impossible that he was left because of the divinity how could it be uttered 
from the person of the divinity: "My God, my God, why have you abandoned me"? 
But this word was shown [to be] from the person of his incarnation according to 
human passions ... so what was in the tomb was the body, and the soul departed 
!mJ...t']pou td OUJ.11tclV'tU. nroc; OUV b 'tOlOUtoc; KUl 'tT]AtKOUtoc; KUtd 'ttlV Ull'tOU 8E6tT]'tU OtKtp&c; 
EAE'YEV "f1J... (, f1Ai. "". 
144 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.64.4-5 [GCS 3/213]: ""oi.JK l:aa~:tc; tt'lv 'I'U:X.iJv flOU de; "AtoT]v, oi.JO€ ocba~:tc; 
'tOY oat6v CJOU ioEiv otaq>Oopav". OU'tE ydp KUtU t1tEV b liytoc; 8E0c; J...6yoc; 'ttlV \jfUXtlY OU'tE 
l:yKatEA.Eiq>OTJ t) 'I'UXtl ai.Jwu tv "A ton" ('for you will not leave my soul in Hades; neither will you 
suffer your holy one to see corruption'. Neither had the holy divine Logos left alone the soul, nor was 
his soul abandoned in Hades). 
145 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.64.4-5 [GCS 3/213]. Epiphanios viewed the soul as bait for death: death 
approached the soul, but he suddenly found the divinity hiding behind the soul. 
146 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.64.2 [GCS 3/213]:"t) ydp abtou l:vavepronT]atc; ... bp&aa i]oTJ tt'lv 8E6tT]ta 
auv tfl 'I'UXTI KtvouJltVTJV tnt to Kataf...Et\jfat to liytov a&Jla ano npoaronou abtou too KuptaKou 
avepronou, 'tOUttatt tile; abtou l;vaveproni]aEroc; 1tpoE~UAEto". For the notion of the "dominical man" 
in the Arian controversies, Grillmeier's contribution remains irreplaceable. Grillmeier pointed to the 
Marcellan origin of the term and its subsequent use by the Nicene party. See Grillmeier, Christ, 287ff. 
According to Griilmeier, the term referred to the glorified state of Christ's humanity without 
introducing a distinct active subject. 
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together with the divine Logos. 147 
Epiphanius was careful enough to maintain the unity between the humanity and 
divinity even in death. The indication that it was the "dominical man" that cried out 
Mt 27:46 was a theological device to secure the unity between body and divinity. The 
body was still part of the incarnation. Thus, it was not left in the tomb alone: it 
remained the body of the incarnation. For Epiphanios, "neither was the incarnate 
presence abandoned during the passion". 148 Gregory of Nyssa had indicated that it 
was the presence of the Godhead that prevented the corruption of the body. 
Epiphanios followed suit. For Epiphanius, it was not the Godhead that abandoned the 
body, as the Apollinarians might have suggested. Origen and Didymos highlighted 
the presence of the soul in Christ. Epiphanios diminished the role of the soul in 
Christ: it was the Logos that secured the unity between the humanity and divinity. It 
was only the soul that was separated from the body: the Logos remained united with 
the soul and the body. In Epiphanios' thought, Christ became a co-sufferer with the 
human race. His suffering was a "proof' -to borrow from Layton- for the reality of 
his human nature. Epiphanios highlighted abandonment as the separation between 
body and soul in rigorous terms, emphasising that Christ assumed natural passions. 149 
g. Cyril of Alexandria: the Nestorian outbreak. 
In the years following the outbreak of the Arian controversy, theological 
deliberation on the "loud cry" had taken on the form of refusing the application of 
such experience to Christ qua God by the Nicene party. In most cases, the rigorous 
presentation of a "concrete" human element was devised in order to remove any 
suspicions concerning divine passibility. But, it was noticed that, the theological 
obscurity of the Nicene faith inevitably brought to the fore the Nestorian 
understanding of humanity as a distinct active subject in the incarnation. 
In his exegesis, Nestorius was unwilling to attribute the loud cry to the Logos 
147 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.66.1ff[GCS 3/214]. Also in 69.63.4 [GCS 3/212]and 69.66.3-4 [GCS 3/214]: 
"d Of; illiuvatov ftv KataoxsOf]vat Old ttlV 9s6tTJta, n&c; apa tK 7tpOOW1tOU tf]c; ai:Jtou 9s6tTJtoc; 
flouvato I:>TJ9f]vat to "Os{; JlOU, Os{; llOU, tva tl kyKattA.t7ttc; lle;" b.AA.' outoc; EK 7tpOOW1tOU tf]c; ai:Jtou 
l;vav9pronilosroc; b.v9pro7t01ta9&c; EOeiKVUtO b A6yoc; ... o&lla I){; apa to EV tcp llVilllatl, [Kat] 11 lj!UXt'l 
0{; ouvanf]A.Os tcp Oscp A6y<p". 
148 Epiphanius, Pan. 69.42.4 [GCS 3/190]. According to Rosse, for Epiphanios, the divinity 
abandoned the humanity Rosse, Cry of Jesus, 76. 
149 Epiphanios, Anchoratus, 33.4ff [GCS 1/42]. Epiphanius, Pan. 2.3.2ff [GCS 1/230]. 
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qua God. It was the son of Mary that was abandoned on the cross. Nestorius provided 
a literal understanding of abandonment in terms of separation which he viewed in the 
relation between Logos-man. According to McGuckin and Gavrilyuk, Nestorius had 
two theological drives: i) a reaction to Apollinarian human minimalism and, ii) the 
maintenance of divine impassibility. 150 Unfortunately, Nestorius' thought has only 
been preserved in fragments edited by Abramovski, and also in extracts from his 
works that were included in the Acts of Ephesus (A.D. 431). Nestorius was unwilling 
either to attribute abandonment to the Logos or diminish the reality of the 
abandonment. In arguing divine impassibility and also the authenticity of the 
experience, Nestorius applied abandonment to the relationship between human and 
divine in Christ. Who was abandoned on the cross was the man, i.e. a collaborator in 
the divinity ( 9Eiac; aU9Evriac; ouvEpy6c;). 151 Nestorius asked: "if he was crucified due to 
weakness, who was weak, you heretic? The Logos the God"? 152 According to 
Nestorius, it was the man with whom the Logos was united (auvaq>Eia) that 
experienced weakness, natural passions, and was abandoned on the cross. 153 After the 
outbreak of the controversy, the Nestorian party was accusing the Cyrillian party of 
confusing the natures and ascribing passibility to the divine nature. 154 
150 In ACO 1.1.6/11: "dKOtJCJOV OE Kat btl. tOU eavlirou, d £ott 1tOtS KEliJ.EVO~ b 0E6~. 'iva na6TJtOV 
tOV 6EOV doayliyroiJ.EV. l:xepoi, <pTJOiV, OvtE~ KUtTJAAU'YTJIJ.EV t&t 6E&t otd tOU eavlirou tOU uiou 
abtou. OUK ElnE otd toU eavlitou tOU 6EOU A.6you" (listen also that in death, if it is that God was 
lying [at the tomb], so that we infer that God is passible. Though we were enemies, it says, we were 
econciled to God through the death of his Son. He did not say through the death of Logos the God). 
Cf. McGuckin, Saint Cyril, 130. Gavrilyuk, Suffering, 141. Grillmeier, Christ, 451. In late antiquity, 
the problem of divine impassibility was linked to the early accusations of patripassianism (e.g. 
Noetius). Gavriluyk has criticised Harnack's position that the problem ofpatripassianism was never a 
real issue for Christian theology. Especially during the Arian controversy, patripassianism was 
rejected in the face of Sabellius. Any strict unitive Christology and Trinitarian theology that argued 
the "personal" involvement of the Logos qua God in the passion was suspicious of introducing the 
participation of the Father in the passion. This fact reflects in the Arian diminution of the ontological 
status of the Logos. On the other hand, any diminution of the involvement of the Logos in the passion 
was putting under question the manner in which salvation was brought upon the human race by a 
divine agent. If the participation ofthe Logos was relative, then, it was an open question how a man 
transformed the human passions. Gregory of Nyssa provided the most insightful discussion on this 
matter in his Contra Apollinarium, and also Gregory Nazianzen in his Ad Cledonium. Gavrilyuk has 
presented the most coherent analysis of the subject addressing the span from the Arian controversies 
to the Nestorian outbreak. Gavrilyuk, 'Patripassian Controversy Resolved: The Son, not the Father 
Suffered in the Incarnation', in Suffering, 91-100. It is characteristic that even in the Arian 
controversies one party was accusing the other party of either patripassianism or the heresy of Paul of 
Samosata who had introduced two distinct active subjects in Christ. 
151 In ACO 1.1.2/49. 
152 In ACO 1,1.6/12. Nestorius provided a chain of syllogisms to show Cyril's absurdity in introducing 
weakness and death as qualities attributed to the Logos. For Nestorius, Cyril had subjected the divine 
to passibility. 
153 In ACO 1,1.6.12. 
154 Abramowski (ed.), Nestorian Collection, 43, 68, 84 and 118. 
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It is clear that Cyril of Alexandria gained an interest in the motif of 
abandonment only as part of his defence -or attack, in many cases- against 
Nestorius. 155 In the early stages of his exegetical career -i.e. prior to A.D. 428- Cyril 
had shown no interest in the significance of the loud cry on the cross. It is indicative 
of this, that in his extensive commentary In Matthceum, he had overlooked the loud 
cry, turning his attention to the sudden darkness and also Christ's final words. The 
episode only attracted his attention in his polemical works: twice he responded to 
Nestorius' scepticism quoting directly from the latter (Adversus Nestorium). Cyril's 
intention was to fully expose the weakness ofNestorian divisive Christology. 156 
So far, it has been indicated that, prior to the Nestorian outbreak, Patristic 
literature left an obscure possibility that abandonment as separation could apply to 
the relationship between the Godhead and manhood. Nestorius seems to have drawn 
this conclusion: abandonment could apply to the relation between God and man. 157 
The Nicene faith had shown that the only option open was to apply separation 
between the Logos and the Son of Mary. Cyril felt that Nestorius had explored such 
an option by breaking the unity between the Godhead and manhood. Cyril acquired 
another theological position: the loud cry, qua action, belonged to the Logos 
incarnate; i.e. the Logos in his humanity. 158 In order to avoid the Scylla and 
Charybdis of either acknowledging divine passibility159 or Apollinarian minimalism, 
Cyril denied the definition of the loud cry as a desperate cry in abandonment. For 
155 Cyril's twelve anathemas attached to his third letter to Nestorius became a stumbling block for any 
true communication between him and the Antiochene party. See Cyril's works Apologia xii 
Capitulorum contra Orientales, PG 76, 316-385 --against Andrew of Samosata's refutation of the 
anathemas--, Apologia xii Anathematismorum contra Theodoretum, PG 76, 385-452 --facing 
Theodoret's refutation-- and Exp/anatio xii Capitulorum, PG 76, 293-312. It was only after the 
Formulary of Reunion (A.D. 433) -drafted by Theodoret of Cyrrhus- that the significance of Cyril's 
anathemas was put a-side. See Fr. Young, 'The Twelve Anathemas', in From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A 
Guide to the Literature and its Background (London: SCM, 1983), 220-229. Grillmeier, Christ, 491. 
156 In ACO 1.1.6/47: "o M onaxupt~611evoc; lltl oe'iv abtov civ9pomov voe'ia9at \jltA.6v, aA.A.d Beov 
Kat civ9pO:l1tOV, il7tOVEilEt llEV tOV ilKUVBtvov atecpavov Kat td Etepa t&v 1taB&v iotK&c; avBpcimrot 
Kat avd llEpoc;, 7tpOOKUVetV OE blloA.oye'i auv tftt Be6tl]tt toutov" (he claims this that it is not 
possible to think of him as mere man, but God and man, and he attributed the thorny glow and the rest 
of the passions exclusively to man, in one part, and he confesses to worship him together with the 
Godhead). 
157 Meyendorff observed that Nestorianism was inevitable due to the obscure Christological 
suggestions in the Nicene Creed. According to Grillmeier, Nestorius depended on the Nicene faith 
when he introduced Christ as the active/suffering subject. In employing the term, he did not provide 
an ontological understanding of the word as long as the term was felt to maintain the unity of the two 
natures. J. Meyendorff, Christ in the Eastern Christian Thought (Washington D. C: Corpus, 1969), 3-
16. 
158 Cyril, Nest. PG 76, 96Dff. 
159 Cyril, Ad Reginas, 1.1.5/34 
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Cyril, it was always the Logos incarnate that was hanging on the cross. Any 
reference to abandonment as separation could lead to the Arian diminishing of his 
divine state. 160 The loud cry was a supplication while the Logos was about to face 
death at a human level in his incarnational state. 161 Thus, he faced the fear that was 
natural to the soul when death was ante port as. 162 Cyril depended on the Origenist 
tradition by showing the paradigmatic and also salvific character of the loud cry. 
Christ prayed in the name of fallen humankind. 163 In doing so, Christ provided an 
example for the faithful. 164 
According to Jouassard, Cyril employed Origenist typology for a difficult 
matter. For Jouassard, his "typological" understanding diminished the involvement of 
the Logos in human sufferings. Christ's actions were in pretence. 165 
Patristic literature sought to avoid the problems of either separating the Logos 
from the Father, or the Godhead from the manhood. As it was mentioned, Gregory 
had already shown the importance of maintaining the Logos as the element of unity 
in Christ in order to explain the resurrection, and also the incorruptibility of Christ's 
body. Had Cyril argued thus, he would have been accused of identifying the Logos 
only with the soul. That would bring him one step closer to Apollinarianism for his 
opponents. 
Basil had introduced the motif of the loud cry as a faithful prayer. John 
Chrysostom fully exploited this position. Cyril returned to this line of reasoning. For 
Cyril, the loud cry was not in despair. It expressed the reality of the passion: Christ's 
soul was shrinking back before death. What triggered the faithful prayer on the cross 
was the prospect of approaching death. 166 For Cyril, Christ experienced fear at an 
economical level. Already, Didymos had developed an ethical understanding of fear 
as a natural passion that it was not immediately associated with sin. For Cyril, the 
divinity permitted the humanity to experience her natural shrinking back before 
16
° Cyril, Chr. PG 75, 13288 and also in ACO 1.1.4114. 
161 Cyril used the linguistic fonns: "Eux6~EvO<;" in ACO 1.1.4114; "tK6uowrro0vrO<;" in 1.1.5/35; 
"KaAoOvrcx;" in 1.1.5/35; "tK rrappfloia~ aval3oQv" in Cyril, Chr. PG 75, 1325C. 
162 Cyril, Thes. 24 (PG 75, 389]. 
163 Cyril, Ad Reginas, 1.1.5/34. 
164 Cyril, Chr. PG 75, 1321C. Idem, ComLk. PG 72, 921C. Idem, ComJn. PG 74, 92C. 
165 Jouassard, 'L' Abandon', 609fT and 617. 
166 Cf. Athanas ius, Fragment a Varia, PG 26, 1241 C: "cptpEI 6t Kai r~v rapaxr'JV rf)c; oapK~ trri r4J eaverr({J 
rrpom6vrl" (he carries the trembling of the flesh when accepting death). 
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death. Cyril's presupposition was soteriological: Christ assumed fear to heal it. 167 
Cyril fully appropriated the Gregorian notion of a transformation from within 
Christ's humanity: 168 Christ's humanity maintained its distinct character (weakness-
limitations). But it was also transformed due to its union with the divine Logos 
(deification): 169 
Had he not shrunk back, (human) nature would have not be freed from shrinking 
back; if he was not sorrowful, it would never have been spared from sorrow; had he 
not been distressed, (human nature) would never have been delivered from these. 
And you can apply this reasoning to any of the human conditions, for you will find 
that, in Christ, the passions were moved not to take control of him, as is the case for 
us, but havin~ been moved, they were subdued by the power of the Logos dwelling 
in the flesh. 17 
In the incarnation, the Logos assumed human limitations that he called his own. 171 
Whatever belonged to his humanity, it belonged to the Logos according to his 
kenosis -a term that Cyril understood in its Origenist meaning of voluntary 
poverty. 172 Kenosis meant that the Logos subjected himself to the natural limitations 
of his humanity voluntarily in order to affirm the authenticity of the latter and restore 
it. 173 His loud cry was another expression of this assumption of human limitations in 
kenosis. 174 The notion of voluntary poverty continued to veil the mystery of the 
incamation. 175 Indeed, in his Thesaurus, Cyril discussed Mt 27:46 alongside the 
167 Cyril, ComJn. PG 94, 880. Cyril refuted Appolinarianism by indicating that such shrinking back 
before death belonged to the rational soul. In fact, Cyril related this shrinking back to thoughts. Cyril 
appropriated an Evagrian distinction between motions related to the irrational and the rational parts of 
the soul. The irrational is disturbed by evil passions. The rational is affected by thoughts commencing 
from memory and anticipations. For instance, Evagrius had related anger to memory and unfulfilled 
anticipations. See Evagrius, Pract. 4 and also 10. 
168 Nazianzene, Epistula ci ad Cledonium. PG 37,181C: ''To ydp llnp6oA.11ntov, ll9spdnsurov" (That 
which is not assumed is not healed). Cf. Athanasius, Fragmenta Varia, PG 26, 1240A: "Ei yap 1.u') aurt'><; 
WIJOiwro np6c; 6v9pt.imouc;, ouK ~~uvavro oi av8pwno1 61JOio0cr9m np6c; 0E6v" (if was not after the likeness of 
men, men would not be able to be after the likeness of God). Cyril, ComJn. PG 74, 890. Cyril 
reproduced verbatim the Gregorian motto: "6 ydp j.ll) npooEiA.llntat, oi.Jot OEorootat" (what was not 
assumed was not saved). Cf. Nazianzene, Carmina Dogmatica, 11,35 [PG 37, 468A]. 
169 Cyril, ComLk, PG 72, 921 C and 9248-C. 
17° Cyril, Thes. 24 [PG 75, 397C]. Cf. Athanasius, In illud: Nunc Anima mea turbata est, PG 26, 
12410. 
171 In ACO 1.1.4/14. 
172 In ACO 1.1.5/35ff. Cyril, Chr. PG 75, 13280. Idem, Thes. 24 [PG 75, 397]. 
173 Cyril, Thes. 24 and also ACO 1.1.6/121. 
174 Idem, ComLk. PG 72, 9200: "Oi.J ydp lost tov Ka9tyjlEVov de; KEVrootv, Kal. tote; til<; 
llv9pron6tlltO<; l>!li3~>1311K6ta jlEtpOtc;, n;apatts'io9at lioKs'iv td av9promva" (it was not proper to think 
that he who descended to kenosis and entered the limits of humanity quit the human conditions). 
175 Unlike modem thought, Cyril had little to say about kenosis. The term was coined to express the 
mystery of the incarnation as utterly inexpressible. Modem thought has moved in the opposite 
direction: kenotic theology became the basic tool of thought to exemplifY the incarnation. It has been 
felt that the Logos' self-poverty revealed something about the character of the divine nature: the 
Godhead is capable of poverty and alienation from its own nature qua the divinity. Hence, the 
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prayer in Gethsemane. In doing so, Cyril illustrated the interaction between affirming 
Christ's real humanity, and the restoration of humankind. The assumption of human 
limitations was not a passive condition but a rather dynamic motion of the Logos 
who made human weakness his own. 176 Cyril inquired about the purpose of the 
incarnation if the Logos did not assume true humanity alongside all its natural 
limitations. 177 That Christ shrank back before death was a result of natural 
accordance: naturally, the soul desires life over death. 178 On the cross, as in 
Gethsemane, the miraculous natural phenomena, and also the fact that Christ 
committed his spirit to his Father, manifested that he was not a mere man; he was 
always the Logos incarnate that preserved human weakness in order to overcome it. 
h. Theodoret of Cyrrhus: the sober exegete. 
Unlike most of the authors discussed so far, Theodoret presented a genuine 
interest in the loud cry. This interest was manifested in his exegetical works. 179 Like 
generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit -defined in tenns of the kenosis of the Father--
is the "estrangement" of the Father from the other two divine persons. This kenosis is eternal and also 
resulted in the creation of the world and the incarnation. It is true that patristic thought introduced the 
notion of otherness in God, but this was only in tenns of the incarnation. The application of this 
notion of otherness in the life of the Trinity has only limited the awe before the mystery of the 
incarnation. If the divine nature is kenotic, then the incarnation was only part of what it is a "natural" 
process within the Godhead. For instance, in the episode on the cross, Bulgakov saw the estrangement 
of the Logos from the Spirit. This estrangement was founded in the notion of the eternal generation 
and procession --respectively-- in the Trinity. Balthasar followed the same notion of kenosis which he, 
too, related to divine estrangement. However, he was more cautious than Bulgakov to keep an 
apophatic attitude to this kenosis. Balthasar did not intend to exemplify the 'Hegelian' relationship 
between the immanent and economic Trinity, but to show the continuity between Christ's limitations 
and our limitations. See S. Bulgakov, Du Verbe Incarne. Idem, The Comforter. N. Gorodetzky, 
'Doctrinal Writings on the Kenosis', in The Humiliated Christ in Modern Russian Thought (London: 
SPCK, 1938), 127-174. P. Gavrilyuk, "The Kenotic Theology of Sergius Bulgakov", SJT 58, no.3 
(2005), 251-269. N. Sakharov, 'S. Bulgakov on kenosis', in The Theology of Archimandrite Sophrony, 
119-126. Evans, 'The Self-Emptying of God', 246-272. Richard, Christ: The Self-Emptying of God 
Balthasar provided a constructive criticism of Gennan kenotisism and Bulgakov's theology. See 
Balthasar, Theodrama: Theological Dramatic Theory, vol. IV, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco 
CA: Ignatius, 1994), 319. Idem, Mysterium, 32. A. Baker, 'The Kenosis Problem in von Balthasar's 
Reading of Bulgakov', URL: http://www.geocities.com/sbulgakovsociety/ ABaker-
BulgakovBalthasar.doc (last accessed 05/03/08). A. Scola, Hans Urs Von Balthasar: A Theological 
Style, trans. J.T and A.C.T., Retrieval & Renewal (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995). G. F. O'Hanlon, 
The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs Von Balthasar (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). B. Blankenhorn, 'Balthasar's Method of Divine Naming', Nova et Vetera, 
vol. I no. 2 (2003), 245-268. P. Casarella, 'The Descent, Divine Self-Enrichement, and the 
Universality of Salvation', URL: http://communio-icr.com/articles/PDF/PCasarella.pdf (last accessed 
05/03/08). 
176 McGuckin, Saint Cyril, 183cf .. 
177 ln ACO 1.1.1/39 and also 1.1.5119. 
178 Cyril, Thes. 24 [PG 75, 397]. 
179 ln a polemical context, Theodore reserved his comments on the loud cry only when refuting Cyril's 
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Cyril -though independently-, Theodoret realised the dead end that the motif of 
abandonment as separation had led Christology. Thus, he turned to the notion of Mt 
27:46 as a faithful prayer. Already, Basil, John Chrysostom and Cyril had followed 
this exegetical stand. For Theodoret, Mt 27:46 was Christ's prayer in his humanity 
(av9pwrrivwc;). The loud cry manifested the "reason of the economy" (6 Myoc; r~c; 
oiKOVO(.Iiac;). Christ prayed by addressing the Father who actually listened to his cry: 
the prayer illustrated the union between the Father and Son. 180 What Theodoret meant 
by the "reason of the economy" was the fact that, though Christ was always aware of 
his union with the Father, he prayed to illustrate this union. Thus, it was a prayer in 
union, not separation. Arguing thus, Theodoret met the Arian scepticism about the 
unity between the Logos and the Father. 181 
The fact that Theodoret addressed the active subject as 'Christ' could be an 
indication that his Christological allegiance was with the Antiocheans. According to 
Grillmeier, Nestorius had favoured the term "Christ" over "Logos" without strictly 
identifying it with the Logos. He understood it as the end-result ofthe union between 
God and man. Theodoret did not use the term in this sense. The anti-Arian context in 
which he employed the term, and the fact that he did not follow the Athanasian 
distinction between groups of actions was an indication of Theodoret' s willingness to 
maintain a single active subject. 
He says that he is abandoned, without any sins being committed by him, but death 
holds onto him, since he has been given power over the sinful. So he calls 
abandonment not the separation from the united divinity, as some have claimed, but 
the occurring assent to the passion. 182 
Theodoret dismissed the notion of separation. The indication concerning the claims 
of "some" individuals could point to several theological groups: Arians, 
Apollinarians, Nicenes -due to their obscure Christology- and even Nestorians. Cyril 
did not hold such a position (i.e. separation). For Theodoret, abandonment defined 
twelve anathemas. Cf. Cyril, Apologia contra Theodoretum , PG 76, 409B. 
180 Theodoret, Comls. 15.347 [reference in Mtlhle (ed.), Theodoret von Kyros: Kommentar zu Jesaia]. 
181 Idem,ibid. 15.360: "Kal oi.> OJ.ltlCpUVel talna 'tOU J.lOVO'}'eVOU~ tl'lv 6e6'tTJ'tU: oflA.o~ ydp tfl~ 
otKOVOJ.lla~ b Myo~" (and these do not diminish the divinity of the Only-begotten, for the reason of 
the economy is manifest). 
182 Theodoret, Psal. PG 80, 1009: " DEyKataA.eA.dcp6at 15£ A.tyEt, ~ llJ.Laptia~ J.lEV oi.>OeJ.lln~ i.>n' 
ai.>tou ygvoJ.LEvTJ~. wu 15£ 6av0:tou KeKpatTJK6to~. o~ Katd trov ftJ.laptTJK6trov tl'lv €~ouolav 
EOEOeJC'tO. 'EyKU'tUAel\jllV tolvuv JCUAei. oi.> 'tOV ·fl~ t}VffiJ.lEVTJ~ 6e6'tTJ'tO~ xroptOJ.lOV, &~ 'tlVe~ 
i.>netA.l'Jcpaotv, iiUd 'tllV yeyEVTJJ.lEVTJV toU na6ou~ OU)'XWpT)OtV". 
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divine "consent" ( auyxrop11cn v ). The divinity assents so that Christ was subject to 
death: "The divinity was present even when the form of the servant suffered, and it 
allowed it to suffer". 183 For Rosse, 
the sense that Theodoret gives to the abandonment of Christ comes close to the 
sense that philological analysis attributes to the verb itself (in Hebrew and in Greek), 
a sense that P. Foresi summarizes in these terms: 'to leave someone entirely in a 
precarious situation'. The Father abstains from intervening in a situation of suffering 
provoked by men. 184 
In his Explanatio in Canticum, Theodoret had addressed the soul's abandonment in 
terms of divine assent to trials. In his Christo logy, Theodoret followed the same line 
of reasoning. Cyril had touched upon this theme, but only briefly. The notion of 
divine assent provided a coherent background for Theodoret's Christology and 
anthropology. Thus, Theodoret implied the continuity between Christ's humanity and 
the human race. It is not clear what Theodoret's source was. Already, the Macarian 
Spiritual Homilies and also the "Evagrian" Lausiac History had illustrated the link 
between divine assent and distressful conditions. Despite the fact that Origen had 
already made such a comment, it was not until Evagrius and Macarius that the notion 
of abandonment was firmly established in terms of divine assent to trials. 
Thus, it is in Theodoret that we could discern the beginning of a link between 
Christ's suffering and the experience of abandonment by the devotee. What was 
common between Christ's humanity and humankind was not an experience of 
separation from God; but the fact of divine assent to trials. In both cases (exegesis 
and Christology), Theodoret excluded the notion of sin. Theodoret returned to the 
Origenist notion of ethical trials as testing -well spotted by Layton-. Christ 
experienced trials (i.e. passion/death) to show his faith, on the same way that 
humanity had been tried. Already Gregory of Nazianzus had argued the importance 
of human obedience in terms of Christ's obedience to the Father. The notion of 
assent shows the continuity between Christ and humankind. 185 
183 Idem, Psal. PG 80,1 009:"Tiapflv ydp t] 6£6tll<; Kai 7taoxouan tfl tou oo6A.ou J.!Opq>fl, Kai 
OUV£XWPllO£ 1ta6£lv". 
184 Rosse, Cry of Jesus, 77. 
185 Nazianzene, Fil. 5-6 [PG 36, 108-112]. Cf. Didymos, Trin. PG 39,913-916. 
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i. John Damascene: defining the tradition. 
Exegetes of the era of late antiquity who discussed the abandonment of Christ 
on the cross came to an end with John Damascene. His own exegesis extended from 
his theological epitome Expositio Fidei, 186 to his polemical work De duabus 
voluntatibus,187 Contra Nestorianos/ 88 and his In Epistulas Pau/i. 189 However, his 
interest in the loud cry was only momentary. The years from Chalcedon (A.D. 451) 
to 2"d Constantinople (A.D. 680-681) directed theological attention to the manner in 
which the union between the human and divine was achieved. After Chalcedon, the 
politics of pursuing an ecclesiastical union under the imperial auspices focused on 
issues that affirmed the union between the human and divine. Maximus the 
Confessor -an important source for John- had defended the presence of natural 
human capacities in Christ. Maximus' greatest contribution was the fact that -while 
revisiting the earlier Athanasian distinction between actions attributed to the divinity 
and the humanity- he concluded that the scriptural accounts demonstrated the 
presence of the humanity qua humanity, and the humanity qua deified humanity in 
Christ. Thus, Maximus avoided the sharp Athanasian distinction by indicating the 
need to manifest the fact that the humanity of Christ remained within its ontological 
constitution and maintained its natural accordance: it kept its distinct ontological 
character, and also it was enriched and transformed. 
According to Louth's exposition of the Damascene's thought, John found 
himself in a totally different political and theological ambience from the other 
authors so far treated. John developed his thought under the Muslim caliphate, 
defending --or better defining- the orthodox faith against other religions (e.g. Islam) 
and Christian heresies that the imperial authority had had the power to suppress in 
Byzantium. Thus, John's writings corresponded to different needs in theology that 
rose together with the iconoclast controversy (c. 730), the shrinking of the Byzantine 
territory in East and West, and the expansion of the Arab world. However, despite his 
political subjection to the Caliph, John's theological allegiance lay within 
Byzantium. 
186 Damascene, ExpF. 68 [all references in PTS 12]. 
187 Idem, Volunt. 28.57ff[all references in PTS 22]. 
188 Idem, Nest. 26.1 [references in PTS 22]. 
189 Idem, Commentarii in Epistulas Pauli, PG 95, 824. 
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John treated Mt 27:46 as a prayer. He discussed it under the title "On the 
Prayer of the Lord" in his Expositio Fidei, 190 blending together his sources. It is clear 
-pace Louth- that John employed an Evagrian definition of prayer as the ascent of 
the intellect to the divine. 191 By using this definition, John illustrated the unity 
between the human nous and the Logos (anti-Apollinarianism). 192 He also introduced 
several examples of such prayers in Christ's life. 193 His last example concerned Mt 
27:46. Having identified the loud cry as prayer, John followed the established anti-
Arian argument concerning the unity between Father and Son. He also extended such 
unity to the relationship between divinity and humanity in Christ. 
Neither is the Father his God, only if we divide what is seen from what is meant by 
the subtle imaginings of the nous, as it is so in our case, nor was he abandoned by 
his own divinity. But we were abandoned and forsaken. So he prayed thus 
accommodating our person. 194 
Joussard raised scepticism with regard to the above extract. It is not surprising, since 
Jouassard understood accommodation as a 'typological' device. For John, Christ 
accommodated abandonment only in a 'relative' way. 195 The presence of "urro~uEral" 
(to play role/pretend) could justify Jouassard's argument. However, John used it by 
means of 'putting on' .196 
190 Damascene, ExpF. 68 [pg 167-168]: "nEpi rflc; roO Kupiou rrpooEUxflc;". 
191 Cf. Evagrius, Orat. 35: "Ilpooeuxl'] l:ottv avapaot<; vou np6<; 8e6v". Louth, Damascene, 176. 
192 Damascene, ExpF. 68 [pg 167]: "b iiyto<; abtou vou<; iina~ Kall' !Jn6otaotv t<p llecp A6ycp 
flvrojltvo<;" (his holy nous was once [and for all] united with the Logos the God hypostatically). 
193 Cf. Jn II :41 and Mt 26:39. 
194 Damascene, ExpF. 68: "oute ydp eeo<; abtou b 1tUtl']p. d llTJ 'YE otatpelltvto<; ioxva'i<; tOU VOU 
<pavtaoiat<; tou bprojltvou l:K tou vooujltvou, tlioootto jJ.Eil' flll&v, o6te KateA.ei<pllll bno t~<; 
OtKEtU<; lle6tnto<;. an· f'J!ld<; ftj.l.EV oi. E'YKUtUAEAEtjljlEVOt KUl 1tUperopUjlEVOt. "QotE tO f'JjJ.EtEpov 
oiKEtoUj.l.EVO<; np6oronov tauta npoonu~ato". I have consulted Schafrs translation in the The Nicene 
and Post-Nicene Fathers series [vol. 9, 802]. 
195 Damascene, Exp.F. 69: "Xpl) dotvat, io<; ouo oiKetrooet<;: Ilia <puotKl) Kai o!Jmroon<;. Kai Ilia 
1tpOOOl1ttK1) KUl OX,EttKT]. <l>uotKl) j.l.SV oov Kat obotroon<;. Kall' ftv otd <ptA.aveproniav b KUpto<; ti]v 
tE (jiOOtV f'Jjl&V Kat td (jiUotKd nlivta avtA.ape (jiUOEt Kat aA.nllei~ 'YEV6jJ.EVO<; civllprono<; Kat t&v 
(jiUOtK&v l;v ndp~ 'YEV6j.l.EVO<;: 1tpoOOl1ttK1) at, OtE tt<; to 1-:ttpou U1tOOUEtat 1tp6oronov otd OX,EotV, 
olKt6v <pll!lt t1 ayannv. Kat avt' abtou wu<; bnep abtou notdtat A.6you<; ll111i€v abtcp 
npooi]Kovta<;. Kall' ftv ti]v te Katapav Kai tl)v l:yKatliA.wvtv flll&v Kai td totauta o!JK 6vta 
(jiUOtKU OOK abto<; tauta &v tl 'YEV6jJ.EVO<; CpKEtffioato, and tO f'Jj.l.Etepov avaoEX,6jlEVO<; 1tp600l1tOV 
Kai jJ.Eil' flll&v moo6jlevo<;" (we need to know that there are two accommodations: one natural and 
essential, and one prosopic and relative. Natural and essential according to which through his love for 
mankind the lord assumed our nature and all that is natural becoming in nature and reality man and 
experiencing what is natural. It is prosopic, when he puts on him the person of the other in 
relationship, I mean pity and love; and for it (i.e. the person), he makes the words (his own) though 
they are not proper for him, through which (he assumed) the curse and our abandonment and all these 
that are not natural he did not accommodate them being himself or becoming like that, but receiving 
our person and taking our part). 
196 Both meanings (i.e. 'to put on' and 'to pretend') originated from the classical tragedies where the 
actors were putting on them their vestement and mask to assume another 'personality'. Thus, they 
pretended to be another person. In the modem Greek use, the verb only signifies a pretentious action. 
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Before John, Maxim us had distinguished between natural ( q>umK~) and relative 
(OXETIK~) 197 accommodation (oiKEiwmc;). 198 The first defined natural properties that 
constitute humanity and were essential to its being; such as hunger and thirst. 199 For 
Maximus, such passions resulted from the fall. However, they were an essential part 
of human existence after the fall. They were the results of the fall "according to 
punishment" (Myo1 ElTITI!Jiac;). The relative accommodation includes what humanity 
197 For Coakley, the relative accommodation of human weakness did not detach Christ from his 
experience. It highlighted the paradox that the divine Logos experienced weakness. S. Coakley, 'What 
does Chalcedon Solve and what does it not? Some Reflections on the Status and Meaning of the 
Chalcedonian Defmition', 143-163. 
198 The term accommodation or oikeiosis {oiKEiwmc;) was of Stoic origin. Clement was the first to 
appropriate the term for Christian ethics. For Clement, it defined the assimilation of human nature to 
passions due to ethical corruption, or the ascent of the soul from passions to apatheia. Thus, it defined 
either estrangement or return to one's own nature. Clement, Paedagogus, 2.10.11 0. Idem, Stromata, 
4.23.148. However, it was also an alternative term for the "likeness" to God -apparently borrowing 
from the classical meaning of oikeiosis in terms of friendship and familiarity--. Clement, Stromata, 
5.4.23. In its Stoic sense, the term had addressed self-awareness of the individual with regard to what 
constituted its nature (i.e. being). For the Stoics, accommodation of one's nature was more of a 
cognitive process through which the individual was becoming self-aware of its being. This notion 
entailed the concept of taking actions that were proper to one's being. The individual evaluates things 
that stand outside it and takes proper actions for or against them. Thus, the self was the principle of 
evaluating matters. The notion of oikeiosis, in the sense that it developed self-awareness, was also 
related to self-preservation. As the individual is developing self-awareness of its being it deliberates 
on things profitable for its own nature and things unprofitable. Thus, for the Stoics, choice was an 
existential function of the self. Discussing a passage in Cicero, De Finibus 3, 20-23, Engberg-
Pedersen noted that the notion of oikeiosis was not a teleological one where nature had set objectives 
that the self needed to follow. It was the self that perceived its own objectives qua nature. T. Engberg-
Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic 
Philosophy, Studies in Hellenistic Civilization II (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990). R. W. 
Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1999). Athanasius was the frrst to incorporate this motif into his Christology taking its 
meaning at face value: the Logos has made space {oiKtw-w) for the human element in him. Athanasius, 
Fragmenta Varia, PG 26, 1245A and 1325A. Didymos, however, was the first to relate oikeiosis to 
kenosis in the light of human natural passions (blameless passions/MuiPA.TJtU 1tU6TJ) highlighting the 
notion of "making way" for that condition which Christ was not qua God. Didymos, FrPs. 716 [Ps 
68:17-19]. Cf. Cyril, Epistulce Pascalces, PG 77, 868,53. An important element of the Stoic theory of 
oikeiosis was expressed by Cicero when discussing self-awareness. For Cicero, nature embedded 
animated species with self-awareness that lead them to their conceiving what self-preservation meant 
for their being: it is within human nature to avoid whatever might bring destruction to its being. 
Maximus fully exploited this notion in his attempt to show that human nature desires life rather than 
death as a natural capacity embedded into humanity by God. See Maximus, Opusc. 1, [PG 91, 12C]; 
3, [PG 91, 48A]; 7, [PG 91, 77C]. Maximus, Disputatio cum Pyrrho, PG 91, 297A. Bathrellos, The 
Byzantine Christ, 123-124. Beyond any doubt, Maximus was working on the patristic origins of the 
term as opposed to a direct reading from the Stoics. Cf. John Chrysostom, In illud Pater si possibile 
est transeat, PG 51,38. Theophilus of Alexandria, Sermo in jluxu sanguinis laborantem, in AC02 
1.288. 
199 Maximus, Opusc. 19, PG 91, 221B: "n'I ooamp cpuo1Ka ruvxavEI IJETO r~c; cpuoEwc;" (whatever it is 
natural according to the nature). 
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has put on due to the fall, though these were not an essential part of its being:200 i.e. 
the results of sin "according to dishonour" (Mye1 6TIIJiac;).201 However, after the fall, 
they became part of humanity. The motif of abandonment belonged to the latter 
group. Maximus intended to show the way that Christ accommodated the results of 
the fall and also the results of sin without endangering his ethical purity.202 As it was 
observed, Didymos designated the latter as 'Mye1 rrapamw!Jarwv'. It cannot be 
accidental that Maximus deliberately employed the multifaceted motif of 'Mye1' in 
this sense to address the results of sin in order to dissociate the cause from the results 
(sin-passions). 203 
John appropriated this Maximian distinction by introducing the difference 
between "essential" (eumw611c;) and "prosopic" (rrpeowmK~) accommodation?04 For 
Maximus, the former accommodation included properties that constitute humanity 
qua humanity without which the latter would have been a docetic appearance. The 
reason that John substituted Maximus' relative accommodation for the prosopic is 
because it expressed better Maximus' spirit: Logos accommodated the results of sin 
in his economical kenosis.205 Hence, John emphasised the hypostatic union between 
200 Maxim us, Opusc. op. cit.: "ou~· aln'oO KUpiw~ tariv, 0 IJ~TE ~IJWV KOHl cpuarv w~ <JUOTOTIKOV, Ei Kai ~IJWV 
£iva1 AtyETOI ~ICl T~V apxaiav rrap6f3aarv, oiov ~ OyvOIO, ~ tyKOTOAEiljll~, ~ rrapaKO~, TO OvUTTOTOKTOV" (it is not his 
mainly, what it is not for us constitutive [i.e. fundamental] of nature, even though it is said to be ours 
for the ancient transgression, such as ignorance, the abandonment, the disobedience and the 
insubordination). 
201 Maximus, Opusc. 20, PG 91, 237A. 
202 Maximus distinguished between ignorance, which was not part of human nature even though it had 
appeared to humanity after the fall, and the capacity of desire which, according to Maximus, was an 
essential property of humanity. Maximus, Opusc. 19, PG 91, 217-224. The distinction between what 
was natural in order to be human and what was only accommodated for soteriological reasons was the 
mean line of reasoning for the Maximian party in order to secure the presence of human natural 
capacities in Christ against the monothelite diminutions. See Bathrellos, Byzantine Christ. A. Louth, 
Maximus the Confessor, Early Church Fathers (London: Routledge, 1999). M. Tt>ronen, Union and 
Distinction in the Thought of St. Maximus the Confessor, Early Christian Studies (Oxford: OUP, 
2007). 
203 In his ascetical writings, Maximus had distinguished between the passions that worked from within 
human nature and the passions that had had an external cause (i.e. sin). Christ accommodated the first 
and only the results of the second without ever being subjected to this external cause (i.e. sin). Cf. 
Maximus, Thai. 51 [PG 90, 484). Maximus, LibAs, 35 [PG 90, 940-941]. Maximus was working on 
the Gregorian motto that Christ restored whatever he had assumed. 
204 I have deliberately avoided translating the rrpoawmKt/ as "personal" in order to avoid a modern 
personalistic reading of the term. For John, the term highlighted the reality of the incarnation, 
presenting the incarnation as the economy of the Logos. 
205 Maximus, Opusc. 9, PG 91, l20A: "ouK fKTI<Jic; ~v. ~ tcp' ~IJiV, 6Ma KEVW(JI~ urrtp ~IJWV TOO aapKw9tvr~ 
Myou To rr69~" (the passion was not a punishment, as it is for us, but it was the kenosis of the Logos 
for our sake). 
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the Logos and his humanity (prosopic). For John, the humanity was 'humanity' to the 
degree that it maintained its natural properties within the hypostatic union. Some 
features, such as abandonment, were accommodated within the salvific scope of the 
incarnation. 
John turned to the Origenist notion of the paradigmatic nature of Christ's 
passion. It was not "cowardice" (IJ1Kpo4Juxia) that caused Christ's despair as he was 
crushed under the weight of the appointed task. 206 Through the loud cry, the Son 
manifested his obedience to the Father by providing an example to the human race: 
"He suffered in our nature to strengthen it against the passions and teach us to look at 
God during temptations and call upon him for assistance". 207 Christ assumed human 
weakness and showed the way to strengthen humanity against such weakness. For 
John, the assumption of human weakness was understood in terms of the restoration 
of the human race. But such restoration was not superficial: Christ defeated natural 
limitations in his flesh. Rather than indicating Christ at the level of an exemplar, John 
emphasised the active character that restoration means for the devotee. What Christ 
taught was not to merely imitate him by praying, but "look at God ... and call upon 
him for assistance". This was John's exhortation to action. 
206 Damascene, Nest. 26.1 [pg272]. Cf. Maximus, Disputatio cum Pyrrho, PG 91, 297D. 
207 Damascene, Nest. op. cit: "{nttJ.!Etvs tfl i'JJ.lst€p~ qn'Jcmt, iva v~:uproan tautllV Katd t&v na9&v 
Kat otM~U i'JJ.lii<; !;v tot<; 1t€lpaOJ.!Ol<; npo<; 9EOV ~AE1t€lV Kat abtov 1tp0<; E1tlKOtlpiav KaA.Eiv". 
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PART3 
1. Origenist ascetical themes 
Origen was not a "mystic" in the modem meaning of the term. 1 Despite the fact 
that he had introduced the foundations for a Christian mysticism, in his Commentary 
on the Song of Songs, Origen did not address the direct mystical and ecstatic 
enrapture of the soul at a cognitive or supra-cognitive level.2 Origen remained an 
exegete who emphasised the presence of the Logos in the Christian scriptures and the 
sacramental life of the Church. 
Here, we will expand our research to include Origen's more ethically-oriented 
works, such as Exhortatio ad Martyrium and De Oratione, his exegetical 
masterpieces Commentarii in Evangelium Joannis and Homilice in Numeros, and also 
his notorious De Principiis. 
It was observed that, in the Song of Songs, Origen did not safeguard the soul 
from trials. But Origen did not overlook the presence oftrials in the soul's spiritual 
journey. In fact, he presented ethical trials as a spiritual norm. In his Exhortatio and 
De Oratione, Origen provided scriptural witnesses (i.e. Job 7:1, Is 28:10 and Ro 5:3-
5) for such trials,3 identifying trials with this present life: "[T]hat the whole of human 
life upon earth is a time of temptations we learn from Job in the following words: Is 
not the life of men upon earth a time oftemptations"?4 For Origen, temptations were 
the warfare of the soul with passions and desires. In a lengthy passage that is worth 
citing Origen wrote: 
For whether the wrestling is afainst the flesh that lusts and wars against the spirit5 or 
against the life of all flesh (which is synonymous with the body which the 
intelligence, otherwise called the heart, inhabits) and such is the wrestling of those 
1 For a fresh look to the difficulty to describe any Patristic author as "mystic" in the light of the 
modem approach to religious mysticism, see the 'Afterword' in the second edition of A. Louth, The 
Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed., 2007), 200-
214. 
2 The only work that Origen provided On Prayer interpreted the dominical prayer. Cf. Mt 6:9-13. It 
was the work of Evagrius of Pontus De Oratione that commenced the Christian shifting from biblical 
exegesis (i.e. dominical prayer) to a more independent discourse that discussed prayer within the 
context of human purification, ethical warfare and passions. For instance, compare the content of 
Origen, De Oratione, P. Koetschau (ed.), GCS 3 (1899), 297-403; Gregory of Nyssa, De Oratione 
Dominica, GNO 7.2 (1992), 5-74; Maximus, Expositio Orationis Dominicce, PG 90, 872-909 to that 
ofEvagrius, De Oratione, PG 79, 1165-1200. 
3 Origen, Martyr. I [all references indicate chapter divisions in the edition of Origen, An Exhortation 
to Martyrdom, Prayer and Selected Works, R. A. Greer (ed.), Classics of Western Spirituality 
(London: SPCK, 1979)]. 
4 Origen, Orat. 29.2 [translations by Greer unless otherwise stated]. Cf. Jn 7: I. 
5 Eph 6:12. Ga 5:17. 
6 Lvl7:11. 
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who are tempted with temptations which are "common to man"; or whether, as with 
athletes who have made progress and are more perfect, no longer wrestling against 
flesh and blood or tested by temptations that are common to man, which they have 
now trodden under foot, our struggling is against principalities, and against the 
powers, and against the rulers of the darkness of this world, and against spiritual 
wickedness, 7 in either case we are not released from temptation. 8 
The presence of temptations was applied to both the immature and also more perfect 
members of the Church. Origen illustrated the various forms that trials could acquire: 
fleshly passions, and also warfare against the demonic powers. Origen took Mt 7:14 
at face value highlighting the "hard path" of Christian life.9 Yet, for Origen, the "hard 
path" was understood in connection to the "body of death", i.e. sin. 10 According to 
him, it was sin that made this life a "hard path". This hardness was a predicate for the 
path, not a "natural" quality. Origen emphasised that, in the Gospel, the path was 
designated as "rE8AIIJIJEvrl", not "8,\i~ouoa". 11 What Origen argued was the fact that it 
was sin that made the path to be hard; the path --as such-- was not hard. In doing so, 
Origen highlighted the presence of sin as a spiritual factor. 12 Spiritual growth was 
hard only for this soul that had not put off sinfulness. In emphasising the ethical 
importance of sin, Origen was rejecting the Gnostic notion of an evil or inadequate 
Creator. For Origen, it was sin that caused evils. 
In his De Oratione, Origen introduced the presence of demons which he linked 
to the presence of temptations. The Alexandrian author had not maintained a unified 
theory concerning demons and their ethical role: in his De Principiis, he denied the 
fact that demons were responsible for the human passions. The latter resulted from 
the excessive and immoderate operation ofthe body. 13 But, in his exegetical work In 
Numeros, Origen associated every individual sin with an appropriate demon. 
7 Eph 6:12. 
8 Origen, Orat. 29.2. [trans. Lay]. 
9 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 4.22.138: "tt OE ouiOEot~ Kai. q>Uot~ Em:at Kai. OUVUOKTJOt~. 
ob o€1 OE ilpOEVta~ Jl€'tU't€0ftvat, ilAA.d ~aoi~ov-ra~ ilq>tKEOOat ot o€1, otd 7tUOTJ~ -rft~ O't€Vi\~ 
ot~:A.06na~ ooou: -rouw yap !>on -ro l>huoOftvat b1to -rou 1ta-rp6~. -ro dl;tov y~:vtoOat -rnv ouvaJ.nv 
-rft~ xapt-ro~ 1tapd wu Owu A.a~dv Kai. ilKroA.6-rro~ ilvaopaJldv" (the disposition is nature and 
practise. There is no necessity for removing those who are raised on high, but there is necessity for 
those who are walking to reach the requisite goal, by passing over the whole of the narrow way. For 
this is to be drawn by the Father, to become worthy of receiving the power of grace from God, so as to 
run without hindrance) [trans. in The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 2, pg. 895]. 
10 Origen, In Jeremiam, 20.7.20 [pg 280 in SC 238]. 
11 Origen put Mt. 7: 14 and II :30 side by side: the narrow gate and hard path, and the light yoke of 
Christ. Though the path was hard indeed, it was light when compared to the sinful life. But also, the 
hard way was like a light yoke when the faithful was taking into consideration the prices with which 
he would be rewarded. Origen, Martyr. 31-32. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 2.20.126. 
12 Origen, Commentariis in Evangelium Joannis, 6.19.105ff [pg 208 in SC 157]. 
13 Origen, Prine. 3.2.2ff. 
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According to this latter work, sin could not have been committed without the 
presence of the demons. 14 Their presence introduced a sort of "darkness" that lurked 
within the soul. 
Even in this case, and despite the undeniable fact that Origen set the 
foundations for the later development of a Christian demonology, in his own work, 
the presence of demons was primarily associated with idolatry in terms of ignorance. 
Demons were not 'personified' human passions. They were entities that desired to 
lead the soul to idolatry. Idolatry was the outcome of ignorance, i.e., the 
abandonment of divine knowledge. What caused God's wrath in the biblical 
narratives was Israel's ignorance concerning the Godhead. This ignorance led Israel 
to idolatry. At an ethical level, Origen maintained the role of demons as agents of 
deception that led the soul to ignorance (i.e. sin) and idolatry. 15 In Origen, demonic 
presence was related to the presence of the pagan idols. 16 
The above observations shed more light on Origen's concept of divine 
abandonment. In his work on the Song of Songs, Origen denied the presence of sin as 
a spiritual factor that had caused divine abandonment. Divine abandonment was 
understood in terms of divine pedagogy and providence. In his ethical works, Origen 
presented an argument based on the concept of cause and effect: though God had 
appointed a ministering angel to each individual, God withdrew his angel from the 
person that fell "backwards to more material things". 17 Consequently, the absence of 
the ministering angel led to the presence of the adversary power: "[The worse power] 
having found an opportunity to attack by reason of his indifference, will be at hand to 
prompt him to such and such sin, seeing that he has offered himself in readiness for 
sin". 18 The introduction of the "worse power" was a result of human sin. It is not 
clear what Origen meant by the "worse power". There is no doubt that the 
"ministering angel" meant the divine closeness. It seems that Origen referred to the 
"worse power" to indicate the closeness of sin. According to Jay, Origen possibly 
alluded to L. 11:24-26. Thus, for Jay, the term signified the demonic presence. But, it 
is more likely that Origen merely established the notion of sin in more concrete 
terms, without necessarily introducing demonic presence. Jay remarked that, for 
14 Origen, 27Nm. 8 [to Greer (ed.), An Exhortation to Martyrdom]. 
15 Origen, 27Nm. 8. 
16 Origen, 27Nm. 3. 
17 Origen, Orat. 6.4. 
180. 0 . ngen, rat. op. elf. 
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Origen, sin lied within, whereas the demonic presence "incites and urges us, striving 
to extend sin over a larger field". 19 
What we need to take into consideration is Origen's distinction between divine 
presence and the presence of sin: divine proximity meant the soul's spiritual rest, 
whereas divine absence signalled the presence of sin. Origen anticipated 
Macarius/Symeon' position by indicating that there could be no mingling between 
the kingdom of God and the kingdom of sin in the soul: 
[W]e must understand this about the kingdom of God, that, just as there is no 
fellowship between righteous and unrighteous, nor communion of light and darkness, 
nor concord of Christ with Belial,20 so the kingdom of sin cannot co-exist with the 
kingdom of God. If, then, we wish God to reign in us, let not sin in any way reign in 
our mortal body.21 
Origen established his thought in the Pauline vocabulary: Paul had ruled out the co-
existence of grace and sin in the soul. However, Origen understood this co-existence 
in terms of faith and idolatry. Thus, it would be superfluous to apply to Origen the 
later ascetical reading concerning the distinction between grace and sin. 
Nevertheless, Origen set the foundations for this later development. 
For Origen, unlike the bride of the Song, the soul was not secure at any stage of 
spiritual life. Origen referred to ethical backsliding which could affect even the most 
perfect.22 
Has anyone ever thought that men were outside the scope of temptations whose tale 
he knows, having himself completed it? And what occasion is there upon which a 
man is confident as not having to struggle that he may not commit sin?23 
The picture that Origen drew in this passage was quite different than the image of the 
'joyful" soul of the Commentary on the Song of Songs. In his biblical exegesis, 
Origen was stirring up spiritual desire for union with the divine: it was eros that was 
the main motif of this latter work. In his De Oratione, Origen addressed his patron 
Ambrose to instruct him in ethical labouring. Thus, he tried to elucidate the spiritual 
profits that Ambrose could reap from prayer and ethical efforts. The dominical 
prayer had set a model for prayer. The motif of temptations was an integral part of 
the dominical prayer. Thus, the two diverging images of the joyful soul and the ever-
tempted devotee were employed within different theological frameworks. The two 
images were not meant to be juxtaposed: the ethical application of the Gospel to the 
19 Cf. E. G. Jay (ed.), Origen 's Treatise on Prayer (London: SPCK, 1954), 58-59. 
20 2 Cor. 6:14-15. 
21 Origen, Oral. 25.3 [trans. Jay]. 
22 Origen, Martyr. 18. Cf. Is 14:12. 
23 Origen, Orat. 29.5 [trans Jay]. 
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life of the devotee led the soul to ethical perfection. Overall, Origen pointed to 
ethical perfection without dismissing the fact that this fulfillment was only a promise 
that was yet to come. 
Indeed, in his In Numeros, Origen alternated between the image of perfection 
and the ideal of spiritual warfare: rest and effort, joy and trials. For Origen, the above 
terms had a dialectical character. And also, the divine presence and absence was of a 
dialectical nature. Thus, Origen introduced the notion of ethical efforts and spiritual 
rest. 24 According to Origen, the book of Exodus was an allegory for the soul's 
ascension to the divine. Its context elucidated the various "stations" ( OTa9jJoi)25 that 
were reflections of the stages during the soul's spiritual journey. 26 Israel had travelled 
through resting places, but she also struggled to make her way across the desert. 27 
Bringing this analogy to the ethical life of the soul, Origen presented the paradox that 
the soul was pursued by Pharaoh (i.e. sin) even thought the Lord had delivered her 
(i.e. baptism).28 In order to address this paradox, Origen introduced the theme of 
alternating periods of ethical efforts and spiritual rest. After the time of Israel's 
rescue from Pharaoh's armies, Origen discerned a pattern between resting and 
distressing periods for Israel. At an ethical level, the soul was meant to experience 
periods of spiritual rest and ethical trials. Behind this scheme, Origen indicated the 
work of divine providence. According to Origen, God drew the soul closer to him 
through an initial grace. Then, the soul was left to trials and temptations. This motif 
of interchanging periods of effort and rest could only be explained in the light of 
Origen's notion of divine pedagogy that tested the soul; for God was leaving the soul 
subject to trials and temptations to purify her from the sin that was still stirring 
within her. 
Though Origen seems to have maintained two diverse ethical theories with 
regard to the role of sin in spiritual life, his main point remained unchanged. His 
ethical theory, as well as his exegesis, was informed by the eschatological orientation 
of the Christian faith. Origen introduced the Pauline language of the "promised 
24 Danil~lou, Origen, 296. 
25 Origen reckoned 42 places in which Israel stopped at while wandering in the desert: the number was 
identical to the number of generations that followed from Abraham up to the incarnation. Cf. Nm 
33:1ff. Mt 1:17. 
26 Origen, 27Nm. 4. 
27 Origen introduced this notion based on i) the etymology of the Hebrew names of the various 
locations in the book of Numbers, and ii) the biblical events that took place. 
28 Origen, 27Nm. op. cit. 
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heritage", the "future hope", and the future "rewards".29 The spiritual scheme of 
effort and rest was established on the notion of "time" as divine pedagogy. Trials and 
temptations were spiritual features of this life. Complete spiritual rest signified the 
soul's introduction to the kingdom of God. The dialectics between rest and toil 
suggested that divine pedagogy was not related to sin. But it was linked to the notion 
that union with the divine was a promise yet to come.30 Thus, the divine pedagogy 
was meant to instruct the soul to this eschatological orientation. For Cheek, Origen 
has been working on the neo-testamental complementarity between the kingdom of 
God and the promise to be completed. Indeed, redemption was realised through the 
passion of Christ. But "the plan (for perfect restoration) waits to be consummated in 
the future at the end oftime".31 
Then, for Origen, this present time was a time for testing which he envisaged 
by means of divine paideia. God tested the soul through trials. Even in his biblical 
commentary on the Song, Origen maintained the notion that, despite her perfection, 
the soul was tested by God. Origen related such testing to the coming of "affliction" 
(8hi4.11~) for the soul.32 We need to notice -in advance- that Origen did not distinguish 
between various levels of divine paideia. For him, the most important aspect of trials 
was the fact that, in any case, God was testing the soul regardless of the stage of her 
spiritual progress. Characteristically, unlike the later ascetical development, Origen 
treated Paul and Job's experience indistinguishably: both biblical figures were tested 
by God?3 Origen did not emphasise their perfection before trials. Nevertheless, he 
highlighted their perfection during trials:34 "to face tribulations it is not of the thinks 
that are up to us. But to be displeased and give in belong to the blameworthy matters 
that are up to us".35 Paul and Job were not displeased with God. They did not turn 
29 0rigen, 27Nm. 5-6. Cf. Ro 5:3-5 and 8:18. 
3
° Cf. Origen, Drat. 11.2. Origen emphasised the notion of perfection predicated by the adjective 
"then" which suggested an eschatological orientation. 
31 Cheek, Eschatology and Redemption, 119. 
32 Origen, Se/ecta in Psalmos, PG 12, 1137 (Ps 4:2]: ""On 6E 9Ai\jlt<; b "COl<; ilylotc; ot061!EVO<; 
m:tpaollo<; ilaA.ouotv xaA.d'tat, ano noA.A.&v Pll't&v Ktvo61.lE9a" (that the tribulation that is given to 
the saints that fight is called temptation, we know it from many sayings). Cf. Origen, Prine. 3.4.1. In 
this case, Origen maintained a more cosmological understanding of temptations, relating them to the 
soul's engrossment due to sin. 
33 Origen, Drat. 29.5 and 30.1-2. Idem, Fragmenta in Psa/mos 1-150, 16.7. Idem, Homiliae in Job (In 
catenis), 26. Job underwent trials in terms of avoiding the presence of pride. Origen did not allude to 
Paul at this instance. 
34 Cf. Didymos, In Psa/mos 20-21, 25.4 [21.2 in PTA 7]. 
35 Origen, Selecta in Psalmos, PG 12, 1137: "To l.l€v 9A.i~Eo9at obx liv Ei11 •&v l;cp' iwtv. 'to 0€ 
OUOUpEO'tEl09Ut KUt i:VOt06VUt 'tffiV l;cp' f'llllV \jiEK'tffiV". 
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against God during their tribulations. In the same fashion, the bride of the Song 
maintained her ethical purity; and the martyrs of the Ad Martyrium kept their faith 
pure.36 
For Origen, such trials did not address only the individual. Trials were viewed 
within the scope of the Church's persecutions. It was observed earlier that Origen did 
not dissosiate the life of the individual from the life of the Church. The presence of 
the martyrs affected Origen's theological thought concerning the content of such 
trials: the life of the faithful was put under to the test during the times of the 
persecution of the Church. However, Origen did not discern between ethical trials 
and actual persecution: both terms were interrelated and inter-dependent. 
Origen also did not envisage divine abandonment in spatial terms of 
separation. 37 Divine abandonment was interpreted in terms of the divine assistance. 
God was always present at times of trials, observing the disposition of the devotee. 
Thus, he was intervening to assist and "refresh" his devotee. It seems that Origen did 
not distinguish between the righteous and the unrighteous: despite the fact that 
rational creatures were estranged from God, for Origen, God was remaining in 
proximity even to those "estranged" beings. 38 Addressing the life of the martyrs, 
Origen highlighted the closeness of God during their trials. As soon as the martyrs 
manifested their love, they heard: "the Lord is here".39 Thus, Origen connected the 
divine presence to testing and the manifestation of faith from the part of the devotee. 
God was observing their life before sending his assistance. Silently, Origen was 
pointing to divine providence and pedagogy. 
When commenting on the fourth gospel, Origen introduced a different 
theological stand. He noticed that Christ had not extended his presence in Samaria 
and Cana for more than two and three days respectively. From the historical 
narrative, Origen moved to the mystical meaning: the Samaritans and the Canaanites 
36 Origen, Homi/iae in Job (rn catenis), 18 [PG 12, 1033]. The biblical image of Job was linked to the 
martyrs. 
37 Origen, Oral. 20.2. 
38 In an obscure passage, Origen indicated that those beings that did not participate in God's being 
maintained a spark of divine effulgence. Jay and Greer provided two diverging translations. Jay's 
translation supported an ontological reading where Origen had referred to the distinction between 
God's nature and the nature of the rational creatures that participated in God's existence through a 
kind of divine effulgence. However, Greer's translation suggested an ethical point ofview: Origen had 
argued the condition of those beings that remained estranged from God. Though the original Greek is 
obscure and seems to support Jay's translation, the inclusion of the passage within an ethical discourse 
where Origen did not include any cosmological speculations, seems to favour Greer's translation. 
39 Origen, Martyr. 42. Origen, Oral. 20.2. Cf. Is 40: I 0 and 62: II. 
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were both allegories for the "minds" (voOc;) of the faithful souls. For Origen, Christ's 
attitude could be interpreted in terms of his closeness and also separation from the 
human mind. The Logos was descending to the mind. However, there seems to be an 
impetus that forbade the Logos to remain united to the mind for a longer time. It 
seems that, in Origen, the mind had a limited capacity in its intellectual conception of 
the divine. But this was not so because of the natural incapacity of the mind. For 
Origen juxtaposed the perfect mind --that he designated as the "disciples"-- to the 
mind of the faithful souls ("Samaritans-Canaanites"). The Logos was united with the 
former but he was departing from the latter.40 Thus, Origen introduced the dialectic 
between divine proximity and hiddenness at another level: the Logos' closeness to 
the human mind. Once more, it was not sin that caused the Logos' departure. The 
Logos was instructing the "Canaanites" and "Samaritans" about their ethical 
imperfection. 
In his work De Oratione, Origen reflected on the antinomy that Christ's claims 
contained: Christ had indicated the presence of the divine Kingdom within the human 
soul41 • But, he had also taught to inquire for the coming of the divine kingdom: "thy 
Kingdom come". For Origen, this antinomy highlighted the various gradations of 
divine wisdom that the human nous could attain to: the more the soul was ascending, 
the more she was discovering the kingdom within.42 Origen's approach to this matter 
could shed light on the distinction between the "disciples" and the "Canaanites". The 
latter were on their way to perfection experiencing the presence of the divine groom, 
but also anticipating his future coming in the human mind. 
An important point of Origen's ethical theory needs to be considered before 
moving any further: i.e., the degree to which Origen envisaged Christ as an ethical 
40 The condition of the "disciples" with whom the Logos was united without ever departing from 
them, and the condition of the minds that were subjected to divine withdrawal, introduced the ethical 
variations ofthe spiritual life. Rather than juxtaposing the two conditions, Origen saw the condition of 
the disciples as the suumit of spiritual life: from the imperfect condition, the minds were advancing in 
order to be fully united with the Logos. This condition was a step higher in the spiritual life. Thus, 
whereas for the souls still progressing, the divine Groom was present and then absent, for the perfect 
souls, he was united with them inserarably. At an advanced level of spiritual progress, the Logos was 
remaining united to the mind. Origen's biblical exegesis on the Song of Songs elucidated this point 
further: the Logos departed from the soul until she was introduced to another spiritual condition 
(chamber); i.e. the condition of absolute union with the divine. Origen, Commentariis in Evangelium 
Joannis, 13.52.347 [pg 224 in SC 222]. It needs to be noticed that Origen did not argue in terms of 
mystical experiences. He clearly addressed the notion of understanding the presence of the Logos 
through the scriptures. Whereas some souls failed to discern and grasp his presence behind the 
scriptural passages, the disciples had gained divine illumination, and thus discerned his presence. 
41 Lk 17:20-21. 
42 Origen, Oral. 25.2. 
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example, i.e. a model of action. Origen was directed by the scriptures in his ethical 
approach. He was also influenced by the ethical thought of Clement of Alexandria 
who had highlighted the need for ethical purification. However, Origen envisaged the 
image of the martyrs as ethical examples. The influence of the cult of the Christian 
martyrs was witnessed by the fact that Origen composed his Exhortatio ad 
Martyrium to reinforce the faith of his patron Ambrose during persecution. 43 
Origen's time was saturated with the presence of the Christian martyrs. Origen's 
father was a martyr. 44 Origen came close to martyrdom many times.45 He witnessed 
the persecution of the bishops of the Church in Rome, Alexandria and Antioch 
during the persecution ofDecius.46 
Clement of Alexandria had discussed the value of martyrdom in his Stromata 
before Origen.47 Origen followed Clement in many aspects of his thought. For 
Origen, the martyrs were examples of Christian devotion since they offered their 
lives to God. Origen pointed to their faith and also perseverance during their 
martyrdom. Origen placed the theme of love at the heart of his exhortation to 
martyrdom: through martyrdom the martyrs were manifesting their love for God.48 
According to King's examination of the commentary on the Song of Songs, there was 
an undeniable connection between Origen's exegetical work and the presence ofthe 
cult of the martyrs. Indeed, for Origen, the martyrs underwent the "winter" of trials 
of the biblical bride. They followed the "hard path", and through their trials, they 
were tested by God. 49 Thus, God addressed them in the same terms that he addressed 
43 It is the persecution of Maximin the Thracian (A.D. 235). The book was addressed to Origen's 
~atron Ambrose and the priest Protoctetus. Crouzel, Origen, 16-17. 
During the persecution of Septimius Severus in A.D. 202. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, 6.1.1. 
Photius, Bib/iotheca, 118.92b. Crouzel ruled out as fictitious the story preserved by Eusebius that 
Origen exhorted his father to martyrdom when he was probably only 14 years old. 
45 For Eusebius, Origen developed his desire (epwc;) for martyrdom due to his father death. Eusebius, 
Ecclesiastical History, 6.2.3. 
46 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History, 6.39.1. 
47 Cf. Clement, Stromata, 4.1.1.1 ff. If we take into consideration the parallel scriptural quotations (e.g. 
Ro 5:3-5, Mt 7: 14) between Origen and Clement, it seems that Origen knew the work of Clement 
when he was composing his own exhortation. In fact, the two authors shared with each other the 
centrality of desire {rr68oc;;) and good disposition {rrpoaiptatc;;), the confession of faith through 
martyrdom {61JoAoyia), the notion of ethical purification as part of martyrdom, and also the theme of 
hope {Et\rri6a) as an ideal transcending martyrdom, and perseverance (urro1Jovr')) as part of the ethical 
life. 
48 Origen, Martyr. 2 and also 48. Origen referred to the soul's testing by alluding to Mt 7:24-28. 
49 Origen brought into play the notion of gnosis. Through their trials, the martyrs were demonstrating 
the knowledge of the divine that they had acquired. In the next passage Origen addressed idolatry. 
Thus, he juxtaposed between the demonstration of knowledge of the true faith from the martyrs and 
the fall into idolatry for the unrighteous. Origen, Martyr. 31 and 32. 
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the biblical bride: "the winter has passed".50 Origen understood this winter in terms 
of the afflictions caused by the idolatrous persecutors. But according to Origen, it 
was the demonic wrath that was motivating the latter. 51 Thus, Origen saw in the life 
of the martyrs the application of the exegetical connection between trials, divine 
pedagogy and love for the divine. 
Through their trials, the martyrs became the true fellows of Christ. In Origen, 
the image of Christ was addressed in terms of an ethical exemplar only through the 
life of the martyrs. For Origen, the martyrs stood at the place of the Mosaic priests, 
offering their lives to God: Christ was the High Priest that accepted the sacrifice of 
the martyrs. The primary action of Christ as the High Priest was in offering his own 
life. 52 Thus, the martyrs were following the true High Priest: imitating Christ, the 
martyrs were priests and victims at the same time: the former by means of the action 
of offering; the latter in terms of becoming the object of the sacrifice. 53 Thus, they 
constituted the continuation of Christ's sacrifice. After his death on the cross, the 
martyrs were the new victims, renewing his sacrifice through their martyrdom. 54 
Origen's ethical theory was infused with the Eucharistic concept of Christ's sacrifice 
extending to the life of the faithful. Through their trials, the martyrs became 
"mystical communicants" of Christ's passion. They shared with Christ the "cup" of 
Mt 20:22 which, for Origen, signified Christ's passion.55 But also, they partook in 
Christ's comfort. Origen highlighted the bond between death and resurrection: 
sharing in the passion also meant sharing in Christ's triumph (i.e resurrection). Thus, 
it is the image of the martyrs that has emerged as the application of Origen' s ethical 
50 Sol2:10-ll. 
51 In his biblical commentary and the Exhortatio ad Martyrium, Origen related the presence of 
persecutors and demons to idolatry. The demons were afflicting the souls ofthe martyrs by imposing 
the denial offaith on the minds of the confessors. The persecutors were the demon's puppets that were 
trying to force the martyrs back to idolatry. For Origen, the biblical bride had passed from idolatry to 
faith. The persecutors were forcing the martyrs to return to idolatry. It needs to be noticed that 
idolatry, for Origen, referred to a distorted notion of the divine. Thus, in his Commentary on the Song 
of Songs, Origen related the inner stirring of thoughts to ethical trials. In the Commentary on the Song 
of Songs the Exhortatium, Origen identified the demons with the gods of the gentiles. Origen, Martyr. 
9 and 32. 
52 He 7:27; 10:12. 
53 In fact, the martyrs, as priest, were depicted by Origen as standing in front of the sacrificial altar 
offering their lives. This image was an allusion to the liturgical custom of using the tombs of the 
martyrs as altars for the Holy Sacrifice. 
54 Origen, Commentariis in Evange/ium Joannis, 6.54.280 [pg 342 in SC 157]. 
55 The language that Origen employed had Eucharistic implications. The martyrs were cleansed 
through Christ's sacrifice, and participated in his sacrifice through their giving up their lives. 
However, Origen implied a literal understanding of the Eucharistic participation in Christ's sacrifice 
by addressing the death ofthe martyrs in terms of sacrifice. 
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discourse concerning divine love, perseverance during trials, the following of the 
"hard path" and the comforts yet to come. It was this "Eucharistic" relation between 
Christ and the martyrs that highlighted martyrdom by means of "imitating" the 
passion and also the glory of Christ. For Origen, imitation meant participation in the 
sacrifice and glorification of Christ. 
For Origen, Christ was the manifestation of the divine on earth. He was also 
the author of salvation. This salvation was the result of the action of God intervening 
within history. Origen overlooked the ethical aspect of Christ's life, since Christ's 
life signified the change from ignorance to knowledge and from idolatry to faith. 
Thus, it was the martyrs that were the ethical models of Christian life for Origen. In 
an obscure passage in the Exhortatium, Origen presented Christ as an example of 
humility: Christ did not avoid dying on the cross, accepting a shameful death.56 For 
Origen, Christ's kenosis meant his descent from the bosom of the Father to the world 
and death. The term kenosis highlighted the contrast between the glory of the Logos 
and the poverty of the passion. However, Origen did not emphasise Christ's life as an 
ethical example any further. The identity and mission of Christ pointed to Christ's 
role with regard to the redemptive orientation of human history. Thus, Origen 
overlooked the ethical meaning of Christ's life in terms of imitating the external 
types of his life. The only point that Origen brought into play was the notion of the 
voluntary acceptance of poverty by Christ. 
Within his ethical discourse, Origen introduced a vocabulary that highlighted 
the "perseverance" ( uTToj.Jov~), "confession" ( 6j.JoAoyia), and also "steadfastness" 
(TTpoSuj.Jia) of the martyrs who were designated as "athletes" (aeA.,rai)57• They were 
fighting against the "enemy of truth" (txep6s T~S 0A'l9Eias), i.e., the 
persecutors/demons. Thus, Origen had set the language that was employed by the 
desert ascetics with regard to the Christian ethical life. 
Origen set the "great currents of Christian spirituality".58 He presented two 
diverging traditions that either indicated the unhindered journey of the soul to the 
divine (Commentary on the Song of Songs) or anticipated the presence of trials and 
56 Origen, Martyr. 37. 
57 Origen, Martyr. I. The martyrs experienced trials and temptations, accepting tribulations and 
expecting the hope that was to be manifest "yet a little while". Cf. Is 28:9 and Ro 5:3-5. 
581 have paraphrased from I. Hausherr, 'Great Currents of Eastern Spirituality', EsChQ 2 (1937), 111-
121 and 175-185. 
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temptations throughout the spiritual journey of the soul (De Oratione, Exhortatium 
ad Martyrium, and Homilice in Numeros.). However, Origen did not contrast between 
the two theological stands: the former emphasised the spiritual end that the soul was 
called to achieve (divine union). This stand focused on the action of God within 
history, and highlighted the soul's response to the divine call. Thus, Origen shed 
light on the works of God for the faithful soul. The other stand exemplified the 
ethical life that the soul needed to follow in order to reach perfection. This 
theological position took into account the soul's natural frailty. What united the two 
theological positions was the dialectical form that divine presence and absence 
acquired in Origen's thought. For him, it was divine paideia that was leading the soul 
to spiritual fulfillment. Thus, in his work, Origen illustrated the various ways in 
which God was intervening in the life of the soul. Origen's orientation was 
eschatological: divine paideia was leading the soul to the fulfilment of her union 
with the divine. God suspended redemptive time, thus preventing (from) and also 
redeeming the soul of her immanent natural weakness. In any case, Origen's ethical 
discourse on ethical trials and spiritual resting manifested divine presence within an 
eschatological perspective as "here but not yet". 59 
2. The Vita Antonii and the Letters of Antony. 
The work Vita Antonii was of significant importance for the emergence of 
Christian asceticism. There had been considerable criticism about the attribution of 
the work to Athanasius in the past. However, modern scholarship has established this 
as Athanasian authorship. 60 Still, the question concerning the hagiographical 
depiction of Antony remains open. There are good reasons to advocate the 
authenticity of Antony's life. However, we also need to take into consideration that 
Athanasius was working on the classical form of biographies. This genre shaped and 
highlighted individual elements according to contemporary needs.61 The work was 
popular among the desert ascetical communities, and it influenced the shaping of 
Christian ascetical theory. 
59 Cheek, Eschatology and Redemption, 215. Cf. Turner, Eros and Allegory. 
60 See the intoduction in Athanase, Vie d'Antoine, G. J. M. Bartelink (ed.), CS 400 (1994), 27ff. G. 
Garitte, 'Histoire du texte imprime de Ia vie grecque deS. Antoine', Bulletin de /'institut historique 22 
(1942-1943), 5-29. Idem, 'Le Texte et les versions anciennes de Ia vie de Saint Antoine', Studia 
Anselmiana 38 (1956), 1-12. 
61 Cf. D. Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995). 
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The Letters of Antony have been subjected to scholarly scrutiny with regard to 
the interlinked problems of authorship and authenticity. According to Rubenson's 
review of the past scholarly work on the subject, the Antonian authorship needs to be 
established due to internal and also external evidence. 62 Rubenson examined the 
Origenist elements that the letters contain. He attempted to establish a firm relation 
between the Vita Antonii and the Letters of Antony based on common theological 
lines, and also the common depiction of Antony. Rubenson attributed the Origenist 
elements of the Letters to Antony: he rejected the Athanasian indication of Antony's 
illiteracy as misleading. According to Rubenson, the degree to which Athanasius' 
claim should be taken at face value is limited. Athanasius illustrated Antony as an 
illiterate monk who was confronting pagan philosophers and Arian adversaries 
adequately. That Antony was illiterate does not exclude the fact that he might have 
encountered Origenist positions in the desert that he employed and expressed in his 
Letters. But what has remained unaddressed so far is the influence of Origenist 
theology on Athanasius in the light of the latter's biographical composition. 
Scholarly research has only examined the classical forms behind Athanasius' 
narrative. 
In the present chapter we will attempt to discern Origenist ethical elements in 
Athanasius' biography and the Letters of Antony. In doing so, we will trace the 
emergence of the monastic ideals through the transition from Origenist intellection to 
ethical discourse. 
The Vita Antonii witnessed the progressive emergence of the desert asceticism. 
The ascetics were the new Christian martyrs in terms of devoting their lives to God. 
Though Athanasius was working on the classical genre of biographies, he employed 
the Origenist vocabulary that depicted Antony as the new "athlete" and "martyr" 
whose witness (IJapwpia) was manifested through ethical struggles.63 Athanasius 
62 S. Rubenson, The Letters of St. Antony: Origenist Theology, Monastic Tradition and the Making of 
a Saint, Bibliotheca Historico-Ecclesiastica Lundensis 24 (Lund: Lund University Press, 1990), 35. 
63 Cf. Acta Justini et Septem Sodalium, 5.1: "01. 1>£ aytot J.uiptup&c;; lio~O.~ovt&c;; tov 6&6v, E~&A.66vt&c;; 
l:7ti tov ouvt'J6TJ t67tov i>t&A.drooav to JlUpt6ptov €v tfl wu orotiipoc;; i111&v bJloA.oyi~". For Gregg 
and Groh, Athanasius depicted Antony after the "biblical presentations of the prophets, disciples, 
martyrs, and angels". Athanasius also borrowed themes from the classical era such as the depiction of 
Pythagoras from Apollonius of Tyana. Gregg and Cohs, Arianism, 133. Cf. Apollonius, 1aTopiat 
eavpaatat, 6.1 ff. G. Quispel, 'L'Evangile selon Thomas et les origines de l'ascese chretienne', in 
Gnostic Studies II, Uitgaven van het Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Istituut te Istanbul 35/2 
(Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Istituut te Istanbul, 1975), 98. 
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illustrated Antony's steadfastness64 and perseverance65 while the latter was 
experiencing the fierce attacks of demons.66 Most significantly, Athanasius 
highlighted the motif of Antony's love for the divine. It is in this sense that Antony 
chose spiritual struggles over the pleasures of the present life. 67 The Vita Antonii 
signalled the transition from the era of the martyrs to the era of the desert ascetics. 
For Athanasius, Antony was the new martyr pursuing ethical purification. 
Athanasius illustrated Antony's spiritual warfare in the desert. The ascetic did 
not struggle with inner passions --as the later ascetics--. His warfare was against the 
devil and the demons. It was the devil that attacked Antony, stirring thoughts and 
passions within him. However, Athanasius' ethical theory had a long way to go 
before reaching the later development of ethical discourse: for Athanasius, the 
passions were not inner dispositions of the fractured soul. The depiction of the devil 
was not a concrete expression of the soul's inner disposition. The passions were 
stirred from external stimuli.68 The demons were identified with the pagan Gods 
(Origen). They attacked Antony only when he intruded their habitation --i.e. tomb. 
Their intention was to drag Antony away from the territory. In the beginning, they 
affected his thoughts;69 then his body.70 Eventually, they appeared to him in bodily 
forms and attacked him leaving him half-dead. 71 
Athanasius devised a turning point in Antony's life that divided his biography 
into two parts, i.e. before and after the event: this event is the manifestation of the 
64 Athanasius, Vita, 5.1 [PG 26, 845] and 7.5 [852]. 
65 Athanas ius, Vita, 10.3 [860] and 51.2 [917]. 
66 Cf. Acta Justini et Septem Sodalium, 5.1 [in TLG]: "DO l7tapx.o<; 'Iouotiwp A.&yEt: 'Edv 
jlUOttycolld<; il7toKeq>aA.to6flc;, 7t&7tetoat ott j.t&A.A.et<; ilvaPaivetv Et<; tov obpav6v; 'Iouotivoc; elnev: 
'EA.1ti~ro tK tftc; b7toj.tovftc; Edv b7tojlEivro: otoa M on Kat toic; bpll&<; Ptrooaotv 7tapajlEVEt to Odov 
x.aptojla !lEX.Pt tft<; EK7tuprooEro<;" (The eparch said to Justin: if you are beheaded after being lashed, 
are you convinced that you will be raised into heaven? Justin said: I hope to perseverance if I 
persevere; I know that to those that conduct their life correctly, the holy gift remains until the 
conflagration). 
67 Athanasius, Vita, 9.3 [PG 26, 856] and 14.6 [865]. 
68 The Stoics had defined passions as the wrong judgements of the reason. Clement had indicated that 
the passions were excessive motions of the irrational part of the soul that were "disobedient" to the 
rational part. For Clement, the passions were irrational and connected to the functions of the body and 
the senses. Cf. Clement, Stromata, 2.13.59. For the Stoic and Clement's ethical theory see Lilla, 
"Ethical Theory", in Clement of Alexandria, 60-117. In Athanasius, one gets a glimpse of the later 
ascetical connection between demons and the irrational motions of the soul. See R. Dodds, The 
Greeks and the Irrational (London: University of California Press, 1971 ). Also, Brakke, Demons and 
the Monk. 
69 Athanasius, Vita, 5.2 [848]. 
70 Athanasius, Vita, 5.4 [848]. 
71 Athanasius, Vita, 8.2 [856]. 
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divine presence in light.72 Athanasius' account shared common themes with similar 
accounts in Philo, Plotinus and also Porphyry's biography for Plotinus. The common 
motif was that of a sudden appearance of light. According to Philo, the ascetic 
( acrKI"JT~<;;) sought for divine wisdom. The latter would suddenly appear to him after 
much pain and efforts. 73 In Philo, this appearance was in terms of light. 74 Both 
Plotinus and Porphyry had related the theme of divine presence in terms of a sudden 
apparition of light. 75 
In the Vita, Antony was attacked by demons. In a dramatic turn of events, a ray 
of light suddenly descended upon him.76 The ascetic was relieved from his bodily 
pain, while the demons fled. 77 Antony immediately identified this light with the 
divine presence. The question that he addressed indicated familiarity with his 
interlocutor: "where were you"? 
A closer look at the incident highlights the presence of Origenist ethical 
themes: though Antony suffered bodily wounds, he was remaining watchful 
(YPI"JYOPWV, v~<pwv). As a response to the demonic affections through his body, he was 
fasting. 78 Despite of all the afflictions, he remained firm in prayer. In his Exhortatio 
ad Martyrium, Origen had asked for endurance in trials, pointing to the fact that 
comfort was at hand. 
But commend yourselves 'in every way as the ministers of God': through great 
'endurance', saying, 'And now, what is my endurance? Is it not the Lord?'; in 
'afflictions', persuaded that 'many are the afflictions of the righteous'; in 
'necessities', so that we may ask for the blessedness necessary for us; in 'difficult 
straits', so that by travelling steadily on the straitened and narrow path we may 
arrive at life. If it is necessary, let us commend ourselves also 'in beatings, 
imprisonments, tumults, labours, watching, and fasting'. For behold, the Lord is 
here, and His reward is in His hand to give to each according to his works. 79 
72 Athanasius, Vita, 10.1-4 [PG 26, 860]. The literal analysis ofthe scene could indicate that the divine 
intervention was reminiscent of the classical deus ex machina. For Anatolios, the importance of the 
scene was highlighted by Athanasius' reference to Antony's age during the incident. Anatolios, 
Athanasius, 184. 
73 Philo, Quod Deus est lmmutabilis, 93. 
74 Unquestionably, Philo was influenced by Plato. Cf. Plato, Respublica, 515c4ff; Epistulae, 341 c5 
and also Parmenides, 156d2 and Symposium, 21 Oe 1 ff. However, we could not overlook the increasing 
importance of light in terms of divine revelation in the later apocryphal literature of Judaism. See 
McGinn, The Foundations, 14ff. According to McGinn, the destruction of the Temple urged late 
Judaism to introduce the notion of a direct and unmediated experience of the divine through visions 
and apparitions. 
75 Porphyry, Vita Plotini, 13. Plotinus, Enneads, 5.3.17. 
76 Cf. Ps 117:7. Athanasius, Vita, 6.4 [PG 26, 852]. 
77 For Athanasius, there was an an escalation in the demonic attacks: the attacked through thoughts; 
then they afflicted Antony's body through illness. Eventually, they took visible form and thus 
wounded his body severely. 
78 Athanasius, Vita, 9.8 [PG 26,857]. 
79 Origen, Martyr. 42 [my italics]. 
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Origen had borrowed his vocabulary from the Pauline exhortation to trials and 
sufferings: for Origen, the way of the martyrs was that of "beatings", "tumults", 
"efforts", "vigilance", and "fasting". For every affliction, Origen provided a 
scriptural quotation to strengthen the martyrs-to-be. The same theological line was 
also introduced by Athanasius. His martyr, i.e. Antony, persevered in trials and 
sufferings by fasting and remaining vigilant. He was also reciting biblical passages 
that acknowledged that the divine assistance was at hand.80 Antony cited scriptural 
passages that corresponded to the demonic attacks. 
The biographical account shared common themes with the Origenist 
exhortation. Athanasius' Antony expressed the Origenist motif of divine closeness 
during trials. Antony experienced what Origen had promised for the devotee: Christ 
manifested his closeness to his devotee in the presence of light. God drew near his 
martyr, calling at him and offering his reward: "Antony, I was here". The latter 
expression corresponds to Origen's "the Lord is here". Athanasius highlighted the 
notion of athlesis as testing: Christ did not intervene before observing Antony's 
athlesis. 81 Thus, he offered his reward to Antony. 
We need to address some further observation. At this point, we need to draw 
our attention to the expression "having felt the assistance"82 in the Athanasian 
account. Antony did not hesitate in identifying the apparition with the divine 
presence. His words, "where were you", illustrated familiarity. The apparition 
brought deliverance from his physical pain: his body was relieved from its wounds. 
The two points are interrelated: it is due to the apparition that Antony identified his 
interlocutor with Christ.83 His deliverance from bodily pain informed him about the 
identity of his interlocutor. The experience was not limited to an intellectual level 
--in a Plotinian or Philonian fashion. We need to take into consideration the participle 
"aia961JEVo~" which is a predicate to "6vriAI14JI~". Through the language of the senses, 
Athanasius argued the reality of the apparition.84 In his work, Origen had favoured 
80 PsI I7:7. IKgs I8:I5. Phil 3:I3. 
81 The ascetic was afflicted by passions only because of the fierce attack from the devil. Athanasius 
did not connect this to the presence of sin as a spiritual factor in Antony's life. 
82 Athanas ius, Vita, I 0.2 [PG 26, 860]: "aio961JEvoo:; rflo:; avnAr')ljltwo:;". 
83 As opposed to the presence of the adversary: in the latter case, Antony inquired about his identity: 
"who are you that you talk to me like that? -I am the friend of fornication". Athanasius, Vita, 6.2 [PG 
26,849]. 
84 In doing so, Athanasius illustrated his dependence on Origen and the latter's theological position 
concerning the correspondence between bodily and spiritual senses. 
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the notion of spiritual sense ( a'io9'lar<;);85 Athanasius introduced the participle 
aio9av61JEVO<; in his text.86 For Athanasius, divine presence was felt at an empirical 
level --as opposed to a strict intellectualism.87 Behind these lines, Athanasius might 
have been rejecting the Gnostic intellectual character of union with the divine. 
Athanasius stressed the participation of the body in the divine apparition: Antony 
saw the light and felt bodily relief from his wounds. 
The dialogue between the ascetic and his interlocutor introduced the notion of 
divine presence and absence. Antony's question pointed in the direction of divine 
absence: he was left on his own. Surprisingly, and unlike biblical sources -e.g. Ps 
22.2- Antony inquired first about "where" and then "why" with regard to God's 
presence. 88 Athanasius introduced the antinomy that though Christ was present, 
Antony felt his absence which Athanasius defined in terms of God postponing his 
intervention. It was discussed that Origen had introduced the dialectical nature of 
divine presence and absence: God was leaving the soul subject to trials without 
intervening. Yet, he was at hand. Antony's interlocutor denied any spatial separation 
between him and his ascetic: for Athanasius, Antony experienced divine hiddeness. 
Athanasius could not have come closer to Origen' s theme of divine proximity and 
hiddenness. Such hiddenness was understood in terms of postponing his intervention. 
Unlike Origen's allusion to Is 58:9, "Lo, here am I",89 the Athanasian "Antony, 
I was here", was not a direct citation from a biblical verse. But even Origen 
85 Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum, 1.48.27 and 7.39.44. Also idem, Fragmenta in Evangelium Joannis (in 
catenis), 20.1 [number of fragment in GCS 10]. Idem, Fragment in Lucam (in catenis), 186.44 [pg 306 
in GCS 49]. For Clement, faith began at the level of the senses and was transformed into divine 
knowledge. 
86 Behind the language of vision lies the classical Greek theory of optics as means to know an object. 
Unlike modem notions of sight defined as the abstraction created from the image ofthe object that has 
appeared in the encephalic centre through the neurones stimulated by the eye lenses, the classical 
Greek theory supported empirical knowledge of objects through interchanging "fires" between subject 
and object (ouvaliyt•a) that were united through a third light (i.e. the sun); the objects were conceived 
epistemologically through their mutual participation in sight. SeeS. Ramfos, '0twpla', in 7Aapav f/Jw~ 
roO KWJJOU (Athens: Armos, 2006). 221-116. For Ramfos, the knowledge of an object is empirical 
(including both mind and body) as opposed to the mere abstraction of the mind (intellectualism). 
87 The body participated in the scene through the sense of sight and the relief from pain. 
88 Surprisingly, instead of a Davidic inquiry or even glorification, Antony's address was that of a 
modem lover that is waiting for his love: "where have you been? Why did you not ... "? Cf. Ps 9:22. 
Only the second par tofthe inquiry resembled the lamentation psalms. The lack of biblical foundation 
for Antony's answer advocates for the authenticity of the incident: Antony was not following any 
biblical or classical example. 
89 The editor has cross-referenced Is 40:10 and 60:12 due to the fact that both passages refer to the 
presence of the Lord and the rewards that he brings to the soul. However, it is more likely that Origen 
had in mind Is 58:9 which he had alluded to several times in his exegetical works in order to point out 
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paraphrased, as opposed to citing verbatim from Is 58:9. It might be the case that 
Athanasius also paraphrased the Origenist response. Though Athanasius used the 
scriptures extensively in his Vita Antonii,90 this was the only place that Athanasius 
did not cite directly from the scriptures. More likely, Athanasius found this 
expression of divine closeness in Origen whom he paraphrased. Both authors shared 
the adverb "here" as a predicate of space to show divine closeness and also contrast it 
to divine hiddeness. 
Another ethical position that Athanasius shared with Origen was the aftermath 
of the divine presence: after the apparition of light, Antony was not confronted by the 
demons any more. The ascetic was depicted as a conqueror over the demonic powers. 
The passions ceased to be stirred inside him, and the devil's fierce wrath ceased to 
affect him. According to the biographical account, Antony was never approached by 
the demons again.91 For Athanasius, Antony became a God-bearing man.92 As in the 
case of the biblical bride, Antony has remained unhindered in his ascension to ethical 
perfection. It seems that Athanasius was following a strand of thought that Origen 
had introduced. But, this is not to say that Athanasius copied from Origen 
uncritically. Most probably, Athanasius was familiar with the idea of depicting 
ethical perfection as achievable in this life. 
The point on which Athanasius differed from Origenist tradition was his 
emphasis on the incarnation. Anatolios has examined Athanasius' ethical theory in 
the context of his Christology.93 According to Anatolios, Athanasius introduced his 
ethical theory in terms of the efficacy of the incarnation. Athanasius stressed the 
relationship between the human and divine within the context of synergy. This 
the closeness of God at times oftrials. Cf. Origen, Oral. 10.1. Idem, Selecta in Psa/mos, PG 12, 1121 
[Ps 3:2]. It was also favoured in his exegesis on the Song of Songs where he had argued God's 
£:'esence being at hand. See Origen, Hom. 1.2.269. 
The index of scriptural citations is quite extensive in the edition of the Vita for SC 400. 
91 Even the wickedest creatures of an irrational nature (such as reptiles) had fled at the presence of 
Antony. Cf. Athanasius, Vita, 12.4 [PG 26, 861]. This passage was an allusion to the previous attack 
ofthe demons in the form of reptiles in Vita, 9.5 [857]. For Athanasius, not only the reptiles, but also 
the demons had fled when confronting Antony. Cf. Athanasius, Vita, 13.1-2 [861-864]. 
92 Athanasius, Vita, 14.2 [PG 26, 864]: "[7t]pof]A.9ev b 'Avtrovwc; &cmep EK nvoc; a06tou 
jlejlUOtayroyru.J£voc; Kai 9eocpopot'>jlevoc;" (Antony came forth as from a sanctuary instructed in the 
divine mysteries and God-bearing). 
93 Anatolios, Athanasius, 177ff. Also Rubenson, The Letters of St. Antony. Anatolios addressed 
modem criticism about the meaning of synergy in Athanasius' thought, specifically in his Vita 
Antonii. Anatolios supported that Athanasius viewed synergy in equal terms from both parts: God 
bestowed his grace. But the ascetic needed to respond to this divine action. According to Anatolios, 
the acquisition of divine grace was not only a matter of human volition but required an interaction 
between God and man. Cf. Gregg and Groh, 'Claims on the Life of St. Antony', in Arianism, 133ff. 
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synergy was discernible in the act of creation and also the incarnation. 94 The divine 
power became manifest in the incarnation through Christ's body. This divine power 
passed to his disciples who became the recipients of his grace. For Athanasius, 
Antony was such a recipient of divine power. He experienced the divine grace that 
was working from within him as an outcome of the incarnation.95 Origen had viewed 
the incarnation in terms of the soul's conversion from idolatry to faith. Athanasius 
corrected this view by introducing the results of the incarnation in more concrete 
terms: humanity was transformed through the incarnation. Origen acquired a 
distinctly eschatological position that maintained the tension between the kingdom 
within and the kingdom to come. Athanasius --striving against Docetism and 
Arianism-- illustrated the results of the incarnation. The recipients of divine grace 
defeated death and the demons: Antony merged from the tomb without any sign of 
bodily decay.96 For Athanasius, Antony was a "receiver of God" (9E056xo~),97 
because Christ had already defeated death and the devil in his own flesh. 98 
Athanasius composed his work at a time that Gnosticism in Egypt was questioning 
the role of the incarnation, diminishing the role of ethical life for the favour of 
intellectualism: salvation was understood in terms of an intellectual ascension to the 
divine. In his Vita Antonii, Athanasius defended the ethical value of the incarnation 
and introduced his position -found already in Irenreus- concerning the participation 
of both the body and the mind in deification.99 Antony was not a "bodiless" man, but 
a "God-bearing" man. In doing so, Athanasius abolished the eschatological 
dimension of Origen's exegesis: Antony was already experiencing the transformation 
94 It was Antony's prayer in ethical vigilance that manifested Antony's part in the interaction with 
divine grace. Anatolios, Athanasius, 183ff. 
95 Athanasius, Vita, 40.6ff[PG 26, 901]. 
96 Athanasius, Vita, 14.lff[PG 26, 864-865]. 
97 Gregg and Groh drew attention to the fact that, in Athanasian thought, the term implied the natural 
distinction between the Logos and men. It denied the Arian position that the faithful would enjoy the 
same relation with the Father that the Son was enjoying. Gregg and Groh, Arianism, 147 citing from 
Athanas ius. 
98 Athanasius, Vita, 5.7 [PG 26, 849]:" '0 ydp vo~iaac; o~otoc; y~:vtaOat 9~:(p lmo vwviaKou vuv 
lmai~~:to: Kai b aapKoc; Kal. al~atoc; KataKauxffi~-t~>voc; lmo t'lvOpomou a6.pKa q>opouvwc; 
tlVEtpE1tEtO. LUVTJP'YEt ydp b Kuptoc; abt{p, b aapKa lit' 11~nc; q>optaac;, KUl. t{p affi~att Oouc; ttlV 
KUtd 'tOU Ota~6A.ou viKrtV: matE t&v 6vtroc; t'lyrovt~OI!EV(l)V EKUOtOV A.tyEtV: "ObK tyro BE, a.n· 11 
xaptc; tou ewu 11 auv €~-toi"" (he who thought that he became equal to God was mocked by the 
youth; and he who boasted against all flesh and blood was overthrown by a man bearing flesh. For 
God was assisting him, he who took on flesh for us and gave his flesh for the victory over the devil; so 
that everyone that was truly fighting could say: "yet, not I, but the grace of God within me"). Cf. I 
Cor 15:10. 
99 Cf. B. Otis, 'Cappadocian Thought as a Coherent System'. Also N. Russell, The Doctrine of 
Deification in the Greek Patristic Thought, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford, OUP, 2004). 
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of humanity that resulted from the transformation that Christ achieved through the 
incarnation. 
A parallel reading between the two works (Vita-Letters) indicates that Antony 
held a different view than Athanasius. 100 The illustrated Origenism of the Letters 
caused scholars to question their authenticity. It was mentioned earlier that 
Athanasius had stressed Antony's illiteracy. 101 Nevertheless, in the Vita, Athanasius 
introduced long discourses in which Antony was exposed to Origenist theological 
positions, such as the origin of demons. According to the biographical account, 
Antony had sufficient knowledge to confront the pagans and the Arians. 102 The fact 
that Antony was illiterate could not single out the position that, in the desert, he was 
interacting with people that were well aware of Origenism -Athanasius was one of 
them. In the apophthegms attributed to Antony, Rubenson discerned possible 
Origenist elements that suffice to put under question Athanasius' information 
concerning Antony's illiteracy. Not to mention that, in any case, Antony might have 
dictated his epistles to a scribe. 
Unlike the Athanasian conqueror over the passions, the Antony of the Letters 
introduced the theme of sin as the cause of ethical fall. According to Antony, it was 
pride that caused the original motion of the rational creatures from the uniform 
condition of the minds contemplating the divine. By falling, they were differentiated 
into the conditions of angels, men and demons. 103 Antony underlined the "great 
wound" of the fall that humanity was incapable of healing. Sin led to ignorance of 
humanity's nature as "intellectual substance". 104 Thus, it was only through the advent 
of Christ that the human race was redeemed. Antony's vocabulary is similar to the 
Origenist language of the De Principiis. 
Antony employed the Origenist theological position of time as part of God's 
pedagogy to turn humanity from sin. In this pedagogy, God was visiting his faithful 
through various manifestations which Antony called 'visitations', a term peculiar to 
Origenist thought: 
100 For a thorough analysis of the Letters with a review of the literature concerning the authorship, 
their relation to Vita Antonii and the Apophthegmata Patrum, and the Origenism of the desert 
literature see Rubenson, The Letters of St. Anthony. 
101 Athanas ius, Vita, 1.1 [PG 26, 841 ]. 
102 Athanas ius, Vita, 68.2ff [941 ]. 
103 Antony the Great, The Letters, trans. D. J. Chitty (Oxford: SLG, 1975), 6 [pg. 20 and 23]: "the 
beginning of their motion is the pride which came at the first". 
104 Antony, Lettrs. 2 [pg. 6-7] and 3 [pg. 9]. 
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Truly, my beloved in the Lord, not at one time only did God visit His creatures; but 
from the foundations of the world, whenever any have come to the Creator of all by 
the law of His covenant implanted in them, God is present with each one of these in 
His bounty and grace by His spirit. 105 
Despite the fact that humanity had turned away from God, God manifested his 
presence in various ways, through the presence of the immanent natural law, and also 
the presence of biblical figures such as Moses and the prophets. The presence of the 
natural law as means of divine presence was well established in the thought of 
Clement of Alexandria who employed it to argue the divine presence even in the 
Greek philosophers. Through it, Antony stressed the notion of divine presence in 
various levels (nature-revelation). Most importantly, Antony introduced the dialectics 
of presence and absence: God was present within the history of the human race in 
various levels. Yet, he remained hidden. Moses, who stood for divine presence, was 
incapable of healing the human wound, and thus he withdrew. 106 The same was true 
of the prophets. For Antony, it was human sin that was causing this divine 
withdrawal: God manifested his presence; then, he was hiding. 
The incarnation meant the healing of human sin. This redemption was 
understood in an Origenist fashion as the tum from ignorance to divine knowledge: 
For as many as are set free by His dispensation, are called the servants of God. And 
this is not yet perfection, but in its own time it is righteousness and it leads to the 
adoption of sons. 107 
The expression "not yet" indicated the relative temporal character of the adoption. 
The advent of Christ did not mean that humanity had reached perfection. It was 
Christ's disciples that moved to the condition of adoption: being servants they 
became sons. But that was only through the advent of the Holy Spirit. Thus, the 
incarnation played a limited role in Antony's thought: even though he had referred to 
the healing of humanity, Antony maintained a firm eschatological direction in his 
Letters: the righteousness that the incarnation brought was so in a relative sense, "in 
its own time". Thus, as in the case of Gregory of Nyssa, Antony distinguished 
between perfection in this present life, and the eschatological completion of this 
perfection.108 
105 Antony, Lettrs. 2 [pg. 6]. 
106 Antony, Lettrs. 5 [pg. 14-15]. 
107 Antony, Lettrs. 2 [pg. 6]. 
108 Antony illustrated the need for synergy: the outpouring of the Holy Spirit was not perfection as 
such. What was also needed was human ethical preparation. Anton. Lettrs. 2 [pg. 7]. 
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Unlike the Vita, Antony did not deny the possibility of backsliding for the soul. 
In doing so, Antony illustrated his dependence on Origenist cosmology. 109 For 
Antony, the soul had moved from its original blessedness: "the beginning of their 
motion is the pride which came at the first". 110 The original motion was caused by 
pride. Antony defined pride as estrangement from God and the virtues. 111 Thus, 
Antony exhorted: 
[I] want you to know that there are many who have pursued asceticism throughout 
their life, but lack of discernment killed them .... if you neglect yourselves and do not 
discern your works, that you should fall into the hands of the devil, when you think 
you are near to God, and that in your expectation of the light, darkness should 
overtake you. 112 
Antony did not introduce the Origenist notion of the soul's satiety. He shifted to a 
more ethically oriented discussion that anticipated Paphnutius' ethical discourse in 
the Lausiac History. Origen, however, had highlighted the presence of pride at an 
ethical level. Antony argued that ethical backsliding was possible when the soul had 
obtained considerable spiritual progress. 113 Clearly, the introduction of pride, and 
also the reference to the Origenist origin of demons and men was meant to exhort to 
ethical efforts. Through the scheme of the various grades of the fall, Origen 
introduced the life of the soul within the body. The body was given to soul in order to 
struggle and develop. It seems that this is the reason Antony followed this Origenist 
theory: the fall of the minds to the condition of embodied humanity highlighted the 
material presence and exhorted to ethical efforts. It needs to be taken into 
consideration that Antony was addressing ascetics. 
In his attempt to secure his disciples from pride, Antony transferred spiritual 
rest for an eschatological time. Thus, he highlighted the future acquisition of the 
inheritance, as Origen had referred to the future hope. According to Antony, "[w]ho 
ever saw God, to rejoice with Him and retain Him with himself, so that God should 
not leave him, but help him while he dwells in this heavy body"?114 Antony denied 
109 Origen, Prine. 3.1.12. For Antony, there was a triple motion that showed the subjection of the soul 
to passions: the first motion was related to the natural motions of the body. In this case, the passions 
were controlled by the soul. The second motion resulted from the natural abuse of natural needs such 
as hunger and thirst. According to Antony, an excess in the consumption of food and drink resulted in 
the passionate motion of the body. The third motion was due to the afflictions imposed on humanity 
by the demons' envy. Cf. Antony, Lettrs. 1 [pg. 2-3]. 
110 Antony, Lettrs. 6 [pg. 23]. 
111 Antony, Lettrs. 6 [pg. 22-23]. 
112 Antony, Lettrs. op. cit. 
113 Cf. Origen, Prine. 3.1.12. 
114 Antony, Lettrs. 6 (pg. 20]. 
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that God remained united with the soul in this present life. Thus, the Coptic ascetic 
indicated the tension between divine presence and absence -expressed through the 
language of visitations and separation as above. According to him, the ascetics 
needed to anticipate periods of divine presence and withdrawal. The presence and 
possibility of sin limited Antony's ethical insights. His intention was to exhort 
ascetics to spiritual vigilance and warfare. 
Athanasius composed his Vita as a hagiographical work to exalt the life and 
deeds of Antony. Athanasius intended to manifest Antony's ethical integrity, and 
thus set the ideal image of what a monk should be like. Chapters 5.1-14.1 in Vita 
Antonii introduced Antony's ethical struggles. Thus, Athanasius highlighted his 
achievements and vindicated his sanctity. His fame was based on the tribulations that 
he faced victoriously. Athanasius also underlined Antony's disposition by indicating 
his struggles against the demonic presence. Antony's struggles were depicted in 
terms of divine pedagogy. The ascetic was the new Christian martyr who was handed 
over in trials by God. Thus, the ascetic enjoyed the fruits of his virtue. 115 
In his Letters, Antony addressed an altogether different audience than that of 
Athanasius, and in a totally different theological framework. From the paradigmatic 
nature of the biography-genre Antony's letter signified the introduction of ethical 
exhortation. Interestingly, the difference between Athanasius and Antony is also the 
same difference between the Origen of the Commentary on the Song of Songs and the 
Origen of the Exhortatio, mutatis mutandis. Antony was exhorting to ethical 
vigilance. His vocabulary gave predominance to the notion of sin116 and also to the 
future hope --in terms of the inheritance. Thus, Antony indicated that the divine 
assistance was at hand. However, he also exhorted against ethical laxity. Whereas 
Athanasius viewed ethical life as part of synergism, where human weakness was 
overcome by the work of the incarnation, Antony directed his attention to the 
eschatological direction oftime. Athanasius' Antony seems detached from the reality 
that the ascetics were facing in their daily ethical struggles: for instance, Macarius of 
Egypt highlighted human weakness indicating the foes that the ascetics were 
confronting in their spiritual struggles. On the other hand, Antony diminished the 
role of the incarnation. Thus, his teaching shared the same theological weakness with 
Origen and -at a later time- Evagrius. Yet, Antony introduced 'ascetical realism' in 
115 Cf. Origen, Homiliae in Job (in catenis), 19 [PG 12, 1032]. 
116 Cf. Origen, Prine. 3.l.l2. 
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accepting the possibility of ethical backsliding, and reinforced the meamng of 
eschatology, placing the latter within the scope of salvation. 
3. The ascetical tradition. 
i. Causes of divine abandonment. 
In the Lausiac History, Abba Paphnutius was asked by Palladius, Evagrius and 
Albanius about the causes of ethical misfortunes. 117 Paphnutius was presented with 
the lives of five individual ascetics that faced tribulations as part of their lives. 118 
Though, at this point, Palladius did not provide any further information about the 
individuals inquiring, details of their ascetical conduct were included in individual 
chapters of the Lausiac History. 119 The stories of Valens, Heron, Ptolemy, Stephen 
and Eucarpios shared common themes with each other: spiritual struggle, deception 
by demons --proclaiming their ethical perfection--, confrontation with the ascetical 
community, and repentance or perdition. Driscoll emphasised the fact that the five 
monks were "very accomplished" ascetics. Paphutius was presented with the moral 
fall of "accomplished" ascetics. His companions did not ask about misfortunes in 
general terms; their concern was about monks that had slid even after accomplishing 
spiritual progress. 120 A story from the Apophthegmata Patrum also related the story 
of a mature ascetic that fell into moral corruption: Antony had lamented the moral 
fall of this eminent monk -he remained anonymous- whom he called a "great pillar 
of the Church". 121 Antony had already noticed the spiritual advancements of the 
monk. However, he had also anticipated his moral failure. 122 Driscoll presented the 
117 Palladius, Laus. 47. 
118 Palladius, The Lausiac History, trans. R. T. Meyer, ACW 34 (1964), 47 [reference to vita]. 
119 See J. Driscoll, 'Evagrius and Paphnutius on the Causes for Abandonment by God', Studia 
Monastica 39 (1997), 262-270. In fact, as Driscoll noticed, only three stories were preserved in the 
Greek text. For the lives of Stephen and Eucarpius, Driscoll referred to Syriac translation of the 
Lausiac History edited by Draguet. SeeR. Draguet, Les Formes Syriaques de Ia Matiere de/' Histoire 
Lausiaque, CSCO 169-170 ( 1978). 
120 Palladius, Laus. 47.5: "tt<; i1 ahta too outro ~&vtac; av9pcimouc; l;v tfl l:pflJ.lt~ touc; J.lEV 
a1tat119flvat tflv cppsva touc; ot 1tEptppayfJvat aKoA.aat~" (why it was that men living in the desert 
sometimes are deceived in their minds or are wrecked by lust) [trans. Meyer]. Driscoll has translated 
a,m..taai(lmore fittingly as intemperance. 
121 Apophth. (SysC), 8.1. Antony sent his disciples to the cell of the monk. They found him lamenting 
and imploring God to be granted ten more days to repent. But death met him only five days after his 
fall. The story did not clarify if his repentance was accepted by God. 
122 The incident described in the Apophthegmata Patrum shown the continuity between the Antony of 
the Apophthegmata and the Antony of the Letters. For it was in his Letters that Antony wrote: "[I] 
want you to know that there are many who have pursued asceticism throughout their life, but lack of 
discernment killed them .... if you neglect yourselves and do not discern your works, then you will fall 
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case of Guillaumont who questioned the authenticity of Paphnutius' discourse. 
According to Guillaumont' s hypothesis, this chapter of the Lausiac History was 
articulated by Palladius to present Evagrian thought on the causes of divine 
abandonment. However, Antony's story concerning the fall of the "great pillar" has 
illustrated that the desert fathers were concerned about the causes of moral 
backsliding before Evagrius' time. Antony had not inquired about such a cause. 
However, that the story was included as part of the Systematic Collection of desert 
apophthegms under the title of pride indicates that the compiler of the work was 
concerned about the cause that he identified with pride. 123 Thus, it is quite absurd to 
deny the authenticity of a dialogue when its setting was according to the life and 
experiences ofthe desert fathers. 124 More importantly, both Driscoll and Guillaumont 
did not discern the similarities of Paphnutius' discourse with Nemesius' De Natura 
Hominis. Their intention to argue the authenticity only in terms of the possible 
Evagrian influences on Palladius made them overlook the stunning parallels between 
Paphnutius -or Palladius- and Nemesius. 
Paphnutius began by providing an introductory discourse on the causes of 
events in general. 125 Introducing his ethical teaching, Paphnutius modified the 
Origenist vocabulary that discerned between events according to the divine pleasure 
(Eul>oKia) and also events according to the divine consent (ouyxwP'l01<;). 126 Paphnutius 
into the hands of the devil, when you think you are near to God, and that in your expectation of the 
light, darkness will overtake you". Antony, Lettrs. 6 [pg. 23]. 
123 The title of the chapter in which this story was included is: "nEpi roO 1.111~tv np6<; tni~E1~1v no1Eiv". The 
chapter contains stories that show that vanity and pride are spiritual obstacles in the spiritual life. In 
one of the stories included, Abba Isaiah taught that pride was the mother of all sin. Cf. Apophth. 
(SJSC), 8.6. 12 Driscoll examined Guillaumont's scepticism with regard to the authenticity of the dialogue. He 
tried to meet the objections of Guillaumont that most probably Palladius had articulated the discourse 
by making Paphnutius the bearer of Evagrian positions. For Driscoll, the authenticity of Paphnutius 
was undeniable. See Driscoll, 'Paphnutius', 259fT. See Evagre le Pontique, Le Gnostique ou a celui 
qui est devenu digne de Ia science, A. and C. Guillaumont (eds.), SC 356 (1989), 141-142 for an 
extensive footnote concerning Guillaumont's argument. 
125 Driscoll presented an excellent examination of Paphnutius' discourse in Driscoll, 'Evagrius and 
Paphnutius on the Causes for Abandonment by God', 259-286. As far as I am aware, this is the only 
extensive academic work on the subject. Driscoll treated the connection between Paphnutius' 
discourse and the Evagrian ethical theory. He also provided the most coherent academic work on 
Evagrius' teaching with regard to the experience of divine abandonment. 
126 Origen, Fragmenta in Lucam (in catenis), 192.18 [pg 309 in GCS 49]: "t&v ydp ytVOjlEVffiV ii jlEV 
Katd ~OUATJatV yivetat, ii liE Kat' eblioKlav, ii lit Katd OtlYXIDPTJatV" (from the things that happen, 
some happen according to divine pleasure, others according to consent). See also Suda, Lexicon, 
r.271: "td liE ytv6jlEVa Katd tpeis tp61tOtlS yivetat: Kat' OtKOVOjltaV, Kat' EOiioKiav, Katd 
aunmpTJatv" (things occur in three ways; according to economy, according to pleasure, according to 
consent). Damascene, ExpF. 43 [pp 100-103]. Driscoll and Guillaumont failed to trace the Origenist 
foundation of Paphnutius' discourse with regard to this twofold distinction. In focusing on the 
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dismissed the additional Origenist introduction of events according to the divine will 
(Kara J3ou.A.I")mv). Indeed, Origen had distinguished between events according to God's 
will (Kara J3ou.A.I")mv), his pleasure (Kara Eul)oKiav) and his consent (KaTa auyxwpl")alv). 
The distinction between divine will and pleasure seems to be too obscure to 
conceive. Paphnutius submerged the two concepts into one, i.e., divine pleasure. 127 
In doing so, Paphnutius avoided the implication that the divine consent was different 
from the divine will. In addition, for Paphnutius, though all events were subjected to 
the divine agency, their outcomes were different: some events led to divine 
glorification whereas others led to divine pedagogy. Thus, from the cause of events, 
Paphnutius shifted to their outcomes: 
Everything that happens which is in accordance with virtue and the glory of God 
happens by His will. Now, on the other hand, things harmful and dangerous, 
accidents and falls, these occur with God's consent. 128 
According to this passage, some events led to divine glorification; these were 
according to the divine pleasure. Other events resulted in ethically perilous 
conditions; these occured according to divine assent. Paphnutius subjected all events 
to the divine agency. Either due to divine pleasure or consent, all events in human 
life originated through God's agency. The main motif behind this argument was the 
established notion of divine providence: 129 according to the latter motif, ethical theory 
was part of the Christian cosmology. 130 Already, Clement of Alexandria had 
Evagrian elements of the discourse, they overlooked any loans from other Patristric sources by 
Palladius (eg. Nemesius, Didymos). Palladius was alluding to ideas that were quite widespread in the 
theological literature of late antiquity. See Driscoll, 'Evagrius and Paphnutius'. Also Guillaumont's 
footnote in Evagrius, Gnost, 28. 
127 Nemesius only addressed the events according to their connection to divine providence (rrp6vo1a). 
For Nemesius, providence was defined as the divine will (13ol1Ailalc;). Nemesius, Natur. 42 [pg. 125]. 
128 Palladius, Laus. 47.5: "[ "O]oa toivuv yivEtat Katd apEtt'(v de; 06~av ewu, tauta yivEtat 
Ei>ooKiq. ewu: ooa o' au 1tUAlV E1tt~fJI.lta Kat E1ttKivouva Kat 1tEptotattKd Kat EK1ttffitlKU, tauta 
yivEtat Katd ewu ourxropr)otV" [trans. Meyer]. 
129 See Clement's criticism of the Epicureans, the Stoics and the Aristotelians. These groups were 
either disregarding divine providence (Stoics-Epicureans), or they limited divine providence to the 
celestial realm (Peripatetics). Lilla, Clement of Alexandria. See also Origen, Prine. 2.11.5. Idem, 
Contra Celsum, 7.68ff: Origen distinguished between actions according to divine providence and 
actions according to divine permission. 
130 Even Plotinus had argued for the presence of divine providence though, in his system, this notion 
was obscured due to the depiction of the supreme reality ( r<'> "Ev-the one) as ultimately detached from 
his emanations in terms of its consciousness: it appears that the Plotinian One was not conscious of 
the lower material realm. However, Plotinus had not denied that the cosmos was ruled by divine 
providence. In doing so, he employed the Stoic notion of the Logos as the representative of nous in 
the material world. As Armstrong remarked, Plotinus argued "the moral order in our world" in terms 
oftheodicy. See A. H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of 
Plotinus: An Analytical and Historical Study (Cambridge: CUP, 1940), 102-105. See also, J. M. Rist, 
'The One's Knowledge', in Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: CUP, 1967), 38-52. Also, C. 
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conceived divine providence as the manifestation of God's creating, ruling and 
leading power in the creation. 131 Scheffczyk remarked that, for Clement: "[t]he Logos 
who is the source of the world's being also trains, instructs and redeems mankind; is 
the providence which leads us to our perfection". 132 Human history was envisaged in 
terms of divine pedagogy for the redemption of fallen humanity. 133 From the 
cosmological concept of God as Creator, Clement had introduced the ethical notion 
of God as provider and redeemer for the human race. 
Nemesius of Emesa, an enigmatic figure, also included a discussion on divine 
abandonment in his De Natura Hominis under the theme of divine providence. 134 
Nemesius did not argue in terms of "kinds" of divine abandonment. His intention 
was to illustrate that divine providence was working through a diversity of manners. 
Primarily, his argument sought to find the balance between determinism/fatalism 
(Stoics) and indeterminism (Epicureans) in the light of human 'free agency' 
(a(m:~oumov). According to Nemesius, the diversity of outcomes led one to 
acknowledge the various ways of divine providence. It also indicated the fact that 
divine providence corresponded to the individual disposition/needs of the recipients. 
Thus, Nemesius introduced several biblical figures (e.g. Job and Paul) to highlight 
this latter position. Nemesius followed Origen's De Principiis -not verbatim though-
to show that divine providence did not interfere (i.e. cancel) with human free 
agency. 135 After Origen, Nemesius was the first author to discuss divine 
abandonment in terms of divine providence. If Young is right about the end of the 
4th -century (A.D. 395-400) as the possible composition of the De Natura, then it 
seems that Palladius' source (i.e. Paphnutius or Evagrius) was well acquainted with 
Nemesius' work. 136 Palladius composed his work in A.D. 419-420. This date is 
Parma, Pronoia und Providentia: der Vorsehungsbegriff P/otins und Augustins, Studien zur 
Problemgeschichte der antiken und mittelalterlichen Philosophie 6 (Leiden: Brill, 1977). 
131 Though this was apparent in the biblical narratives, the language that Clement employed and the 
fact that he related the role of God's Logos with regard to divine providence, illustrated Clement's 
dependence on Philo and Plotinus' Neo-Piatonism. 
132 L. Scheffczyk, Creation and Providence, trans. R. Strachan, Herder History of Dogma (London: 
Bums & Oates, 1970), 76. The author referred to the lost work of Clement On Providence which 
survives only in fragments. 
133 See H. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien iiber Origenes und sein Verhaltnis zum Platonismus 
(Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1932). Also: Scheffczyk, Providence, 77-80. 
134 Nemesius, Natur. 43 [pg. 134]. 
135 Origen, Prine. 3 .1.12. 
136 It is not accidental that Nemesius decided to include Apollinarius in his work, unless he wanted to 
show his corrupted positions. Apollinarius drew the attention of the ecclesiastical authorities in the 
360s. Nemesius indicated that Apollinarius's psychology originated from a distorted understanding of 
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posterior to Nemesius. 137 According to Guillaumont, Evagrius was Palladius' source 
for the articulation of Paphnutius' discourse. However, Evagrius did not favour the 
term ouvxwpflm<;, as it is the case with Palladius; 138 nor did the former discussed 
divine abandonment in the theological context of divine providence. Though 
Evagrius implied that all God's actions were informed by his providence for the 
human individual, he did not provide an elaborate argument that was putting 
abandonment and providence side by side. 
For Paphnutius, divine consent was informed by a reason (Myoc;): "his consent 
comes about reasonably". 139 Such affirmation was based on the grounds of Christian 
reaction against the Gnostic concept that misfortunes were the result of an inadequate 
or even evil creator. As a reaction to this position, according to Paphnutius, events 
were the result of the interaction between divine providence and individual human 
agency. In the desert tradition, Evagrius was the person that underlined the fact that 
God was not the cause of evils; he was the source of goodness. 140 According to 
Evagrius, it was only due to divine consent that ethical misfortunes were occurring: 
"[God] is not the cause of evils, being the fount of goodness, but it is said that he 
gives as consenting". 141 Paphnutius gave more emphasis to the interaction between 
divine providence and human agency. 
For Paphnutius, the "right conduct" (6p96c; J3ioc;) was antinomical to the 
"demonic deception" (rrMv11 ~011J6vwv). What Paphnutius implied was an either-or 
ethical scheme: the soul had either "right conduct" of life, or she was subject to 
"demonic deception". The two terms were diametrically opposite. "Demonic 
deception" occured due to careless ascetical conduct: it was ethical corruption that 
what the relation between the soul and nous was. The extreme Arians (Anomoians) had also presented 
a distorted understanding of this distinction. If Nemesius knew the Apollinarian positions, it is 
impossible that he was not aware of Arian thought on this matter. Thus, his allusion only to 
Apollinarius is an indication that he was writing at a time that Christian thought attacked 
systematically the Apollinarian line of reasoning. Young, 'Nemesius of Emesa', in Niccea to 
Cha/cedon, 159-170. 
137 See the introduction in Palladius, Lausiac History in the edition of ACW 34. 
138 Evagrius related the two terms only in his Evagrius, Eccl. 4 [Ec 1:13 in SC 397]. 
139 Palladius, Laus. 47.6: "'H M ourxropfJot<; EK Myou yivt:tut" 
14° Cf. Nemesius, Natur. 42 [pg. 130ft]. 
141 Evagrius, Eccl. 4 [Ec 1:13 in SC 376 ]: "[ou] yap l:onv utno<; KuK&v, 7tfl'Yll llyu9roo6vfJ<; 
U7tapxrov, 1tA.1'!v d Jlll A.tyt:tut otMvut i.o<; ourxrop&v". Driscoll, 'Paphnutius', 281. Driscoll referred 
to Gehin 's commentary in SC 397 in order to establish the anti-gnostic ambience of this theological 
position. He observed that "such distinctions become regular topoi, particularly in monastic contexts". 
See Theodoret, Qucestiones in Deuteronomium, 37 [PG 80, 440A]. 
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caused the demonic deception. Paphnutius was highlighting human responsibility: 
ethical events were connected to the conduct of life. Having argued divine 
providence, Paphnutius turned to the human factor. 
The soul's corruption was a result of her disposition (rrp69Em~) and her actions 
(rrpa~1~). Origen had clearly suggested that human disposition was ethically 
responsible for sin. In fact, for Origen, the concept was discussed in terms of human 
consent: no sin was done without the consent of the individual. 142 The theme of 
human disposition underlined human responsibility (human free agency). 143 
For Paphnutius, even a corrupted disposition could result in spiritual progress. 
For Paphnutius, the soul was capable of spiritual progress without divine assistance. 
Origen and Athanasius presented spiritual assistance in terms of divine intervention 
after observing the steps that the soul was undertaking without divine assistance. 
Paphnutius was following this line of reasoning: the soul could achieve spiritual 
progress in her own terms without divine assistance. However, this was only at initial 
stages in the spiritual life. 144 
According to Paphnutius, it was the human disposition that caused divine 
abandonment: God was abandoning the soul in order to correct her disposition. For 
Paphnutius, abandonment was not a sort of punishment: it was correction: "God 
abandons them for their own good". 145 Thus, Paphnutius introduced the connection 
between divine pedagogy and divine abandonment in his discourse. 146 The notion of 
pedagogy was still highlighting the divine providence: there was a divine plan behind 
ethical misfortunes that was leading to the soul's ethical instruction. 
The form tyKaraActfllt) was not favoured in the written tradition of the 
Apophthegmata Patrum and desert Fathers such as Macarius. In fact, the term 
142 Origen, Prine. 3 .1.4 and more importantly 3 .1.12. Didymos exploited this Origenist position in 
light of the distinction between passio and propassio. Though Didymos placed human consent at the 
centre of his argument, he failed to show the exact "moment" that the individual was held responsible 
for an action with regard to human consent. 
143 Theodoret of Cyrrhus noticed that God could have intervened to prevent ethical corruption. 
However, even though he detested sin, he permitted it due to human free agency. According to 
Theodoret, God was not violating human free agency. Thus, Theodoret underlined human 
responsibility with regard to sin in light of divine consent. See Theodoret, Qucestiones in 
Deuteronomium, 37 [PG 80, 440A]. Idem, lnterpretatio in Ezechielis Prophetiam, 21.17 [PG 81, 
10138]. 
144 Even though for the early ascetics spiritual progress was achieved only through divine assistance, 
they did not deny the fact that the soul was capable of taking initial spiritual terms in her own terms. 
However, this position was clearly distinguished from spiritual perfection. 
145 Palladius, Laus. 47.6: "Owu 1tpoc; to 0\lj.lq>tpov aut&v l;yKataA.tj.t1tUVOVtoc; autouc;". 
146 Cf. Didymos, In Psalmos 29-34,200.17 [Ps 33:17 in PTA 8]. 
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tyKaniAEitpl~ appeared only occasionally in the Apophthegmata Patrum. 147 There is no 
witness for the use of "apaxwpfJO'I~ in the same genre. 148 The main motifs were that of 
auyxwpfJO'I~ and tyKaTfiAcltpl~. The term auvxwpfJO'I~ -and its alternative form of 
"apaxwpfJO'I~ in Macari us- emphasised the notion of divine providence, as opposed to 
the event of abandonment as such. Clearly, both terms tyKarirAEIIIJI~-auyxwpfJO'I~ 
pointed to the divine consent that was behind ethical trials. Though the term 
auyxwpfJO'I~ was in use in terms of forgiveness -either from God or men- in the desert 
tradition, several times it addressed divine consent -so Nemesius of Emesa. 149 The 
two terms became indistinguishable as was the case in Paphnutius' discourse. For 
Evagrius, -in a passage cited earlier- the two terms were in close connection: "God 
is not the cause of evils, being the fount of goodness, but it is said that he gives [this] 
by consenting according to the argument of abandonment". 150 Divine abandonment 
was a spiritual experience taking place within the context of divine pedagogy. The 
experience indicated that God was not the creator of evil: God was leaving the soul 
to experience abandonment because of a cause that originated within the soul. 
147 E.g. Apophth. (AnC), 20: "Kat E'yvro b ytprov ott i:yKatliA.Wjlt~ tou 6wu i:ytvsto autcp. Kat 
pi.\jla~ i:autov EVOl1tlOV tOU 6sou JlStd oaKpurov, i:Msto 1tSpt tfJ~ "(EVOJlEVTJ~ i:yKataA.si.\jiSOO~" ((the 
elder knew that that happened because of divine abandonment. And throwing himself in front of God 
with tears, he was supplicating about the occurring abandonment). Apophth. (SysC), 7.50: 
"[l:;]yKattA.mt JlE b Sso~ Kat ouK E1tEOKE\jlat6 1.1~>" (God abandoned me and he has not visited me). 
148 For Lampe, the earliest use in Patristic literature of "apaxwpflat~ in an ethical context was that of 
Macarius the Great and Diadochus of Photice. Indeed, according to the Patristic Greek Lexicon, there 
is no indication that the verb had acquired the meaning of divine consent before Macarius. Whereas 
Lampe cited only Macarius' witness, he did not include the various forms of the verb "apaxwptw-W in 
the same author. Hausherr cited only the witness ofDiadochus. I. Hausherr, Les Versions syriaque et 
armenienne d'Evagre le Pontique: Leur valeur, leur relation, leur utilisation, Orientalia Christiana 69 
(Rome: Pontificum Institutum Orientalium Sutdiorum, 1931 ), 111. However, before Diadochus, 
Theodoret of Cyrrhus had linked the verb "apaxwptw-W to auvxwptw-W. Theodoret pinpointed human 
misfortunes due to divine assertion by employing the verb "apaxwptw-W. Thus, Theodoret had clearly 
given to the verb the meaning of "giving assertion" in something. Cf. Theodoret, Qua~stiones in 
Deuteronomium, 37 [PG 80, 440A]. Idem, Psalm, PG 80, 1716C [Ps 104:25]. Idem, lnterpretatio in 
Ezechielis Prophetiam, 21.17 [PG 81, 10 13B]. It seems that it is not clear if Theodoret first employed 
the verb in a Christological context or in an ethical frame. Cf. Cyril, De Sancta Trinitate, 606.15. 
Theodoret, De lncarnatione Domini, PG 79, 1457. 
149 The desert tradition used the term in a variety of meanings. On some occasions, it appeared as 
synonymous to forgiveness: "aunroplJa6v JlOl, u~~a. tJJlliptTJKa" (forgive me abba, I have sinned). In 
others, it meant "to give consent", i.e. to give way for something to happen: "aunropTJaov autov, 
u~~a. iva et..an Kat ion as" (forgive me abba, so I could come and see you). See Liddell and Scott 
(eds.), Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon). Also, G. W. H. Lampe (ed.), A Patristic Greek 
Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961 ). 
150 Evagrius, Eccl. 4 [Ec 1:13 in sc 376]: "ou yap EOtlV aitto~ KaK&v, 1tTJ'Yll uya6roauVTJ~ U1tlipx;rov, 
1tAllV si llll AE"(Stat otMvat (o~ aunrop&v Katd tOV til~ i:yKataAsi.\jiSO)~ A.6yov". 
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Despite the fact that Paphnutius highlighted divine providence as the main 
cause of abandonment, he provided a paragraph discussing the "causes" (a'ir1a) of 
divine abandonment. As mentioned earlier, Paphnutius intended to illustrate the role 
of the human individual in light of the experience of abandonment as divine 
pedagogy (providence). The ascetic did not provide a clear number of causes. 
Instead, he provided five biblical images that, according to Paphnutius, had all 
undergone abandonment. 151 The Egyptian elder drew the following connections: 
Causes of divine abandonment 
Virtue ~Sin 
(Job) 152 (Paul) 153 /I~ 
(Paralytic)154 (Judas) 155 (Esau) 156 
Paphnutius introduced three different causes of abandonment which he did not 
connect to "kinds" of abandonment. 157 Abandonment was taking place: i) to illustrate 
hidden virtue; ii) to prevente pride; and iii) due to sin. In the latter case, Paphnutius 
included three different cases (Paralytic, Judas, and Esau). However, if we take into 
account the initial discussion of Paphnutius that distinguished between events that 
resulted in: i) divine glorification and ii) ethical peril, then we could include the case 
of Job and Paul into one group and place the three remaining biblical figures in a 
second group. As far as I am aware, Origen did not distinguish between the 
experience of Paul and Job. For Origen, pride was the cause of Paul's trials; and 
hidden virtue was the cause of Job's tribulations. However, in the existing evidence, 
Origen maintained a unified position about the two cases unifying their experience 
within the scope of divine paideia. It seems that Origen did not distinguish between 
the two biblical figures since he discussed the motif of their trials in terms of divine 
151 Burton-Christie commented on the use of scriptural images by ascetics to demonstrate asceticism 
as the application of the scriptural word in praxis. D. Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert: 
Scripture and the Quest for Holiness in Early Christian Monasticism (Oxford: OUP, 1993). 
152 Job 40:8. 
153 2 Cor 12:7. 
154 Jn 5:14. 
155 Mt 27:5. 
156 Gn 25:29. 
157 Guillaumont discerned only two causes: i) for the manifestation of hidden virtue; and ii) for 
avoidingpride. Evagrius, Gnost. 28 [pg 137 in SC 356]. 
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testing. Taking this latter point into consideration, Paphnutius' scheme could be 
refined as follows: 
Divil\asure Divine consent 
Job Paul 
Paralytic Judas Esau 
The first time in Patristic literature that biblical images (Job-Paul-blind man158) were 
identified in terms of "causes" of abandonment was in Nemesius. The distinction 
between causes that lead to divine glorification or destruction originated in 
Origen. 159 Arguing in terms of free-agency, Origen's intention was to show that God 
was testing his devotee: it was the human disposition that was tested and was leading 
to virtue or destruction. 160 Paphnutius seems to have combined Nemesius' biblical 
images and the Origenist discourse on free agency. What distinguished between the 
two Paphnutian groups was the presence of sin. In the case of Job and Paul, God 
illustrated the hidden virtue and prevented the presence of sin (i.e. pride) 
respectively. The presence of sin was limited to the second group: sin had caused 
their abandonment by God. Paphnutius highlighted the presence of sin by 
introducing three different biblical examples. Whereas the first group experienced 
divine pedagogy, the second group was subjected to divine correction. 161 Paphnutius 
did not copy Nemesius' biblical exemplars verbatim. His selection of biblical images 
corresponded with the lives of the three fallen monks: Valens and Eucarpius 
resembled the paralytic; they were "redeemed" (am9Epcmwcrav) from sin. 162 Heron's 
158 Cf. Jn 9:1. 
159 Origen, Prine. 3.1.12. 
160 For Origen, divine providence did not overlap with human free agency. The one motif did not limit 
the other. According to Origen, God provided for everyone equally. But the human individual 
responded according to his/her individual disposition. 
161 The inclusion of Judas introduced the possibility of perdition. 
162 Palladius, Laus. 25.5. Driscoll reluctantly supported the authenticity of the stories. Driscoll, 
'Paphnutius', 263. Palladius' reference to medical terms such as "il1te9epam:uoav", "olrn.ta" (similar 
sound and form with "olorn.ta"), and "taj.lata" supports the stylistic dependence of Palladius on 
Evagrius. It was Evagrius that had treated divine abandonment in medical terms: "J..lnA.A.ov M tl'tv 
ouoiatOV yaypatVUV b tatpos; t&V \j!UX&V ot' EYKUtUAEL\j!Eros; 9EpU1tEUEt" (this difficult-to-heal 
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life was reminiscent of Esau; he lived an ambiguous life between corruption and 
repentance. 163 Finally, Stephen remained unrepentant like Judas; 164 he was caught up 
in a burning house together with his concubine. 165 Nemesius had included the case of 
the blind-man of the Gospel, but Paphnutius introduced the exemplar of the paralytic. 
Significantly, in the Gospel narratives, Christ exhorted the paralytic to sin no more. 
In the case of the blind-man, Christ indicated that the blindness of that individual was 
not caused by sin. 
The position of distinguishing between causes according to the presence --or 
not-- of sin was advocated by Diadochus of Photice. The bishop of Photice included 
a brief discussion about the causes of divine abandonment in his century of 
Kephalaia Gnostica. 166 Diadochus looked at the reason that humanity was subject to 
demonic afflictions even after the coming of divine grace. It is not clear which was 
Diadochus' source. Diadochus' discussion shared common themes with the 
Paphnutian discourse. However, if we take into account the suggested connection 
between Diadochus and Macari us, 167 then it is more likely that Diadochus actually 
worked on an established motif that he might have known through the work of 
Macarius. Indeed, Macarius presented a reduction on Paphnutius' original discourse 
in his Spiritual Homilies. 168 Diadochus paraphrased his Macarian witness, 
maintaining its basic meaning. 
To put Diadochus' work and ascetical thought within context, according to des 
Places' examination of the historical background, the Gnostic Century of the bishop 
of Old Epirus was an anti-Messalian polemic. Though he did not deny the anti-
Messalian character of the work, 169 Plested argued that Diadochus presented a 
gangrene, the physician of souls heals it through abandonment). Cf. Evagrius, Cogitat. 10 [PG 79, 
1212]. For the life of Eucarpius see Draguet, His to ire Lausiaque, 73. 
163 Palladius, Laus. 26. 
164 Cf. Origen, Commentarium Series in Evangelium Mattheum, 312 [pg 245fT in GCS 38.2]. 
165 Draguet, Histoire Lausiaque, 72. For both Stephen and Judas death was the result of their ethical 
corruption 
166 Diadoque de Photice, CEuvres Spirituel/es, Ed. des Places (ed.), SC 5 (1955). 
167 Plested indicated DOrr's and Places' position that Diadochus was an exponent ofEvagrian thought. 
He indicated that DOrries and Desprez progressively acknowledged the importance of Macarius' 
influence on Diadochus. For Plested, Diadochus was more indebted to the Macarian legacy than it had 
been thought in the past. See M. Plested, 'Diadocus of Photice', in Macarian Legacy, 134. See also 
the introduction of Places in Diadoque de Photice, Oeuvres Spirituel/es. F. DOrr, Diadochus von 
Photike und die Messa/ianer: Ein Kampf zwischen Wahrer und Falscher mystik im Fiinften 
Jahrhundert, Freiburger Theologische Studien, 47 (MUnch: Herder & Co, 1937). R DOrries, Wort und 
Stunde, vol. 1 (Gottingen: 1966). V. Desprez and M. Canevet, 'Pseudo-Macaire (Symeon)', DSp 10, 
20-42. 
168 Macarius, Serm. 54. 
169 Diadoque de Photice, CEuvres Spirituel/es, 12fT. 
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synthesis of Evagrian and Macarian elements. In fact, for Plested, Diadochus 
introduced an ascetical theory within the theological framework of "reformed 
Messalianism" of the Macarian corpus. 170 Diadochus was critical of his sources, i.e. 
Macarius and Evagrius. Macarius had maintained a potential co-existence of grace 
and sin. Diadochus introduced the theme of divine withdrawal (rrapaxwP'lOic;) -a 
term peculiar to Macarian thought- to highlight the efficacy of baptism, and also 
affirm the observed ethical corruption of ascetics (realism). 171 For Diadochus, there 
were two "kinds" -Diadochus did not designate them as such- of divine withdrawal 
(rrapaxlilP'lO'Ic;) that resulted in ethical trials: 172 
Kinds (?) of divine withdrawal 
Pedagogy Aversion 
For Diadochus, God was withdrawing his presence from the soul: i) to test the soul 
(rrme5EUTIK~); ii) due to aversion (cmoOTpo<p~). 173 At a first glance, Diadochus did not 
address "causes" of divine abandonment. His vocabulary was not that of the 
Paphnutian discourse. Yet, Diadochus maintained the original distinction between 
events without adopting Paphnutius' language verbatim. 174 Notwithstanding 
Diadochus' twofold distinction of"kinds" of withdrawal, that he chose the Macarian 
napaxcbpYJmc; over the Paphnutian iyKaraAEupt~ indicates that Diadochus was 
emphasising the notion of divine providence in his discourse. 
170 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 134 and 256. 
171 Plested, 'Diadochus ofPhotice', in Macarian Legacy. 134fT. 
172 The line between "kinds" and "causes" was obscure in the ascetical literature of late antiquity. 
Though Diadochus seemed to introduce two different "kinds" of abandonment, with distinct ethical 
characters, within context, Diadochus was actually discussing "causes" that have resulted in the 
diminishing of the divine presence in the soul and the presence of the demonic powers: the one 
"cause" focused on the divine action, whereas the other highlighted human accountability. 
173 Diadochus, Keph. 86-87 [references according to chapters]. See Diadoque de Photice, CEuvres 
Spiritue//es, 46-48. M. J. Buckley 'Discernement of Spirits', in M. Downey (ed.), The New Dictionary 
of Catholic Spirituality (Collegeville MN: Liturgical, 1993), 274-281. Ed. des Places, 'Diadoque de 
Photice', in DSp 3, 829. G. Bardy, 'Discernement des esprits', in DSp 3, 1253. 
174 John Damascene followed Diadochus' edition of Paphnutius' discourse. As it was the case with 
Paphnutius and Maximus, John Damascene included a discussion concerning the causes of divine 
abandonment and a discussion concerning the distinction of ethical events. In this latter discussion, he 
has freely adapted Diadochus ofPhotice. See Damascene, ExpF. 43 [pp 100-102]. Evagrius, Gnost, 28 
[pg 137 in SC 356]. Cf. Diadochus, Keph. 69 and 87. 
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Hausherr indicated that Diadochus' vocabulary was alternating between the 
motifs of TTapaxwpflCl'l~ and tyKaraAtJtpl~ According to Hausherr, the two terms were 
synonymous in Diadochus' thought. 175 However, Hausherr did not notice the 
Macarian origins of this position.176 Indeed, whereas Paphnutius was distinguishing 
ethical events according to divine pleasure and consent, Macarius substituted the 
latter term with withdrawal (rrapaxwpl']m~). a term peculiar to Macarius. The term 
defined ethical events that were occurring due to divine consent. Diadochus followed 
this Macarian edition of ethical distinction of events. Nevertheless, Diadochus 
remained critical of his source. In the Macarian corpus, rrapaxwpi']OI~ was always 
connected to testing (5oKIIJaoia) or paideia. 177 EyKaraAEitpl~ connoted divine aversion 
due to sin. Thus, Macarius distinguished between the two terms with respect to the 
presence of sin: the former term emphasised the role of God (pedagogy), whereas the 
latter motif highlighted the human ethical responsibility. God withdrew from his 
devotee, but abandoned the sinner. However, in Macarius, this distinction never took 
a dramatic form. 
Macarius was working in an anti-Messalian ambience arguing the presence of 
sin within the soul in terms of human free-will. For Macarius, there was a natural 
incompatibility between grace and sin -already underlined in Pauline theology and 
clarified in Origen-. Thus, for Macarius, the distinction between divine withdrawal 
and abandonment introduced the distinction between divine pedagogy and divine 
chastisement: that is to say that, Macarius was responding to the objection that grace 
seemed to be insufficient to keep the demonic powers away from the soul. Macarius 
intended to show that this is so for two reasons: on the one hand, God instructed the 
soul at an ethical level; on the other hand, the human individual remained responsible 
for ethical corruption. Thus, Macarius wanted to show the importance of ethical 
vigilance: in any case, God was abandoning his devotee. However, Macarius 
distinguished between divine pedagogy and human accountability. Thus, rather than 
two different "kinds" or "causes" of abandonment, the Macarian discourse 
175 Hausherr, Les Versions, Ill. Cf. Diadochus, Keph. 69 and 87. 
176 According to Hausherr, Diadochus treated the two terms as synonymous: withdrawal was 
emphasising the notion of divine assertion and the theme of gnosis that resulted from spiritual 
experience (mipa). However, Hausherr overlooked the Macarian origin of the term. Hausherr, Les 
Versions, Ill. Hausherr drew parallel lines between Diadochus' thought and Evagrian theology, 
overlooking the Macarian influence on Diadochus. 
177 Usually both terms were included in a sentence that illustrates purpose (iva ... ). 
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pinpointed divine intervention (rrapaxwpi')OI~) and human ethical accountability 
( tyKma.A.EilJ.ll~). 178 Diadochus exploited this elegant ethical distinction. Yet, by placing 
both conditions under the same term, i.e. withdrawal, Diadochus exemplified that 
both cases were actually parts of the divine pedagogy. Thus, Diadochus reinforced 
Paphnutius' argument concerning ethical events as part of divine providence. 179 
As it was mentioned, according to the Paphnutian distinction, the ethical events 
that were according to divine pleasure led to divine glorification, and those events 
according to divine consent resulted in ethical peril (tKmWTIKa). Diadochus 
substituted the term tKmwrJKti with a"omporprj (aversion) which was favoured in the 
Macarian corpus as highlighting human accountability. 180 It was noticed that the term 
had originated in the Old Testament -God's turning away his face- and was treated 
as synonymous to divine abandonment. Didymos had indicated that divine aversion 
was part of the divine pedagogy: the soul that had remained sinful experienced divine 
aversion in order to correct her ethical corruption. 181 For Didymos, the soul was 
178 Evagrius, Prov. 120 [Pr 10:18 in SC 340]. Athanasius followed the Origenist position concerning 
the pre-lapsarian condition of humanity in contemplation of the divine. For Athanasius, such 
contemplation was undisturbed and nothing external could be mingled with it. However, the fall 
resulted in the estrangement of the soul from her own nature. As Anatolios noticed, "the soul's turning 
from God is simultaneously an estrangement from itself, a going 'outside itself which is the opposite 
ofthe ecstatic vision of God". Anatolios, Athanasius, 188. 
179 In placing human free agency at the centre of his ethical theory, Diadochus denied that divine 
abandonment had left the soul completely separated from God. See Diadochus, 86. The grammatical 
subject of the verb "to hand into" was obscured by Diadochus intentionally. Diadochus restrained 
from making God the obvious subject of his sentence. It was the sentence -"KaT' cnroUTpcxp~v 
rrapaxli.!Pllal~"- that was the actual subject. This fact reflects Diadochus' argument that it was human 
free agency that had abandoned God in the first place: "'IJUXri 1.1~ 9tAouoa EXEIV T6v 9£6v" (the soul that 
does not want to have God). The negative participle 1.1~ 9tAouoa pointed out the soul's free agency 
(auT£~oum6TllTO) as the factor that decided about her ethical condition. 
18° Cf. Origen, Fragmenta in Psa/mos, 76.1 :" 'Eyro Kiiv 1tpootx.n JlOl b 0EO<;, otd 'tTJV ev EJ.10t 
dvotav obK alo61ivoJ.1at ott npootox.~> JlOt b 0~>6<;: b 0€ l\ort lhal3~>13rtKffi<; Kai npoK6ntrov, obK 
0.vato6rttd til<; tou 0wu npooox,il<;, f) til<; anootpocpil<;: oto vov JlEV A.tyEt on npootox,E J.10t. 
'Ettpro6t OE iva 'tt 'tO 1tp6oron6v oou anootpECjiEt<; an' EJlOU; Mv 1tO'tE alo6rto6E a1tEO'tpaJ.1J.1EVOU 
abtou, f) otd 1tEtpaoJ.1ou, i1 bnroool')notE tou ewu" (Me, even if God is attentive to me, due to the 
foolishness that is in me, I cannot feel that God is attentive to me: for he that has advanced and 
progressed is not insensitive about the divine attention, or about his aversion: so that now he says he is 
attentive to me. In another place: why do you tum your face from me? You might feel that he is turned 
away, either through temptation or anything [sent] of God). Didymos, In Psalmos 20-21, 20.6 [Ps 20:8 
in PTA 7] and 49.7 [Ps 21:25 in PTA 7]. It is more likely that Diadochus found this term in Macarius. 
In the latter, the motif appeared in the context of divine aversion due to sin. Evagrius did not use the 
term within this present context. Macarius, Serm. 16.4.6. 
181 Didymos, In Psalmos 29-34, 200.17 [Ps 33:17 in PTA 8]: "to anootp€'Jiat to np6oronov obK ano 
t&v 1tOlOUV't(OV td KaKd A.tyEt, O.A.A.d t&v ex.6vtrov abto cpatV6J.1EVOV. bA.i'yov OE tapax6tvtE<; 
&oo~av &~ro 'tOU npooO:mou 'YtVE06at: oto Kat etapax.6rtoav. alo6rtotV ~A.aj3ov Ott bnilpKtai 'tt 
abtot<; artotc;. ytyovEv ot fJ anootpocpl'J tou npooO:mou roo~> npoc; to otE'YEtpat l>Kdvouc; touc; 
7tp6tEpov abto bp&vta<; Kat JlTJ il1tEOtpaJ.1J.1€VOV ex.ovta<;, iva tuxrootv abtou. E1tt toU<; 1tOlOUVta<; 
M KaKd obo' autrt fJ aitia, a.n· 1v' alo6rt6&otv on npovoi~ 6wo KatEotKao6rtoav, npovoi~ 6wu 
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corrected, but not punished by God. She was tested in order to conceive her ethical 
corruption. Thus, for Diadochus, both pedagogy and aversion were parts of divine 
pedagogy: through them, the soul was approaching God: 
We should approach God by knowing the experience of both withdrawals according 
to the proper manner of each condition. 182 
Edouard des Places provided an alternative translation: 
It is that we know the experience of both conditions to approach God (pour aller a 
Dieu) with the disposition that fits each ofthese. 183 
Whereas Places' edition emphasises the need to acquire experience of divine 
withdrawal, it is more likely that Diadochus focused on the actual result of the 
experience. For Diadochus, both experiences led to God even though they had 
different features and intensities. 184 
Thus, Paphnutius, Macarius and Diadochus did not actually distinguish 
between various "kinds" of abandonment. Their intention was to show the ethical 
role of sin. Whereas divine pedagogy took the form of testing in the case of Job and 
Paul, the presence of sin turned the reader's attention to human ethical responsibility: 
divine pedagogy corrected and redeemed human ethical corruption. 
According to the bishop of Old Epirus, either because of sin or due to divine 
pedagogy, the soul was subject to divine withdrawal. What underpinned his 
l>v to'ic; i:tvtapo'ic; El.otv. l}ai yivEtai 'YE Kai wino btl t€A.Et X.Prtotcp" (he has said that [God] turns 
away his face not from those that do evil, but from them that have it as an accident. For they are 
shaken for a while and think that they are away from his face. They have conceived that there was 
something disgusting in them. In this case, he turned away his face to stir up those that were 
previously looking at him without him being turned away [from them], so that they could have him. 
But, it is not the same cause for those that they do evil; but so that they could feel that they were 
condemned to distress due to divine providence. Utterly, this becomes a benefit). Cf. Origen, Prine. 
3.1.12. 
182 Diadochus, Keph. 87: "I>Ei ouv ~IJac; tiMTOc; r~v rrtipav rwv OIJ<portpwv rrapaxwp~crtwv Kara rov tK6crr11c; 
rp6rrov rrpomtv01 rill 9t4J". 
183 
"II faut done que nous connaissions !'experience des deux desolations pour aller a Dieu avec les 
dispositions qui conviennent a chacune d'elles". French translation in Diadoque de Photice, CEuvres 
Spirituel/es, 147. 
184 We need to remind the Greek text: "I>Ei ouv ~IJac; EIMrac; r~v rrEipav rwv OIJ<portpwv rrapaxw~crtwv Kara 
r6v EKOOTllc; rp6rrov rrpomtva1 r4J 9t4J". Places translation left the infinitive rrpomtv01 without syntactical 
dependence while the participle tiMrac; was a predicate to &i. I think that it is the infinitive rrpomtva1 
that depends on the verb I>Ei. Thus, the participle EiMrac; has become a predicate of the infinitive 
showing the manner in which something takes place. For Places, the soul needed to have knowledge 
ofboth the experiences to approach God ('pour aller aDieu'). 
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discourse was the notion of gnosis that was the outcome of divine pedagogy. 185 Thus, 
Diadochus narrowed the ethical role of sin indicating that, overall, ascetical life was 
subject to divine pedagogy. Diadochus employed the moderate Macarian 
Messalianism critically, but he also maintained distinct Evagrian elements by means 
of the connection between the motion from praktike to gnosis. For Diadochus, 
spiritual life included the knowledge (gnosis) of both the divine and the demonic. 
According to Diadochus, this was the only way for soul to exercise her natural free 
agency. The term gnosis had been witnessed by both Evagrius and Macarius who 
linked it to the multifaceted motif concerning spiritual experience (mlpa). 186 
Diadochus shed more light on the theme by arguing that the experience of 
withdrawal resulted in the soul's gnosis of the true nature of the divine and sin. 187 
The motif of gnosis as the ultimate purpose of divine pedagogy was not peculiar to 
Diadochus, but characterised an era that witnessed the conflict between and also the 
mingling of Gnostic and Christian ideas. However, according to Danielou, behind 
Diadochus' argument was the notion of divine pedagogy as leading the soul to 
redemption. 188 Diadochus related divine gnosis to both the divine and the demonic. In 
doing this, Diadochus was following Evagrius' argument. However, Diadochus 
employed gnosis in an ethical context that denied an exclusively intellectual 
conception of union with God. He avoided extreme intellectualism by exploiting the 
Evagrian position that true gnosis of sin directed the soul to hatred of sin: "Those 
combating should pursue to hate all the irrational desires, so that they shall have 
185 Diadochus, Keph. 69: "cpumaiJoO Kai tyKmaAEilj.IEW~ To IJtaov nEipa" (experience is the middle of 
illumination and abandonment). Evagrius, Gnost. 28: "TTEipa 15t Tfi~ tyKaraAEilj.IEW~ fyyov~" (experience is 
the progeny of abandonment). See also Hausherr, Les Versions, Ill. 
186 Evagrius, Ad Eulogium, 23 [PG 79, 1124-1125]. Evagrius, Gnost. 28. Evagrius related the ethical 
experience to the gnostic life. Macarius, Serm. 2.10.4 [all references in TLG]. Plested, Macarian 
Legacy, 155. 
187 Diadochus, Keph. 6 and 77. The asceticalliterature did not treat the knowledge of good and evil as 
such. More emphasis was given to the discernment of the works of good and evil, which it was 
designated as the "discernment of the spirits". However, for Diadochus, only the Gnostikos had 
discerned between the works of good and evil. See Diadoche de Photice, auvres Spirituelles, 42ff. 
Also Places, 'Diadoque', 829. Buckley, 'Discernement', 274-281. Bardy, 'Discernement', 1247-1254. 
It also needs to be noticed that Evagrius and Diadochus shared with each other the terms gnosis and 
Gnostikos -both terms had been employed by Clement: Lilla, Clement of Alexandria,ll8-226-. 
Though Macarius had witnessed the former, he never referred to the latter term. The fact that 
Diadochus composed a spiritual century on the life of gnostike with direct reference to both terms was 
a direct witness to his Evagrian dependence. 
188 Already Clement and Origen had drawn the theological lines to connect the life of gnostike to 
divine pedagogy. See Danielou, Origen, 278. 
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hatred against them as their habit". 189 This hatred was not an intellectual 
achievement. It resulted from the soul's experience of both the divine grace and the 
bitterness of sin. For Diadochus, the soul was undergoing alternating periods of 
divine presence and withdrawal as a sort of comparison between the sweetness of 
grace and the bitterness of sin. 190 
Paphnutius put the lives of the ascetics into perspective by indicating that their 
ethical backsliding was caused by sin. For Paphnutius, this sin was understood in 
terms of pride. As made clear, Origen and Antony underlined the presence of pride 
as a spiritual foe. For Antony, the soul remained subject to pride which he illustrated 
as part of the human nature. Indeed, the literature of early desert Christianity was 
permeated with the notion of pride as the mother of sins. Paphnutius clarified that it 
was pride hiding behind the ethical backsliding of the three monks. Hence, according 
to Driscoll, Paphnutius introduced the connection between virtue, pride and ethical 
backsliding. In Evagrian ethical theory, pride was the subtlest of passions that sprang 
from virtue. Indeed, Evagrius, listed pride at the top of his list of vices. Pride was the 
last passion threatening the soul's spiritual progress. But, unlike any other vice, pride 
resulted from this progress. In her ethical journey, the soul was puffed up and thus 
fell back to the life of vice. Paphnutius indicated that Paul avoided being puffed up 
through experiencing ethical trials. Palladius' Lausiac History was meant to be read 
as an ascetical discourse. The introduction of Paphnutius' discourse exhorted to 
spiritual vigilance and warned against ethical laxity. Indeed, Paphnutius' discourse 
189 Diadochus, Keph. 43 and 71: "noaa~ IJtV TO~ aMyouc; tm8U1Jiac; OUTW 15Ei IJEAETOv IJIOEiV roue; 
c]ywv1~o1Jtvouc;, warE Eic; f~1v r6 rrp6c; alirac; IJIO~ KTI'Joao8al". Cf. Evagrius, Cogitat. 10 [PG 70, 1212]: 
"nO.vu to f.ltCJo~ to Katd t&v 8atf.16vrov flf.ltY npo~ arotT]piaY aullJ}IiA.A.~:tat, Kai npo~ n)v l;pyaaiaY 
"t~~ apl:t~ !;anY l:nm'tliEtoY: aA.A.d "tOU"tO EK"tpEq>l:tY EY l:autoi~. WCJ1t€p n 'YEYYT]Ila aya90Y OUK 
iax6of.1€Y, troY q>tA.T]06YroY 1tYEulllitroY 8taq>9Etp6vtroY abto, Kai np6~ q>tA.iaY, Kai auYi]6EtaY nO.A.tY 
"tl)Y IJfUXTtV EKKaAOUilEYffiY: and ta6tT]Y tl)Y q>tA.iav. llnAAOY liE tl'IY SuaiatOY yaypatYaY b iatpo~ 
troY 1Jfux&Y ot' l:yKataA.diJfcro~ 6cpanE6Et: aunrop€1 yap n q>oJ}Ep6Y na6€1Y ttf.la~ l.m' abt&Y 
Y6Ktrop i1 f.l€6' fl!lEpaY, Kat naA.tY 11 1Jfuxl't npo~ to apxstunoY f.ltoo~ enaYatpsx~>t StSaaKo!lEYTJ 
npo~ toY K6ptoY AtyEtv, Katd toY ~aPiB, to, "TsA.EtoY 1-1iao~ l:f.liaouY abwu~. Ei~ l:x6pou~ 
l:ysYOYt6 f.lOl." Outo~ ydp "tEAI:toY lllOO~ f.llOEl "tOU~ EX6pou~. b lli)"t€ Kat' l;vtpy~:taY, f.ltl"t€ Katd 
8t6.YotaY illlapt<i.YroY: 01t€p "t~~ 1tpiDtT]~. Kat "t~~ f.l€'YiCJ"tT]~ ECJ"ttY U1ta6Eia~ "t€Kili)ptoY" (hatred 
against the demons helps us to salvation, and it is proper for working on the virtues; but to breed it 
inside us as a good progeny is not possible, for the pleasure-loving spirits corrupt it, and they call the 
soul back to friendship and an [evil] habit. But this sort of friendship, to put it better, this difficult-to-
heal gangrene, the physician of souls heals through abandonment; he gives consent to suffer 
something terrible by them [demons] during the night or day, and again the soul runs back to the 
original hatred instructed to say to the Lord, according to David: 'I have hated them with perfect 
hatred, they were counted my enemies'. This is the way that the person that sins neither in deeds nor 
in thoughts hates the enemies with perfect hatred; this is the proof of the first and greatest apatheia). 
Cf. Ps 138: 22. 
190 Diadochus, Keph. 6 and 86 and also 30 and 76. 
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introduced the motif of human frailty by indicating the presence of pride within the 
ascetical soul. Paphnutius exaggerated the presence of sin in order to warn his fellow 
ascetics. In an even more dramatic manner, Macarius was diminishing the efficacy of 
divine grace in his sincere eagerness to awaken spiritual vigilance among his fellow 
ascetics. Paphnutius' discourse was shaped within an ascetical milieu where the 
shifting from the efficacy of divine grace (e.g. Vita Antonii) to the predominance of 
human frailty (Macarian corpus) was at work. 
In his work, Maximus the Confessor also addressed the notion of divine 
abandonment. In general terms, Maximus maintained the basic structure of 
Paphnutius' scheme. However, it seems more probable that Maximus had two 
sources: Nemesius and Evagrius. Maximus introduced his own modifications in 
shaping his ethical theory. 191 Maximus addressed the "kinds" (e'i011) of abandonment 
thus: 
Kinds of divine abandonment 
Oikonomical (salvation) Testing (virtue) 
(Christ) (Job-Joseph) 
~ 
Pedagogical (pride) 
(Paul) 
Aversive (sin) 
(Jews) 
Maximus discussed divine abandonment in terms of economy (Christ), testing (Job), 
pedagogy (Paul) and aversion (Jews). Overall, Maximus followed the distinction 
between divine pedagogy and divine aversion. However, Maximus seems to have 
followed the Evagrian and Diadochean shifting point from causes to kinds of 
abandonment. 192 Whereas, Paphnutius examined the "causes" of abandonment, 
Evagrius and Diadochus indicated the "kinds" of divine abandonment. However, at 
least in Diadochus' case, the difference seems to be only in terms of vocabulary since 
Diadochus was actually following the Paphnutian position of highlighting divine 
pedagogy as corresponding to individual needs. This position was not made clear in 
the apophthegmatic form of Evagrius' Gnostikos. Indeed, Maximus retained the 
notion of divine providence as his focusing point. Despite the fact that Maximus 
distinguished between different "kinds" of abandonment, in his closing lines, he gave 
up the implicit distinction between pedagogy and aversion indicating that all the 
191 Maximus, Charit. 4.96 [PG 90, 1072]. 
192 Cf. Evagrius, Gnost. 28. Diadochus, Keph. 86-87. 
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various forms of divine abandonment were filled with divine wisdom and led to 
salvation. 193 
That Maximus favoured the term abandonment over withdrawal advocates the 
position that Maximus was working on Nemesius/Paphnutius and Evagrius, not 
Macarius or Diadochus. 194 Maximus borrowed the main structure from Nemesius, 
especially in terms of the connection between divine abandonment and biblical 
exemplars. In Evagrius, he found the idea of enumerating the "kinds" of divine 
abandonment. Nevertheless, Maximus modified the Nemesian/Paphnutian and 
Evagrian teaching according to his needs. It seems that, from the obscure Nemesian 
discourse concerning providence, Maximus drew the motif of abandonment in the 
light of divine providence. The enumeration of "kinds" of abandonment was of 
Evagrian origin. However, Evagrius had introduced five "kinds", whereas Maximus 
reckoned only four "kinds". 
That Maximus was working on Nemesius rather than Paphnutius is evident 
from the inclusion of Christ's abandonment on the cross. Nemesius was the first 
author of late antiquity to include Christ's abandonment among other "kinds" of 
divine abandonment. 195 In doing so, Nemesius intended to show that the incarnation 
was part of divine providence: through the incarnation, God brought salvation to 
humanity: the incarnation was another expression of divine providence. Nemesius' 
objective was not to argue the similarity or dissimilarity between Christ's 
abandonment on the cross and the abandonment of his devotee. That is to say that 
Nemesius did not introduce a parallel experience between Christ and the faithful 
soul. Nemesius did not understand abandonment as a Christ-like experience. Once 
more, we need to observe that Nemesius only showed Christ's abandonment as part 
of divine providence which illustrated that, through all distinct experiences, God was 
redeeming humanity. It cannot be supported that Nemesius introduced a parallel 
discussion between Christ and the faithful soul: the second part of the thesis 
illustrated the obscurity that surrounded the term "abandonment" when it was applied 
193 Maxim us, Charit. 4.96 [PG 90, I 072]: "~rotiynm 6E ot 1tdVte~ tp67tot lmapxouat Kat til~ Oda~ 
llya96tT)tO~ Kat aoq>ia~ llv<ijleatot". 
194 For the Macarian influence on Maximus see Plested, 'Maximus the Confessor', in Macarian 
Legacy, 213-254. According to Plested, Maximus knew the work of Macarius and was working on 
Macarian themes either directly from him or through the ascetical medium of Mark the Monk and 
Diadochus of Photice. 
195 When Nemesius referred to "kinds", his intention was to show the various ways in which divine 
providence was working in human affairs without necessarily introducing ·distinct forms of 
experiences. 
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to Christ's case. To argue the parallel introduction of Christ and the soul in Nemesius 
as evidence of the Christ-like character of the ascetical abandonment implies that 
Nemesius had a clear definition of the nature and the mechanism of abandonment in 
Christ. But this was not the case. 
What linked Maximus' discourse to Nemesius was the presence of the 
participle "8mco\JoT]<;" (seeming) as a predicate of Christ's abandonment. As far as I 
am aware, such a combination was not common in late antiquity. Didymos was the 
only exception. 196 And even in his case, Didymos did not provide a clear definition 
of what abandonment meant. For him, the main point was that those who were truly 
condemned were the by-standers that mocked Christ. 197 I could not think of another 
possible source for Maximus with respect to the inclusion of oikonomical 
abandonment in his list that was predicated as "seeming". Nemesius, and partially 
Didymos, are the only sources. 198 Didymos was the only author to distinguish 
between the "seeming" abandonment of Christ and the "aversive" abandonment of 
the Jews. However, it was Nemesius that offered a sort of list of various biblical 
figures with regard to divine abandonment. 199 
However, one could locate an obscure introduction of Christ's abandonment in 
Evagrius' Gnostikos. Such an interpretation depends completely on differing 
translations from the Syriac text; a fact that has casted doubts on the reliability of the 
Syriac text and the actual reading of the original Greek text. 200 Evagrius referred to 
the "causes" -or "kinds" according to Frankenberg- of divine abandonment without 
enumerating them in his Gnostikos.201 Here, we will present the Greek retro-version 
196Didymos, In Psalmos 20-21, 25.14-18 [Ps 21 :2 in PTA 7]: " eDnei toivuv etD~ ataupo\n e)lh/luqen o( swth/r, 
dokeiD lie\ tOlD~ aDvOplimo~ eDvjKUtclAelljll~ El v a t to\ UDitOitEOElDV tOloUtD OavtltD ... EDVKat!Wlilp91j OU v 
eDKetDv~ oD M16~. Kai eDautouD eDVKarUJA£tljltV A.tyet, eDnei KetpaA.'l\ lJ v auDtooDv" (for the Saviour has come 
to the cross, it seems to men that it is abandonment to be subjected to such death ... these people have 
been abandoned. And it says that it is his own abandonment because he was their head). 
197 It seems that, for Didymos, the Jews represented corrupted humanity. 
198 Nemesius concluded that "f:yKataA.&i.1tEtai ttc; 1tpoc; Katpov Eic; ot6p9mmv aA.A.ou, iva to Kat' 
abtov (JK01tOUVtES o\ aA.A.Ol 1tatoE6mvtat". Cf. Origen, Fragmenta in Psa/mos 1-150, 36:25: 
"tyKarW.tllToVTal oi liiKa1o1 1rp6c; Kmp6v OOKIIJii~ xap1v". 
199 There is no evidence in Morani's edition of the De Natura Hominis that Nemesius was familiar 
with Didymos' work. 
200 See D. A. Ousley, Evagrius' Theology of Prayer and the Spiritual Life (PhD Thesis: University of 
Chicago, 1979), 31. Ousley observed that the works surviving only in Syriac need to be treated with 
caution since it is more likely that they reflect both Evagrian teaching and also the Syriac ambience in 
which they they were translated. 
201 Driscoll presented an excellent analysis of the present chapter from Gnostikos, examining it within 
the context of the Evagrian ascetical tradition. He indicated its place within the Evagrian thought and 
also the broader genre of desert literature. Driscoll, 'Evagrius and Paphnutius on the Causes of 
Abandonment'. 
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from the surviving Syriac provided by Frankenberg and the French translation of the 
Syriac by Guillaumont. In both cases, it is the punctuation that alters the meaning of 
the sentences. Despite the fact that many chapters of the Gnostikos have survived in 
the original Greek, the chapter that discussed divine abandonment has been 
transmitted only in Syriac. Frankenberg's retro-version was an attempt to restore the 
Greek original of the Gnostikos. 
Mvru.16vtuE To rrtVTE Tfl<; OOKIIJOaiac; Ei~ll. iva txnc; 6p8wa01 muc; 6i\1yoljluxouc; Kai muc; i\urrn 
tKJ.uoi.Jtvouc;. ri ~t Kpumr; apur; ~1a ~OKIIJOaiac; arroKai\UmETOI Kai r; OIJEAOUI.JtVIl ~1a KOTa~iKil<; 
IJETOVtPXETOI KOi yiyvETOI OITiO <wfl<; TOi<; 0M01<;· KOi Ei r'J rrpaKTIKr'J IJETO Tij<; yYWOEW<; OUVUTTOPXEI, 
TOU<; OlJTr'JV KEKTili.JEVOU<; ~IMOKEI TOTTEIVO<ppooUVIlV. IJIOEi yap Tr'JV KOKiOV 6 OUTr'J<; rrEipav i\af3li.Jv, 
ri ~ mipa EKyovoc; tan OOKIIJOOiac;, ri ~t OOKIIJOaia, 9uy6TI1P Tij<; 6rra9Eiac;.202 
Guillaumont's French translation of the Syriac is as follows: 
Souviens toi des cinq causes de Ia dereliction, 203 pour que tu puisses relever les 
pusillanimes abattus par )'affliction. En effet Ia dereliction revele Ia vertu qui est 
cachee. Quand celle-ci a ete negligee, elle Ia retablit par le chiitiment. Et elle devient 
cause de salut pour d'autres. Et quand Ia vertu est devenue preeminente, elle 
enseigne l'humilite a ceux qui l'ont en partage. En effet, il hait le mal, celui qui a 
fait )'experience; or !'experience est un rejeton de Ia dereliction, et cette dereliction 
est fille de l'impassibilite. 204 
Driscoll observed that the surviving Syriac and its translations are obscure: "it is not 
easy to know for sure exactly where in the text to place the numbers that divide what 
he is speaking about".205 For Driscoll, even though Evagrius referred to "five 
causes/kinds", it is not clear which ones he had in mind. Things become further 
confusing if we take into account Hausherr's translation from the Syriac, in his 
remarkable work on the Syriac and Armenian manuscript tradition of the Gnostikos. 
202 The text of Frankenberg was cited by Hausherr in idem, Les Versions, 110. 
203 Frankenberg maintained the notion of testing (~oKIIJOaia). Though the term was witnessed in the 
manuscript tradition, Guillaumont advocated the presence of abandonment in the text, primarily in 
terms of its remarkable witness by both the Syriac and also Greek manuscript tradition of the text. See 
Evagrius, Le Gnostique, 135-136. In fact, in order to support his position, Guillaumont included 
Maximus' use of the word abandonment in the Capita de Caritatae. Thus, he implied Maximus' 
direct dependence on the Evagrian text. So did Hausherr in Idem, Les Versions, 110-111. They both 
overlooked Maximus direct dependence on Nemesius. 
204 Evagrius, Gnost. 28: "Remember the five causes of abandonment so that you can raise up again the 
weak souls brought down by this affliction. In fact, abandonment reveals hidden virtue. When virtue 
has been neglected, it re-establishes it through chastisement. And it becomes the cause of salvation for 
others. When virtue has reached a high degree, it teaches humility to those who have shared in it. 
Indeed, the one who has had an experience of evil, hates it; for, experience is a flower of 
abandonment, and such abandonment is the child of passionlessness" [trans. Driscoll]. See Driscoll, 
'Paphnutius', 277. 
205 Driscoll followed the translation and punctuation of Guillaumont. See Driscoll, 'Paphnutius', 277. 
His statement would have made more sense if he had in mind the text of Frankenberg and Hausherr. 
Guillaumont was consistent about his punctuation. In his extensive footnote --in the Evagrius, Le 
Gnostique, 28-- Guillaumont, whom Driscoll followed, clearly pointed out the five kinds of 
abandonment. 
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But first, we need to note that, according to Frankenberg's retro-version, for 
Evagrius, divine abandonment resulted in ethical chastisement and communicated a 
certain quality to others. This quality was the "cause for life" ( airia ~w~c:;) according 
to Frankenberg. But, Hausherr and Guillaumont translated it as "cause de salut" 
(cause of salvation). At this point, for reasons of convenience, we could accept that 
cause of life and cause of salvation are practically synonymous. Frankenberg and 
Hausherr --on the one hand--, and Guillaumont --on the other hand-- disagreed about 
the syntactical dependence of the sentence "cause of salvation": for them, the phrase 
depended on the sentence concerning ethical chastisement. For Guillaumont, it was 
an independent sentence. Frankenberg and Hausherr intoduced one period including 
the motifs of chastisement and salvation: "Kai ~ OIJEAOUIJEVI"J ~16 Kara~iKI"Jc:; IJETaVEPXETal 
Kai yiyvETal airia ~w~c:; mlc:; aMo1c:;" (Frankenberg);206 "Ia [ vertu] bralante est restaun!e 
grace a la condanmation [qui l'atteint], et devient cause de salut pour les autres" 
(Hausherr).207 Guillaumont separated the two sentences: "quand celle-ci a ete 
negligee, elle Ia retablit par le cha.timent. Et elle devient cause de salut pour 
d'autres". If we follow Guillaumont's punctuation/08 then according to him, Evagrius 
included the following "causes" of divine abandonment: 
hidden virtue chastisement salvation humility hatred of sin 
Any attempt to examine Frankenberg's translation whilst maintaining his 
original punctuation209 is bound to fail. His text is even more impenetrable than 
Driscoll maintained about Guillaumont' s translation. His punctuation is quite 
uncertain. Hausherr spotted Frankenberg's weakness in the last sentences that 
referred to the acquisition of "rrETpa", and the following connection between divine 
206 In Hausherr, Les Versions, 110. 
207 Hausherr, ibid, 113. Hausherr used semicolons to distinguish between the five causes. Thus, the 
comma between the two sentences showed their inter-dependence. 
208 Guillaumont used five full-stops in order to indicate the length of the sentences and thus point out 
the five causes of divine abandonment. See also footnote no. 28 in Evagrius, Le Gnostique, 135ff. 
209 Frankenberg used all sorts of punctuation that have obscured the meaning of the text. It is also 
probable that the Syriac text was following the obscurity of the Greek original that lacked punctuation, 
or it was transmitted with confusing punctuation. Hausherr and Guillaumont introduced further 
sources to shed more light on the passage, such as Diadochus and Maximus. Their punctuation was 
dictated by their interpretation of what other sources might have revealed the true meaning of the 
Gnostikos. 
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abandonment and impassibility. For Frankenberg, the sentence concernmg the 
"salvation of others" was part of divine chastisement. It seems that Guillaumont took 
the sentence referring to divine impassibility as predicating the sentence addressing 
the connection between divine abandonment and "rrtipa". However, Hausherr 
separated the two sentences: 
[c]elui-la bait le mal qui en a fait !'experience, or !'experience est un fruit de Ia 
dereliction; et <il y a meme> une dereliction <qui> est fille de l'apatheia. 
It needs to be noticed that, the three scholars devised their punctuation in order to 
maintain the number "five" that Evagrius introduced in his opening lines. What could 
be extracted from Hausherr's examination on chapter 28 of the Gnostikos is the 
following scheme: 
hidden virtue chastisement humility hatred of sin apatheia 
In his effort to discern the five causes --maintaining Evagrius' initial reckoning--
while clarifying the distinction between hatred of sin and apatheia, Hausherr 
abolished the notion of divine abandonment as an individual cause of the salvation of 
others.210 As it was mentioned, for this scholar, the sentence was part of the notion of 
divine chastisement. The reason why Hausherr came up with the above scheme 
depended entirely on his attempt to discern behind the Evagrian text the Origenist 
distinction of spiritual life into three stages: praktike, physike and theologia. 211 
Indeed, Hausherr anticipated his methodology by indicating that Maximus designated 
the four causes of abandonment as "salutary" (owT~p1o1).212 Noticing the lack of any 
reference to apatheia from Maximus' side, Hausherr suggested that Maximus 
excluded the notion of abandonment as resulting in apatheia for the reason that it 
was not a true salutary cause. According to Hausherr, Maximus approached the 
210 Driscoll did not comment on this fact. Due to the fact that he examined the Evagrian position only 
with respect to Paphnutius' teaching, he only focused on the notion of divine abandonment as 
chastisement and testing. Though, in fact, Driscoll addressed all the causes of divine abandonment -
including apatheia- of the Gnostikos, he left out the concept of abandonment as the "cause of 
salvation for others". See Driscoll, 'Paphnutius'. 
211 For a brief examination of the three stages of the spiritual life see Louth, Origins, 102ff. 
212 Maxim us, Char it. 4.96 [PG 90, I 072]. 
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notion of apatheia, in this instance, as an echo of the Origenist notion of the 
eschatological restoration of beings (arroKaracrram~).213 However, Hausherr has 
overestimated Maxim us' dependence on Evagrius at this instance. Maxim us did not 
use the term apatheia which he did not find in Nemesius/Paphnutius discussion of 
divine abandonment. 
Nevertheless, it is worth following Hausherr's thought. According to him, the 
two first causes (chastisement-virtue) were related to the initial steps of spiritual life 
that established virtue within the soul. The next two causes (humility-hatred) were 
connected to the fight of the monks against pride at a more mature spiritual stage. 
The last cause, i.e. "the fruit of apatheia", was related to knowledge. Hausherr 
referred to Maximus to clarify the last point. According to Hausherr, Maximus had 
related the last cause of abandonment to knowledge of both the human "weakness" 
(acr8tvt1a) and the "divine power" (C5uva1 .. 11~). 214 Hausherr attempted to present 
Evagrian thought as a coherent system: the threefold distinction of the spiritual life 
was a motif that was permeating the Evagrian ascetical corpus.215 Even though his 
discussion on the subject seems to justify his interpretation, we could not ignore that 
Evagrius was not consistent in his use of the term apatheia. Apatheia in the 
Gnostikos might have implied the final apokatastasis of humanity in terms of 
perfection. However, in the De Oratione, the third part of chapter 37 addressed 
apatheia in terms of the soul's ethical struggle against temptations. Thus, Evagrius 
did not always connect apatheia to the eschatological restoration of humanity. The 
term had both i) an ethical and ii) an eschatological meaning. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that only Guillaumont's translation 
supports the position that Evagrius actually discerned the theme of "salvation of 
others" as a "cause" of divine abandonment. In his extensive footnote in the edition 
213 Hausherr, Les Versions, 111-112. 
214 Cf. Evagrius, De Octo, 18 [PG 79, 1164]: "Mtya av6pomoc; ~oT]606J..u:voc; napd E>wu: 
€yKatEA.Eiq>6TJ, Kai to ilo6Ev€c; t7ttyvro ti)c; q>uoeroc;. Obo€v EXEtc;, o J..lll napd E>wu eA.a~Ec;" (a man 
was greatly helped by God; he was abandoned and conceived the weakness of nature). Maxim us, 
Charit. 2.67 [PG 90, 1005]. Though Hausherr pointed out Maximus' dependence on Evagrius, he 
overlooked the fact that Maximus could have found the theme of gnosis as resulting from divine 
withdrawal in Diadochus of Photice. See Louth, 'The Sources of Maximus' Theology', in Maximus 
the Confessor, 25ff. 
215 According to Hausherr, in the Ad Monachos, Evagrius introduced the motif of abandonment in the 
light of the three stages of the spiritual life. Driscoll followed Hausherr and brought into play the De 
Oratione as a potential cross-reference for Hausherr's position. Evagrius, AdMon. 62 . Idem, Orat. 37 
[PG 79, 1176]. See Hausherr, Les Le9ons, 55. J. Driscoll, The 'Ad Monachos' of Evagrius Ponticus: 
Its Structure and a Select Commentary, Studia Anselmiana I 04 (Rome: Pontificio Ateneo S. 
Anselmo, 1991), 234. 
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of Le Gnostique, Guillaumont provided some further insights:216 what attracted 
Guillaumont's attention were John Damascene's Expositio Fidei, and the fragments 
in Nicetas' exegetical catena on Matthew that were attributed to John.217 Alongside 
divine aversion and pedagogy, John added the experience of abandonment "npoc; 
ot6peromv d.A.A.ou" relating the example of Lazarus,218 the blind-man and, the 
martyrs. 219 But, in his Expositio Fidei, John included a final introduction: "So that, 
from the action that seems to be absurd, a great and wonderful thing might be 
achieved, as, through the cross the salvation of the mankind."220 Noticeably, John 
maintained the images of Lazarus, the blind-man and the martyrs. Thus, in his 
Expositio Fidei John added the case of Christ. However, John was copying verbatim 
from Nemesius, leaving outside whatever he thought as superfluous. It is not 
accidental that John included his discussion on abandonment within the scope of 
divine providence, like Nemesius. Thus, even in John's case, there was no reference 
to real "kinds" of abandonment in terms of enumerating them. Though John had also 
followed Diadochus' distinction between two "kinds" of divine abandonment, he 
only did that in order to show the various ways that divine providence was 
following. 221 
Maximus included another scheme, in his Capita de Caritatre, that underlined 
his clear dependence on Evagrius this time. It is significant that, in this instance, 
Maximus dismissed any allusion to biblical images. He overlooked the motif of the 
"salvation of others". Maximus also maintained the number "five" that had been 
introduced by Evagrius' Gnostikos. However, Maximus did not address the causes or 
kinds of abandonment (tyKaraAE14J1<;). He referred to divine withdrawal 
(napaxwpi'JOI<;), and introduced the causes that resulted m demonic attacks. 222 
Maximus shared all his points with Evagrius, but one. 
216 Evagrius, Le Gnostique, 137. In any case, it was not Guillaumont's intention to argue Maximus' 
source. Driscoll avoided discussing the only concept that Guillaumont did not examine any further in 
the Gnostikos. Driscoll, 'Paphnutius'. 
217 Damascene, Fragmenta in Matthaeum (in catena Nicetae), PG 96, 1412. 
218 Lk 16:19-31. 
219 Jn 9:3. 
220 Damascene, ExpF. 43 [pg 101]: "[(]va otd tll<; 7tpd~Ero<; tll<; OOKOUOT]<; ilt67tOU j.!Eya tt Kat 
9aUjlaOtOV Ka't0p9ro9fl ffi<; Otd 'tOU ataupou tt'IV arotT]plav t&v ilv9pronrov". 
221 Damascene, ExpF. 43 [pg 101]: ''Tll<; M l:yKataA.Ehj!Ero<; datv cloT] ouo: eatt ydp l:yKatdA.Et\j/t<; 
OtKOVOjltKt'l Kat 1tatOEUttKt'l Kat EO'ttV l;yKatUAEt\j/t<; tEA.da ilnoyvroattKT]/'' (there are twO kinds of 
abandonment; there is "oikonomical" and educational abandonment, and there is abandonment of total 
despair). 
222 Maxim us, Char it. 2.67 [PG 90, I 005]. 
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discernment (virtue-sin) human weakness 
acquisition of virtue atred of sin 
According to Hausherr's examination of the Gnostikos, the Maximian scheme 
depended entirely on Evagrius.223 However, Maximus did not "copy-paste" from his 
source uncritically. He edited his own linguistic applications. What is striking is the 
absence of the motif concerning the "cause of salvation of others". Either Maximus 
did not discern this motif within the Evagrian text, or he deliberately removed it from 
his own scheme. In this scheme, Maximus introduced the presence of demonic 
afflictions. Thus, according to the latter hypothesis, he eliminated the case of 
"salvation of others". It seems that Maximus treated the motif in close connection to 
Christ's abandonment on the cross. Thus, he preferred to leave the motif outside, 
counting it unfitting to include it in a chapter that related withdrawal to demonic 
afflictions. 
Maximus treated the Nemesian and Evagrian texts as unsystematic sources that 
had introduced the motif of divine abandonment. He used the N emesian and 
Evagrian components according to his own needs. As it was mentioned, Maximus 
could not have discerned the notion of providence in Evagrius' Gnostikos. It was 
only in Nemesius that Maximus found this theme. Indeed, in his second scheme that 
depended on Evagrius, Maximus addressed the causes of demonic afflictions without 
highlighting the theme of divine providence. Maximus might have discerned the 
motif of the "salvation of others" in Evagrius. However, it is certain that he found it 
in Nemesius. There is no evidence that Nemesius was acquainted with Evagrius' 
thought. It seems that the introduction of Christ's abandonment belongs entirely to 
the theological genius of Nemesius. If Guillaumont got his translation right, then 
Evagrius had obscurely deliberated on this theme, observing that the abandonment of 
one person could be the cause of salvation. 224 
223 Hausherr, Les Versions, Ill. Evagrius, Le Gnostique, 136. 
224 John Damascene used Nemesius' scheme. The introduction of the distinction between TT(]t~urtKr) 
and emoyvwar!Kfj t'VKaniAEttpt(;"indicates that he was also aware of the Diadochean ethical thought: divine 
aversion led to despair. Kotter did not refer to Diadochus' work in the critical apparatus of the 
Expositio Fidei. 
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As has been noticed, another point of departure that Maximus introduced to the 
Nemesian!Paphnutian teaching was the inclusion of the Jews.225 Paphnutius 
emphasised the presence of sin and its results for the spiritual life. Nemesius had 
overlooked this factor. Maximus stressed the notion of divine pedagogy. Thus, he 
limited any references to the presence of sin as a potential cause of divine 
abandonment. However, he did include the notion of divine aversion in the biblical 
figure of the Jews. It seems that Maximus was well aware of both the Nemesian and 
the Paphnutian discourse. However, it was in the latter that Maximus discerned the 
notion of divine aversion in terms of divine pedagogy. Paphnutius included a triple 
allusion to sin including the biblical images of Judas, Esau and the paralytic. 
Maximus limited the presence of sin as a spiritual factor by employing three 
examples of divine pedagogy instead (Paul, Job and Joseph). The notion of divine 
aversion was limited to the image of the Jews. The inclusion of the term aversion 
(Km' arroarpocp~v) suggests that Maximus was familiar with the Diadochean 
introduction of this motif in the ascetical literature. We need to exclude a potential 
Macarian dependance since the connection between aversion and pedagogy in 
Macarius was very obscure. Maximus had intended to introduce the image of the 
Jews in terms of their biblical depiction: they were abandoned by God in the desert, 
wandering and fighting against many nations. Thus, Maximus implied the presence 
of sin. After the exegetical work of Origen, especially on the book of Numbers the 
wandering Jews were linked to the spiritual journey of the soul that was advancing 
through trials and temptations. In this sense, this biblical image was not similar to the 
Paphnutian inclusion of Judas. Maximus smoothed the motif of divine aversion by 
saturating his discourse with the theme of divine pedagogy. The Jews were tested in 
the desert as they were led by God to the Promised Land. Unlike Paphnutius that 
duplicated the images related to sin, Maximus extended the notion of divine 
pedagogy. 
ii. Perfection and sin. 
When looking at the Apophthegmata Patrum, it is evident that the genre 
introduced images that addressed the state of spiritual perfection: at this stage, 
225 Maximus, Charit. 4.96 [PG 90, 1072]. 
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Macarius was an interlocutor with demons,226 while obedient monks raised the 
dead. 227 In fact, at this stage, all sorts of miraculous incidents occurred, whilst monks 
transformed their "black-skinned" self into an angelic countenance.228 Clearly, these 
were the works of ascetical perfection. It was observed that, Athanasius presented 
Antony as enjoying the fruits of perfection in this present life. There is no doubt that 
the influential work of Athanasius was part of a broader tradition founded on a 
Christocentric model of ascetical life that highlighted the value of the incarnation. It 
is in this context that, for Amma Sarah, victory over passions was established on 
Christ's defeat of the passions in his flesh. 229 According to the life of Abba Pachon,230 
he was redeemed from the spirit of fornication only through Christ's intervention. 
This spirit had afflicted him for more than 12 years. However, his passion subdued 
only through the intervention of Christ who "was crucified for us". 231 These last 
words communicated the message that spiritual perfection resulted from Christ's 
victory over passions in the incarnation.232 The fleeing demons of the Apophthegmata 
echo Antony's victory over them in the Vita Antonii: the demons were not dreaded 
by the monks any more. In fact, it was the demons that were mocked by the Christian 
ascetics. 233 Above all, victory over demons was the work of humility. 234 The monk 
that had achieved humility was liberated from the passions. He was feared by the 
demons who did not dare to approach him. Hence, behind the works of perfection, 
the desert ascetics had discerned the works of humility. To borrow from Keller, 
humility was making "Christ tangible": the acquisition of humility linked the monks 
226 Apophth. (AC), Macarius.3; Theodore ofFerme, 27. 
227 Apophth. (AnC), 294. See Benedicta Ward, 'A Sense of Wonder: Miracles of the Desert', inN. 
Russell (ed.), The Lives of the Desert Fathers: The Historia Monachorum in JEgypto (London: 
Mowbray, 1980), 39-46. 
228 Apophth. (AC), Paul the Simple. I. For an examination ofthe notion ofblackness of skin as part of 
the ascetical anthropology and demonology see Brakke, 'Ethiopian Demons: the Monastic Self and 
the Diabolical Order', in Demons and the Monk, 157-181. 
229 Apophth. (AC), Sarah, 2. Ramfos pointed out the dimensional relation between creation and the 
incarnation. According to Ramfos, creation is the outcome of divine freedom; miracles need to be 
viewed in terms of this freedom that remains unbound to the need for a scientific explanation. The 
incarnation is the ultimate extension of the working of divine freedom within creation. What links 
creation and the incarnation, in fact, is the manifestation of divine love as an extension of freedom. S. 
Ramfos, 'Wonders and Visions', in Like a Pelican in the Wilderness: Reflections on the Sayings of the 
Desert Fathers, trans. N. Russell (Brookline MA: Holy Cross, 2000), 237ff. 
230 Apophth. (SysC), 5.54. 
231 Cf. Apophth. (AC), Elias.7; Moses.1; 18. Apophth. (SysC) 5.52. 
232 Burton-Christie, The Word, 245. The author discerned the work of humility behind the closing 
lines which he believes that they were a short comment from Abba Elias. 
233 Apophth. (AC), Theodore ofFerme, 27. 
234 Apophth. (AC), Anthony, 7; Theodora, 6: "[x]al. £A.qov ott obof:v fJJ.Luc; vtx~. d JlTt 
tamnvo<ppoo6vrl" (and [the demons] said: nothing defeats us, only the humility). The same story also 
in ibid, Macarius, 11. Apophth. (AnC), 307. 
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to Christ. It was Christ's humility that was featured in the ascetic deeds through their 
humility. 235 Humility was the beginning and the end of virtue236 and, according to 
Amma Theodora, the only way to salvation.237 Abbas such as Ammonas, Arsenius or 
Poemen were depicted in terms of spiritual perfection. 238 Their humility was well 
attested and tested. 239 The Apophthegmata included short ethical exhortations that 
concluded: "do this and you will be saved".240 What this exhortation meant was that 
the elder instructing had followed the above exhortation and had been saved. 241 In 
Antony's case, an angel had instructed him to alternate between times of prayer and 
work to fight back acedia. According to the story, Antony accomplished what he had 
been instructed, and "doing thus he was saved".242 
But, this was only half the story. The "God-bearer" Antony had also grieved 
over the ethical fall of the "great pillar of the Church".243 Before the ethical fall of 
this ascetic who "had performed a miracle on the road", Antony had pointed to his 
spiritual progress. He had also expressed his scepticism about his spiritual future, as 
if anticipating his fall. His fear was realised within a few days. In this same tradition 
that highlighted the ascetic's ethical frailty belong sayings and stories of ascetics that 
dreaded the time of death. For instance, the judgement that followed death was a 
consideration that had been sojourning with Abba Arsenius until his last breath.244 It 
235 Apophth. (AC), Daniel, 3: " ·Eeoc; l:oti tfl um;pll<puviq. tou otu~6A.ou, 1ti1ttEtV a1to tft<; 
tU1tEtvrom:roc; tftc; l:vtoA.ftc; tou Xptotou" (this is how the pride of devil is brought low, through the 
humility ofthe commandment of Christ) [trans. Ward]; ibid, Arsenius, 33: "[o]tK l:tU1tEtvffi011ouv tou 
otopOffioaoOut !;autouc;. KUi 1tOpEUOftvut tfl tU1tEtvfl Mq, tOU Xptotou: OlO Kui fleVOUotV E~<O tftc; 
~aotA.Eiac; tou 9Eou=" (they do not humble themselves so as to correct themselves and walk in the 
humble way of Christ) [trans. Ward]. Apophth. (AnC), 373: "[E]XE n)v o<ppayioa tou Xptotou, tout' 
eott tt'lv tU1tEivrootv" (have the seal of Christ, that is the humility). See Burton-Christie, 'The 
Humble Way of Christ', in The Word, 236-260. Also, D. G. R. Keller, 'Humility: Making Christ 
Tangible', in Oasis of Wisdom: The World of the Desert Fathers and Mothers (Collegeville MI: 
Liturgical, 2005), 131-155. Also: Ramfos, 'Humility: Withdrawal from Being', in Pelican in the 
Wilderness, 183-195. 
236 In B. Ward (ed.), The Sayings of the Desert Fathers: The Alphabetical Collection (London: 
Mowbray, 1981), John ofthe Cells, 2 and Syncletica, 26. 
237 Apophth. (AC), John Colobos, 22. 
238 Ibid, Ammona, II; Arsenius, 30; Bessarion, 4; Joseph, 7; Poemen, 144; Silouan, 3. Ramfos, 
'Wonders and Visions', in Pelican in the Wilderness, 235ff. 
239 Ibid, Peter the Pionite 3; Poemen, 4; The Roman Abba, 2 [for Ward, undoubtedly, this Roman 
Abba is Abba Arsenius]. Apophthegmata Patrum, (AnCol), 43. Ramfos and Burton-Christie 
juxtaposed the works of humility to "false-humility" which, according to the desert fathers, was a 
demonic devise. See Burton-Christie, The Word, 241. Ramfos, Pelican in the Wilderness, 185. 
240 Apophth. (A C), Anthony, 3; Arsenius, I. Biare, 1; Joseph, 4; Macarius, 41. Apophth. (SysC) 1.1 and 
5.53. 
241 Apophthegmata Patrum, (A C), Agathon, 4; Cassian, 4; Silouan, 6. 
242 Ibid, Anthony, 1: "[K]ui out roc; 1t0t&v l;oro~EtO". 
243 Ibid, Anthony, 14. 
244 Ibid, Arsenius, 40. 
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is remarkable that an accomplished ascetic, such as Sisoes was, would ask for more 
time in order to repent.245 The notion of ethical backsliding was an integral part of the 
asceticalliterature of late antiquity. This warning anticipated a potential ethical fall 
in the life of the ascetics which puts under question the degree to which we need to 
understand perfection as a victory already won by the faithful soul. 
The desert literature introduced the theological tension of arguing the spiritual 
life in terms of perfection and also potential backsliding. Whereas the ascetics had 
presented ascetical life in terms of the victory over passions as resulting from the 
incarnation, they also illustrated this present life as conducted by spiritual trials. For 
Amma Theodora, the accomplished ascetics had defeated the demons. Nevertheless, 
she also indicated that, in fact, trials are featured at all stages of spiritual life until 
one's last breath: 
[L]et us strive to enter the narrow gate. Just us the trees, if they have not stood 
before the winters and the storms cannot bear fruit; so it is with us, this present age 
is a winter; and if we don't [strive] throu~h many trials and temptations, we cannot 
become heirs ofthe kingdom ofheaven.24 
This passage echoed the Origenist connection between winter and the future rewards 
in the Exhortatio ad Martyrium. 247 According to Amma Theodora, this present life 
featured the winter of trials. The distinction between the present life ("winter") and 
the life to come ("kingdom of heavens") gave to her exhortation an eschatological 
flavour: perfection was a condition yet to come. Another female ascetic, Amma 
Syncletica, employed the image of Paul to conclude that, even at the stage of 
spiritual perfection, demons waged war against the soul. 248 The "God-bearer" Antony 
had assured Abba Poemen that the latter needed to expect temptations until his last 
breath. He also pointed out the impossibility of entering the divine joy without 
ethical trials. For Antony, it was only within trials that God manifested his glory: 
"Whoever has not experienced temptations cannot enter into the kingdom of 
heavens. He said, (you) take away the temptations and no-one is saved"?49 
245 Ibid, Sisoes, 14. 
246 Ibid, Theodora, 2: ".A yroviaaa9s dasA.9Eiv otd tftc; CJtEvftc; 1tUATtc;. "Ov tp61tOV ydp td o€vopa, 
Mv l.ltl MProat :(Etl.l&vac; KUi UEtouc;, KUp7tocpopdv ou 0\Jvavtat: outroc; Kat 'fllltV, b a\rov outoc; 
:(Etl.lOOV ECJtt: KUl Edv l.ltl otd 1t0AAIDV 9A.hj1EffiV KUl 1tEtpUOI.liDV, oi:> OUVTtCJ61.1E9a tftc; PaatA.dac; t&v 
oi:>pav&v ysv€a9at KA11POV61.1ot" [trans. Ward]. 
247 Origen, Martyr. 31-32. 
248 Apophth. (AC), Syncletica, 7. 
249 Ibid (AC), Anthony, 4-5. The translation by Ward "without temptations no-one can be saved" 
expresses in a free style the meaning of Antony's words. The closing sentence was iterated verbatim 
by Evagrius according to the same alphabetical collection. Cf. Ibid, Evagrius, 5. 
182 
For the ascetics, spiritual progress was informed by the divine paideia: spiritual 
warfare was the ideal way to ethical ascension. Thus, perfection was a promise that 
remained unfulfilled in this life. The ascetics communicated this position through the 
introduction of ethical trials even at a mature spiritual stage. Unlike Athanasius' 
Antony who was victorious over the passions, for Amma Syncletica, spiritual 
progress and ethical life were coterminous factors: the higher the progress, the more 
intense the trial. At this point, it needs to be noticed, in advance, that the scheme (the 
higher ... the higher) was an integral ascetical theory of Macarius and Evagrius.250 
Spiritual progress was conceived in connection to the intensity of ethical trials. 
According to the Apophthegmata Patrum, Abba Pachon experienced pedagogical 
abandonment: "God has left me alone".251 What is of interest for us is the fact that 
Abba Pachon described his experience in terms of despair and even blasphemy. If we 
follow Diadochus' distinction between pedagogy and aversion, in strict terms, then it 
is evident that Pachon experienced abandonment due to his ethical corruption. For, in 
Diadochus, despair and blasphemy were part of divine withdrawal according to 
aversion. However, God revealed to Pachon that he was only tested: it was not sin 
that caused divine abandonment: Pachon did not suffer ethical corruption. According 
to this account, the experience of divine abandonment, even at a mature spiritual 
level, was a dreadful event. Only God's intervention held Pachon from despairing. 
The desert fathers presented the theological tension between perfection and 
spiritual struggles unsystematically. The two positions were not juxtaposed. They 
were integrated into an ascetical system that discerned the works of divine pedagogy 
at all levels of spiritual life. In fact, it is also the case that the ascetics identified 
divine presence with trials: "[A]n elder was afflicted and sick continuously. It 
happened that for a year he was not tried and was grieving and crying saying: God 
has abandoned me and has not visited me" ?52 The elder felt desolated due to the fact 
that divine pedagogy had abandoned him. It is not the case that the ascetic had 
reached ethical apatheia. The lack of trials was a sign of divine abandonment. The 
ascetic acknowledged the profit that divine pedagogy had for the spiritual life. It was 
noticed that Clement had envisaged spiritual life in terms of divine instruction. 
250 Evagrius, Prakt. 59. 
251 Apophth. (SysC), 5.54: "imtot'l j.lOU b Ss~". 
252 Apophth. (AnC), 2.209: "rtpmv tt~ f)v Kat ouvsx&<; i:KaKouto Kat f]o!ltvst. ~uvt~'l os abtov 
sva i;vtautov l.lt'tKaKm!lf]vat, Kat !;ouocp6pst OEtv&<; Kat SKA.at€, A.tymv: 'EyKattA.t1tE j.l€ b !lEO<; Kat 
obK i:1t€0KE\jfat6 j.l€". 
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Origen had emphasised the value of the "narrow gate". And, for the Christian 
ascetics, spiritual stillness was the deprivation of divine pedagogy: 
Abba Poemen said of Abba John the Dwarf that he had prayed God to take his 
passions away from him so that he might become free from care. He went and told 
an old man this: 'I find myself in peace, without an enemy', he said. The old man 
said to him, 'Go, beseech God to stir up warfare so that you may regain the 
afflictions and humility that you used to have, for it is by warfare that the soul makes 
progress'. So he besought God and when warfare came, he no longer prayed that it 
might be taken away, but said, 'Lord, give me strength for the fight'. 253 
Notwithstanding that Abba John had reached the ideal of ethical "tranquillity" 
(aiJEPIIJVia), an elder introduced the notion of spiritual warfare as a great ideal. The 
elder discerned the work of pride behind abba John's words. Thus, he instructed him 
to beseech divine pedagogy in order to be established to his previous humility. The 
elder implied a connection between ethical tranquillity and the presence of pride. 
The fact that Abba John needed to return to his previous humility highlighted 
the link between spiritual progress and ethical laxity (pride). To illustrate this 
connection, Abba Orsisius drew the analogy between the soul and a lit lamp:254 the 
Holy Spirit withdrew from the soul when negligence had taken over the soul; like a 
lamp without oil that was put out. At times that the soul was stripped of divine 
assistance (Holy Spirit), the demons attacked her like mice devouring the unlit wick, 
and breaking the vessel. The fire was protecting this vessel a few moments ago. Abba 
Orsisius' intention was to warn against spiritual laxity. According to him, the soul 
that was acquainted with divine presence was not ethically secured. As opposed to 
Athanasius' biography of Antony, the ascetic that Abba Orsisius had addressed 
remained subject to potential spiritual foes unless he remained ethically vigilant: the 
soul could "put off' divine presence because of her spiritual negligence. Such 
negligence sprang up within the human nature. And it resulted in demonic presence -
as opposed to resultingfrom demonic presence. 
For those that compiled the 'Systematic Collection' of the Apophthegmata 
Patrum, the "young monk" that caused Antony's grief was attacked by pride. For the 
253 Apophth. (AC), John the Dwarf, 13. "Elm;v b a~~u<; IlotJ..l1')V 1tcpl. tou a~~a 'lrolivvou tou 
lWAO~OU, Ott 1tapEKUAEOE tOV e~:ov, Kal. tiP9TJ td 1tU9T) il1t' abtou, Kal. yf':yOVEV UJ..lEPlJ..lVO<;. Kal. 
U1tcA.9rov, d1tt ttVt ytpovtt: 'Op& EJ..laUtOV ava1taU6j..lEVOV, Kal. J..lTJOEVa 1t6AEJ..lOV EXOvta. Kal. 
AE"/El abt('i> b ytprov: "Y1tayE, 1tapaKUAEOOV tOV e~:ov, motE tOV 1t6Acj..l6V OOt l;A.Odv, Kal. i'Jv 
ElXE<; 1tp6tEpoV OUVtpt~1')V Kat ta1tctV(J)OtV: otd ydp t&V 1tOAEj..l(J)V 1tpoK61ttEt i'J \j/UXt'J· 
IlapEKUAEOEV ouv, Kat l;A.06vto<; tOU 1tOAEJ..lOU, OUK Ett Ei\~ato ap9f]vat abtov a1t' abtou, an· 
EAE"fE: .Me; J.!Ot, KuptE, U1tOJ..lOVt)v l;v tot<; 1tOAEJ..lot<;" [trans. Ward]. Cf. Ibid, Poemen, 13. Ibid, 
Syncletica, 7. Apophth. (SysC) 7.29: "16 oru.JEiov TOO IJOvaxoO tv TOi~ TTEipaoiJoi~ cpaivETOI" (the hall-mark of 
the monk becomes manifest in temptations). 
254 Apophth. (AC), Orsisius.2. 
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desert fathers -whose positions Evagrius was expressing-- pride was the most subtle 
vice. Unlike every other sin, it sprang together with spiritual perfection, as a parasite 
of the virtue. According to Ramfos, pride was the sin when one believed that he/she 
had reached spiritual perfection. This is clearly the context within which Paphnutius 
had presented his discourse. The ascetics of the Lausiac History were affected by 
pride: they believed the demonic suggestion that they had reached perfection; they 
rejected the warnings coming from the ascetical community, and even thought that 
they were worthy to encounter Christ. Thus, for the desert literature, pride was the 
sin to count on oneself, dismissing the ascetical community and becoming isolated. 
Pride was an ethical temptation that originated within the ascetical self.255 For Keller, 
pride was "ingratitude" towards God.256 
According to Driscoll's examination of Paphnutius' discourse, Evagrius 
devised the motif of divine abandonment to show the interaction between praktike 
and the contemplative life.257 Hausherr anticipated Driscoll's observation by pointing 
out the bond between the experience of divine abandonment and the three stages of 
ascetical life: praktike, physike and theologia. For Hausherr, the experience was 
featured in all stages of spiritual life. 258 Such an argument has maintained that, for 
Evagrius, apatheia was not a static condition. The acquisition of the divine did not 
protect the soul from experiencing divine withdrawal. Despite the fact that 
O'Laughlin did not actually discuss the motif of divine abandonment in Evagrius, 
nevertheless, he pointed to the interaction between praktike and the contemplative 
life in Evagrius' system: "The feet of Christ are 1tpalcrtril and contemplation. If he 
puts his feet on all his enemies, then all will know 1tpa.Knril and contemplation". 259 
That the soul contemplated the divine mysteries did not mean that she was no longer 
subject to the former; nor was the praktike depriving the soul from glimpses of the 
divine splendour. 
255 Ramfos, 'Humility', in Pelican in the Wilderness, 183-195. Ramfos turned his attention to the fact 
that humility required ethical vigilance due to the fact that, in the desert, ethical perfection could 
create a reputation among the co-ascetics that, eventually, damaged ascetical humility. 
256 Keller, 'Humility', 137. 
257 Driscoll, 'Paphnutius', 274. 
258 Hausherr, Les Versions, 113. Cf. Evagrius, KephGn., 1.10. 
259 Cf. Evagrius, KephGn., 6.15 and 5.35: "if the bread of reasonable nature is the contemplation of 
beings, and if we have received the command to eat this 'in sweat of our face' ( Gn 3: 19), it is evident 
that it is through 7tpaKnK1) that we eat this". [trans. O'Laughlin, 137-138]. 
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Guillaumont examined the notion of apatheia in Clement and Evagrius. 260 Due 
to the stoic echoes that the term held, apatheia was viewed as a condition of 
emotional indifference, where the soul had put off every emotion and disposition. 
However, Guillaumont illustrated aptly that the Evagrian apatheia was not the Stoic 
-or Clementine in some respects- ethical and emotional indifference. Evagrius gave 
an ascetical content to the term. For him, it designated the stage where the soul 
remained subject to demonic attacks. At this stage, thoughts continued to pop up 
within the mind. Yet, the soul would not give her consent to the passions.261 As 
O'Laughlin aptly observed, Evagrius discussed the passing of the soul from praktike 
to the contemplative life. However, Evagrius was returning to "issues of 7tpaKnKi) 
which remain constant once the desired level of impassibility is reached. Temptation 
and opposition continue to affect even accomplished monks".262 Evagrius did not 
envisage the spiritual stages in a strict order of consecutive steps. He has rather 
outlined the interaction between the ethical and the contemplative life. It is true that, 
for him, in order for the soul to pass from ethical struggles to contemplation, she 
needed to master her passions and thoughts. Pride, according to Driscoll's comment, 
"[is] an especially subtle temptation because it bases itself on what is of genuine 
good in the monk's life".263 Evagrius listed pride and vainglory as the most subtle 
and supreme temptations that threatened the soul. 264 What is more important is the 
fact that pride was actually associated with apatheia.265 For Evagrius, the presence of 
pride was a sign of spiritual progress. It was the last temptation that the soul had to 
face. However, this temptation, unlike the others, originated from the virtues and 
interacted with them. Pride actually appeared after the acquisition of apatheia. 
260 Guillaumont, 'Le Gnostique chez Clement d' Alexandre et Evagre', in Etudes sur Ia spiritua/ite 
de I 'orient chretien, Spiritualite Orientale 66 (Begrolles-en-Mauges : Abbaye de Bellefontaine, 1996), 
151-160. CfGuillaumont's introduction in Evagrius, Traite practique ou le moine, vol. I, A. and C. 
Guillaumont (ed.), SC 170 (1971), 98. 
261 Evagrius, Prakt. 6 and 74-75. Cf. Ousley, Theology of Prayer, 174. 
262 M. W. O'Laughlin, Origenism in the Desert: Anthropology and Integration in Evagrius Ponticus 
(PhD Thesis: Harvard University, 1987), 241. 
263 Driscoll, Evagrius, 228. 
264 Evagrius, De Octo, 15-19 [PG 79, 1160-1165]. Evagrius, Prakt. 14. 
265 Evagrius, Orat., 37 [PG 79, 1176]: "First of all pray to be purified from your passions. Secondly, 
pray to be delivered from ignorance. Thirdly, pray to be freed from all temptation and abandonment" 
[trans. Bamberger]. Cf. Driscoll, Evagrius, 234-235 [Driscoll cites Evagrius, Orat., 38 (sic)]. 
Following Hausherr, Driscoll discerned the distinction between the three stages of spiritual life behind 
Evagrius words. The warfare against the passion belonged to the initial stage where the soul was 
struggling in the praktike. The second stage was fighting ignorance and led the soul to knowledge, 
thus signifYing the passage from praktike to the contemplative life. The third stage was fighting pride 
thus establishing the soul to undisrupted contemplation. lr. Hausherr, Les Le~ons d'un contemplatif: 
Le traite de l'oraison d'Evagre le Pontique (Paris: Beauchesne, 1960), 55. 
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In a chain of chapters in his Ad Monachos, Evagrius addressed the passing of 
the soul from praktike to the contemplative life. 266 He began by introducing the 
presence of apatheia in the soul and the acquisition of contemplation (gnosis). 267 Yet, 
"[w]hen the spirit begins to be free from all distractions as it makes its prayer then 
there commences an all-out battle day and night against the irascible part".268 At this 
point, the soul was attacked by prideful thought. Like the monks of the Lausiac 
History, the soul was presented with apparitions and dreams by the demons:269 
The demon of pride is the cause of the most damaging fall for the soul. For it 
induces the monk to deny that God is his helper and to consider that he himself is 
the cause of virtuous actions. Further, he gets a big head in regard to the brethren, 
considering them stupid because they do not all have the same opinion with him. 270 
Evagrius was warning against ethical backsliding. His lines are an abbreviation of 
Paphnutius' response to the reasons that led the monks of the Lausiac History to their 
ethical distruction: having achieved apatheia, the soul was afflicted by pride. She 
believed in her achievements, and thus forsook God's assistance. Evagrius concluded 
that pride resulted in divine abandonment. The latter motif was viewed in terms of 
God correcting the soul's corruption. Abandonment re-established the notion of 
human frailty within the ascetical soul: 
Do not give your heart to pride 
and do not say before the face of God 'Powerful am I'; 
lest the Lord abandon your soul 
and evil demons bring it low. 
For then the enemies will flutter around you through the air, 
and fearful nights will follow you.271 
According to Driscoll's examination of the Evagrian discourse in the Ad Monachos, 
the experience was meant to restore the soul's humility, and instruct her about her 
weakness. It turned the soul against sin. Yet, in Evagrius' ethical system, even after 
266 Evagrius, Prakt. 63-70. 
267 It began with the nous discerning its own light. 
268 Evagrius, Prakt. 63. 
269 According to Driscoll, Evagrius had clearly incorporated the stories of monks that he personally 
knew in his ethical theory. The monks had been deceived by apparitions, as it was the case in the 
Lausiac History. Thus, his theory was established on an ethical realism. Driscoll, 'Evagrius and 
Paphnutius', 279: "Experience with fallen monks is what probably gives him the details of his 
description". 
270 Evagrius, Prakt. 14. 
271 Evagrius, AdMon. 62: 
"Ml'( o(i><; U1t£pT)<paViQ. al'(v Kapoiav 
Kat Jlft ei1tnc; 7tp0 7tpoOc07tOU tou 6wu: ouvat6c; stJlt, 
iva Jlft K6ptoc; i::yKataA.l7tTI al'(v 'JIUXTJV, 
Kat 1tOVT)pOt oatJlOVEc; ta7tEtVcOOOI>atV alnt'Jv. 
t6tE yap OE ot' i.tEpoc; 7ttOTJOOI>atV oi EX6poi, 
VUKtEc; Of; <poPEpat otaot~ovtai aE" [trans. Driscoll]. Cf. Driscoll, Evagrius, 56. 
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this expenence, the soul was not firm in the condition of ethical apatheia. She 
remained subject to backsliding: 
The hate we have for the demons helps our salvation a great deal, and it favours the 
practice of virtue. Yet we are not strong enough to nourish it in ourselves like a good 
seed, for spirits that love pleasure destroy it and summon the soul back to its old 
love and habits. But, the doctor of souls cures this love, or rather this horrible 
gangrene, through abandonment. He permits that we suffer some terror caused by 
them, during the night and during the day, and so the soul comes again back to its 
original hate, having learning from David to say to the Lord, 'With perfect hatred I 
have hated them; they have become my enemies to me (Ps 138:22)'. For this is the 
one who hates his enemies with a perfect hate, the one who sins never in act nor in 
thought. Such is proof of the first and the greatest passionlessness. 272 
In his Gnostikos, Evagrius presented the case that divine abandonment resulted in 
hatred of sin and apatheia. In his On Evil Thoughts, he elaborated further by pointing 
to the pedagogical character of the experience. According to Hausherr, the motif of 
hatred of sin, the knowledge of one's weakness, and also ethical apatheia were terms 
intimately related to the experience of divine abandonment. When we take into 
consideration that all the above terms appeared in the context of spiritual maturity, it 
is evident that Evagrius highlighed the interaction between praktike and 
contemplative life. The presence of pride after the acquisition of apatheia from the 
soul distanced the Evagrian ethical theory from the Stoic notion of emotional 
indifference. In Evagrius, ethical apatheia and divine abandonment were interacting 
stages within the spiritual life.273 Abandonment resulted in apatheia, and it 
maintained apatheia within the soul.274 However, the soul continued to experience 
spiritual rest and ethical warfare. For Evagrius, the soul could not have reached 
perfection in this life. She only gained glimpses of the fulfillment yet to come. 
With the above observations we have intended to put the Evagrian notion of 
divine abandonment into its right eschatological perspective. The interplay between 
praktike and the contemplative life was another way for Evagrius to postpone the 
soul's ethical fulfillment. Indeed, the life of apatheia could not be identified with the 
notion of completion in Evagrius' work. To establish this position, we need to take 
into consideration his Great Letter and, most importantly, his Kephalaia Gnostica. 
Within the two works, Evagrius provided a fair understanding of what he envisaged 
272 Evagrius, Cogitat. 10. [trans. Driscoll in idem 'Paphnutius', 280] 
213 Evagrius, KephGn. l.lO: "Among the demons, some are opposed to the practice of the 
commandments, others are opposed to the intellections of nature, others are opposed to the words 
concerning God, because the knowledge of our health consists of these three things" [trans. Ousley, 
172ft]. . 
274 Driscoll, 'Paphnutius', 282-283. 
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as perfection. It is in the latter book, however, that Evagrius illustrated the interaction 
between praktike and contemplative life in vigorous terms. 275 In the former, Evagrius 
discussed the exact nature of Christian perfection. 
Regardless of the speculative character of the Kephalaia Gnostica, its history 
within the context of the Origenist controversy (61h-century)276 and the esoteric 
features of the Great Letter which have become a point of scholarly friction, 277 the 
fact remains that, in both works, Evagrius established the notion of perfection within 
an eschatological horizon. Evagrius was following Origen and Nicrea in showing 
deification as the work of the incarnation. However, according to Evagrius, the 
deification of the human nature remained unfulfilled due to the eschatological 
character of Christianity.278 As O'Laughlin observed, Evagrius conceived "unity" as 
the culmination of the spiritual life.Z79 Characteristically, Evagrius referred to the 
"unity of the minds" in the final restoration - a position that has ignited a long debate 
about his orthodoxy since late antiquity.280 In his Great Letter, Evagrius wrote ofthe 
motion of the "minds" (v6E~) like rivers that met the great sea (i.e. the Godhead).Z81 
In this "sea" all the "minds" were unified, abolishing every distinction in terms of 
numbers, names and forms. For O'Laughlin, this unification was understood as the 
eschatological restoration (i.e. fulfillment) that could not be achieved in this life.282 It 
is not our purpose here to examine the firmness of Evagrian esotericism. What is of 
importance is the fact that Evagrius presented us with a clear vision of what 
perfection was for him: as with Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius addressed perfection in 
the present life only in relative terms. This present life provided only glimpses of this 
great sea, i.e. the Trinity. 
Apatheia was a stage of relative ethical perfection that interacted with praktike 
and the contemplative life. According to Evagrius' vision of the future perfection, the 
soul remained subject to her weakness in this life, facing spiritual foes such as pride 
in every step. However, like Origen, Evagrius did not deprive the soul of spiritual 
275 O'Laughlin, Origenism, 137-138. 
276 See A. Guillaumont, Les 'Kephalaia Gnostica' d'Evagre le Pontique et l'histoire de l'origenisme 
chez les grecs et chez les syriens, Patristica Sorbonensia 5 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962). Also, 
O'Laughlin, Origenism. A. M. Casiday, Evagrius Ponticus, Early Church Fathers (London: 
Routledge, 2006). 
277 Casiday, Evagrius, 28ff. 
278 O'Laughlin, Origenism, 119. 
279 Evagrius, The Great Letter (Ad Melaniam [sic}), 22. Cf. Jn 17:22. I Cor 15:28. 
280 Evagrius, KephGn. 1.6-8. Guillaumont, Kephalaia Gnostica, 39. 
281 Evagrius, The Great Letter, 27ff and 66. 
282 O'Laughlin, 'Eschatology', in Origenism, 150ff. 
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consolation: spiritual efforts were followed by rest and joy. But, even this joy could 
easily turn to anxiety and pride. Evagrius related sadness to the soul's unfulfilled 
desire. Unlike Gregory, Evagrius presented a negative understanding of desire. 
Desire led the soul to expectations. The failure to fulfil this desire for spiritual 
progress led the soul to sadness. Evagrius complemented the description of the soul's 
undisrupted ascension to the unity of divine life in his more esoteric works. 283 
This tension between spiritual realism and theological eschatology was also 
maintained in authors that were closely associated with Evagrius: i.e. Macarius and 
Diadochus. Macarius presented both strands of ascetical thought. On the one hand, 
he highlighted the works of divine grace within the soul. On the other hand, he 
illustrated an ethical realism: the soul was not secure in her spiritual ascension. 
Macarius/Symeon was well acquainted with Paphnutius' discourse: "how those who 
are activated by the grace of God fall"?284 In his ethical 'realism', and despite that 
Macarius had argued the divine presence within the soul, he did not deny a potential 
ethical backsliding. In fact, according to him, perfection could be achieved only 
through ethical trials.285 Macarius discerned periods of spiritual rest and ethical 
struggles in the spiritual life: the ascetical soul was at rest, and then she was afflicted 
by demonic thoughts anew. For Macarius, only the spiritually na'ive could have 
imagined that the divine presence meant the cessation of passions and thoughts 
within the soul. The main point of Macarius' discourse was the co-existence of the 
grace and sin within the soul. That is not to say that the soul was at one and the same 
time acquainted with both the grace and sin. What Macarius meant was that the soul 
was a battlefield between the two spiritual factors. He integrated this position in his 
283 It might be the case that behind the riddles concerning the transformation of the spiritual bodies 
and the existence of other worlds yet to come, Evagrius attempted to present eschatology as an open 
horizon without limiting himself to the temporal notion of death or even the Second Coming. As it 
was the case with Origen and Gregory ofNyssa, in his Kephalaia Gnostica, Evagrius was unwilling to 
give a temporal definition to the notion of the final restoration. It is true that Evagrius has baffled 
modem scholars with his thought on the transformation of humanity to the state ofthe angels and the 
foundation of new worlds. Cf. Guillaumont, Kepha/aia Gnostica, 113ff. O'Laughlin, Origenism, 130 
and especially 150ff. We need to approach Evagrius work by taking into consideration his 
unwillingness to defme a notion of how eschatological restoration would be, and also define a time 
that there would be no spiritual progress. Evagrius was well acquainted with Gregory of Nyssa and he 
might have known the latter's theory on epektasis which Evagrius clothed with the language of bodily 
transformation and eternal creation. The degree to which we could take his descriptions on what 
eschatology would include at face value remains questionable. Maybe his description was not one of 
what eschatology could be; but it touched upon the open eschatological horizon, as in Gregory of 
Nyssa and Didymos. 
284 Macarius, Hom. 7.4: "Kai 1t&<; 1tt1t'tOUotV o\. evepyo6~evot !mo xnpttoc; eeou;". 
285 Macarius, Hom. 17.5. 
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thought by appropriating the notion of divine withdrawal: the grace diminished when 
the demonic presence was at hand due to human free agency. Notwithstanding the 
divine presence, sin always remained within the soul afflicting her. According to 
Plested's exposition of the Macarian ascetical theory, Macarius was well aware of 
the Platonic definition of evil as 'non-being'. But Macari us was not constructing an 
ontology in his thought. He was addressing ethical laxity, thus exaggerating the 
works of the grace and also highlighting human frailty. 286 Macarius' position seems 
to have been shaped through his interaction with his fellow-ascetics. This is the 
reason why we called his ethical theory "realistic". As in Paphnutius' case, Macarius 
was addressing the ethical fall of ascetics. For Macarius, the ascetical life was 
synonymous with spiritual warfare. It was through "the narrow way" that the soul 
needed to walk to reach perfection.287 An exaggeration of the work of grace on 
Macarius' part would have diminished the ideal of ascesis as continuous spiritual 
vigilance. 
For the reason that Macarius highlighted the works of divine grace within the 
soul, it was only through the theme of diminution of the divine presence within the 
soul that he could compromise this position with his spiritual realism concerning 
trials. In his ascetical program, the notion of divine withdrawal was of central 
importance: 
The grace exists always inside, and it is rooted, and it is leavened from a young age, 
and it has become like a natural and fixed thing of one nature with what is in man. 
And it takes care of man in many ways as it pleases for his profit. Sometimes the fire 
burns and blazes even more, sometimes it is softer and milder; and this light, 
sometimes, it burns and shines even more, sometimes it shrinks and grows 
gloomier.288 
Using the analogy between a lamp and the light of the lamp, Macari us indicated the 
varying degrees to which the divine grace manifested its presence within the soul: the 
divine grace revealed itself in full-strength; but it also diminished. For Macarius the 
presence of divine grace varied. 289 This variation was illustrated by putting side by 
side divine presence and also divine withdrawal-abandonment. We need to be 
reminded that, in Macarius, the two latter terms were synonymous. Both themes 
286 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 36ff. 
287 Macarius, Serm. 55.2ff. 
288 Macarius, Hom. 8.2: '"H IJEV xaplr; Mlal.Eimwr; OUVEOTI, Kai tppi~WTOI Kai t~UIJWTOI EK vtar; ~AIKiar; KOi Wr; 
<pUOIK6V KOi TTfjKT6V EVEVETO OUT6 T6 OUV6V r4l av9pWTT4J wr; IJIO OUOia, TTOAUTp6rrwr; 15t tiJr; 9tl.EI rrp6r; T6 OUIJ<pEpov 
oiKOVOIJEi T6V av9pwrrov. TTOTE IJEV rrAtov EKKOiETOI KOi CrrrrETOI T6 TT0p, TTOTE 15t wr; 1JaA90K6TEpOV KOi rrpauTEpoV, KOi 
aur6 T6 q>Wr; KOTO KOipour; Tlvar; TTAEOV t~CmTETOI KOi AOIJTTEI, TTOTE 15t UlTOOTEAAETOI KOI OTUyvO~EI". 
289 Macarius, Typs. 10.3. 
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pointed out divine consent. However, the latter motif highlighted human free-agency. 
The former illustrated divine pedagogy even for the soul that was spiritually firm. 
Both motifs were connected to i) the diminution of grace and ii) afflictions by the 
demons.290 Macarius emphasised divine consent and also human responsibility in 
order to compromise between the efficacy of grace (i.e. incarnation) and ethical 
realism (i.e. ethical backsliding). 291 
Macarius shed light on the multifaceted concept of divine withdrawal. Like 
Paphnutius, Macarius noted that divine pedagogy safeguarded the soul from her 
ethical fall. Macarius employed the image of Paul to indicate that the foe of pride 
remained present in the spiritual life.292 It comes not as a surprise that Macarius 
placed pride at the centre of his ethical thought. But what is important is the fact that 
Macari us made pride a part of human nature. For Macari us, pride was an immanent 
feature of human nature. In fact, Macarius implicitly employed the Origenist notion 
of pride in connection to the devil's fall due to pride, and the subsequent fall of 
Adam. According to Macarius, the "pure" nature inclined to pride. 293 In fact it was 
the presence of divine grace that resulted in pride. While discussing the image of 
Paul, Macarius was actually addressing ascetics who were deceived about their 
ethical perfection. 294 
But Macarius also maintained a more intellectual argument illustrating his 
interaction with Evagrian and also Gregorian thought. For the Alexandrian ascetic, 
the spiritual life was established on the dialectics between grace and ethical trials. 295 
This polarity extended even to the level of spiritual perfection. In fact, as it was in 
Evagrius, Macarius showed the relative character of this perfection: the soul 
experienced divine presence and withdrawal while progressing ethically. There is no 
290 Macarius, Typs. 9.1-2. 
291 In order to refute spiritual dualism, Macarius argued that it was only due to divine consent that the 
soul experienced demonic attacks. However, he underestimated his own argument by using vivid 
images that suggested that the demons were actually independent spiritual factors within the soul. For 
the transformation of the demons from divine agents to divine adversaries see the classical articles 
under the title 'Demon', in Dictonnaire de Spiritua/ite, vol. 3, 141-219 [by S. Lyonnet, 141-152 for 
the Old and New Testament demonologies; J. Danielou, 153-189 for classical views up to Origen; and 
Cl. and A. Guillaumont, 190-219 for the patristic period]. Also the two invaluable contributions by E. 
R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational. Idem, Pagan and Christian. See the most inclusive 
monograph on Christian monastic demonologies by D. Brakke, Demons and the Monk. 
292 Macarius, Hom. 7.4. 
293 Macarius, Hom. op. cit.: "i':xEt ydp fl Ka8apd q>6cn<; to imaipEa8at" (the pure nature has [as its 
~roperty] to become proud). 
94 Macarius, Hom. 17.5. 
295 Macarius, CEuvres Spiritue//es /: Homelies propres a Ia Collection/// V. Desprez (ed.), SC 275, 
(1980), 60-61. 
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indication in Macarius that the soul was ever redeemed from this bipolarity in this 
present life. Macarius turned to the recurrent theme of poverty and richness: the 
person that was rich needed to expect [spiritual] poverty. But he was also aware that 
after poverty richness would be restored again. 296 
Macarius' thought was not as systematic as it is presented here. However, one 
could discern four positions that were of central importance in the Macarian thought. 
The four positions indicate the contexts within which Macarius addressed divine 
withdrawal/abandonment as an integral part of spiritual maturity: 
i) gnosis 
ii) training 
iii) ministry 
iv) eschatology 
i) Macarius/Symeon was interacting with the Evagrian ascetical theory: divine 
withdrawal resulted in gnosis of both good and evil. As Plested put it, "the 
coexistence of sin and grace is permitted so as to educate and to form the soul".297 It 
is only through the experience of divine withdrawal that the soul knew the two 
natures within her: 
So by the experience of the two natures, tasting frequently both the bitterness of sin 
and the sweetness of grace the soul might become more perceptive and more 
vigilant, so as to flee evil entirely, and to attach itself wholly to the Lord.298 
This sort of knowledge included the knowledge of the human nature, and also 
addressed the nature of divine grace and sin. Through this ethical experience, the 
soul maintained a strong notion of her weakness. But, primarily, she was acquainted 
with the true character of the divine and demonic. We need to see this argument in 
the context of Macarius' position on free-will. Only through full knowledge of both 
the divine and the demonic could the soul have chosen to follow one of them. 
ii) Macarius also discerned the notion of continuous training through divine 
withdrawal. It was the dominical exhortation with regard to the "narrow gate" that 
informed Macarius' position. Asceticism was established on the notion of ethical 
training. For Macarius, there was no time that the soul was not expected to conduct 
her spiritual warfare. His argument could not be isolated from his thought regarding 
human weakness and spiritual vigilance. However, Macarius integrated the desert 
296 Macarius, Hom. 10.1; 15.42 and 27.6. 
297 Plested, Macarian Legacy, 37. 
298 Macarius, Typs. 12.2 [trans. Plested in idem, Macarian Legacy, 37]. 
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concept of continuous spiritual efforts and divine training by indicating that it was 
Adam who was given the concept of spiritual warfare first. In fact, Macari us went so 
far as to introduce ethical determinism: the demons were introduced in creation so 
that Adam could find an ethical opponent. Once more, Macarius was not establishing 
an ascetical-theological ontology. He devised this position to argue the spiritual norm 
of human life conducted in spiritual trials.299 
Macarius did not identify ethical trials with divine absence. For Macarius, even 
divine presence was a trial. Even though he expressed the notion of divine 
abandonment in terms of ethical misfortunes and demonic assaults, Macarius 
discerned the divine presence within trials. Through ethical afflictions, God was 
testing the soul's love and disposition. According to Macari us, the spiritual rest that 
the soul experienced before the presence of the divine could lead the soul to ethical 
laxity. Thus, God gave the soul rest in order to observe whether the soul inclined to 
laxity or not. Through interchanging periods of trials and divine assistance, God was 
testing the soul's endurance and spiritual alertness: at times of trials the soul could 
tum against God. While in spiritual rest, she could forsake her ethical vigilance. 
Thus, for Macari us, spiritual rest was not a reward. It was another form of testing the 
soul's alertness.300 
iii) Plested pointed out the interaction between Macarius and Gregory of 
Nyssa. It is difficult to support which author anticipated the other. It is a fact, 
however, that Macarius dissociated divine withdrawal from sin, establishing a 
broader argument. When inquired about the case of the apostles, Macari us noted that 
their experience of ethical trials illustrated the function of the apostles within the 
community. He acknowledged that, when caught up in divine inebriation, the soul 
forsook her personal needs being "fed" and "clothed" by God. 301 For Macarius, the 
soul could have stayed in this stage unceasingly. Yet, God was withdrawing his 
presence, so that the soul could experience her human natural need and also interact 
with the Christian community. Like in Gregory's De Vita Moisis and Homiliae, the 
soul was always connected to the community. She was communicating her spiritual 
299 Macarius, Serm. 55.2.8. 
300 Macarius, Serm. 57.1. 
301 An implication that God fulfilled the soul's very "being" with his presence. Cf. Mk 9:3 and Nu 
6:15. 
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experience with the uninitiated souls.302 Thus, Macarius envisaged the role of the 
virtuous man within the community in the light of divine withdrawal. Yet, even in 
this context, Macarius did not abolish the connection between withdrawal and ethical 
trials. The Macarian ideal of communal service addressed the Messalian position that 
prayer was the only activity required from ascetics. According to Macarius, God was 
instructing the soul to minister the community by diminishing his divine grace. Thus, 
the acquisition of divine grace was not the only ascetical ideal; the ministering of the 
community (i.e. spiritual direction) was also valued highly in the ascetic thought. 
iv) Macarius also appropriated an Origenist/Evagrian eschatology that showed 
the relative character of spiritual perfection in this life. For Macarius, God was 
directing history to a final fulfilment where the soul was finally introduced into the 
kingdom of God. Considering the fact that the soul experienced spiritual rest in this 
life, Macarius could not overlook the eschatological perspective of Christian 
asceticism. Macarius highlighted the fact that the soul experienced divine rest and 
also ethical trials in order to distinguish between this present life and the 
eschatological rest of the soul: 
This present time is for grief and tears, that age is of smiling and joy; this present 
time is of the cross and death, that time is of redemption and unspoken pleasure; this 
present time is of the narrow and hard way, that time is of rest and peace. 303 
Macari us juxtaposed the "engagement of the Sprit"304 that featured the "consolation" 
of the soul (rrapaKAilm<;) to the "perfect rest" and "rewarding" (TEAEia avarraum<; Kai 
avmrrMom<;). Spiritual perfection could be fulfilled only in the life to come. As 
Macarius put it, this present life featured grieving and pain: Macarius was exhorting 
to ethical vigilance and ascesis. Yet, the life to come meant the final ethical 
completion of the soul: the latter position maintained the eschatological orientation 
of the Christian Gospel. Macarius provided an argument that was clothed with 
eschatological meanings: the spiritual life was directed to a final completion which 
was not to be identified with the present consolations. What featured at the heart of 
his argument was the presence of the cross which anticipated the future redemption. 
Macarius' thought was dispersed within the vast volume of spiritual homilies, 
characterised by their polemical character against the extreme ascetical tendencies of 
302 Macarius was aware of this fact: he ministered the ascetical community as a spiritual director for 
disciples such as Evagrius. Cf. Gregory, Life of Moses, 1.56. 
303 Macarius, Typs. 10.3. Cf. Mt 7:14.2 Cor 6:2. 
304 2 Cor 1:22. 
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the Messalians. It was Diadochus of Photice that brought Macarian thought into a 
remarkable systematic synthesis. Diadochus enriched Macarian ethical thought while 
moderating the latter's Messalian overtones. Even though scholars have treated the 
notion of divine pedagogy and aversion in Diadochus, they have not provided any 
insights in the eschatological character ofhis ethical theory. 
To begin with, Diadochus highlighted divine assistance within the soul. Yet, 
this assistance never took the form of Athanasian perfection. For Diadochus, this 
assistance was a consolation that rested and encouraged the souJ.3°5 Diadochus was 
following the established ascetical position, expressed through Evagrius, that denied 
ethical perfection in the present: 
So it is possible here for those who progress to perfection to taste her (charity) 
continuously; but, no-one could possess her completely, until the mortal has been 
swallowed up by life. 306 
The ethical perfection of the present life was only a foretaste, not fulfillment. For 
Diadochus, there was a distinction between continuously tasting and actually 
possessing perfection. Thus, Diadochus resolved the observed theological tension 
between the two traditions depicting the soul dialectically in perfection and ethical 
trials. For Diadochus, the soul participated in both conditions. The tasting of 
perfection was not synonymous to the acquisition of perfection. Diadochus was 
following Macarius in distinguishing between an "initiating joy" (Eicraywy6~ xapa) 
and the "fulfilling joy" (rEAEIOTTOI6~ xapa).307 What stood between the two conditions 
was the notion of divine withdrawal in order for the soul to experience ethical trials. 
Diadochus did not deny the intensity of the experience. As he related, even within 
the context of pedagogical abandonment, the memory of the diminishing divine 
grace was grieving the soul: "Thus, the soul is even more sorrowful at the memory of 
the spiritual love, without it being possible to possess it in her senses through the 
deprivation of the most perfect pains."308 However, Diadochus denied that divine 
abandonment caused despair for the soul. What Diadochus designated as "moderate 
305 Diadochus, Keph. 32 and 76: ''J.uKpaic; rropoxwp(JcrEm Koi rruKvoic; rropaKA(JcrEmv rrop' o0T~c; [Tfic; xaprro<;] 
yOJ\ouxou1JE9o" (we are fed by the grace through short small concessions and many consolations). 
306 Diadochus, Keph. 90.4: "warE ouv yEuEcr901 IJEV our~<; (av<lrrll<;) tvroueo auvExwc; ol Ei<; rEAEr6r11ra 
TTpoK6mOVTE<; ~UVOVTOI, TEAEIW<; ~t our(Jv OU~Ei<;_MVOTOI KTrjcroaeor, Ei IJri ClTOV KOTOTTo9n TO ev.,r6v UTTO T~<; ~w~c;". 
307 Diadochus, Keph. 60. 
308 Diadochus, Keph. 90: "69EV rrAtov aAyUVETOI r; ljiUXri q>tpoucro IJEV r(Jv IJVriiJ'1V T~<; TTVEUIJOTIK~<; 0y0rr'1<;. IJri 
~UVOIJtV'1 ~E OUT(JV EV oicr9(JcrEI KT(Jcrocr9or ~10 T(JV TWV TEAEIOTOTWV TTOVWV uartp1101V". 
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despair" ( O"Uj..lj.JETpoc; cmEATTIO"j.J6c;) expressed the idea that God remained hidden from 
the soul, but at the same time strengthening her. Thus, it was the hidden divine 
presence that was resolving the soul's despair. But this is not a reason to deny the 
intensity of the experience. The soul did experience great grief (i\um1 rroM~): "the 
soul is even more sorrowful".309 
If we take into account Diadochus' distinction between the tasting and the 
possession of ethical perfection, then it is apparent that the stages of "initial" joy and 
"final joy", and also the periods of spiritual rest and ethical trials were dialectical 
conditions complementing each other. What it was observed by Ousley with regard 
to Evagrius' ethical theory is also valid for the Diadochean ascetical theory: divine 
grace and spiritual struggles were interacting features of ascetical life. 310 Diadochus 
introduced the notion of hidden grace that was working within the soul. According to 
his position, the soul did not always discern the presence of grace within her. What 
Diadochus affirmed was the closeness and at the same time hiddenness of God 
within the souP 11 God was close to the soul through the presence of his divine grace. 
But he was also hiding from the soul, assisting through a mysterious power. For 
Diadochus, the dialectic between hidden and revealed divinity applied to the ethical 
life of the soul: divine manifestation and hiddenness was a spiritual norm that was 
expressed through the dialectical character of spiritual rest and ethical trials. The 
notion of divine withdrawal in Diadochus highlighted the fact that it was God that 
was the main spiritual factor in the soul's struggles to approach ethical perfection. 
Diadochus also linked the spiritual life to the acquisition of the virtues. 
According to Diadochus, charity was the highest virtue. As in Evagrius, charity was 
a virtue that related the soul to her fellow-men. 312 But also, it was the virtue standing 
at the summit of the spiritual life. 313 For Diadochus, divine withdrawal established 
309 Diadochus, Keph. op. cit. 
310 Ousley, Theology ofPrayer,l91. 
311 Diadochus wrote about the lamp of gnosis (Auxvoc; Tfic; yvwatwc;) that needed to remain lit, echoing 
Abba Orsisius and also Paul. Diadochus, Keph. 28.9. Cf. I Th 5:19 and Apophth. (AC), Orsisius, 2: 
"ayvwcrrwc; TO noAAo tvtpytT i{J 8toMy4J 4JUXO TO tauTiic; 1JUC1T~p•a" ([grace] in a secret way works her 
mysteries within the divine-instructed soul). In 77 .I, Diadochus played with the antinomy of the 
words "tyKpumt•v" (hiding) and "napEiv" (as "napouoia" in the text, i.e presence) and then moved to 
say that, even when it was withdrawn, "divine grace communicates part of her goods to soul" 
( npOOOIJIAtT TO 4JUXO 1..1tpoc; Tl Twv tauTfic; ayaewv ). 
312 See the 9th defmition in Diadochus' introductory paragraph. Also: Diadochus, Keph. 34 and 74. 
313 See the 2nd defmition in Diadochus' introductory paragraph. Also: Diadochus, Keph. 34 and 89-
90. Diadochus distinguished between the natural love that the soul possesses as a natural property and 
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charity in the soul. Through experience, the soul was instructed about the 
transcendental character of charity: the latter was not to be identified with any other 
virtue.314 In its relation to charity as the summit of the spiritual life, divine 
withdrawal signaled spiritual maturity. In his thought, Diadochus minimised the 
elegant distinction between divine pedagogy and divine aversion: Diadochus pointed 
to the transcendental character of the experience. At the end of the day, the 
experience was related to the knowledge of what charity was. 315 
The transcending character of charity urged Diadochus to argue for the relative 
nature of spiritual perfection. Divine abandonment indicated that spiritual perfection 
was not dependent on human efforts: 
Whatever he, who has been exercised, believes to be perfection has been 
imperfection compared to God's wealth in abundance of love; even it has been 
possible for someone to ascend to the top of the ladder that was shown to Jacob 
progressing through his efforts.316 
For Diadochus, God withdrew the manifest presence of his grace so that the soul 
would distinguish between the divine wealth presented in this life and the actual 
promised reward of the life to come:317 God presented his wealth to the soul, but then 
withdrew to stir her desire. Diadochus seems to have appropriated the Gregorian 
notion of God stirring up the soul's desire for him. 
iii. Imitation of Christ: kenosis and the ascetics. 
According to Rosse's examination of the motif of divine abandonment in the 
Patristic era, it was only after the Middle Ages that Christian literature emphasised 
the connection between Christ's abandonment on the cross and the abandonment of 
the spiritual love that was the gift of the Holy Spirit. With the first love, the soul was progressing to 
the ethical life. But this love was not sufficient to lead to spiritual perfection. The divine 
contemplation was commencing only with the acquisition of the second love that was related to the 
presence of the Holy Spirit within the soul. For an analysis of Diadochean thought on charity, the 
introduction of Places' remains invaluable. Diadoque de Photice, CEuvres Spirituelles, pg. 48-49. 
314 Diadochus, Keph. 90. 
315 Diadoque de Photice, CEuvres Spirituel/es, pg. 47-48. 
316 Diadochus, Keph. 85. "T6 yap TOO TTOI&:UOIJEVOU VOIJI<OIJEVOV TEhEIOV OTEAE<; ETI w<; np6<; TOV nAoOTOV TOO 
nairlEuovTO<; ~IJa<; 9EOO tv aycmn un<lPXEI qnAon~o~ia<;, Kav oArw T~v 1aKwl3 r:iEIX9Eioav KAi~o~aKa avEA9Eiv TI<; 6uvi']9[J TO 
npoKon[J Twv n6vwv". 
317 Diadochus, Keph. 90: " (y)EUEI IJEV ouv TO OyiOV TTVEOIJO tv apxal<; T~<; TTpoKOTT~<;. EiTTEP 9EPIJW<; tpao9WIJEV 
T~<; apET~<; TOO 9E00, T~V ljJUX~V tv noon aio9r']OEI Kai TThl']poq>opiQ T~<; yAUKUTI']TO<; TOO 9E00, iva EXO Eirltval 6 voO<; 
tv 6Kp1!3Ei tmyvwoEI TO TtAEiov fna9Aov TWV cp1Aoetwv n6vwv" (at the beginning of the progress, the Holy 
Spirit gives the soul a taste of the sweetness of God in every sense and fulness, if indeed we ardently 
yearn for the virtue of God, so that the nous knows in perfect knowledge the supreme trophy of his 
divine-loving efforts). 
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the ascetical soul in trials.318 According to Rosse --citing Delumeau's witness-- the 
Rhineland mystics were the first to establish this theological connection. This 
position suggests that ascetical abandonment was an experience established on the 
idea that the mystics were "imitators of Christ". 319 This imitation encompassed all the 
events and experiences of the spiritual life: divine abandonment was such an 
experience. The connection between the mystical experience ofthe soul and Christ's 
abandonment on the cross illustrated the extension of the work of the incarnation on 
the ascetic soul.320 What lies at the heart of this concept is the notion of kenosis of the 
self, understood in dialectical terms of death and resurrection. Christ's kenosis led 
him to the ultimate abandonment on the cross, where he willingly gave up his life 
and that led to his resurrection and glorification. 321 According to Ramfos, the early 
ascetics pointed to the kenosis of the ascetic self through humility: the spiritual life 
was progressing from egocentrism to kenosis and glorification. Such kenosis 
commenced with the withdrawal from the world ( avaxwp'lm<;;) and it reached its 
climax with the acquisition of humility and obedience. 322 The image of Christ was 
standing at the centre of the ascetical kenosis: 323 for Florovsky, Christ's life was a 
kenosis progressing from the Paternal bosom to the maternal womb, the betrayal, the 
cross and the tomb. 324 Balthasar extended the work of kenosis to the ascetic self.325 In 
this final chapter, we will discuss the degree to which Byzantine ascetics viewed 
their own experience of divine abandonment in terms of the "imitation" of Christ's 
abandonment. Thus, we will examine the meaning that the "imitation" of Christ 
acquired for the early ascetics. The analysis will be limited to the notion of imitating 
Christ with regard to the image of the suffering Christ in asceticalliterature.326 
Patristic literature discussing Christological issues did not draw the connection 
between Christ's abandonment and the ascetical experience. That is to say that the 
318 Rosse, Cry of Jesus, 78. 
319 Rosse, ibid, 91 [footnote 12]. See also, Delumeau, Sin and Fear. 
320 Balthasar, Mysterium, 75ff. 
321 Sakharov, Archimandrite Sophrony, 218-219. 
322 Ramfos, Pelican in the Wilderness. Ramfos highlighted a progressive kenosis that began with the 
"withdrawal from the power to act" and ended with the kenosis of the self through humility. Ramfos 
called the latter the "withdrawal from being". See also, Balthasar, Mysterium Pascha/e, 76. 
323 Sakharov, Archimandrite Sophrony, 224ff. 
324 G. Florovsky, Creation and Redemption, Collected Works 3 (Belmont MA: Nordland, 1976), 
lOOff. 
325 Balthasar, Mysterium, 75ff. 
326 For a thorough analysis of the scriptural origins and also the development of the theme in the 
patristic era see the article 'Imitation du Christ', DSp 1, 1536-1601. 
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two incidents were never put side by side in late antiquity. Christ's suffering was 
viewed in terms of assuming the weakness of the human race. But, as it was 
observed, the link between sin and the results of the fall urged the Patristic authors to 
refine the way in which Christ accommodated human weakness: Christ assumed the 
results of sin. However, Christ's experience was distinct from the human experience 
since the latter was always related to sin: Christ assumed the human condemnation, 
but he was never condemned. Patristic literature intended to secure the concept that 
Christ suffered in the same fashion as the human race, but not due to sin (anti-
docetism). It was only the human race that remained subject to sin. Christ 
accommodated the results of sin, not sin qua a factor of ethical corruption. 
To turn to the ascetic ethical theory, the two authors -as far as I am aware- that 
introduced a discussion that put Christ's abandonment and the ascetical abandonment 
side by side were Nemesius and Maximus.327 Maximus depended on Nemesius.328 
However, the latter did not introduce a 'parallel' experience between Christ and the 
ascetical soul. Nemesius included this insertion as part of his general discussion on 
divine providence. His intention was to highlight the providential character of the 
incarnation: God was working for human redemption. Evagrius might have also 
introduced this connection -independently- without addressing divine providence. 
That would have made Evagrius the first author to treat Christ's abandonment as a 
parallel experience to the abandonment of the ascetical soul. The only passage that 
supports this position is obscure. The hypothesis depends entirely on the degree to 
which Guillaumont's translation from Syriac represents the authentic Evagrian 
discourse. 
Unlike Balthasar, Hausherr,329 Guillaumone30 and Driscoll331 overlooked the 
meaning of the introduction. For Sakharov, the Maximian insertion meant a parallel 
discussion between Christ's experience and the ascetical abandonment: 
In Maximus, we find a fairly schematised classification of the various categories of 
abandonment, which recapitulates the preceding patristic ideas: there is abandonment as 
a test, as a purification, as the edificatory punishment, and Christ-like abandonment. 332 
327 Maximus, Charit. 4.96 [PG 90, 1072]. 
328 See Damascene, ExpF. 43 [pg 101]. 
329 Hausherr, Les Versions. Iliff. Hausherr silently dismissed the fact that Evagrius had vaguely 
touched upon Christ's experience in his Gnostikos. His intention was not to provide a thorough 
discussion of the Maximian insertion. 
330 Evagrius, Gnost. 28 [and subsequent footnotes in SC 356]. 
331 Driscoll, 'Evagrius and Paphnutius on the Causes of Abandonment'. 
332 Sakharov, Archimandrite Sophrony, 254. 
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Unlike our observation that Maximus only introduced the "ways" in which divine 
providence has been expressed throughout human history, Sakharov took Maximus' 
reference to "kinds" of abandonment at face value: thus Sakharov discerned the 
introduction of a "Christ-like" experience in Maximus. The term "Christ-like" has a 
dubious meaning: it either means abandonment as it was in Christ's case, or it 
suggests a 'Christ-like' model of abandonment. So, was Christ's experience identical 
with the abandonment of the ascetic soul? Balthasar denied this hypothesis: Christ's 
abandonment was different from that of the ascetical soul.333 Taking into 
consideration the fact that, in his doctoral thesis, Sakharov was trying to establish the 
patristic foundations for a "Christ-like" model with regard to ascetical abandonment, 
it seems that, for him, the "oikonomical" abandonment suggests a 'Christ-like' model 
of divine abandonment. But is this what Maximus meant? 
To answer this question, we need to return to our earlier observations about the 
introduction of the theme in Maximus and also John Damascene. Maximus was 
following Nemesius of Emesa. Thus he did not distinguish between parallel "kinds" 
of divine abandonment. Maximus' intention was to show the way in which divine 
providence corresponds to individual conditions in the light of human salvation. 
Maxim us included the case of Christ, not as a distinct "form" of abandonment. It was 
another "way" or "cause" that highlighted a different context in which divine 
providence was working: i.e. salvation of the human race. It is indicative that, 
whereas the other "kinds" addressed individual redemption, the case of Christ 
introduced the notion of universal salvation. In addition, the fact that divine 
pedagogy and aversion had dominated the ascetical discussion (Macarius, 
Paphnutius, Diadochus), Maximus abolished this elegant distinction by pointing out 
the presence of divine providence. But, when Maximus treated the "causes" of 
demonic afflictions, Maximus did not include Christ's case. Clearly, Maximus 
intended to distinguish between human afflictions and the case of Christ. It was the 
presence of sin as a spiritual factor that urged for this distinction. Because, even in 
the case of divine abandonment, Maximus discerned the relationship between ethical 
afflictions and passions,334 Maximus coined the term "5oKouoTJc;" (seeming) to deny 
333 Balthasar, Mysterium, 78. 
334 Maximus, Charit. 4.95 [PG 90, 1072]. 
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the fact that Christ's experience was informed by the presence of passions.335 Thus, 
Maximus identified Christ's abandonment with the work of divine providence. But, 
at an ethical level, he denied an identification between Christ and the other biblical 
figures. His abandonment was only "seeming": it did not result from sin. 
As it was mentioned, in his Expositio Fidei, John also introduced the theme of 
Christ's abandonment.336 John was only copying from Nemesius, not Maximus. John 
maintained the Nemesian "~oKollcrl")<,;". In his Fragments on Matthew, John introduced 
a parallel list with that found in his Expositio.337 In this case, he did not include the 
"oikonomical" abandonment of Christ. The list of the Fragments is a reduction ofthe 
one in the Expositio. Its elimination shows that Christ's experience was not identical 
with the rest of the experiences on the list. What urged John to this distinction is also 
the presence of sin.338 Whereas every human experience includes a certain degree of 
ethical corruption, the case of Christ was different in this respect: his abandonment 
was neither due to sin nor due to divine pedagogy. 
The second part of the thesis discussed the scepticism with which Patristic 
literature of late antiquity approached the accommodation of human weakness from 
Christ. That is to say, the degree to which Christ's experience of human weakness as 
"man-like" was taken into serious consideration since it was affecting Christ's divine 
identity and ethical purity. It was only in a refined way that Patristic literature 
addressed Christ's experiences in man-like terms. That raises the objection 
concerning the degree to which we could support that the ascetics could have 
exemplified their experience of abandonment in Christ-like terms. 
But this is not to say that the ascetics did not view their spiritual experiences in 
Christocentric terms. It was already mentioned that Athanasius presented the 
asceticallife as resulting from Christ's incarnation and subsequent victory over the 
passions. Despite the fact that the early ascetics had not developed a connection 
between Christ's abandonment and the abandonment of the ascetical soul, they had 
envisaged spiritual life in Christocentric terms. It is true that the ascetics introduced 
335 Maximus, Charit. 4.96 [PG 90, 1072]: "iva ~u:i rf]c; ~oKoual']c; tyKorOAEilJ.IEWc;" (so that through the 
seeming abandonment). 
336 Damascene, ExpF. 43 [pg 101]. 
337 Damascene, Fragmenta in Mattheum (in catenis Nicetre), PG 96, 1412. 
338 John was commenting on Mt. 27:5 where Judas hanged himself. It is clear that John wanted to 
emphasise the presence of sin as resulting to divine abandonment and stress the ethical role of human 
disposition (np69Emc;). 
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the concept of the "imitation of Christ". The imitation of Christ was a term that had a 
biblical origin and was primarily coined after the Pauline language in 1 Cor. 11: 1. 339 
In the Systematic Collection an elder defined the ascetical life as the "imitation of 
Christ". 340 In late antiquity, the theme was in use in the broader concept of the soul's 
being made 'according to the divine image' and 'after the divine likeness': for 
instance, in Clement the imitation was linked to the divine likeness of the soul. 341 
Origen developed the notion of imitating Christ by following the Pauline 
exhortation.342 In his exegetical context, Origen had invited his reader to follow 
Christ's disposition that willingly had accepted death. 343 There is no evidence that 
Origen's exhortation to the imitation of Christ included an imitation of the historical 
elements of Christ's life. 
The ascetics incorporated the notion of "imitating" Christ in their ethical 
discourses. Such imitation did not address the stages of spiritual ascension or the 
union between the soul and the divine. According to Burton-Christie for the ascetics, 
the ascetical exhortation to imitation included the presence of Christ's humility 
within the ascetic self.344 For Keller, the Christocentric core of such an exhortation to 
humility made Christ tangible for the ascetics.345 Humility was the link connecting 
339 See 'Imitation du Christ', DSp 7, 1536-1601. 
340 Apophth. (SysC), 1.37: '"Dpo<; XPIOTiavoO IJiiJI']OI<; Xp1oroO". 
341 See Origen, Adnotationes in Exodum, PG 12,1453: "[ '0]1.10iroaic; i;onv tJ otd t&v aya9&v 
npa~EIDV f.ltJ.lllOtc;. At67tEp ou tote; UJ.lUptUVOUOtV, and tote; Katop9ouatv i;~OJ.lOtoihat b Kuptoc;" 
(being according to the likeness is the imitation through good deeds. So that the Lord is assimilated, 
not to the sinners but to those achieving it). Maximus, Thai. 10 [PG 90, 288D]: "Oi. os tf]c; 
9&IDPllttKf]<; TJOll J.lOOnx&c; ii~tro9svtE<; 9eoA.oyiac; xai n<iall<; q>avtaoiac; l>A.txf]c; tov vouv xa9apov 
KU'tUO'tl'jOUVtE<; Kai Eix6va tf]c; 9dac; ropat6tllto<; OAllV ilv&A.A.tn&c; q>spouoav 'ttlV i:KJ.llJ.lllOtV, 
ECJ'tiDOUV fy.Ltv oi. ayan&vtec;" (Those that mystically have become worthy of the theoretike theology 
already constituting the nous pure from every material imagination and an image of the divine beauty, 
bearing the imitation unceasingly, those lovers stand among us). 
342 Cf. I Cor. 11: I. Origen, Fragment a in Lamentantiones, 116.4 7 [pg 277 in GCS 6]. 
343 Origen, Commentarium in Evangelium Matthaei, 20, 17-19 [pg 462 in GCS 40] 
344 Burton-Christie, 'The Humble Way', 236-260. 
345 Keller, 'Humility', 131-155. Gregory, Beat. 1.82.20ff. For the reason that it was impossible for the 
individual to imitate God in his perfection, Gregory envisaged imitation as the participation in his 
humility which he immediately related to Christ's kenosis (cf. ibid, 1.84.9): "oox&t JlOt ntrox.dav 
nv&6J.1atoc;, tl'lv i;xouotov tU7tEtvocppoo6vllv bVOJ.lU~&tv b A6yoc; [sic]. Ta6tll<; os un6o&t'YJ.1U tl'lv 
'tOU ewu 7t'tiDXEiav b . An6otoA.oc; ftJ.ltV A.{;yrov npoodxvuotv, oc; ot' ftJlnc; i;mroxwoE 7tAOUotoc; 
&v, tva ftf.lEt<; tfl EKEivou mrox.d~ 1tAOUtl'jOIDJ.lEV. 'En&i ouv td dna 7tUV'tU, ooa 7tEpi 'ttlV 9&iav 
xa9opntat cpuotv, i:JnEpnintEt t<l> J.lStp~:p tf]c; av9pronivllc; cpuoeroc;· ft os tanEtv6tll<; ouf.1cpul'jc; nc; 
ftJ.ltV i;on" (the Word [sic] seems to me to be using the words 'poor in spirit' to mean 'voluntary 
humility'. The model ofthis is indicated by the Apostle when he speaks ofthe humility of God, 'who, 
though he was rich, yet for our sakes became poor, that we by his poverty might become rich'. Every 
other aspect of the divine nature exceeds the limits of human littleness, whereas humility has a natural 
affinity with us) [trans. Hall]. Gregory reversed the Platonic position: kinship with God was not 
viewed in terms of the soul's natural majesty, but by means of the soul's participation in God's 
kenotic humility. Cf. 2 Cor 8:9. Phil2:5-7. See Meredith, 'Plato's "Cave"', 49-61. Presently, Gregory 
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Christ and the ascetics. As Burton-Christie put it, "in pursuing humility, (the 
ascetics) were attempting to realize in their own lives the call to self-emptying 
exemplified in the words and witness of Jesus".346 The presence of humility had 
deeper implications for the ascetical life: humility was presented in the dialectical 
terms of the cross and resurrection, poverty and glorification. It was only through 
self-emptying that humility could be achieved. This notion of self-emptying, poverty 
and the presence of the cross was close to the Christological motif of kenosis. 347 For 
the ascetics, humility meant more than the mere positive disposition of the soul in 
trials and temptations: according to Burton-Christie, what stood at the centre of 
humility was Christ's cross, his obedience to the Father and his self-emptiness that 
led to death. Yet, his death also led to the resurrection. The ascetics were called to 
participate in his death and glorification. 
The theme of the 'imitation of Christ', and the participation in his death and 
resurrection, was not employed by Evagrius. 348 It was Macari us that gave the theme 
its proper place within Christian ascetical theory. Macarius exhorted his fellow-
ascetics to the imitation of Christ: Christ had left his divine glory and condescended 
to trials and death. His exhortation established the link between Christ's cross and 
the ascetical trials: 
The soul that is following the word of the Lord ought to take up the cross of the 
Lord with joy, as it has been written, that is to say, all things readily on behalf of the 
Lord, who experienced temptation, whether secret or visible and to have the hope 
always in the Lord. For it is in his power to try the soul that he has withdrawn and 
also to redeem from every temptation and trial for him.349 
Macarius introduced a link between the notion of the imitation of Christ and the 
concept of divine withdrawal: the soul has lifted her cross. This cross entails the 
presence of ethical afflictions. Macarius placed divine "power" at the centre of his 
has alluded to Plato's cave in 84.18: "b -rfl<; ntasco<; Kupto<; tv anTJI.atcp Ka-r6:ys-rat" (the Lord of 
all creation lodges in a cave) [trans. idem]. 
346 Burton-Christie, 'The Humble Way', 236. 
347 Keller and Burton-Christie examined the notion of humility as sharing in Christ's sufferings in the 
desert tradition. Thus, they drew the connection between humility and kenosis. See Keller, 'Humility: 
Making Christ Tangible', in Oasis of Wisdom, 131-155. Burton-Christie, 'The Humble Way of 
Christ', in The Word, 236-260. Ramfos, 'Humility: Withdrawal from Being', in Pelican in the 
Wilderness, 183-195. 
348 However, Evagrius was not lacking references to the centrality of the cross for the ascetical life. 
Cf. Evagrius, Ad Eulogium, 6 [PG 79, 1101]. Idem, Oral. 17 [PG 79, 1172]. Idem, De Vitiis quae 
Opposita sunt Virtutibus, 3 [PG 79, 1144]. 
349 Macari us, Typs., 9.1: "[b ]q>d/.~:t ouv f) 'liUXl'l f) •<P Mycp wu Kupiou !;~aKol.ouiJouaa "-rov 
O'tUUpOV" 'tOU KUpiou aipt:tV Jll:'td xapa<;. io<; ytypan'tat, 'tOUttanv tto[JlCO<; EXEtV 07tOJlEVt:tV Btd 
tov Kuptov 1t1iv-ra l>nspx6J.1t:vov nstpaaJlOV d-rs Kpun-rov d-rs q>av~:p6v, Kai. Ei<; tov K6ptov 
lr.noKptJlaaiJat tfi 1;/.nilit nav-rots, on tv !;~ouaiq. attou tan Kai. to IJI.t~flvat tl')v \jluxl')v 
napaxcopoUJlEVTJV I.Jn' UO'tOU KUi tO i:r.no/.utpcoiJflvat 7tUVtO<; 7tt:tpaOJ.10U Kat 0/.i\j/ECO<;". 
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passage, indicating that trials and also redemption lied within this power. Such 
power, according to Macarius, was established on the fact that Christ manifested 
himself to the soul both in "poverty" and "glory". The interaction between Christ's 
glory and poverty took place within the ascetical interaction between spiritual rest 
and ethical trials. In Burton-Christie's words, 
Jesus Christ was the model of humility par excellence for the monks. The endurance 
of afflictions, insults, trials, and dishonor for the sake of Christ, one of the signs of 
blessedness in the Beatitudes (Mt 5:10-12), was an important ideal for those living 
in the desert, and an expression of humility. However, it is Christ's own example of 
humility- his kenosis of self-emptying (Phil. 2)- whose shadow falls most 
dramatically across the Sayings.350 
Thus, Macarius presented Christ's model of humility in the dialectical terms of 
Christ's suffering and his glorification. But this dialectical interaction was extended 
to the life of the ascetics. They also experienced poverty (i.e. trials) and glorification 
(i.e. divine grace): 
You need to be co-crucified with the crucified, suffer with the sufferer, so that you will 
be co-glorified with the glorified. 351 
The Lord has shown himself to her in two persons: in his wounds and in the glory of 
his light. And the soul sees the sufferings which he suffered for her, and she 
contemplates the brilliance of his divine glory ... advancing in both the persons, in that 
ofthe sufferings and in that ofthe glorious light.352 
Christ was known to the soul in two manners: i.e. in his poverty and glory. The first 
referred to his trials;353 the latter, to his glory. Christ illustrated his poverty in 
sufferings. But he also manifested his divine glory. The notion of following after 
Christ's sufferings was established in soteriological terms: Christ suffered for the 
human race. This sacrifice was passed to the spiritual life of the ascetical soul. 
According to Macarius, Christ condescended to human conditions because of his 
love for humanity. Then, for Macarius, the soul needed to correspond to Christ's 
sacrifice by suffering for Christ's love.354 Macarius concluded his thought by 
introducing the Pauline hymn of Christ's kenosis. 355 In doing so, Macarius illustrated 
the interaction between Christ's sacrifice and the ethical life of the soul. 
350 Burton-Christie, The Word, 240. Cf. Macarius, Serm. 55.4.3ff. 
351 Macarius, Hom. 12.1 ff. 
352 Macarius, Typs. 3.3: "[o]EiKV\lotV abtfl EU\ltOV b KUpto<; tv 0\lOl 1tpo00l1tot<;. ev tE tot<; 
otlyJ.La<nv abtou Kat €v tfl Ml;n tou <proto<; abtou, Kai esropd 11 'Vuxl) td nd9TJ, li lmep abtil<; 
ena9EV, 9sropd M )(Ul tl)v bntpA.UJ.l1tPOV Ml;av tOU EV9EO\l <proto<; abtou ... Kai EV i.tJ.Lq>OtEpot<; tOt<; 
1tpOOID1tOl<; 1tpOK61tt0\lOU, ev tE tip tOU nd9oll<; Kat EV tip tOU i;v061;ou q>rot6<;". 
353 Is 53:2-6. 
354 Macarius, Typs. 3.3. 
355 Phil 2:6-7. 
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Macarius fully employed the Pauline interaction between kenosis and 
glorification. He placed the cross at the heart of Christian life, as a symbol of 
spiritual suffering in love.356 The life of the ascetics was an extension of Christ's 
kenosis in the incarnation.357 His language was that of glorification through poverty, 
and humility through endurance in trials. 358 There is no evidence that the ascetics 
treated Christ's abandonment on the cross as the climax of his kenosis. The ascetics 
did not refer directly to a "Christ-like" model of abandonment either. Nevertheless, 
the image of the suffering Christ was standing at the centre of the thought of authors 
such as Macari us and also Isaac of Syria. This image of the suffering Christ informed 
their ethical theory and anticipated the modem theological approach that envisaged 
the ascetical experience as an expansion of Christ's redemptive sacrifice on the cross. 
356 Ga6:14. 
357 Macarius, Typs. 6.4. 
358 Macarius, Hom. 3.3ff. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the role that the motif of divine abandonment played 
in the Patristic thought of late antiquity. The main questions that the thesis looked at 
were: i) the "normativeness" of the experience of divine abandonment in spiritual 
life; and ii) the degree to which the Patristic thought could have presented a "Christ-
like" model of abandonment. 
The first part traced the origin of the motif of divine abandonment in the 
religious literature of the Near East. The motif was not associated with sin and 
chastisement: the lamentation psalms did not identify the cause of the abandonment. 
However, they introduced the connection between divine abandonment and 
distressful conditions. It was only in times of trials that the devotee felt that God had 
turned his face away from him; God did not intervene to spare his devotee from 
attacking enemies. 
Origen was the first Christian author to appreciate fully the religious value of 
the Song of Songs for the Christian spiritual life. Origen discerned the motif of 
abandonment as an integral part of the Song of Songs. Thus, he highlighted the 
dialectical character of divine presence and absence. For Origen, the dialectical 
relation between divine presence and absence was a theological device that 
highlighted i) divine paideia and ii) eschatology. Divine abandonment was viewed 
within the scope of divine paideia: God instructed the soul, leading the latter to her 
ethical fulfilment. Divine paideia instructed the soul about her nature: the soul 
realised her immanent weakness. But also, divine abandonment illustrated the 
eschatological orientation of history. God was leading soul to her final fulfilment. 
However, this fulfilment remained only a promise. The soul's present ethical trials 
introduced her to the reality of her final union with the divine. However, Origen left 
the time of this final union open by pointing to the Second Coming. 
Despite the fact that Gregory of Nyssa did not always follow Origen in his 
exegesis, he maintained the centrality of the motif. Gregory incorporated his 
theological position on abandonment within a broader scheme of Christian 
anthropology. He maintained the dissociation between abandonment and sin, and 
indicated that the experience of abandonment was an intellectual experience: the soul 
was introduced to the depths of divine incomprehensibility. Despite the positive 
assertions that derived from Gregory's optimism about spiritual life, the fact remains 
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that, at the summit of spiritual life, Gregory introduced a sudden discrepancy that 
caught the soul off her guard. Gregory rejected the Origenist possibility of the soul's 
ethical backsliding. Nevertheless, he maintained the same eschatological direction as 
Origen: distressful conditions occurred even at the summit of spiritual perfection. 
This was due to the distinction between the acquisition of virtues in this life, and the 
soul's ethical fulfilment in the future. 
Theodoret of Cyrrhus belonged to the generation of exegetes that, unlike 
Origen and Gregory, were in direct contact with the developing ascetical 
communities of late antiquity. By the time Theodoret composed his commentary, 
Evagrius had already introduced his refined ascetical thought in the Egyptian desert. 
Despite the fact that Theodoret was affiliated with Syriac asceticism, his exegesis on 
the Song did not remain in great uniformity with the current desert anthropology. 
Theodoret' s exegetical viewpoints on abandonment were not part of his 
anthropology. Theodoret touched vaguely upon the theme of abandonment in terms 
that recall the Evagrian-Macarian argument: the common point between Theodoret 
and the Desert asceticism was the notion that divine abandonment was defined as 
divine consent in trials: God did not intervene in distressful conditions. It remains 
uncertain whether or not Theodoret had direct access to the Evagrian tradition when 
arguing for abandonment at a level of precaution. It was only in an obscure passage 
that he mentioned the link between abandonment and human frailty. Theodoret 
introduced the notion of slothfulness, not, however, as a technical term. He 
maintained that the experience of abandonment was linked to divine paideia and led 
to spiritual perfection. Theodoret approached Christ's suffering and the abandonment 
of the soul from the same perspective: the definition of abandonment as "divine 
consent" led Theodoret to show the prominence of divine providence both in Christ's 
experience of human weakness, and in the ethical trials of the soul. 
Finally, Nilus was the exegete who looked at the Song of Songs as the means 
by which he could instruct his fellow ascetics. The notion of abandonment was 
incorporated within an anthropology that, unlike Origen and Gregory, viewed 
spiritual life from the soul's point of view. The soul was not secure in her spiritual 
journey. Laxity and pride appeared as parasites of virtue. Despite the fact that the 
incarnation played the most important role in his work -Nilus maintained more 
Christological elements than any other exegete- he viewed the spiritual life in terms 
ofthe soul's response to the divine call through her ethical efforts. In doing so, Nilus 
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exhorted his addressees (i.e. fellow ascetics) to spiritual vigilance. He was the only 
author to introduce the motif of abandonment in terms of divine chastisement. 
Despite the fact that Nilus asserted that the bride introduced the groom to her inner 
chamber, the anthropology that permeated his exegesis weakened his optimism: 
pride was a parasite of virtue that God remedied through abandonment. The 
experience of abandonment in terms of chastisement showed the way in which God 
led the soul to perfection. Most importantly, Nilus was of one mind with his 
exegetical predecessors that the soul experienced ethical trials even at the level of 
spiritual maturity. 
Gregory and Nilus presented the most technical commentaries. The terms they 
used were the fruit of a long development in Byzantine theological (Trinitarian 
debates) and ascetical thought (desert tradition), respectively. Origen and Theodoret 
drew the lines in which other exegetes could follow. Despite their many theological 
differences, personal exegetical presuppositions, diverse exegetical viewpoints -
evident in their stylistic divergence, and the differing degrees in which they used 
technical terms - the Patristic commentators showed that at the summit of spiritual 
perfection, the soul experienced a sudden shift in her relationship with the divine that 
caught her by surprise. The commentators illustrated such a surprise in terms of grief 
and a transitory despair. What all commentators agreed on was the fact that, even at a 
mature level of spiritual perfection, the soul remained subject to trials and 
temptations. However, they left it to be inferred that, at her spiritual maturity, the 
soul knows how to deal with such distressful conditions. 
The second part showed the reluctance with which Patristic literature 
approached the interpretation on Mt 27:46. From the time of Irenreus onwards, it was 
only within the context of theological polemics. that the Patristic sources discussed 
the loud cry on the cross. 
The two main problems that Patristic literature encountered while addressing 
Christ's loud cry was i) the maintenance of his ethical purity and ii) the protection of 
his unique identity. In the Christological context, divine abandonment was 
dissociated to the notion of divine paideia. It was linked to sin and became 
synonymous with the separation between God and human race after the fall. When 
viewed in these terms, it was felt to be inappropriate to apply divine abandonment to 
Christ, owing to Christ's ethical purity. Thus, Patristic literature progressively 
developed an understanding of the results of sin that could maintain Christ's ethical 
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purity without diminishing the reality of his humanity. However, abandonment as a 
result of the fall was not associated by any means with the notion of divine paideia. 
Though Jouassard focused on the distinction between "realism" and 
"typology", it seems that the real distinction in Patristic literature concerning the way 
that Christ experienced abandonment was between a position interpreting Mt 27:46 
in terms of"separation" and the idea that Mt 27:46 expressed a faithful prayer. 
The notion of "separation" led Patristic literature to a dead-end: the subject and 
the object of the experience remained obscure. During the Arian controversies, it was 
left to be implied that it was Christ's divinity that was separated from the humanity. 
Only Gregory of Nyssa and Epiphanius indicated that the loud cry referred to the 
separation between the soul and the body. But even this position could not explain 
the fact that, in his loud cry, Christ addressed God. Gregory was firm that the 
divinity was never separated by the body. When Christ's natures were viewed in 
more concrete terms (Nestorianism), it implied that there were two active subjects in 
Christ: the Logos abandoned the man Jesus. Patristic literature rejected this position 
in the condemnation ofNestorius' divisive Christology. 
It was Origen that established a paradigmatic understanding of the loud cry on 
the cross. Basil exploited it, and Theodoret gave it its most precise expression: he 
applied the Origenist-Cappadocian position to the relationship between the Logos 
and his humanity. The Logos gave his consent to trials, i.e. death. His humanity was 
left subject to human weakness. And, in her turn, the humanity showed its deified 
character. Though Theodoret did not argue in these terms, the theology of Maximus 
and John Damascene developed the Patristic thought on these lines. Maximus argued 
for a distinction between humanity qua humanity, and deified humanity. He fully 
exploited the notion that divinity gives way (accommodates) to the humanity to 
enable it to experience its natural weakness. But, this humanity was also deified. 
Thus, human weakness was overcome. The main conclusion that Patristic literature 
drew was that Christ experienced what it was to be human, i.e. human weakness. The 
argument never proceeded the other way around: i.e. the devotee was not undergoing 
Christ's experience. 
The third part shed more light on to Origen's thought concerning divine 
abandonment. It showed that, for Origen, divine abandonment was a spiritual norm: 
ethical trials were followed by spiritual rest. For Origen, it was the martyrs that were 
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the ethical models for the faithful: through their sacrifice, the martyrs participated in 
the passion and also the resurrection of Christ. 
The Athanasian point that dismissed ethical trials after the acquisition of divine 
grace was put side by side with the Antonian notion of divine visitations and ethical 
tribulations. These two authors expressed two traditions that were not necessarily 
contrasting: the first argued in terms of the efficacy of the divine grace through the 
works of the incarnation. However, the second position highlighted ethical realism 
indicating the possibility of ethical backsliding. Thus it exhorted to ethical vigilance 
and spiritual efforts. 
It was also observed that the ascetical literature of late antiquity included a 
discussion of divine abandonment as part of divine providence. It was through 
abandonment that God led and instructed the soul. Even when the ascetical literature 
distinguished between "kinds" of abandonment, this was not in terms of different 
types of abandonment. The two "kinds" highlighted divine providence and human 
responsibility, respectively. 
Also divine abandonment was a device to show the interaction between the 
ethical life and the life of contemplation. It was both at an ethical and also 
eschatological level that divine abandonment was envisaged as a spiritual norm: i) at 
an ethical level, the motif highlighted the possibility of ethical backsliding due to 
occurring trials. But also, still at an ethical level, the motif of abandonment was 
associated with the most subtle of vices, pride. ii) The motif maintained the 
eschatological anticipation of an ethical fulfilment. God presented the ascetics with 
the reward waiting for them. He withdrew his presence leaving the ascetics subject to 
trials in order to stir their desire for ethical fulfilment. 
Finally, the concept of the "imitation of Christ" as an ethical example was 
examined. The ascetical literature did not address this imitation in terms of external 
types of Christ's life. The term was closely connected to the notion of the humanity 
being "after the divine likeness". In an ethical level, the "imitation" addressed 
Christ's humility. It was through the acquisition of humility that the ascetics were 
making "Christ tangible". It was in these terms that the ascetics related Christ's 
kenosis to the ascetic soul by indicating Christ's poverty and the progressive 
withdrawal of the ascetics from the society and the human-self. This poverty was 
understood as the ascetical disposition to accept this withdrawal. 
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To conclude, the two main themes that permeated the Patristic discussion 
concerning divine abandonment were i) divine paideia and ii) the eschatological 
message of the Christian faith. It is through interchanging periods of rest and trials 
that God instructs the soul, remedies her natural weakness and leads her to ethical 
fulfilment. It is within this context of paideia and eschatology that the Eastern 
ascetical tradition and the Western spiritual thought might approach and understand 
their common Patristic roots. 
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